Nikolai Zlobin is the Director of Russian and Asian Programs at the Center for Defense Information in Washington DC, and editor-in-chief of the Washington Profile News Agency.

The world's approach toward developing a military policy requires some critical reconsideration. I am convinced that a revision of this approach is a normal phenomenon, not a criticism or a rejection of old doctrines. The world is changing, technology is evolving, political structures are shifting, threats are mutating, and new social problems are constantly appearing on the horizon. It is necessary, therefore, to engage in constant policy re-evaluation. This is a process that all countries must engage in, since the issues being examined today have such a fundamental significance for the entire world.

These days, it is also necessary to differentiate military policy and foreign policy. Russia has traditionally looked upon its foreign policy as an instrument of defense against the outside world, as a way of safeguarding its national interests. In many ways, this approach coincides with the American outlook, but contradicts the views of most of the countries in the world, primarily those of Western Europe. For this reason, Europeans have a difficult time understanding Russia's foreign and military policies, because her foreign policy is too militaristic, and her military policy is too foreign-policy based. In my view, military policy, military doctrine, and foreign policy should be separated, since foreign policy, after all, must deal with a wider spectrum of issues, not merely with securing the country's national safety. Such an approach is hopelessly outdated.

And, finally, my last introductory note - the formation of today's military policy is closely tied to the serious geopolitical developments that have taken place in the world, a place where traditional issues, which have formed the basis for foreign policy decision-making for centuries, no longer apply today, or else apply in ways that we are not used to dealing with.

First and foremost, the definition of war itself has changed. Contemporary warfare is a mechanism for regime change, or a mechanism for regulating the activities of a regime in any given country. In that sense, the goals of a military doctrine and the goals of military policies must be revised to take into account the changes in war's character. The meaning of victory has been lost. It is not very clear, in today's world, what counts as a "victory". In part, there is the question of whether the war in Iraq has been completed. Are there problems in Iraq or Afghanistan that fall within the sphere of military response, or are they now the burden of a civilian administration? There is an occupying army in Iraq, but there is no war in the traditional sense. There is no Saddam Hussein, with whom a ceasefire or a capitulation could be signed with. On the other hand, these documents would have no result anyway, since there are no conditions for peace. If previously there was a definitive line drawn between war and peace, today that line has been blurred. This enormous change is one of the most important reasons for developing new approaches for the formation of military policy.

Many structures and organizations have appeared, and will continue to appear, that have no state-like characteristics. A country's traditional military policy, therefore, ceases to operate, since it was designed to deal with sovereign states. Al-Qaeda, for instance, has no army as such, no command hierarchy, no one to sit down with at the negotiating table. In other words, we are dealing with the absence of statehood in potential enemies. Today, no one really knows how to deal with problems when the enemy is not institutionalized. And for that reasons, since we are dealing, in a military sense, with enemies not institutionalized and formalized through statehood, our entire system of international structures, and all of our international law, cannot function.

War has acquired, both de facto and de jure, a radically new dynamic. The main problem consists of the fact that no one is prepared for this situation, either intellectually, or politically, or morally. Not a single military machine is ready to reject old stereotypes and re-think the current situation. September 11 was the igniting spark in a series of explosions that have demolished our old perceptions, and we have turned out to be unprepared to replace old approaches with new doctrines, new ideas, new policies. In that sense, Russia is not the only country lacking a military policy - so is everyone else. As a result, today's military policy is, unfortunately, impulsive, improvisational, able only to respond to events that have already unfolded.

The concept of alliances has also changed with the appearance of flexible coalitions, i.e. coalitions around a particular problem. Iraq is an example of this. The US, in attempting to solve the Iraqi problem, created a coalition for those who agreed with the decision calculus offered by the US. Those in solidarity with the US view that the problem is real, and those who approved of the tactics proffered by the US became temporary allies, without signing any long-term agreements. When another problem appears, they could view it from a different perspective, and act as opponents rather than allies. That is, the signing of agreements on partnership over a long-term perspective takes place less and less frequently, since no one is ready to conclude an agreement lasting a quarter century into the future. No one knows how the situation may change, and no one can be sure of who are their enemies and who are their friends. The idea of an alliance must be viewed through the prism of the particular circumstance. (And yet, of course, rich countries like the US has more opportunities for seeking allies around the world than, for instance, does Russia.)

