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Washington ProFile's Nikolai Zlobin
 
A View From Washington
Russian Reaction, Hold the Hysteria
by Nikolai Zlobin, Director of CDI Russian and Asian Programs
Izvestia, March 18, 2003

The prominent 20th-century military theorist John Fuller once said that the goal of war is not victory, but peace. No one doubts a US military victory in Iraq, but many are unconvinced that it will bring peace. And yet for this administration, the goal is not simply peace, but a new world order.

The White House is now convinced that the current, post-WWII system of international relations is no longer able to deal with new problems. Today's situation is akin to the immediate post-war years, when the international community was forced to seek a new path for global relations and international structures. Using its unprecedented political and economical superiority, America has given her vision a world-wide scale and made it the center of an international debate. Today's global agenda is determined in Washington.

The White House is not very interested in the results of the UN inspections. Disarming Iraq or controlling Iraqi oil is not the issue. The US is beginning to build a new international system, which will revolve around the security of America and her allies. To achieve this, the US is willing to endure colossal economic losses and, if necessary, reject its alliances with a number of traditional Western European partners.

The new system will be built upon the principles of defense, shying from counterstrikes, as has been the case over the past half-century, and leaning toward military prevention of potential threats. The war on terrorism has shown that there is no reliable defense against it, and that counterstrikes are meaningless since terrorists have no government structures or armies to target and defeat, nor a president to sign the capitulation treaties, nor an economy to embargo. To weigh the legitimacy of the American military operation in Iraq on the scales of contemporary international law, including the UN Charter, as suggested by Igor Ivanov, is meaningless. International law provides no levers for pre-emptive actions. And while Washington would like a sign of approval from the Security Council, they don't consider it a prerequisite. The Council cannot be expected to approve measures that would hasten its demise - it cannot be expected to continue existing in its current form for more than a few years longer. This, in part, forces Paris to forget its recent hypocrisy and embrace Russia, another potential victim of reform in the UN.

Iraq is now the key to stabilizing the Persian Gulf region, which today, according to Washington, is a direct threat to global security. America prefers to start with Saddam Hussein, but certainly won't stop there. Kim Chen-Il understood this, demanding written security guarantees from the White House, which of course America cannot grant a communist regime.

The question before Moscow today on what position to take in the Security Council, and how to respond to a US military operation in the Persian Gulf, is not just about Iraq. Moscow must develop a position that relates to the US strategy of deep restructuring of international relations. Even if Moscow doesn't agree that the new security system should begin with the disarmament of Iraq, instead of, say, Israel or Pakistan, it would be a mistake for Russia to turn a blind eye to Washington's long-term goals in Iraq and not extract the maximum advantage for itself.

A strategic partnership with the US, the only country ready and capable of providing Russian security, should not be undermined because of a disagreement over Iraq. Iraq is only the first step by the US, a step that Russia should treat without hysteria and move on. Moscow should remain America's partner even if it's convinced that the partner is making a mistake in Iraq. A strategic union with America fully corresponds to Russia's national interests on the global arena. Partners may have differences in tactics and critique each other's mistakes, but in no way should the US-Russia union be dependent upon the fate of a Middle East dictator.

On the other hand, Moscow should delineate its disagreements with Washington and elaborate its stance as a strategic partner. One couldn't say that America is ready to accept Moscow in such a role. Reports of Russian willingness to veto the Anglo-American resolution at the Security Council were printed in Western newspapers alongside polls that showed more than half of Russians believing that Stalin played a positive role in the country's history. This not only shocked US society, but also forced the elite to consider the Russian motivation for relations with Iraq, and the reliability of Putin's integration with the West. Russian diplomacy still has a lot of work ahead, and disagreements about Iraq are only complicating the task. But only in a union with the US can Russia expect to strengthen its own security and receive a worthy role in the unfolding world order, as well as a voice in the new international structures. To miss this chance would be the biggest mistake in the history of post-Soviet foreign policy.

 
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