For two years now, Russia has been a member of the international anti-terror coalition, with the US as its putative leader. What are the results? How have the events in Iraq affected the US-Russian alliance? And finally, what will presidents Bush and Putin talk about during their September 24 meeting at Camp David ? Izvestia observer Georgiy Bobt and scholar Nikolai Zlobin discuss these and other issues.

“Non-improvable” Relations

GB: The upcoming anniversary of 9/11 is also the anniversary of a turning point in Russian foreign policy. People in the West proclaimed how great it was of Putin to join the anti-terror coalition. Today, this claim is sounding stale. The war with terrorism has not become less relevant, but new items need to be placed on the agenda, and this is happening with some difficulty. There was talk about a dialogue on energy issues between Russia and the US , dialogue that would infuse the relations with more substance. Now this topic seems to have faded out of view somewhat. Or will something change at the September meeting?

NZ: I agree, the situation with US-Russian relations is worrisome. Incidentally, after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union , I argued against the thesis of “improving Russian-American relations”. These were US-Soviet relations, and they were non-improvable in principle. They needed to be jettisoned completely, placed into the archives, replaced by a new relations paradigm based on a fundamentally new philosophy and worldview. This did not happen. I was told then: we are no longer enemies, we have no choice but to become friends, and from that, the relationship will develop naturally. This was a deeply flawed approach. The outcome of this approach, in my view, is that our relations are today in a state of intellectual, economic, and political bankruptcy. This is indeed worrisome. After 9/11 it became obvious that everything in the past which people had been trying to improve is now meaningless. A shift to a new model of relations is necessary. And after Putin spoke out in support of the West and the US , a certain vague conception of strategic partnership did appear, defined by the war on terrorism. This brief era of searching for a partnership ended with Iraq . We did not become strategic partners. Russia and the US have no fundamental basis for relations. There is cooperation on certain issues: terrorism, energy policy, etc, but a “holistic” relations paradigm that answers these questions – where will we be in 20 years, why do we need each other? – does not exist. Everyone likes to say, “we have agreed to disagree,” and this is our achievement. But where have we agreed to agree? That list is excessively short, and contains mostly tactical issues.

GB: And if we replace “ Russia ” with “ Germany ” – do these countries have a fundamental basis for a relationship?

NZ: There is a difference. The American elite entered into conflict with the German leadership, but not with Germany . US-German relations have and will continue to be normal: huge trade volume, a unity of political, moral, ideological, cultural values – none of those things were disturbed by the tactical spar over Iraq . As, by the way, was the case with France . In Russia , the situation is exactly the opposite. There is a good relationship between the Presidents, favorable relations between the elites of both countries, but relations between the two countries are practically non-existent. Relations between the two countries work because Bush and Putin like each other. But if future Russian and American presidents cannot work together, relations will go to hell in a handbasket.

GB: I think it’s enough for elites to have a good relationship, since the general Russian public does not participate in forming the foreign policy agenda. The gap between the elite and the public is much greater in Russia than in Germany . By the way, anti-American sentiment in Russia has greatly increased over the past few years, despite the good Putin-Bush relationship. So our president, in his friendship with Bush, seems to be making a mistake. Yet the average person is not judging Putin for it.

NZ: I wouldn’t pay too much attention to anti-American sentiments in Russia . Russia , as paradoxical as it sounds, is a fairly pro-American country, if we take into account our value systems, our attitude toward personal freedom, etc. It is the most pro-American Asiatic power. And it’s not that important that the two elites see each other in a positive light – it’s more important that they can cooperate. There is no healthy pragmatism in their relations. As Iraq showed, the Russian elite was convinced that America would experience tremendous difficulties without Russia , that Russia would be able to offer tremendous assistance. Within the American elite, however, the dominant idea was that America is strong that it doesn’t need anyone. Now there is a retreat from these extreme positions.

GB: Because both sides made a mistake…

NZ: The American mistake was less harmful…

GB: Really now? Soldiers are being killed in Iraq every day, and the US public is becoming increasingly concerned about that.

NZ: Compared to the catastrophic scenarios suggested in March and April – all the bridges will be blown up, all the oil wells will be burnt – it hasn’t been that bad.

