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The year 2003 turned out to be a period of serious miscalculations in Russian foreign policy, the consequences of which will be felt for years to come. The most important of these was the forgoing of strategic opportunities, which came about during the international war on terrorism and the beginnings of rapprochement between Moscow and the United States. This blunder can be explained in part by the rigidity and narrow-mindedness of the western, including American, establishment’s political thinking, as well as by its egoism and self-confidence. Yet to a much greater degree, this was a consequence of the fact that Russian foreign policy after 1991, with all its changes in rhetoric, never succeeded in developing comprehensive fundamental approaches or a new system of ideas, but instead remained intellectually helpless, impulsive, improvisational, and often even imitative. In many respects foreign policy continued to be based on world perceptions produced during the Cold War – more typical of the Ministry of Defense than of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This sharply separates Moscow from other European countries, where foreign policy has long been built on different principles and priorities – mainly social, economic and humanitarian ones.
However, precisely such an approach could have become the basis of a strategic union with the United States, where, after September 11, 2001, national security and the protection of its territory and interests also became the basis of foreign policy. Russia, seemingly, acquired the most powerful of possible allies. When Russian President Vladimir Putin declared his full and unconditional support of the United States, it was viewed as a strategic choice made by the Russian administration and corresponding to the interests of both countries, as a “revolution in Russian foreign policy.” Russia regarded the American tragedy as its own – thousands of people with flowers came to the US embassy in Moscow. “America and Russia will now be able to better understand one another; it will be easier for us to find a common language,” wrote the Russian mass media. At the same time, NATO declared the invocation of its charter regarding collective action of countries within the block. Russia was immediately in the company of the world’s strongest countries, united by a common vision of global problems and threats. After only several months, however, Russian-American relations began to sharply recede. Europe began to actively push Russia away. Russia itself took on a position that promoted a division of Europe, which obviously contradicted the strategic interests of Russia’s security. The responsibility for the mistakes and miscalculations that they allowed in their foreign policies during the last two years should not be waived for either the US or Europe, yet the failure to put into practice Russia’s “September 11th strategic choice” is Moscow’s own. For the past two years, the Kremlin has failed to articulate to Washington just what this choice means in practice, has not tried to convince its society or Russian elite of its suitability, and has not even made any steps toward its implementation. If a foreign policy revolution has taken place, it did not exceed the boundaries of Putin’s cabinet. Russian foreign policy appeared not only to lack the corresponding economic and organizational resources, but also the necessary political will. Certainly this is not only a problem for Russia. The war on terrorism demonstrated the sheer inadequacy of the system of international relations and the political philosophy on which it was based for the last half century. In this system, Russia played a leading role, serving to balance the US. The Cold War provided the world with a certain predictability and equilibrium, a primitive sort of thinking about foreign policy accompanied by a comfortable existence. It did not allow for a fierce war – and this was its historic merit. America needed more than ten years after the disintegration of the USSR, as well as the September 11 tragedies, to attempt to define new principles of national security and to start to realize the degree of its responsibility. Europeans continue to live in their glass house, absent a meaningful foreign policy. The Arab world has lost all tolerance and, perhaps a sense of historical reality, by fixating on revenge. It is difficult to predict how many years Russia will spend in search of its place in the new world.