In previous times, military priorities were formed on the basis of geographic proximity. Today, the development of technology, including military and communication technology, has eliminated the necessity for basing military priorities on geographic factors. I consider it a deeply mistaken view to build a military doctrine based on the nature of contiguous or nearby countries. This is the approach of the Cold War period, which is meaningless today.

It is clearly obvious that Russia cannot be an equal partner of the US. And yet, despite the fact that the US has a military budget that far exceeds the entire budget of the Russian Federation, America is unable to solve many problems due to a variety of reasons - lack of military experience in certain regions, lack of influence, lack of knowledge regarding regional circumstances, and, last but not least, a negative image that expands beyond the Arab world. That's why I think that Russia and several other countries, despite being unable to be global partners, have the chance to become regional partners for those cases when the US and the international community have issues that need to be resolved in a particular region.

Russia, partially by conducting a proper military policy, could do this very successfully, especially when it comes to Central Asia, the Far East, a significant part of the Asian continent, specific regions in the Middle East, in Africa, and in Latin America - areas where Russia has both influence and a traditional authority. America is unlikely to gain the same authority in Central Asia that Russia currently maintains; therefore, even if Russia cannot maintain complete partnership parity with the US, then it at least could be an equal partner in Central Asia. It could even become the leading country for solving international security problems in that region.

I believe America would be very interested in such a regional partnership. For that to happen, it is not sufficient to develop Russian or American military policy. These policies must also be coordinated so that they operate together with maximum effectiveness. This is an approach that would be potentially very beneficial for both Russia and the US.

Military policy is an extension or a part of other policies; it cannot be viewed separately from how America sees itself in the near future, not to mention how it sees the world in the near future. America's foreign policy is a part of America's outlook upon the rest of the world. After September 11, America encountered unprecedented problems. One of the issues is whether it's possible to ignore your own principles of freedom and democracy, and have a dictatorial foreign policy. In the national security doctrine, the answer is an unequivocal yes. Within American society there is no consensus on the issue, and undoubtedly many American believe that an undemocratic foreign policy does not befit the US. Another issue - can democracy be imposed through force? Will democracy become a part of the military doctrine? Or are there some economic or social processes which bear no relation to the military doctrine, and for which military policy must clear the way? Strictly speaking, neither the Pentagon nor the White House have the time to sit and ponder these questions, and they therefore react, on a daily basis, to the developments around them. These questions are being pushed aside for the time being, and the answer given is that we are doing this, we have the army, we have the money, let's do it and see what happens. It is not fact that the current method of developing US foreign and military policy will persist as the main mode for developing these policies for the next twenty-five years.

A serious shift in priorities has taken place. If before the business of America was business, then today the business of America is national security - hence the change in the role of the military policy, toward providing that security. Secondly, for the first time since the Civil War, America faces a threat on its own territory. Americans today are forced to absorb the fact that military policy is a part of their daily life, and it is a difficult fact to absorb. The psychological process is an arduous one. Russia has much more experience in this field than the US. Globalization, the most important process of the 1990s, must also be taken into account - borders are losing their significance, and it is no longer possible, as once was said, to "stop the enemy at the border", since the borders have become transparent. Only recently - for instance, during the Persian Gulf conflict - the government could control the flow of propaganda. Today this has become impossible. The internet, satellite television e.t.c all lead to the fact that the state's control over the ideology of its own society has been irretrievably lost. Thus, if propaganda, counter-propaganda, and the creation of ideological support in society was once a part of the military doctrine, then today this is no longer possible.

Globalization has broken down doctrines, there are no national markets anymore - only a merging global market. This creates yet another difficulty for the state. National administrations and presidents are losing their traditional functions, including control over the army. Who will take control over these functions? - that is still an uncertainty.

