The evolution of George Bush in his post as president partly recalls Vladimir Putin's own evolution, albeit in the opposite direction. Two years ago Bush came to power with the image of a dependent, short-sighted politician. But now no one recalls either the epithets he was awarded by the American and world press, or the exceptionally low expectations of his administration from American society and various world capitals. He has been transformed from a president whom no one thought capable into a politician who now has forced America and the world to accept his political agenda.

For only the third time in US history has the President's party increased its presence in Congress during the midterm elections, and it is believed that the deciding factor in these elections was the President himself. I myself was a witness to how a brief pre-election appearance by Bush in traditionally Democratic states led to the victory of the Republican candidate. Of course, Bush continues to regularly err in his pronunciation of complex words and sentences and is unable, for instance, to properly pronounce "nuclear weapons", but no one is still looking at this as a true indicator of his intellect.

Bush is not burdened by lengthy experience in world politics. At the outset of his stay in the White House he began asking questions that at first glance seemed naïve, questions that on one hand shook up the international political establishment with their directness, simplicity, and political incorrectness and, on the other hand, puzzled that establishment. For the answers were not forthcoming. Bush immediately put under suspicion everything that during the last half century was considered to be indisputable truths in international relations. He turned out to be the child who, with his simple questions, stumped all the sages of foreign policy.

Having clinched a unanimous approval of the UN Security Council resolution on Iraq, Bush is celebrating another victory. It is difficult to say whether this will be a Phyrric victory. In that direction, Bush has achieved nearly everything during the past year. Washington was able to strip Saddam Hussein of absolutely all global support, except from the side of terrorists, and to make the Iraq issue the epicenter of international relations, giving the countries of the world a direct choice: "Whose side are you on?". He convinced the UN to make Iraq the main item on its agenda, and convinced Baghdad to accept the weapons inspectors on the basis of a new, stringent Security Council resolution, which Iraq and, by the way, Russia, did not even want to hear about only two months ago. He played on the disagreements among his opponents within the Security Council - France, Russia, and China, who were unable to develop a coherent stance - and guaranteed himself a free hand in the question.

The great majority of Americans hope there will be no war. Russia, which on every stage of the Iraqi epic stood against the American position, and lost every time, is counted upon in America to wisely use its strong influence on Baghdad, leading it to a full and controlled disarmament.

For George Bush the Iraqi problem carries a partially personal connotation, which cannot but affect his rationality in making the choices related to this question. But his position toward Russia is also hardly considered rational by many in Washington. Bush's relationship to Russia and president Putin carries very personal characteristics. The White House's Russian policy is being formulated today not by traditional mechanisms and criteria, but on the personal sympathy which the American president feels toward Russia and her leader. Russia and Putin have become an example of the departure away from traditional diplomacy and standard mechanisms of foreign policy choices, which Bush has displayed over the past two years.

While the elites of both countries counted each other's warheads and tried to untangle the webs of Kremlin intrigue, the global energy market, and geopolitical interests, Bush met with the Russian president and personally decided that he could trust Russia with Putin at her helm. Moreover, he could trust her more than all the traditional US allies on the European continent combined, a sentiment that shook up his traditionally anti-Russian and pro-European foreign policy elite. No matter how the Kremlin behaved thereafter on the international arena, no matter what happened inside Russia, the American president's position did not budge and consequently, neither did US policy toward Russia. This costs a great deal.

Yet this cannot continue forever. Recently North Korea put Washington in an embarrassing situation, confessing under the weight of the evidence that it had continued its nuclear program, deceiving the White House and the entire world. The Russian president, by the way, should also keep this in mind next time the Korean leader is persuading him in the sincerity of his words. From the very beginning Bush did not believe Kim Chen-Ir, but trusted Putin, thereby making his own authority reliant in some ways upon developments in Russia.

In their time Clinton and Gore were accused of undertaking a policy toward Moscow that was "too soft", closing their eyes to corruption in the upper echelons of power, chaos in the country and the army, and criminality. In pre-election debates George Bush explicitly reproached Gore for ignoring Russian problems, astonishing Americans by correctly pronouncing Victor Chernomyrdin's name. Bush will not want to be in Gore's position in two years and lose votes in the election because of his current faith in Russia and Putin. The explanation that he wanted better, but it ended up as usual, local voters, as always, will not accept.

P.S. The article was not assigned by the White House, and the author did not vote for Republicans.

Translated by Seva Gunitskiy