TABLE OF CONTENTS
 

Engagement before Invasion

Michael Donovan, Ph.D., Research Analyst, mdonovan@cdi.org

On the eve of a possible war with Iraq, Americans should consider that the United States has the ability to change the strategic map of the Middle East without firing a shot. Washington should reinvest itself in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and explore an improved relationship with Iran. Meaningful re-engagement in the peace process would help to repair America’s beleaguered image in the Arab world and strike at the ideological center of gravity of Islamist terrorism. Iran represents the future of the Persian Gulf. Engaging Tehran would encourage the democratic evolution underway in that country and help define a brighter future for the region as a whole. Moreover, improvements in either relationship would mitigate the risks inherent in any invasion of Iraq.

Following Sept. 11, 2001, many believed that if the United States were to enlist the support of Arab states in the war on terrorism Washington would have to address the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon certainly believed this to be the case when he warned Washington not to "try to appease the Arabs at our expense…Israel will not be Czechoslovakia." The source of the prime minister’s ire was President George W. Bush’s endorsement in early October 2001 of the idea of a Palestinian state. Sharon’s unfortunate statement understandably riled the administration. But in the intervening months, the administration nevertheless abdicated its leadership role in promoting peace in favor of a dangerous over-identification with the interests of the Sharon government. In January 2002, President Bush equated the Palestinian rejectionist groups with al Qaeda. In June, the president put on the table a plan for a Palestinian state predicated on the conditions that Yasser Arafat be replaced by a more palatable figure. Of the Israelis, little more than patience has been asked. The administration’s approach to the crisis transformed a longstanding U.S. strategic priority into what Thomas Friedman has correctly called a policy of "benign neglect." In the meantime, the mutual bloodletting has continued. Little wonder that Washington has found so few enthusiastic supporters for regime change in Iraq.

Likewise, Washington missed a number of opportunities to improve relations with Tehran. After the events of Sept. 11, 2001 U.S. and Iranian interests converged, and there seemed to be a possibility for improved relations. Observances in sympathy for American victims of the attacks were held in a number of Iranian cities. Both conservatives and reformists immediately denounced the attacks and later offered to assist in the rescue of downed American pilots involved in military operations in Afghanistan. Iranian assistance played an important role in the successes in Afghanistan and the formation of an interim government. European governments argued that the time was ripe to strengthen Iranian reformers through engagement. Continued hostility, they said, played into the hands of hardliners who used it as an excuse for their own failure in governance. In January, however, Bush declared Iran a charter member of the "axis of evil." In July, the administration signaled that it no longer believed reformers in Iran were capable or serious about delivering constructive change. The shift in policy placed Iran in the "captive nations" category, and implied that Iranian democracy would come only by toppling the present order.

The administration’s inflexible approach to these problems no longer makes any sense. The overwhelming victory of reformers in the 2000 elections has changed the political landscape in Iran, perhaps permanently. Washington should take steps to encourage this transformation and the democratic aspirations of a population that is young, well educated, and surprisingly pro-American. Demographically, economically, and politically, Iran is destined to be the major player in the region, and it interests dovetail with those of the United States to a remarkable degree. For Tehran, economic considerations have assumed paramount importance and it has largely renounced its hostile revolutionary legacy in favor of improved relations with its neighbors and the West. To be sure, Iran’s support for Hezbollah and the Palestinian rejectionist groups remains a serious problem, but this policy serves the interest of a hard-line minority and is not representative of Iran’s politically sophisticated and reform-minded younger generations. Likewise, Iran’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction must be viewed within the context of its legitimate security concerns. Taking these concerns into account in deliberations about the future of Iraq and Afghanistan would help dampen Tehran’s appetite for such weapons, foster trust with Washington, and enhance prospects for success over the long term. Ignoring Iran’s security interests confirms the suspicions of hardliners and handicaps those in Tehran who would fully integrate the nation into the international community as a responsible member.

Serious attempts by Washington to revive the Middle East peace process, even at this late stage, would be universally welcomed. Internationally, the threat from Saddam is seen as a narrowly defined obsession of Washington’s. In contrast, the Israeli-Palestinian crisis continues to be the number one concern of Arab and Muslim communities in the Middle East. The administration’s unconvincing argument that the road to peace leads through Baghdad is viewed abroad as cynically self-serving. Washington cannot impose a solution, even if it had one. However, a conditional approach that places the onus for progress simply on reform of the Palestinian Authority is unlikely to produce results. Leadership requires the courage to formulate both the outlines of a just settlement and a timetable for its implementation. Re-engagement would provide Arab leaders with the political cover they need to cooperate with the United States both in the war on terrorism and the disarmament or overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

Progress in the peace process and toward Iran would be mutually reinforcing. Iranians debate the wisdom of further obstructionism, with critics openly asking why Tehran should be "more Palestinian than the Palestinians." Meaningful progress that garnered the support of a majority of Palestinians would also find support among Arab states. It is likely that pragmatists in Iran would use this progress to leverage a reduction in material assistance to terrorist organizations. Closing the gap between American and European approaches to the region would allow a more unified response to problems and magnify the influence the West can bring to issues like terrorism and weapons proliferation. Most importantly, progress in the peace process and Iran would help to further isolate radicals who currently reject political solutions to the many problems facing the region. In this way, re-engagement will anchor stability in the region and foster the constructive change that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein cannot.

