Make no mistake – the sudden about-face by the Bush administration toward the UN and the request for foreign assistance in stabilizing Iraq does not mean that the US could not have done it alone. They could have, by sending more troops and committing more funds. What the turnaround really signals is something else entirely – the beginning of the pre-election campaign. The foreign policy shift was not brought about as a result of a sudden epiphany in the hawkish camp, whose members suddenly developed a love for the international community, nor a result of Powell’s diplomacy triumphing over Rumsfeld’s blunt force. It came about because George Bush and his party suddenly have something more important on their plate than the fate of Iraq , the UN, the war on terrorism or the search for WMDs. The real issue at hand is the probability of staying at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue for another four years.

Only recently it seemed absurd to even doubt the inevitability of Bush’s reelection. But today, his administration finds itself in a tough spot, unable to address the question flung at them in an accusatory tone by every Democratic presidential hopeful: Why did we rush into war alone, and how did the American people benefit from the war? The question, thus posed, transfers the issue from the sphere of foreign policy, which is relegated primarily to the Pentagon and the State Department, into the domestic sphere, where the Average Joe is scratching his head, trying to figure out why he and his friends should lay out another 87 million dollars, why the reports from Iraq inevitably include deaths of American GIs, and why his family fells less secure from terrorism than it did a year ago. In short, what use does the Average Joe have for George’s actions?

And as Joe ponders, George’s ratings have reached a new nadir. Policies should not be based solely on presidential ratings, but they do demand strict attention as election time nears. If the big question is not addressed, next fall Washington may experience a boom in the moving industry that always accompanies the departure of an unseated administration. This is what’s defining the foreign policy zigzags of the White House, and the other countries should not delude themselves with any other explanations. Of course, Bush and his team begrudge the fact that they have to share the fruits of a brilliant military victory with other countries. But this is a much lesser evil compared to the possible perspective of handing the reigns over to another administration. In a certain sense, the world has become hostage to the US election campaign. If the Security Council rejects a resolution to help America in Iraq , this will give the Washington hawks a chance to say: see, we told you so, the UN is good for nothing, and that’s why we ignored it last spring. And if one or two countries do decide to send military contingents to Iraq after all, the UN’s reputation, or what’s left of it, will be severely diminished.

If, on the other hand, the Security Council swallows the bitter pill and forgets the recent offenses by the US , authorizing a resolution favorable to American interests and sending foreign troops into Iraq , the Bush Administration will present the outcome as if it had been part of the White House strategy all along. And if Germany and France refuse to send soldiers despite the resolution, even as other European countries contribute troops, this will only help Bush to isolate Paris and Berlin and downgrade the image of “old Europe”. If Russia sends soldiers, the deployment will be the final nail in the coffin of a Franco-Russo-German alliance, the existence of which may have been a major nuisance for the White House. Either way, Bush will trump the best cards of his opponents in the run-up to the election. As is often the case, the House always wins.

But the win may carry a hefty penalty. Soon after coming into power, George Bush let it be known that he will not let US foreign policy be affected by the opinion of the international community or the interests of other countries. Until now, this creed was the foundation of American actions around the world, including the war on terrorism. But this approach currently finds itself in dire straits. Washington will need to accede to a number of compromises that take into account the desires of the European Union or the Arab League of Nations, for instance. This is a positive development if the issue at hand is the hampering of American unilateralism. But will the world become safer as a result, and will the war on terrorism become more effective? Compromise, as is well-known, can not only empower the weak, but enfeeble the strong – in this case, the US. And one question that deserves the most serious consideration is whether Russia ’s strategic safety will profit from such compromises.

Nikolai Zlobin is the Director of Russian and Asian Programs at the Center for Defense Information in Washington DC, and the editor-in-chief of the Washington ProFile News Agency.