In Russia there is lately much talk about a new “Vietnam syndrome” unfolding in America, that the nation is aggravated by a prolonged war, which costs lots of money. This is very troubling for the Republican administration a year before the presidential elections. In your opinion, how significantly will these tendencies affect the outcome of the presidential elections in the fall of 2004?

It depends on whether Bush will be able to explain his foreign policy choices to the American people in a logical and assured manner, as well as on the public’s expected outcomes of its current international efforts. The issue at stake is not the success of the operation in Iraq, but the ability of Bush’s critics to prove that the administration made a mistake or, conversely, the ability of the administration to prove that it did not make a mistake and that things are, more or less, proceeding as expected. The administration might say that yes, there are difficulties, but they are surmountable, and the situation could have been far worse had we followed advice similar to that, which is heard from the Democratic camp today: that is, that we should have waited for UN approval in March or we should have invited foreign armies to join the operation. There is no reason to believe that an international occupation of Iraq or an occupation under the control of NATO or the UN would have been more effective than the current one.

Recently, Bush’s positions have indeed weakened, and for two reasons. First, he is facing a challenge from the Democratic presidential candidates. There are already ten of them, and they’re posing some tough questions. It seems the administration was not ready for an assault by such a well-coordinated chorus of Democratic candidates. Second, the dynamics of public sentiment in America have a sinusoidal quality. After the quick occupation of all Iraqi territory, Americans, naturally, were expecting something big. That’s why today, when the administration says that this will be a prolonged endeavor, another year or year and a half at the least, and that the war will require more and more money, Americans are troubled by the stark transformation from the feeling of a quick and bloodless victory to the current situation – when American soldiers are dying and the price of war is rapidly rising to astronomical levels. As a result of all these factors Bush’s ratings have fallen to an all-time low. It will be far more difficult for him to win the election now than it was before Iraq.

So what are the chances that the next president of the United States will be someone other than Bush?

That’s a difficult question. In America, foreign policy plays a very small role during the elections. Americans will be judging the situation in Iraq not from the viewpoint of military success or failure, but rather by how the situation has affected their life in America: how much they have to pay, how much they loose on investments because of the war, how it affects their travel around the world from the viewpoint of safety and so on. But none of these outcomes have become fixed. The administration is still able to alter the state of affairs. The opposition, including Clark, has no means of affecting this situation and in that respect Bush has an advantage. He can still create a foundation for victory. The Democrats, meanwhile, can only choose who they want to nominate, and this decision will be based on what problems appear most relevant in 2004. Elections in America are not won by the “best” candidates, but by those who can pose a question correctly and who can find a theme that resonates in the country. It is difficult to predict what theme will be the most important to the electorate in the fall of 2004. In general, the person who formulates the most appropriate platform is the one who will receive the mandate to power.

In the past few months there have been calls from some American politicians to reform the structure of the UN, which many in the country believe does not correspond to today’s political realities. How can such an unwieldy and ossified structure be reformed?

Speaking on the topic of the UN, on the one hand, much talk revolves around the fact that, as of yet, there is no global structure that could function more effectively. The first instinct is to restructure that which is already there. No one disagrees that there needs to be a global organization that would help coordinate opinions and would act as a sort of world club, where it would be possible to mutually agree upon certain joint operations. On the other hand, there is an apparent belief that the UN, in its current form, cannot deal with, nor has it ever been able to deal with, problems that have arisen. As you can recall, the UN was created at the end of WWII to ensure that none of the Allies would enter into separate negotiations with Germany. That was the UN’s initial purpose. Later, the organization was formally solidified in San Francisco, and the main purpose became, speaking directly, the prevention of World War III. But the UN could not decisively deal with any of the problems that arose in the post-war period. The UN had no bearing either on the war in Korea or the war in Vietnam. The collapse of the USSR and the complete transformation of the world during the past 15 years took place without any UN participation. Bosnia, Afghanistan – all of this took place parallel to UN structures. As a result, quite expectedly, doubts arose about the organization’s effectiveness. The UN is capable of effective work in important, but humanitarian spheres, such as AIDS, ecology and education, but it has no effect on military conflicts, especially among great powers. At a minimum, the UN should be kept to solve humanitarian questions. But, on the other hand, a structure needs to be created which would help us answer questions of military and political nature. There are different ideas and proposals being put forth. The main issue is that the US feels very constrained by the UN framework and the framework of international law.

Why is this so?

