RUSSIA — THE MOST PRO-AMERICAN ASIAN POWER
Interview with Nikolai Zlobin, Center for Defense Information
Polyarnaya Zvezda, The Northern Star, www.zvezda.ru
September 2003
Interview conducted by Victor Olevich

Q: In what way, in your opinion, will the expected adoption of the EU Constitution in the near future affect relations within the US-EU-Russia triangle?

Nikolai Zlobin: I think the role of Eastern European countries will increase and the political development of the EU will focus substantially on the development of all Europe rather than just Western Europe. This will strongly affect the configuration of the political, economic and social processes in Europe. Certainly, this will cause a change of attitude toward Russia, as Eastern European countries will be less likely to welcome (or, at least, will not be indifferent toward) any talk about rapprochement of Europe and Russia and will view these processes with extreme suspicion. I believe that it is necessary for Russia to develop a serious program of mutual relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and to try to win their political affection, because in many respects the issues will not be decided in Paris, Berlin or London, but in the countries of Eastern Europe. Consequently, I believe that the acceptance of the constitution, the unifying processes, and the creation of an all-European mechanism will change the political nature of the old continent. And the manner in which Western Europe functioned in relation to the Soviet Union will vanish. What the new mechanism will be, we do not know yet. But it seems to me, that there is a deep misunderstanding in Moscow of the processes taking place in Europe. Moscow still prefers to perceive Europe as a non-unified political, economic and military entity (which really is not whole yet, but is gradually beginning to develop) and splits relations with Europe into relations with its individual countries: Russian-French relations, Russian-German relations, Russian-British relations, Russian-Polish relations. This type of relations will become a thing of the past more and more, and it is necessary to think about the concept of Russian-European relations. In my opinion such an understanding is not present in Moscow today. And here lies a great danger of permitting strategic miscalculations, which will have serious repercussions in the future.

Q: How can pre-election campaigns in the US and Russia in 2004 affect Russian-American relations?

N.Z.: As far as the American pre-election campaign is concerned, President Bush needs several examples of successful resolution of international problems through the use of peaceful methods – diplomatic and political – not military methods. Conditionally speaking, he has Afghanistan, Iraq and the war on terrorism to demonstrate his skills as a commander-in-chief, a military leader. But Bush also has a very urgent need to show himself as a diplomat and an international politician, able to solve problems behind a negotiating table, able to form friendships with leaders of other countries. Russia, in this sense, presents a very good example of an opportunity to demonstrate oneself as a diplomat and an international politician. I think that President Bush will try to emphasize, in his pre-election campaign, his role as an international politician, a leader of the free world, as proclaimed in the past, instead of simply a champion against terrorism. For instance, let us take the Middle East Quartet in which Russia participated (by the way, a relatively successful quartet from the point of view of the development of a concept of resolution to the Middle East conflict). Russia’s role there was extremely effective, just as America’s role was. I think that President Bush will try to play on such things in his pre-election campaign and to demonstrate his skills of working with the Kremlin, working with Western European countries, working with leaders, and working with Putin in particular. And I assume that there is a great possibility that he will choose Russia as one example of states where he can demonstrate the success of proliferation of American influence without the use of military force.

As far as Russian policy is concerned, certainly, President Putin has a different problem – on the one hand, he needs to win the forthcoming elections and there is no doubt that he will win them, but the problem lies in the fact that the degree to which the win is connected to the foreign policy orientation of the country is extremely insignificant. Today there exist too many urgent internal problems that were not solved during his first presidential term, and generally the emphasis will certainly be placed on them. I think that there will be some anti-Americanism in the rhetoric and a certain distancing from direct support of the United States will be preserved, when actually – in real policy – we will not see such a distancing. I would not exaggerate the anti-Americanism of the Russian society. Russia is a relatively pro-American country as it possesses a similar system of values, world outlook and attitude toward property and freedom. I have already repeatedly said that Russia is the most pro-American Asian power. Therefore I think that President Putin’s pre-election campaign will balance between a hefty share of anti-Americanism (so as not to run completely into the Russian narrow-minded stereotypes in which Russia follows in a channel of American policy), and, on the other hand, a relatively insistent continuation of its course of integration with the West. In the Russian Federation, from which I have recently returned, there is a discussion about which path Russia should follow, how it should develop its relations with America and Europe. It seems to me, that this is not a vital question because Russia is still relatively far from both America and Europe, and the differences between America and Europe that exist in political culture, models of democracy, the market and political behavior, are not yet noticeable in Russia today. Integration with the West should include both Europe and America at the present stage. Possibly, the difference will begin to show in a generation or two and then there will arise a need for choice. Today such a need does not exist. Therefore integration with Europe, integration with the West, and integration with America follow along an approximately similar political path. In President Putin’s pre-election campaign this path will, probably, not be as distinct externally. Though concealed, however, this path will be well defined, since I do not see, to tell the truth, any alternatives to such a policy, keeping in mind the necessity of solving those internal problems that I have mentioned.