Nearly all definitions of international politics in the dictionary need reassessment. Not long ago the main criterion of international unions was common values in society, for instance, democracy, a free market or socialism. Today unions are formed on the basis of practical advantage, geopolitical opportunities and common general foreign policy goals. New difficulties arise for Russia in these circumstances. On the one hand, by virtue of its inner character, it is an unappealing partner. On the other hand, countries which were traditionally within the Russian sphere of influence or were in search of its friendship, for example Uzbekistan and Georgia or Poland and Bulgaria, have begun to show great interest in partnership, and even entrance into other power-centers, foremost with the US and NATO. In these circumstances Moscow is left with only two alternatives to formulate independent blocks – part of Central Asia and Belarus. However, the essence of blocks has also changed. Now they take on a temporary character, as few participants want to be held to long-term promises, and the situation changes so quickly that national elites are often not capable of understanding the deeper meaning of events. A typical example is the reaction of the Russian foreign policy establishment to American actions in Iraq. Unions are created for the solution of a concrete and limited problem, following which countries simply run in different directions. Who knows, they may next meet as opponents. This is unacceptable for the weakened Moscow, which wants much more formalized relations, foremost with the US. At Russia’s insistence, an insignificant treaty regarding the reduction of offensive arms was signed in May of 2002 in Moscow, although the US suggested agreeing to these reductions on an informal basis. Indeed, Moscow is insisting on the formal cancellation of the “Jackson-Vanik” amendment and the conversion of all arrangements with the EU into formal agreements. The concepts of war, safety and military power have changed, creating new challenges for the US, as the only military superpower, as well as for Russia, as a country that has lost its military superiority and ability to independently provide for its security. The military weakness of Russia is a new and radical factor in international relations. Contrary to the stereotype perpetuated in Russia, its military’s weakness has become an unpleasant factor for the US rather than a positive one. Such weakness today requires not only comprehension, but also compensation. This cannot be, for instance, provided by Europe, with which Russia has many more unsettled problems than with the US. The military weakness of Europe itself is not a new phenomenon. Yet until recently, this weakness was concealed by the enormous military support provided by the US. Today it is important for Russia that the Atlantic friction not damage international security, as Russia is located much closer than Europeans, and most definitely closer than Americans, to the most explosive region on the planet. Modern wars are usually conducted without physical contact. The emphasis is placed not on the head-on collision of armies, and the purpose is not so much military victory, but rather the change in regime or its politics. There is nothing unique about this; changes of regimes have taken place in Russia, the countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR during the 1990s. But here again, opinions in Moscow and Washington differ as to which countries represent the greatest threat to the world. Moscow believes that they include, for example, Georgia, Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, whose rockets can reach Russia’s territory, while Iraq did not present any direct threat. In its opinion, Iran does not present a dire threat, either. However, Russia is not capable of waging a modern war. A traditional war, in which it could take part, will not lead to the achievement of stability in dangerous regions. This comes in addition to the existing political and economic frailty of Moscow. Therefore its role in the making of such decisions today is extremely insignificant.
In its time, the Second World War destroyed all existing international institutions and created new ones. The UN was established to replace the League of the Nations, which was incapacitated in war conditions, and to guarantee that all states within the anti-Hitler coalition would not sign separate peace agreements with the countries of the “Axis.” In 1945, five winning countries joined the Security Council. This seemed quite logical and fair from the point of view of the five. The fact that, for instance, two entire continents were not represented – Africa and Latin America – did not seem to compromise the legitimacy of the body. Today, however, it is hardly justifiable to define the international importance of this or that country based on the results of the last world war. So, the second and third economies of the planet – Japan and Germany – hold much more importance for the global economy and politics than, say, Russia or France. Yet neither are part of the Security Council, nor is India with a population of over a billion and nuclear capabilities, or Indonesia, the world’s fifth most populous country. Nuclear-capable Pakistan and Brazil are similarly excluded. Globalization, the technological revolution and the expansion of the club of nuclear countries have further accelerated the disintegration of the traditional hierarchy of international authority. From many capitals of the world the structure of the United Nations today looks unfair and illogical. Long before the disintegration of the USSR, the United Nations turned into a bureaucratic structure, dealing less with political problems than with humanitarian aid, education and health services. Enormous geopolitical changes in the world over the past fifteen years took place without its involvement. The power of the United Nations today is a result of the lack of competition and the longstanding connections with national elites in the majority of the world’s countries, who use