Contemporary international law was formulated in the conditions of the Cold War and based on the outcome of WWII. It deals exclusively with state-based structures. Terrorism, in its present form, did not present a relevant problem. Nor were there powerful non-governmental organizations, which are not only capable of damaging a state, but of placing its very existence into question. Non-governmental organizations such as al-Qaida are not written into either the structure of the UN or the UN principles of world governance (which are based on the existence of sovereign states). The US feels that today the UN is less of a facilitator and more of an impediment to the resolution of these very important questions.

As I said, there exist a number of suggestions about the future of the UN, and one of them revolves around the idea of creating a military structure based on collaboration between the UN and the US. An idea exists to wrap the UN around a whole array of constantly operating, non-UN, political and diplomatic alliances, such as the Quartet in the Middle East or the Big Six in North Korea. These structures would simultaneously be tied into the UN and would be given a certain degree of independence. Here we cannot ignore such things as the absence of UN leaders from Africa and Latin America, which are not represented in the Security Council. India, Brazil, Germany, Japan, Indonesia – these are great powers that are also not represented in the Security Council. These countries, following WWII, had limited political opportunity to express their personal will. Meanwhile today, France and Russia, which lag behind these countries in demographic and economic development, continue to occupy leading positions on the Security Council. Moreover, new structures are created based on inter-governmental cooperation and amalgamation such as the EU. In the future, these processes are likely to replicate in Latin America and the Persian Gulf. The UN has, once again, turned out unprepared for this, even from a structural point of view.

There are some extreme proposals for reformation, such as disbanding the UN and creating some sort of a World convention or World center. Russia would obviously not profit from such a plan, since it currently holds a permanent seat on the Security Council and during such a restructuring would surely be demoted in its political standing. There is also talk of giving the US some special status within the UN, such as “a permanent chairman of the Security Council,” or the Americans could be given two votes instead of one. Today, the veto rule is also not functioning as many would like, since one country can block everything that the other countries agreed upon. Perhaps the veto power could be expanded to more countries and would only function if three or four countries veto a proposal. In other words, the future of the UN is wide open, and it cannot be otherwise, since international relations are changing so rapidly. What suits everyone today may be entirely unacceptable in tomorrow’s conditions.

Russia, as you said, is obviously not interested in dismantling the current UN structure. A permanent seat on the Security Council is our second, following nuclear weapons, real superpower component. Nonetheless, before his trip to America Putin and his administration made a number of statements, which fully indicate that Russia wants to be America’s ally and not its opponent. What was the motivation behind these statements? Was it a strategic choice or a tactical move before the elections?

I think that Putin made this political choice consciously. But the choice is still far from becoming implemented in Russian foreign policy. The situation is similar to the post-9/11 scenario. At the time, Putin demonstrated his vision of a problem and gave his support to the US, but these proclamations never left the boundaries of his cabinet and were never realized in the realm of policy. Russia is locked into two mutually contradicting goals. The main goal is ensuring the country’s strategic safety. There’s an obvious sentiment in the Kremlin that providing national security is impossible without a close strategic partnership with the US. Today, no one in the world besides the US will help provide Russian security or even concern themselves with such issues. Here Russia has no alternatives. The provision of security, the war on terrorism, the defense of southern borders, the prevention of nuclear proliferation – it is doubtful that Russia will succeed at all of them without America’s help.

But Russia also demands a high level of prestige and world influence, and this constantly clashes with the need for a US-Russia alliance, because such an alliance would decrease Russia’s influence in the world, making Russia simply a junior partner to the US with zero political clout. The same thing happened with Europe after WWII, when Europe’s political influence practically atrophied and Old World politics became completely ineffective during the Cold War. Russia does not want to and is not ready to share that fate. Politically, Russia wants to play a leading role in the world, therefore it constantly needs to distance itself from the US. Thus, there’s a contradiction between an understandable ambition and an understandable necessity, and Putin is attempting to operate from within that contradiction. His pro-American rhetoric, which becomes anti-American at times, reflects his attempts to find a balance between these two extremes.

The Kremlin is finally coming to realize that a country’s development depends less on what documents the leaders sign and how much the leaders like one another and more on what sort of an image Russia projects. Today attempts are seen at improving this image. This process has become especially apparent over the last few months. Without resolution of this problem, Russia will not achieve a partnership with America and will not ensure its national security. I think that in both Russia and America we are stuck on three topics that persist from one summit to the next. The first is national security and the war on terrorism, the second is nuclear proliferation, and the third is energy policy. As a result, everything is framed around these issues as if there was nothing else to discuss. There are no other issues being evolved. We should distance ourselves from suchan approach. We need to find a new, more fundamental base for relations. It seems that Putin understands this well.