GB: Don’t worry, they’ll burn everything down yet.

NZ: I don’t think so. I wouldn’t exaggerate the significance of the guerilla war in Iraq, compared to those positive things that the Russian press practically ignores – the mass construction in Baghdad, the long lines around the city of people signing up to enter the new army and the new police force. Real change is taking place. But the Russian press has an inclination to focus on the negative.

Iraq is exemplary in another respect. Over the past ten years, during the period of so-called improvement in our relations, we ignored or put off certain unsolved issues. The issue of Iran was put off, and now it has grown to such a size that it can no longer be ignored. Or the problem of North Korea . We didn’t necessarily have to face the Iraq issue now, but in the end it would have been worse to put it off longer. The issue with Japan about the northern territories was left to future generations and as a result, Russia somehow managed to not make an ally out of Japan . This was a failure of the foreign policy elite. The second-largest economy in the world doesn’t want anything to do with Russia , doesn’t want to make investments into the energy industry, and is not a Russian partner in the Far East .

In Search of Gain

GB: Here’s the problem – the Russian elite is experiencing the “Kozyrev syndrome” which can be boiled down thusly: during the Kozyrev period of diplomacy in the early 90s, we gave Americans everything. And where is the gratitude? There is resentment that we received so little in return. Same with Japan : we could have given them the Kuril Islands , and then it would have turned out that our investment climate was not quite right. With the Americans, our elite always ask the question: what have we to gain from this? And they refuse to understand that maybe there is nothing concrete to gain. What will we get if we refuse nuclear cooperation with Iran , and lose one billion dollars, or more if we take future nuclear reactors into account? This view is hard to overcome.

A more simple example – visas. At summits, whether with the EU or with the US , we hear one thing, but when a Russian person walks into a Western embassy, he hears another. And he considers it an insult. And there is no friendship of the peoples, as between Germany and the US . There are no breakthrough initiatives on either side, even though this shift from a relationship between the presidents and the elite to a relationship between the people could provide substance for a new agenda. These could be initiatives in a number of areas – visa, small business, cultural, or scientific. Moreover, there is a whole number of strategic projects – reforming “failed states” in Africa or regimes in transition, as in Iraq . There needs to be a push for mutual cooperation on the missile defense systems. Many things could be used for a new agenda.

NZ: The view that Russia did not receive anything in return is highly misleading. Didn’t Russia ’s security improve because of improved relations with the US ? Aren’t Russia ’s global interests being secured in a better way?

GB: From the point of view of many representatives of the Russian elite, relations with the West are viewed in the context of all the changes over the past 15 years. In this context, Russian security has decreased: no one used to blow up residential buildings in Russia etc. And all because, so they say, of the “damn American influence”. Democracy was brought to Russia by the West. It wasn’t actualized through liberating the elites or the normal person. The impulse for introducing liberalism into Russia came from the fear felt by the Soviet elite that the country is losing the military-technological race to the US . Fear overtook the Russian gerontocracy not because of visions of national anger, or populist demands for democracy and market reforms, but from Reagan’s Star Wars. Let’s be friends, they said to the West. And the West said: okay, let’s start with you acting more civilized. Open up, become more democratic, more market-oriented. The Russian elite did not generate anything democratic, but borrowed it from the West. And it still perceives many things the same way it has before. It’s walking forward with its head turned back. This is manifested through certain utterances by public figures, through TV shows, through elite and mass culture, which is saturated with “Sovietisms” and nostalgia for the past. This is characteristic for foreign policy and for the dialogue with the US .

NZ: I agree. But to place all the blame on the US is a childish move in establishing a political culture, both for the elites and the public at large. The blame for USSR ’s bankruptcy cannot be placed on the US . The US did not paralyze the Soviet economy, it did not rob the country of bread, potatoes, vodka and sugar, or force the public to go on rations. And regarding security: we need to look at it fundamentally: Putin has repeatedly said that the biggest threat facing Russia today is Islamic fundamentalism. Has this threat increased since Russia began cooperating with the US ? The liquidation of the Taliban in Afghanistan , the liquidation of the Iraqi regime – did this not undermine the positions of Islamic fundamentalism? And look at relations with Europe : all rapprochement with the EU over the past ten years has taken place under the influence of the US . Europe is not rushing to get closer to Russia , America is trying to force it to do so.