its platform to solve their own problems and solidify their international image, which they cannot achieve through real politics. This was demonstrated by the Security Council debates on the question of war in Iraq, and the French and German resolution projects. Since the Kremlin has turned into an insignificant political player, it has become especially clear that the UN is not capable of solving the main political problems of the present, the nature of which have also changed considerably. It did not, for example, solve the Chechen problem, the problem of international terrorism, genocide in Serbia and Ethiopia, nor problems in the Near East, Afghanistan, East Timor, Liberia, North Korea, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug-trafficking or many other conflicts. There is no doubt that the US will eventually transfer some of its functions in Iraq to the United Nations, but there is no certainty that this organization will be capable of carrying them out effectively. Today there needs to be either a radical reform of the United Nations or its dissolution and the creation of an new international organization capable of adequately reacting to the changed world. However, Moscow is taking a very cautious position on this question, affirming “the dominant role of the United Nations” while neglecting the problems of its own inefficiency and thus again, differing in views with Washington. Iraq can become “a heavy burden” for the organization, and the struggle against international terrorism can lead to the final breakdown of the United Nations in its present form, which partly corresponds to historical logic, and to a significant degree, to the wishes of the US administration. This may take some time, but any reforms of the United Nations will inevitably raise the status of Washington and lower the status of Moscow. The latter will naturally resist, as the Security Council is its last opportunity to mark its presence on the political Olympus of the world. It is simply impossible for Russia to become as eminent in the foreseeable future. For this precise reason, Vladimir Putin is declaring that any reforms of the United Nations should be carried out “only within the framework of the UN” and “through the use of procedures, which are within the norms of international law, and are recognized by the United Nations itself.” That is, with the decisive participation of Russia. There exists a serious divergence with Washington on this question. Having come to power, President Putin proclaimed: “Russia needs to build its foreign policy on the basis of a precise definition of national priorities, pragmatism and economic efficiency.” After the Second World War the USSR took up precisely such a position, from which it provided itself with an influential role in all of the main international structures for half a century and managed to play a key role in the world. In part, the situation repeats itself today. Russia certainly does not have the advantages that the USSR had then. However, until the spring of 2003, it nevertheless was in the same camp as the US and NATO. The acceptance of twelve new member states from Eastern and Southern Europe is the last expansion of the EU in the near future. The same can be said about the present-day NATO. At least in the next half-century, Europeans do not foresee a place for Russia in Europe. Therefore the union with Washington is key for Moscow. However, Russia’s position on Iraq appeared to be an obvious departure from the proclaimed pragmatism and from the strategy for such a union. By speaking against American actions, Moscow has aggravated a deep, maybe even insurmountable crisis within the UN and the Security Council. If, for example, the US and following it, Great Britain, halt their participation in the Security Council or simply cease to take part in its activities, it is Russia that will lose out the most. In aspiring to prevent the war, Russia only hastened it; it involuntarily promoted the splitting of Europe and the weakening of EU positions, which directly clashes with its own interests. Its position has strengthened the contradictions within NATO and led to an increase in the role of Eastern European countries there, which will only complicate the implementation of the European course of Russian policy. In its own time, “the Big Seven” became an attempt to find a new “non-UN” form of coordination of interests of the countries of the West. However, with the end of the Cold War, the political value of these meetings began to greatly diminish – their agenda has changed. The inclusion of Russia as a permanent participant in 2001 (under pressure from Washington) as well as the invitation to meetings of representatives of other states, for example China in 2003, has provided “the Big Eight” with a new chance to become a source of serious international discussion on the most important questions. Russia should not only have tried to actively participate in meetings and offer its own agenda, but also to transform them into a profitable tool for the solution of world problems favorable for Russia. But this is impossible without positioning itself in line with the policies that are today carried out by the world’s only superpower – the United States, in line with what mass media calls, not entirely correctly, the “Bush doctrine.”