How can military policy account for this confluence of problems, how does one maintain patriotism in the army, how does one maintain the army's military fervor and loyalty? How should goals be formed? Before, not one country had faced such questions. Today, this problem, especially in democratic countries, has become one of the most serious issues, with no answer in sight. International laws, as I said in the beginning, have ceased to play their role. National laws too are frequently losing their role. Problems are appearing that our predecessors did not encounter when they formed their military policies. And we have no answers to these questions, which gives birth to impulsiveness and improvisation, and a lack of a coherent military policy.

Let's take the following example. Europeans and Americans treat international terrorism in different ways. The US sees terrorism as an evil foe, which must be repelled by any means necessary. Bush has declared a war. US military policy toward terrorism is a wide-scale war, with bombings, offensives, soldiers, missiles, with death and destruction. If we don't get them, they will get us. This outlook is rooted in the culture and messianic tradition of the US, their refusal to see shades of gray. A friend of mine told me that Americans are ready to defend a city whether or not its residents want to be defended.

If you look at the European approach to the same problem, you will see a fundamentally different outlook. Europeans see terrorism as criminality, not as a military foe, and fight it not with an army but with police force, with more stringent laws, stricter visa regimes - by sending the terrorists to jail. Americans don't even want to bother with that, their position is to kill and destroy terrorists wherever they may be. And, starting from that dichotomy, the issue is not that the Europeans were against the war in Iraq. The issue is the appearance of diverging approaches to the same problem. In that sense, I am deeply convinced that Russia today will have a much easier time negotiating its military doctrine with the US rather than with Europeans, who live under a blanket of illusions and believe that nothing will harm them. Even in Great Britain, which is much closer, ideologically and mentally, to the US, Tony Blair has had a very difficult time convincing the public of the necessity of directly supporting the US. I believe that Putin will have a much easier time forming Russia's military doctrine because Russia, in my view, looks at life and society in general more realistically than the Europeans.

It is crucial to understand what the goals of today's military policy are. In Russia, it seems to me, there is no such understanding. America has that understanding, but there is the question of whether it is correct or not. Americans, as I've already said, have become fixated on national security. Thus, their military policy and doctrine are based on the principles of securing the US territory. Russia, as of now, has no understanding of the purpose of foreign and military policy.

Speaking of the sources of influence on the formation of Russia's military strategy, it should be emphasized that a consensus in society is necessary, as is a constantly ongoing national discussion, which is currently lacking in Russia, for many reasons - there hasn't been time for the discussion, there are no appropriate institutions or media outlets to support such a discussion - that is, there is no infrastructure for forming a national discussion on key questions. There is no society of experts, no think-tanks, no fresh elite - only the elite left over from the Soviet period, who are trying to adjust themselves to new realities. In the Russian business-elite, on the other hand, there has been a qualitative change, the arrival of a new generation. This has not been the case among the political and foreign policy elite. I think that the old generation still controls all the key positions. They were useful, even in the transition stage, but a new elite is needed today, one that could perform a deep analysis of the current situation and offer the Kremlin a recipe for developing a military policy.

The problem is not only with who forms the military policy, but also with who executes it. There is a need for institutions that deal with making military policy a reality, institutions that deal with its economic, foreign-policy, educational and ideological aspects, institutions that develop strategy, and so on. Russia lacks these institutions. We need think-tanks, highly-qualified experts, mass support, publications, and organizations to execute the policy, because a decision is worth nothing without a proper mechanism for its realization. That is, the task is to create an institutionalized structure for carrying out foreign policy.

And on this issue, the West has tremendous experience in building structures and creating governmental and non-governmental organizations. Obviously, military policy should not be left in the hands of the army - it is a political issue, a social function of the society. There must be civil structures, which Russia currently lacks, and there must be civil oversight. I would focus attention on creating non-military structures that deal with carrying out military policy. The Army, in this case, is only one element of the military policy. Foreign policy is much wider in scope than the army - it encompasses armaments, technology, science, foreign policy, and a vision of the country's future, a vision of the threats, and so on. The army is but a concrete mechanism for resolving concrete problems, and military policy cannot be left to the army, because it will then become army politics. As President Truman once said, "there is the right way, the wrong way, and the army way." Decisions cannot be left to the army way, and a mechanism for intellectual civil politicization of military policy needs to be developed to a much greater extent. There is world-wide experience with this, and Russia, I think, could borrow from that experience. Even though they may be little intellectual experience with this, there is a lot of institutional experience, in NATO, or the US. Otherwise, even if the Kremlin develops even the most ideal version of military reform, there will be no on there to carry this reform out.

