The Need for a New Model of Strategic Partnership
Summits between leaders cannot replace full-fledged relations between Russia and the U.S.
By Nikolai Zlobin, nzlobin@cdi.org, Center for Defense Information
Nezavisimaya Gazeta - Dipkurier, Oct. 14, 2003

Nikolai Zlobin is the Director of Russian and Asian Programs at the Center for Defense Information in Washington DC, and editor-in-chief of the international news agency Washington ProFile.

In the past few years, high-level Russian-American meetings have become increasingly more frequent. In the words of Bush and Putin, each new meeting is inevitably more successful than the last. But the joint press conferences on the outcome of the meetings have become increasingly more brief and boring. Of course, not every summit should lead to momentous consequences, but neither should the two presidents continuously discuss topics that have not been properly prepared for them, or might be more appropriate for the competencies of lesser-ranking officials.

A Difference in Views 

Meetings between leaders, even frequent and successful ones, cannot replace full-fledged relations between two countries. In Camp David, the presidents were asked why, despite their serious divergence of views on Iraq, relations between the two countries have not worsened. In his answer, Vladimir Putin went to great lengths to explain that fundamental strategic interests of both countries are far stronger than the problems that divide them, and that both presidents see these interests, not emotions or ambitions, as their guiding point. George Bush responded with something to the effect that “Vladimir and I trust each other, he’s a good guy who’s fun to spend time with, and that’s why relations between our countries are so good”. The American president did not mention anything about the convergence of fundamental interests. 

These answers, it seems to me, reveal a difference in the views on the relationship. To the American president, personal factors and likeability indeed have an important significance in international relations. The current master of the White House pays most of his attention to the so-called subjective factor, to the nature of relations between the ruling elites and leaders of different countries. Being the head of the world’s only hyperpower, George Bush allows himself to deal only with those politicians with whom he has personal friendly relations, and ignores others, as much as possible, no matter how important their countries might be to the US.

But the sympathies and antipathies of George Bush is not the only thing that comprises American foreign policy. Let’s not delude ourselves – relations between the US and, for instance, Germany, are indeed full-fledged, strategic, and partnership-oriented. At the same time, relations between the Bush administration and Schroeder’s government are extremely bad, due to a variety of factors which include personal characteristics. The same applies to France. Conflicts between the national elites on the topic of global order should not overshadow the fact that French-American relations are developing normally.

Still no Trust

None of this holds for Russia. It’s important for President Bush that he can trust Putin, but cannot trust Schroeder or Chirac. Bush has no policy toward Russia, but a good relationship with Putin, which comprises the entirety of his Russia policy. But to the average American, it makes no difference whether Bush, Chirac, Rumsfeld, Schroeder, Putin, or Villepin have more ambition or desire for global domination. He knows, first of all, that the English, French, Germans and the Dutch are “our people” and can be trusted and, secondly, that politics is a dirty business, insincere and egotistic, and it would be better to avoid it.

Regarding Russians and representatives of other countries of the former USSR, Americans feel no personal trust toward them. Quite the contrary. And the fact that the politicians of these countries, upon coming to Washington, exchange pats on the back with President Bush and discuss what great guys they are, perplexes the average American even more. Relations between politicians here are good, but between countries – bad, or rather non-existent.

Russian-American relations have not turned into relations between countries and peoples, but are instead developing in the framework of a narrow military-political model. And each high-level meeting only reinforces this direction of development. If we look at them from this viewpoint, then the summits are indeed one more successful than the last.

But when it comes to a relationship between the two societies, the potential for it has diminished over the last few years, which cannot help but cause serious alarm. Through the efforts of politicians who are looking to find a common ground for partnership, Russian-American relations have become firmly locked into three important but narrow paths. These are international security and global terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, lastly, the possibility for cooperation in the energy sector.

Of course, these paths do branch out periodically – today, for instance, leading toward Iran, the UN, Georgia, North Korea, or Saudi Arabia. But the paths themselves were made in the years of the Cold War, and do not lead anywhere from a strategic point of view. With certain variations, it is precisely this agenda that has occupied the bilateral agenda for at least half a century.

From the very beginning, both countries have tried to hold technologies for the development of WMDs under their control. Moscow and Washington have always combated terrorism, except each capital saw their own definition of it, as a rule, as a political mirror reflection of the other’s. Finally, at the outset energy policy was practically the only sphere in which the USSR successfully collaborated with the West, spending decades pumping its gas, for instance, into NATO countries.

The Need for a New Base of Cooperation

What fundamentally new things did the end of the Cold War bring to Russian-American relations? Are our nuclear rockets not pointed at each other, do the citizens of both countries easily travel back and forth, do they visit each other on vacation, and are Russian universities filled with Americans who are striving to receive a high-quality education? “Nee-yet,” remarked the American president wittily at Camp David, using up his entire reserve of the Russian language in the process.

What has been realized in practice – not for politicians, but for people? Was it that fantastic, in the words of Putin and Bush, level of trust which has formed between them, when one says about the other, “I like him.”? Even if Putin and Bush could not stand each other, those three current paths would remain the basis for the relationship between the two countries.

I won’t argue with the fact that building a model for strategic partnership in the framework of military-political cooperation is convenient for the establishment of any country. It doesn’t require what is called interaction with the national masses. But how reliable is it? Political priorities will change; that is an axiom. But will Russia always continue to neighbor the most dangerous hotspots in the world? One wants to believe that someday these regions will attain relative order. And then the importance of a special partnership with Moscow based on security issues will decrease for the US.

The problem of WMD non-proliferation is also not a prerogative monopolized by the two countries. It looks like in the next decade access to such weapons, in one form or another, will be available to a number of governments, and possibly to non-state actors as well. North Korea became the example of the bankruptcy of the concept of non-proliferation, and Iran is revealing the sharpness of the disagreement in one area where, according to the two presidents, Russia and the US are already allies.

Regarding energy cooperation – it has never made anyone into strategic partners. It’s sufficient only to look at the relations of the US with countries of the Persian Gulf. Nor is the transformation of Russia into a gas station for the West likely to fulfill Moscow’s foreign policy ambitions.

Despite all this, the meeting in Camp David can still be a step forward. It was the first time that no joint declaration was issues, but only a communiqué, as suggested by America. The US wanted to make this meeting as informal as possible, distancing themselves from traditional summit stereotypes. Everything was planned in the style of a weekend for two married couples, in the course of which the presidents could peacefully socialize. Unfortunately, Lyudmila Putina could not fly into the US. But, for the first time, the Presidents created a list of orders addressed to concrete people and organizations, which notably included a deadline for their completion.

Only time will tell if it will be possible to overcome the inertia in the bilateral relationship. But it would appear that the meetings between the Russian and the American president will cease to be the sole “major and unique” events in the relations between the two countries.

Translated by Seva Gunitskiy, CDI Research Associate.