For centuries, policy was built on agreements and relations between sovereign states. During the last quarter century, global economic processes have wrested it from the control of individual states. International corporations have easily broken down the boundaries of traditional financial and labor markets. Russia appeared to be away from it all. Today the Euro has been added to the dollar, becoming another supra-national means of payment. The development of technology in the communications sphere and the spread of the Internet has threatened the sovereignty of national mass media, that is, the capability of governments to regulate the mass media in their countries or impose an ideology on their own territories. The freedom of movement of people and goods, money and information, has led to the swift loss of sovereign rights in traditional states. This immediately created an array of new problems for the administration of the weakened Russia. In the international arena, there appeared numerous non-state political actors which do not submit to any sovereign government. An example of such an actor is “al-Qaeda” or the terrorist organizations in Chechnya. It is impossible to settle a contract or to exchange ambassadors with them, just as it is impossible to apply sanctions or impose an embargo on them. Some governments support them, although it is practically impossible to seize one by the hand; they cannot be defeated with traditional methods. They do not fall under the jurisdiction of international law, for it deals with sovereign states. The Geneva Convention or, for example, the Charter of the United Nations, does not mention terrorists at all. At the same time, Russian methods of keeping order in Chechnya arouse a storm of indignation from the countries of the West. However, the world community appeared not to have the means to deal with these non-state actors. The old “doctrine of restraint” and the international law upholding it, which has given us a half-century of peace, appear incapacitated today for they were based on restraint of one state by another and were provided for by means of increasing state and, first and foremost, military power. However, the acts of terrorism in the US have shown that neither a huge military budget nor a super-modern and technologically equipped “space” army nor a computerized police are able to protect the country’s population from attack. The most advanced state, whose military budget exceeds the military budgets of the following twelve most powerful countries in the world put together, has not succeeded at its basic function – the safety of its citizens. America is more capable than anyone to protect itself from any state in the world, but the attack did not come from a state. Russia faces a similar problem in Chechnya. The inevitability of opposition of sovereign states to the international non-state actors, which reject the very idea of national sovereignty, is becoming a general problem. It is possible to demand the termination of acts of terrorism from the Chechen administration, even to enter into a corresponding agreement with them, but it is clear that it does not control its territory and exercises some sort of “limited sovereignty.” Vladimir Putin is, in his own way, right to refuse negotiations with Maskhadov, since the latter is to a significant degree a “virtual” leader. But, on the other hand, Putin himself controls an insignificant number of factors determining the situation in Russia. Moreover, the world community more and more insistently feels that it has a right to intercede in the affairs of a sovereign state if that state’s government carries out mass genocide of its population, helps terrorists and accommodates terrorist training camps, or makes weapons of mass destruction which can be directed at other countries. Once the potential danger of the policies of a sovereign state exceed a tolerable level, its legitimate sovereignty can no less legitimately be shattered from the outside. In other words, “limited sovereignty” is becoming our global reality. If before it was possible to strengthen border control and increase the readiness of the army at the sign of heightened danger, now it is pointless. From here comes the idea of preemptive strike as a means of maintaining national security. It would be wrong to say that this idea simply annuls the doctrine of restraint or that this is a new idea. Preemption and limited sovereignty were in many respects included several decades ago in the so-called “Brezhnev doctrine.” Moreover, they were employed by the Soviet Union in relation to socialist countries: Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. However, in international affairs at that time, the emphasis was placed on the “impact of retribution.” The aggressor knew that in the event of an attack he could expect a response. Today, in the case of his refusal to disarm upon demand from the international community, a preventative strike can be inflicted upon him. Certainly, this conceptualization is extremely debatable and dangerous, fraught today by unpredictable consequences. However, it is not as much a display of Washington’s imperial thinking, but the recognition of the fact that after the end of the Cold War “the doctrine of restraint” was unable to prevent a single conflict. Further, it strategically and intellectually disarmed advanced countries in the face of a new enemy. It became a recognition of the fact that modern states continue to lose their traditional functions and are no longer capable of providing either their own safety or the safety of their allies, and that their borders and defenses are becoming all the less reliable. In order for “the doctrine of preemptive strike” to not become the primary method of managing international relations in the new century, it is necessary to offer something conceptually different, capable of systematically and effectively replacing the now-historical “doctrine of restraint,” instead of trying to return the US to its old legal environment, as is periodically proposed by the Kremlin. For Russia, by virtue of many reasons, this question is more critical than for the majority of other countries in the world. Therefore Russia prefers to focus its criticism of the concept of preemptive strike not on the idea itself, but on the questions of who, how and on the basis of what arguments such a decision would be made. In its opinion, the UN should serve as the “deciding body.” Moscow should agree to accept the basic elements of the “Bush doctrine” as a foreign policy tool, which today provides for Russian national security better than anything else. But it should also demand special participation in the formation of corresponding decisions on a bilateral basis or, for example, in the framework of “the Big Eight.” For this, partnership with the United States is again necessary.