Bush has said many times, with an apparent sincerity, that he believes in Vladimir Putin’s good intentions and considers him a friend. How does the American society at large see the Russian president?

Americans would like to understand Putin’s position more clearly. They must determine for themselves exactly what he represents. Is he a modernizer of Russia, a reformer, as he appeared in 1999, or has he fastened himself at the role of a stabilizer, a balancing figure whose main goal is to maintain stability and predictability in the country? Among the elite and the politicians more and more lean toward the latter. Americans today are also troubled by a different question – how competent is he? Here, there are many doubts. In this context, the struggle between Kremlin clans naturally interests America. Everyone understands that Putin, on the one hand, must reconcile both clans. On the other hand, he ought to show whose side he is on from a strategic point of view. Along those lines, there is only a feeling of contradiction and skepticism about many of the President’s pronouncements, as there are no guarantees that the president can implement his political will.

The Yukos affair is probably only augmenting these doubts …

Yes, undoubtedly. In the eyes of America, Yukos is a shining symbol of Russian business. Americans are also drawn by the figure of Khodorkovsky, who is obviously an extraordinary and interesting man, and who has on numerous occasions spoken here in America, presenting some bright and fresh ideas. But there is no clarity as to what we are witnessing – is it a glitch in the system or a new line of policy? That’s why the criminal prosecution of Platon Lebedev is percieved as a sort of test for President Putin.

It would be interesting to hear your views on the Iran problem. Not long before his trip to the US, Putin said that Russia demands that Iran join the NPT. To what extend do you think the US will be able to pressure Russia with regards to Iran? Many people in both Washington and Moscow have said that 800 million dollars from Busher is not worth the price of spoiling relations with America?

It is unlikely that this decision will be fully acceptable for the US, however, I think that Washington will be able to pressure Moscow toward something acceptable. Americans have responded very positively to shift in Russian policy on Iran, as reflected in the interviews Putin gave to the American media. The only thing that bothers them is that these changes are so late in coming. Here the blame should not only be placed on the Kremlin and Putin, but on American politicians, and in particular, the Clinton administration. The Iran question has been around for a long time and with Clinton in office it kept being moved into the background, as neither country wanted to damage their relationship. Clinton’s hope for Russia, which was evident in his full support for Yeltsin, “who will build democracy for the Russians,” led to many divisive questions, including this one, being put in a cellar. When Republicans came to the White House there was a sharp shift in the approach – currently relations with Russia are based not on Russia’s domestic situation, but on global events. Iran immediately became a big problem, and it turned out that there around this issue there appeared an entire web of new difficulties. There is widespread suspicion inside the US about the necessity of the Busher power plant for Iran. Busher will not solve any of the country’s problems in the sphere of energy, especially since Iran has the world’s second-largest reserve of natural gas (a source of energy, incidentally, that powers a quarter of American electric plants). Why then do they need a nuclear reactor? Why does Iran need nuclear energy? Experts understand that Busher is completely unfit for creating nuclear weapons. Americans suspect that Tehran is using the commotion around Busher to distract from some other nuclear project.

Can any predictions be made about the timing of developments in Iraq? When will the provisional government be created? When will the allied forces leave? When will the elections take place?

I think we are talking somewhere in the realm of 2004. For Americans elections are a certain sacred cow. Until elections take place, Americans will not consider Iraq to be on the right track. The very fact of elections in Iraq will be very significant for the US. There is a good historical precedent – in the 1940s, after the de facto recognition of the state of by the US, President Truman vetoed the shipment of arms to the Jews even though Israel was at the moment at war with six Arab countries. The veto was valid until the country held its first national elections. After the elections the US gave Israel de jure recognition and began shipping weapons as well as providing military and political support. For Americans any democracy must begin with elections. Until the elections takes place Americans will not leave. But elections require a relative state of peace, free press, a civil society and so forth. So far these processes have yet to appear. I think that we need to wait another year and a half or so. A large contingent of American forces will remain in Iraq this year and a significant portion of 2004. During this period, Americans will probably try to hold elections. They would never pass the power on to an appointed government, and will not leave until at least the first draft of an Iraqi constitution is put on paper and until the rudimentary beginnings of civil society begin to take shape.

Nikolai Zlobin is the Director of Russian and Asian Programs at the Center for Defense Information, and editor-in-chief of the international news agency Washington Profile.

Translated by Olga Levitsky and Seva Gunitskiy, CDI Research Staff.