Q: What promises does a potential victory of a Democratic candidate in the 2004 U.S. presidential election hold for Russia?

N.Z.: The situation today is such that no matter who is situated in the White House the policy will be approximately the same. There can be certain nuances, in my opinion. It is possible that more attention will be paid to international institutions and multilateral decision-making, but the general direction of the foreign policy strategy is unlikely to change. If we proceed from the fact that President Bush relatively independently and in a unilateral manner has made the decision regarding the need to conduct a military operation in Iraq with a very small number of allies both inside the country and in the whole world, then it is possible to assume that the Democratic President would not make such a decision, at least at the present stage, but would come to this decision during the third year of his administration. That is, the discussion concerns tactical details, namely – when and how to make these or other decisions. And, probably, from this tactical point of view there would be a difference in American policy, but from a strategic point of view, I believe, the difference does not exist. Apropos attitudes specifically toward Russia, I think that today in the White House sits the most pro-Russian president of the past century. In the past hundred years there has not been a President who was more pro-Russian, freer from anti-Russian stereotypes, from anti-communism stereotypes. Any other person in this position would slow down, or at least would reduce, that small positive tendency that exists in U.S.-Russia relations today. Stated frankly, the small positive tendency in these relations is almost completely connected to the personal empathies of Bush and Putin, empathies that were initiated by Bush. Therefore with all the skepticism, mistakes, a negativity that exists in Bush’s foreign policy, if any other person were to arrive in the White House these empathies could simply disappear – as they are simply a human element in policy – under conditions when Russia and America do not have fundamental bases of relations. And they really are absent today. Much depends on the human empathies of two leaders and if this empathy will disappear then relations will be thrown back into some sort of a vacuum. Among the Democratic candidates today I do not see a single person who clearly and positively speaks out on the topic of foreign policy and especially on relations with Russia. Bush's defeat will put under question, or even liquidate, the present, let small but positive tendency in Russian-American relations.

Q: You touched upon the theme of the Middle East. How will U.S. policy in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region develop in the immediate future?

N.Z.: It seems to me that, to the surprise of the entire world, President Bush truly wants to solve this problem. Many U.S. presidents have spoken about the fact that they wanted regulation of the conflict in the Middle East, but they did not have enough desire, political will or opportunities for this resolution. President Bush has all the same obstacles, but it seems to me, that out of all American presidents (once again with all the skepticism which can be expressed with respect to his policies), he has demonstrated the greatest persistence in his attempts to solve the problem in the Middle East. Where this persistence comes from, I, to tell the truth, do not understand. I did not expect such a furious desire to solve the problem of establishing peace in the Middle East and such a sharp, cool attitude toward Israel from President Bush and his administration. It seemed to me that the present American administration would be far more pro-Israeli. I think that presently we are witnessing a turning point, and those stereotypes that existed in relation to the Palestinians, their leader and the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state in general, play a much smaller role in American politics than they did under Clinton, Bush-senior, and under all past U.S. presidents. I think that if President Bush will not be able to solve the problem of establishing peace in the Middle East and the creation of an independent Palestinian state, he already has, however minimally, changed the political atmosphere in Washington and the attitude of the American establishment to this question. It became more tolerant, more flexible and less pro-Israeli. At the very least, if he will not be able to solve these problems, he will create a certain base for the prospects of their resolution by the next American president.

Q: What are the possible consequences of the crisis around North Korea for Japan, America, and the PRC? 

