In the summer of last year, after the first meeting of the Russian and American presidents in Slovenia, George Bush announced that he looked into his colleague's soul and understood that he could trust him completely. And recently, the liberal newspaper, The Washington Post, showed a caricature: The Russian President is lying in bed, in the Lincoln Bedroom of the White House, with Korea's Kim Jong Il, Saddam Hussein and Iran's Mohammed Khatami.

Bush is peeking into the half open door and telling Putin: "Vladimir, let me know when you have a free minute — I'd like to look into your soul again…" The butt of the joke is not Putin, of course, but Bush, who, according to the newspaper, was so misguided. This opinion is contested in the American elite, but not by everyone — The New York Times even reprinted the caricature.

George Bush is doubtlessly the most pro-Russian US president in recent history. It would be very imprudent for Moscow to fail to get the maximum long-term advantage from this unique situation. But it seems that, instead, Moscow is looking for any excuse to make trouble for the United States and demonstrate the independence of its foreign policy. One gets the impression that it maintains that "opposite" approach — whatever is good for the US is a priori bad for Russia.

Of course Washington understands that the Kremlin leadership must take into consideration public opinion. And the public cannot but shock the average Westerner. For example, a recent VTsIOM survey showed that 52% of the Russian answered in the affirmative the question "Do you think the Americans got what they deserved?" Moreover, only 15% of the respondents maintained that the US is fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, while the rest felt that the US was pursuing its own goals, that are not related to anti-terrorism. Without a foreign policy strategy, but, at the same time, with an anti-American elite, a mainly anti-American media and a public that outstrips certain Islamic countries in its distaste for the United States, it will be difficult for the Kremlin to prove to Washington its reliability as an ally.

America wants to keep Russia as a reliable friend, but, in international relations, as in life in general, it is easier to deal with a predictable enemy than with an unpredictable friend.

The US is a key Western state. If it loses the friendship of the US, Moscow will inevitably complicate its relations with all developed nations, including the European nations, which are already very reluctant to make compromises with Russia, agreeing o them only under heavy pressure from Washington. Whether Russia likes it or not, its way to Europe lies through the Potomac. To be an ally of Washington does not mean to "bend over backwards" for it without a second thought, on first command. It's enough to look at the policies of France or Germany.

Whom can Moscow consider a friend, then? Whom can it rely on? No one has any illusions about China. The Arab nations, which were so good at taking advantage of Moscow's anti-Americanism during the Cold War, now see in Russia a potential rival on the energy market. As for Iraq, Russia's desire to solve this problem while maintaining the regime of Saddam Hussein is reminiscent of the USSR's attempts to prevent the Second World War by concluding friendship and cooperation agreements with Hitler's Germany. One cannot count on a dictator's decency. It's the absence of decency that makes one a dictator.

Moscow has no, and will have no, real levers to pressure Hussein. He already started wars twice without consulting it, and only agreed to readmit inspectors under the direct threat of an American invasion. There is no guarantee that he will not want to go to war again, or expel the inspectors again, provoking an international crisis. Moscow could become the victim of the next venture the regime it allowed to survive takes.

Nowadays, Iraq is very successful at playing the primitive flattery card, convincing Russia that it can stop the US. This is a salve for the Russian elite, which is not only unwilling to lick the wounds it received during the collapse of its superpower, but is also sadistically picking at them. The Kremlin has fallen for this banal card — played by various political adventurers — more than once, spending billions of dollars and ending up taking no tricks in someone else's game.

Even out of basic practicality, which is so popular on Smolenskaya Square, it is obvious that, by protecting Saddam Hussein's regime, Russia radically decreases its chances to participate in the division of the post-Saddam pie.

Regardless of the results of the inspectors' mission, the US today is set on changing the nature of the Iraqi regime. It is considered here that, unless this is done, sooner or later the West become a victim of terrorism once again. And if the West is weakened, Russia will be too. Furthermore, in such a situation, it could become "the weakest link."