Even if Russia and the US agree on the methods of fighting international terrorism, they strongly differ in their understanding of its essence. Sooner or later Moscow must make a choice. Before Iraq, Russia’s position was close to the European one, however it is obvious that the Euro-Russian alliance has not developed, and could not have developed, after the end of US and British military operations in Iraq. Conceptually, the Russian establishment views international terrorists as some sort of criminals of a “new kind,” as criminal elements that are often amalgamated into certain structures. Chechen insurgents or “al-Qaeda” are perceived by it as a kind of modern mafia – not Italian, but Islamic. In Moscow people think that it needs to be fought by means of intensification of the police regimen, toughening of laws and passport checks, crackdowns and control over territory. The Chechen insurgents are looked upon as criminals, trying to play on the aspiration of Chechen people toward independence. Washington, in turn, sees modern international terrorism as a socio-political phenomenon, an international movement which has a political and ideological, rather than criminal, nature. A movement that aspires not toward illegal profits or concessions on the part of certain governments, but toward a destruction of the basis of our civilization, toward a replacement of one system of fundamental values and priorities with another. It is necessary to fight such terrorism not as one would against simple criminals, but as against deadly enemies – using all accessible military power. Further distress in Washington is caused by the possibility of the rise of terrorists to power somewhere, as occurred in Afghanistan. Russia supported the liquidation of the Taliban government in Afghanistan from the very beginning, seeing it as a threat to its national security, as well as for other reasons. The unification of terrorists and the state immeasurably strengthens the destructive capabilities of terror, makes it much more complex to fight, and makes it easier for terrorists to have access to weapons of mass destruction. The terrorist Islamic organizations possessing such weapons become the most serious potential challenge to global security today. The US places modern Islamic extremism and terrorism in the same category with such phenomena as, for example, communism or fascism. Russia, which recently professed communism and possessed along with this, on the one hand, the biggest Communist Party in the world, and on the other, a sizable Muslim population, along with being located close to the centers of Islam, cannot afford this. However, Moscow also cannot ignore the fact that Europe has become the training ground for acts of terrorism and that “al-Qaeda” views the old continent not as the object of its attacks, but as the base for preparation of new attacks, including those on Russia. The Russian approach, focused on the fight against specific groups in response to their specific acts, contradicts with the White House’s calls for the development of a large-scale war against Islamic extremism and terrorism. Russia’s strategy in the fight against global terrorism is only beginning to develop. Not one of the international systems of security that exist today – from NATO to the CIS – is able to provide for Russian security and sovereignty and give Russia a place in the world that would please it strategically. And it is doubtful that Russia can join any existing global groupings. Islamic extremism aspires toward historical revenge, trying to regain that which has been lost for some centuries under assaults of western civilization. And it is naïve to believe that it will stop on Russian borders having remembered the threat of a Russian veto of war in Iraq in the UN Security Council or the age-old support of Yasser Arafat. It would also be naïve to think that Europe will suddenly concern itself with problems of Russia’s security when it is not even eager to help the US. Similarly, it is unlikely that Russia’s integrity and sovereignty will ever become a priority for China or any other country in Asia and in the Far East. At the present day, no one is as interested in the security of Russia as the United States, even if its motivation is ego-driven. Regardless, Moscow is not left with a large geopolitical field for choice. However, the prospects of a strategic US-Russia union are not as definite as they recently seemed. Russia-US summits held in 2003 became alarming symptoms of how mutual relations of two countries can suffer without a fundamental base. They have shown extensive disregard for deep-rooted problems and the presence of serious mutual disagreements, which have brought the recent idea for a search of a strategic partnership to the present-day dereliction. Relations between the two countries are at their lowest of the past decade. Disagreements on Iraq have forced us to finally recognize that keen, fundamental, and probably irreconcilable differences exist between the US and Russia. They include the approach to international problems, the construction of a new world order and a system of global security, the understanding of modern threats and the essence of the fight against them, as well as the approach to international law. Russia moved almost to the end of the list of countries with which the American establishment is interested in developing relations today. Its foreign policy elite, in turn, has given up on the thought that America critically needs the union with Russia today and is, on its own, not capable of resolute actions anywhere in the world. The “trust-based partnership,” about which President Putin spoke in July 2002, has not materialized. The Iraqi conflict has brought to an end an entire era. From the failed search for a model of strategic partnership, Russia and the US have the opportunity to cooperate now on a number of common problems. It is no secret that practically all of these shared problems occur in the fields of security and energy, and yet this hardly guarantees that attempts at mutual relations will be successful.