N.Z.: This is a difficult question because North Korea is a big riddle. We do not know what to expect from it – practically no information comes from inside North Korea. As any closed dictatorial system it is unpredictable. Today nobody can tell what processes are going on inside, but that they are extremely negative could be said for sure. The North Korea example has shown one simple, but terrible fact: the entire system of control over the spread of nuclear weapons is, in fact, bankrupt. Our world outlook and the fundamental beliefs about what and who to control in order to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons have collapsed. If we shut our eyes to how India, Pakistan and Israel developed their nuclear bombs because they were more or less predictable and controllable, the state of affairs in North Korea has shown that the situation has gone too far. The nature of the very idea of nuclear safety changes with the advent of nuclear weapons in North Korea. As it turned out, we do not have a mechanism of political and diplomatic resolution of the problem, and at present no one is ready to discuss a military alternative. On the one hand, there exists an extremely unpredictable situation first and foremost from the point of view of the countries that you have mentioned (ones which surround North Korea), and on the other hand, we do not have the understanding, experience or ideas needed to resolve a problem of this kind, namely the possession of nuclear weapons by a communist dictatorship when the Soviet Union no longer exists and, as its seems, the system of control over nuclear weapons has been going uphill. That is on the one hand – partial unpredictability, on the other hand – intellectual, political and diplomatic powerlessness. No one can offer any solutions and, unfortunately, North Korea could serve as an example for many other states that may want to put the world (or their nearest neighbors) on its knees in precisely such manner, or, at least, to force the most powerful country in the world – the United States – to sit down to a negotiating table. I think that there are definitely leaders around the world that rub their hands and say: “Nice going, North Koreans! If only we had a bomb! We would be getting all of the world’s attention now and would gain from it, blackmailing great powers in order to receive as much economic and energy aid as possible.” Nuclear weapons are really the weapons of poor countries, and I am afraid that the example of North Korea will open the gates for boundlessness, where all poor countries will begin to buy or produce technologies and materials for the development of weapons of mass destruction and then we will have an unpleasant chain reaction. Thank God that North Korea is still a state where everything is under strict control, however, what if this situation occurs in a country where the government does not control the flow of events? There will be even less predictability then, and the likelihood that the weapons will fall into the hands of terrorists or some other elements that are not subordinate to the state (alternative armies within the framework of civil war) will be extremely great, and then all hell will break loose. Therefore, North Korea’s neighbors are not disturbed in vain – no matter how the situation develops, they will have a great chance of becoming the first victims of this unpredictability and our intellectual incapacity to solve the problem.

Q: How could a new configuration of mutual relations within NATO be structured while the EU is expanding and a new U.S. global military policy is being realized?

N.Z.: These are two big questions. On the one hand, U.S. military policy today it is not just becoming global, it is becoming the foreign policy of the United States since the maintenance of American national security is becoming the chief concern within the U.S. foreign policy framework. It is not possible to ensure the safety of the United States without having ensured global safety. Thus, the U.S. is compelled to engage in global security and at present their foreign policy is largely directed precisely toward this. Therefore, naturally, the U.S. military policy is caught up in this matter as one of the elements necessary for the realization of the foreign policy. However, it is not limited to military policy alone as practically all U.S. foreign policy efforts in the world today are directed toward the creation of a new system of global security. The American economy is developing from the point of view of providing security – American foreign policy connections, military connections, the military doctrine, the doctrine of trade relations, development of corporations – everywhere providing national security through the creation of a new global security system is set as the chief concern. Take for example the American policy toward former Soviet republics in Central Asia. It consists of two basic principles: aid to these republics for the creation of national armies and for the creation of border forces and forces of law enforcement. Americans came to a simple conclusion that sending their soldiers and building bases everywhere is practically impossible - there are not enough forces, money or soldiers. Therefore there is talk about the necessity of creating national armies, national police, national border troops, and law enforcement agencies, which would carry out these tasks on the spot, tasks that would otherwise have been carried out by American soldiers. It is much easier to create an efficient Kirghiz army, an efficient Tajik army and to assign to them the tasks of patrolling the border, suppression of terrorism, and control over drug and human trafficking. Thus, in the final analysis, all this will be seen as beneficial from the point of view of the maintenance of U.S. national security. The same thing is currently happening in Africa where the White House is starting to spend large amounts of money on the creation of national armies and police forces precisely in order to prevent the formation of bases of international terrorism that could be extruded from Asia after the destruction of the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is quite probable that they will start to gradually move over to Africa, and in Africa there are virtually no efficient armies, constant civil wars, practically no police, and enormous corruption. Today’s White House efforts concerning Africa are focused precisely on this; the U.S. policy on Africa does not call for the construction of bases or the transport of soldiers, but aims to assign these responsibilities to relatively professional national armed forces and police. Even if we assume that they would take up anti-American positions on the whole, in a military sense they will never have enough force to challenge the United States, yet they will be capable of putting an end to terrorism and drugs on their own territory. This, once again, will positively affect the maintenance of U.S. national security. That is, from the point of view of the military doctrine, or the comprehension the changing U.S. actions on the world arena, today there is an attempt to reach the goals of global security not so much through direct military intervention and tools, but through the creation of national armies, national police, and such working models as, for example, Japan at the end of the 1940s – the emergence of which at once changed southeastern Asia. If such a model works in Iraq, then naturally the Middle East will start to change very quickly. Leaders of Saudi Arabia, Libya, Syria and Lebanon will have a difficult time keeping their populations under full control if, conditionally speaking, democracy and the market will begin to blossom in Iraq and the people will start to live normally. We have observed this in the Japan example, following which Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong appeared. The United States is moving from opposition to the Soviet Union within the Cold War framework to attempts to reconfigure its military strategy so that maintenance of U.S. national security will not depend entirely on the quantity of American soldiers and bases in the world, but also on the presence of professional armies, national police and friendly regimes practically in all regions of the world.