The visa question is a very touchy one. But the Russian elite and, in part, the presidential administration have fallen into their own trap. A year ago, when president Bush visited, I participated in many discussion about the fact that Russians should be able to visit the US on the same terms as East Europeans. But then people in Moscow put out a call to publicly admit that international terrorism operates in Russia , primarily in Chechnya . How is the West supposed to open up its borders? By admitting that international terrorism operates within Russia , Russia put itself in the same category as Pakistan , Libya , and Lebanon .

GB: So, what do you suggest, we should call these people freedom fighters?

NZ: No. But there’s no need to add yourself to the list of countries who cannot deal with international terrorism. By winning the tactical victory in diminishing the criticism against the Chechen war, it lost more strategically. You want countries to open up borders and provide investment to a country where terrorists operate? When this question was being discussed last year, I was shown dozens of articles from the Russian press on how easy it is to purchase passports and other fake documents in Russia . That is, the government does not control this sphere. The fight for easing the visa regime will end up with only the elite being able to travel.

GB: I agree that this threat does exist.

NZ: And another interesting thing. In contemporary Russia , I have noticed, there’s a lot of talk about disenchantment with the West. But in the world at large there is a lot of disenchantment with Russia . Many expectations were not fulfilled about Russia , just like many Russian expectations about the West were not fulfilled. It’s amusing to hear discourse on who Russia should enter into alliances with – China , India , Asia in general, the CIS, who to partner up with in the EU. But the question being ignored is who wants to enter into an alliance with Russia . It seems to me that Russia has no reliable friend, no friends whatsoever. But for some reason, in Moscow many people are convinced that the choice lies with Russia .

GB: But do other countries have reliable friends?

NZ: It’s not called friendship – it’s countries who want to enter into alliances. And there is a long line at the White House of countries who want to do this.

GB: But that’s because of selfishness. And Belorussia wants to be friends with us.

NZ: By the way, the Russo-American project on reforming Belarus is a good idea. All in all, our cooperation could bring about some interesting results in Eastern Europe .

GB: It seems to me that the Russian elite could take up the question of whether it needs foreign alliances at all. At one point, isolationism was very useful for America . Maybe for Russia , isolationism could become the dominant idea in foreign policy. The country would just concentrate on itself for a while.

NZ: I agree. But for that, you need an understanding of strategic development goals. And if it’s decided that it’s not important for Russia to deal with Africa , there should be someone else to deal with Africa . In reality, America is interested in strengthening Russian influence in areas where American influence is lacking, Central Asia first and foremost. Russia , as a great regional power, can hold a lot more sway in its backyard than America . I agree that Russian foreign policy should be egotistic, and should not be reminiscent of a dog out for a walk, leaving its mark here and there. It needs to have a marked presence in Asia , in the Muslim world, in the Far East , in China , in Europe , in America – everywhere! Until Russia fleshes out a response to whether it’s ready to solve problems of strategic security, whether in an alliance with America or without one, its foreign policy will remain impulsive and unpredictable. No one likes that, friends and foes alike.

GB: Why do you say that, Russia ’s position on Iraq was rather predictable.

NZ: It was improvised.

GB: It was predictable. Decisions were taken by people who grew up in atmosphere of a struggle between two superpowers. America says one thing, therefore Russia should say the opposite. No Russian diplomat can openly admit that we will gladly follow America ’s lead. This is not a problem just for France of Russia, but a world-wide cultural irritation toward a global hegemon. Moreover, there is concern (not necessarily related to Yukos) that anti-Western sentiments in certain fractions of the Russian elite could affect the short-term development of relations with the US . And we’ll start sending diplomats-spies to each other, as happened shortly before 9/11.

NZ: There is that danger. But this is possible only in conditions of a total lack of a fundamental basis for relations, when tactical manipulations take on an enormous scales shadow serious issues. It’s time to do something. The time is not lost yet, but the window of opportunity is closing. And when it closes, it will stay so for a long time.

Nikolai Zlobin is the Director of Russian and Asian programs at the Center for Defense Information and the editor-in-chief of the Washington Profile News Agency.