As far as energy is concerned, Russia has a good chance of becoming one of the key players in this field, capable of rendering a serious stabilizing influence on the oil and gas situation and thus, on the global political atmosphere. The United States is extremely interested now in such a stabilizing force and certainly will promote its creation in every way possible. Russia has a golden opportunity, and yet it is difficult to even predict when it might be ready to assume such a role. To achieve this, there not only needs to be a modernization of the entire Russian energy industry, but also the attraction of multi-billion dollar investments, a sharp reduction in energy use inside the country as well as manufacturing costs, deepening of economic reforms in the country, creation of a permanent system of fast and safe delivery of energy carriers to consumers in different parts of the world, and so on. This may take decades and no one will wait for Russia. There is a real danger in that when Russia carries out this huge task, spending billions of borrowed dollars, modernizing its economy with an emphasis on the energy sector, and causing a whole complex of hefty social deformations, the need for such an “energy stabilizing” factor may have long since passed, or this need will have been satisfied by other countries or groups of countries. Russia might then find itself in an energy trap of its own construction, from which escape would be extremely difficult. The countries of the West, especially the US, have gleaned serious political lessons from their recent histories and will do anything today to avoid economic and political dependence on the manufacturers of oil. The fate of former President Jimmy Carter holds no appeal for current politicians. The United States will try to reconstruct the energy world market so that in it, as in any other market, the buyers rather than the sellers of oil, gas and other resources, would assume the dominant role. If they succeed, even if not to the fullest degree, then the balance of power in this sphere could change considerably, and from influential legislators of political trends, the world manufacturers of oil and gas will find themselves in a position similar, for example, to the present position of steelworkers, gold miners or manufacturers of household electronics. Of course, the mere presence of oil or gas in a country does not automatically make that country a strategic ally of the US. Saddam Hussein offers an example of this; America was not only reluctant to buy oil from him, but through sanctions, sharply limited the delivery of Iraqi oil to the world market. Moscow objected to such action, incidentally. Today, Washington is reconsidering its relations with Saudi Arabia, though it will remain the main supplier of oil to America, and Iran has been designated by the Bush administration as part of the “Axis of Evil.” Besides, it is obvious that the more actively Russia enters the world market of energy carriers, the more competitive it will be with the oil-producing countries of the Arab world, where its political relations have been traditionally strong. Will the possible profit serve as sufficient compensation for the deterioration of relations with these countries, and for the loss of Russia’s position in the Persian Gulf area? Or will such compensation be an energy partnership with the US? But this also is impossible without a substantive political foundation. Given the justifiable criticism of Bush’s foreign policy for its adventurism and voluntarism, it is important to mention that Russia lost more than it could afford in the Iraqi crisis. Moscow’s position was much more than pragmatism – it did not correspond to either the economic or national interests of the country. Indeed, it directly contradicted the central principles of the declared foreign policy. This cannot be blamed on the unilateral approach to international affairs, which the US currently demonstrates and a series of gestures that can hardly be called friendly to Moscow – from protectionist policies on steel issues and the “Jackson-Vanik” amendment, to the ousting of Russia from Afghanistan and the Caucasus. The spring and summer of 2003 demonstrated that Russia not only lacks the understanding of the essence of contemporary global processes, but has no strategically integral foreign policy. This cannot be blamed solely on President Putin or the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Russia does not possess either the pertinent structure or the operational intellectual potential to adequately analyze global developments, to deliver realistic forecasts, to develop an optimal course of action for the country in the international arena and to present it to the president. The institutions and people responsible for this task are not at all capable of handling it. There is no evidence that Vladimir Putin is politically powerful and independent enough to be able to insist on his own vision of the world. Moscow demonstrated an entirely unacceptable level of improvisation, and as is known, an unpredictable friend is worse than a predictable enemy. Russia is a nuclear power, therefore, improvisational foreign policy is not only its sovereign affair, as it is capable of rendering a destabilizing influence on many processes in the world. Today it is clear that the popular thesis about the “necessity of improving relations between Russia and the US” which appeared after the end of the Cold War, turned out to be false. It is impossible to improve that which has been created for other political and international realities. It was necessary not to “improve relations,” existing between the US and the USSR, as they are by definition “non-improvable,” but to form completely new bilateral relations, and to build them on a principally different strategic and conceptual basis which is yet to be formulated. For example, it is impossible to improve the steam engine indefinitely, at some point it will be necessary to move on to something essentially new – a fuel or electric