Already we can find many examples when military doctrine is viewed in a wider sense - that is, in a sense of how the country sees the world and how the country sees itself in this world. Israel, for example, has good experience with this, because they were able to attract international opinion, create an intelligence service, and work toward solving the problem of providing the country's national security. Both Russia and the US, it seems, will have to do the same thing. The US is gradually acquiring experience in this area, and Indonesia is an example of that. Indonesia is a very different country than it had once been because it has a market economy. The US was able to significantly lower the military threat level in that region - that is, to create a country, as they had once done with Japan, which serves as a model for other countries in the region. Jumping ahead, I will say that in Iraq Americans will also be creating a model, since there is not a single Islamic country today that has a democratic government. The American idea is to build in Iraq a model for other countries, a model of a normal market, of a free, democratic country. Perhaps the model will not be successful; not all models are. They attempted the same thing in Kosovo and in Mexico. But the model that emerges is not a military one, but a socio-political and an economic model. At the same time, it is an attempt to solve a colossal military problem - to create a stable region, which is politically close to normal countries and agrees to help in the war on terrorism, because terrorism threatens them as well.

The same applies to Central Asia. I've spoken to high-ranking American politicians, who deal with American involvement in the region, and have arrived at an interesting conclusion: the main goal of America's Central Asia policy is, at this stage, the creation of functioning armies in the region. It seems like a paradox. But it's not, because the creation of an army, of secure borders, of police, of law and order will ensure the region's security and stability, which cannot be created any other way. That is, the US military policy in Central Asia is to help local armies become powerful. Of course, they will never be as powerful as the Americans, but they will be strong enough to control their own territory. Today it is far more advantageous to help create an army and thereby ensure your own safety, because you will have eliminated the threat from that region.

Military doctrine should move away from the idea of a military stand-off, and toward the world-encompassing idea of ensuring the safety and stability of a region. How to go about doing that - whether economically, by helping to build an army, or through other means - is a different problem for each country. Today, America has turned its attention to Africa - another region which is potentially important for three reasons: first, after we have cleaned up Asia and have it more or less under control, Africa could become the source of international terrorism. Second, Africa has an enormous market for labor, and may well be the last market for cheap labor. And third, Africa is an enormous continent that is relatively untouched by foreign investment. Again, in order to ensure Africa's stability and security, these problems must be solved. A simple example: why do you think Bush has allotted 6 billion dollars for the struggle against AIDS, and recently visited Africa with a program to fight that disease? For a very simple reason: because AIDS primarily affects the African youth, the potential army conscripts. And African armies cannot be strengthened without dealing with the AIDS problem. This is a shining example of a strategic approach. And the problem of providing national security has been transformed from a purely military one to a political and a social one. An army, especially a modern army, is an actor that has less and less influence on enforcing the major government functions, especially under conditions of such rapid technological change. The army must become smaller, it must become more technological, because the battle is not between armies anymore, but between systems of communications. When the bombing started in Kosovo, stealth fighters flew from Missouri, the heartland of America, bombed Kosovo, and returned home in a single trip. There was no need for any infrastructure, no need for soldiers, for front lines, nothing except a system of communication and the corresponding technology. That's why the army itself is a small part which must serve some function and resolve some problems, but on the whole, military policy in today's circumstances, particularly after September 11, is a much more economic, technological, and political system of values than a purely military one. And there is some experience with this dynamic. Perhaps there are no answers to concrete questions, but experience with such an approach already exists. And Russia, it seems to me, needs to do exactly that - to revise the very approach toward developing military policies, toward their formation and execution - and in this case, the world's experience undoubtedly deserves scrutiny.