As far as Europe is concerned, the situation there differs somewhat since Europe today is facing serious internal changes linked to the acceptance into its ranks of a large number of Eastern European countries, and hence to the change in the nature of the political and military threats that exist with respect to this region and to the sharp drop in the level of political and ideological unity among European countries. Closely tied to this is the fact that Europe needs to find its place in relation to the United States and the former Soviet Union, it needs to find its political path in the present day world – something that Europe has not done for the past half century. There is a certain childishness in the European policy as it was so compressed between two superpowers that it atrophied and became a political impotent. It seems to me that overcoming this political impotence is an important task for Europe today. The same thing can be said about NATO – it has become a political, military impotent. Today this impotence is not very noticeable because there are no direct military threats before NATO and, for now, none can be perceived in theory. Therefore, how they can overcome these problems and return to a combat-effective state is an urgent question today. I could even presume the possibility of a creation of a NATO-like military structure, which can conditionally be named Eastern European NATO, because Eastern European countries today are closer to potential explosive places and can, at present, render much more influence than the traditional countries of Western Europe in resolving problems of global security. I think that on the whole, militarily Europe will remain a dwarf until there is a change in attitude toward the fundamental questions of the military budgets in these countries. In the countries of Western Europe, there is certainly an extremely skeptical attitude toward an increase in the military budget, however, in Eastern European countries the attitude is much more positive. They want to gather force quickly, to play a more serious political role in the world, but this will be possible only through increases in their military budgets and the creation of efficient armies, which would be able to participate in the resolution of various problems as determined by great powers such as the United States and Great Britain. This way they can pull themselves out and onto a political Olympus as is currently being done by Poland and Ukraine. If they cannot do this then they will remain a political backwater. And they understand this perfectly. Therefore, I believe that there is a desire both to increase military budgets and to participate in transporting their soldiers to the main conflict areas around the world, as this can ensure for these countries further strategic participation in the future, though to the detriment of Western European countries which are extremely reluctant to do this today. I think that there will be a very serious restructuring in European countries, including military and political restructuring, which today very much depends on political will. If the countries decide to forego the comparatively convenient and satisfactory lifestyle, a habit which was formed in the times of the Cold War when Europe was located under an umbrella and was deprived of its own political will, then they will have a chance to advance onto the foremost spots in the New World Order. Those countries where no such political will appears shall be left behind on a political curb.

Q: Will the contradictions between Europe and the United States grow and how can they be neutralized or resolved?

N.Z.: Contradictions between the United States and Europe are, in fact, contradictions between the American way of life or the American way of development and the European way. To tell the truth, I do not see any major contradictions in this and it is unlikely that they will increase.  All these countries are interested in the development of democracy and free market, have a single system of values, a single outlook on life, a shared culture and Atlanticism. On the other hand, the contradictions between the American elite-establishment and the European elite-establishment will gradually increase, because the world order is being restructured – Europe is seeking its own place, independent from the United States. The European elite also desires power, it wants to break free from the state of political idleness where it was trapped during the second half of the twentieth century. And in order to break free, it needs to seize some functions from the American elite. This is why, I think, the contradictions will grow – the European elite might possess private, national interests, differing from those of the United States, which might be justified by geographic, ethnic or cultural matters. This is not a conflict between Europe and America, but rather a conflict between two establishments, two elites and it will grow. I think that a conflict of this type will only benefit the parties – both sides will benefit from competition as a political monopoly is not needed. I believe that in this sort of a competition whoever manages to better carry out a certain task wins the right of resolving it – in which case we will all win.

Q: How can the United States convert its current military and political victories into economic success?

N.Z.: The main route is the stabilization of the Middle Eastern region. There is not a single Arab country that preaches democracy. A market without democracy can only exist in a very limited, conditional sense. It will be an incomplete market. From the perspective of global economic development, the United States would be extremely interested to see the Middle East as a region of free market. However, the resolution of this problem is impossible without changes in the political structure of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, as well as the political nature of existing local regimes. I believe this is a long and big process, nevertheless, as the westernization of the Middle East proceeds, from the point of view of democratization the global economy will develop to the benefit of the largest world economy – the United States. There is also a more pragmatic way linked to the fact that those companies that invested money in lobbying U.S. military gains and successes, as well as U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Iraq, hope to acquire certain contracts there. Therefore, they will try to convert the military victories and their pertinent investments into some sort of dividends, which could later be circulated and put into banks. In another words, both in the short-term and long-term calculations, the United States is extremely interested in transforming its political and military achievements into some sort of economic gain.

Nikolai Zlobin is the Director of Russian and Asian Programs at the Center for Defense Information, and editor-in-chief of the international news agency Washington Profile.

Translated by Olga Levitsky, CDI Research Assistant.