engine. Both parties spent ten years attempting to improve the “steam engine,” and as a result, they currently lack a clear policy toward one another which, given their size and power, can negatively affect the overall development of the global environment. The conflict over Iraq, in fact, became a conceptual bankruptcy of the model of Russian-American relations, by which we abided for the last decade and especially after September 11, 2001. If there is no fundamental basis in relations and no understanding of their strategies, then any controversies – over steel or poultry for example – take on exaggerated proportions, as we have nothing to rely upon for their resolution. It can be assumed with a great degree of probability, that the conflict over Iran might turn into something much more serious. George Bush sympathizes with Putin on far more issues than fit into the framework of bilateral relations. Clinton befriended Yeltsin, believing that the latter could lead Russia to democracy. Bush’s attitude toward Putin has a far more personal character and yet is in no way an evaluation of the situation in Russia. Bush is the most pro-Russian US president in modern history, but the lack of substance in relations between the US and Russia and the lack of cultural and political unity and significant economic collaboration, turn the trust of the two presidents into capital that should not be put at risk. Still, no matter how genuine the personal friendship between Bush and Putin may be, in the end that is not what Russia and the US need. Russia requires a thoughtful and sound foreign policy and a fresh elite capable of developing it, as well as professionally institutionalized structures for its effective implementation. Otherwise, when a strategic path is finally chosen by Moscow, it might still not stray beyond the boundaries of the presidential cabinet. The United States, in turn, which has lately been developing its foreign policy in haste for obvious reasons, needs to finally realize that the effectiveness of its national security system greatly depends on the degree to which it considers the security concerns and political ambitions of other countries. Especially if the question revolves around such countries as Russia, which in political, regional, religious and demographic parameters finds itself in the mainstream of the foremost present-day conflict, as a matter of fact, alongside the US. All the other numerous aspects and directions of Russian foreign policy, in my opinion, are secondary with respect to the aforementioned. Russia needs to define its position on fundamental, world-outlook issues of the new world order, decide which position it wants and is capable of occupying in the new era, as well as how it can provide for its unity, prosperity and security. In other words, it needs to define itself in relation to the main center of modern power, the United States. Both in the US and in Russia, the absence of a serious, non-politicized foreign policy discussion is felt. In Russia, it often takes the shape of traditional accusations of Washington having hegemonic aspirations. Thus Moscow criticizes the US-British occupation of Iraq without presenting any evidence that, for example, the Russian-European occupation might be more successful. The Kremlin opposes the unipolar world, as it is governed without Russia’s participation. There is no evidence, however, that a multipolar world would provide for Russian security better than a unipolar one. Multipolarity is not only less stable and predictable, but would also not necessarily guarantee an increased role for Russia in the world, as it is no longer capable of being an independent power-center. If Russia and the US manage to agree on the new, “special” character of their relations, then Russia will have many more chances of benefiting from the unipolar world, it would have to give in to undesirable compromises far less often. Not too long ago, it seemed that the Russian elite was about to make an intellectual breakthrough. But instead, Moscow experts began reasoning that even if Russia decided to enter into an alliance with the West, then Russia must be the head, while the US would be only the fists and the check-book. Once again, everyone started talking about the Russian empire. There emerged proponents of the idea of Russia occupying an intermediate position between Europe, the US and Asia – a position of equal distance from the power centers of the world, a position of a sort of “Transatlantic integrator.” It is unclear, however, why everyone suddenly was in need of an intermediary, and even if that was the case, why this role would be entrusted to Moscow, famous for its inability of finding a compromise in international affairs. After Iraq, Russia faces the difficult task of overcoming the consequences of its only serious foreign policy mistake of the past decade. It needs clear-cut positions on those ideas of the future world order, which are nurtured in the White House today. At the same time, the Kremlin cannot become hostage to the political struggle between different groups in the US administration, as such a danger, seemingly, exists. The matter concerns Russia’s role in the new world order and the new global security system, which will replace those that existed for the past half a century. The main issue is, how Russia, whether in close alliance with the US or outside of it (and not in opposition to, but precisely outside of an alliance) would be able to occupy the most beneficial position in the world for itself and provide for the strategic security of its interests. No matter how obvious the answer is, it seems that the Kremlin not only needs to voice it clearly, but must also put it into practice as the basis of its foreign policy course. Nikolai Zlobin is the Director of Russian and Asian Programs at the Center for Defense Information, and editor-in-chief of the international news agency Washington Profile. Translated by Olga Levitsky, CDI Research Assistant. |
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