Skipping Missile Defense’s Operational Testing Is Unwarranted And Could Deliver A Death Blow To Confidence In The U.S.’s Arsenal

Victoria Samson, Research Associate, vsamson@cdi.org

Testifying in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on Feb. 13, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld released some startling information: the Department of Defense asked in the fiscal year 2004 budget request for a waiver that would allow the Pentagon to skip operational testing for some of the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) programs. Claiming that the systems didn’t need to be perfect before being deployed, Rumsfeld argued that "it makes sense to waive [operational testing] when reasonable people look at the situation and say that it’s time to do that." Yet given the poor showing missile defense has had in testing thus far and its largely immature state of development, it does not seem reasonable to grant a waiver from operational testing. Furthermore, it could set a precedent where weapons are hurried into production before they have completed their testing, resulting in the fielding of unreliable systems that unnecessarily endanger American lives.

The request for an operational testing waiver takes up no more that one paragraph in the FY’04 budget request. It asks that funding "be used to develop and field an initial set of missile defense capabilities, and such fielding shall be considered to be system development and demonstration" for acquisitional purposes. It goes on to define the initial set of missile defense capabilities as the "Block 04" Ballistic Missile Defense System funded in FY’04 and FY’05, and finishes by assuring that "subsequent blocks of missile defense capabilities shall be subject to existing laws governing development and production of major defense acquisition programs." In other words, the technologies needed to meet the 2004/2005 deployment schedule -- primarily the ground-based midcourse missile defense (GMD) and the sea-based Aegis ballistic missile defense (Aegis BMD) programs (although the presidential directive was so loosely worded that a number of other technologies could be included here) -- would be able to skip operational testing before moving into initial production and, in doing so, bypass federal law regulating defense acquisition. Ostensibly, the waiver is limited only to the Block 04 system, but there is the chance that, if granted in this circumstance, MDA would attempt to expand it to more of its systems.

Members of Congress have expressed discomfort with the possibility of circumventing the defense development process. At the Feb. 13 SASC hearing, Sen. Carl Levin, (D-Mich.), expressed concern about the application for a waiver, pointing out that the operational testing function "exists to prevent the production and fielding of a weapon system that doesn’t work right." And in a Feb. 19 letter to Rumsfeld, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, (D-Calif.), questions the move: "Given the potential cost of a failure of missile defense, I believe that, if anything, it should be required to meet more stringent test standards than normally required."

The standards a weapon system must meet before it can move into production are clearly laid out in the U.S. Code governing federal law. Title 10, Ch. 141, Sect. 2399 says that "a major defense acquisition program may not proceed beyond low-rate initial production unless initial operational test and evaluation of the program is completed." It later explains that the end goal of testing is to "confirm that the item or components actually tested are effective and suitable for combat." Operational testing serves the very important purpose of ensuring that the weapons do what they are supposed to do; it is not a frivolous or expendable part of the procurement process.

The U.S. Code does allow, under certain circumstances, for operational testing to be skipped. In Title 10, Ch. 144, Sect. 2430, a waiver may be granted if the Secretary of Defense does the following:

1. determines that operational testing would be "unnecessarily expensive or impractical,"
2. develops an alternative operational testing program,
3. describes how the system will be evaluated, and
4. submits to Congressional defense committees a report containing the above.

Based on what was submitted with the unclassified version of the FY’04 budget request, if the Pentagon has decided on another way of evaluating missile defense programs outside of operational testing, it has yet to share it. And while operational testing certainly is expensive -- each flight intercept test of the GMD program costs roughly $100 million -- the case has not been made that it is unnecessary.

This move for a waiver is the latest step by a Defense Department that seems to want to play fast and loose with weapons procurement rules. Secretary Rumsfeld’s much-touted theory of ‘spiral development,’ where a weapons system would be fielded and then finish its development (rather than vice versa), compresses and crunches the developmental process through which a weapon system normally has to proceed until it is nearly unrecognizable. The reason the Pentagon has given for its new approach to weapons procurement is that it wishes to change along with the times. But there might be a less admirable motive pushing for spiral development. Supporters of missile defense have been trying to overcome the systems’ technical limitations by smoothing over anything that might prove embarrassing, like a poor performance in operational testing.

This has already been played out in the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missile defense system. The military has been working on the program for the better part of a decade after the first Gulf War highlighted the threat short-range ballistic missiles could pose to U.S. troops abroad. The PAC-3 did fairly well in developmental testing, causing planners to schedule a perfunctory four operational tests in the spring of 2002, with the confident assumption that a decision could be made in September 2002 to move into low-rate initial production. To be blunt, the PAC-3 bombed operational testing. Sometimes the missiles failed to launch, other times the computer system failed to transmit target information in time, and in still others a shaky interception did not result in the destruction of the target missile. After the last test failure, MDA announced it would hold off on the low-rate initial production decision for at least a year so that follow-on testing could occur. The only thing buoying the PAC-3 presently is the impending war with Iraq. The program has been awash with funding so it can ramp up missile production in time for the expected hostilities. In the meanwhile, no new operational testing has occurred. Whatever problems plagued the PAC-3 last year most likely still exist.

DoD’s Director of Test and Evaluation, Thomas Christie, lists in his most recent annual report at least 23 more flight tests that the PAC-3 needs to undergo. Christie also evaluates in his report the state of the other missile defense programs, none of which is very encouraging. The GMD system "has yet to demonstrate significant operational capabilities," and its testing program needs to "go beyond the typical proof-of-concept demonstration in order to provide a higher confidence in estimates of operational capability." The Aegis BMD system’s test program is called "simplistic" and "non-stressing." What is eye-opening is that these programs are the farthest along of all the missile defense systems. The glaring immaturity of the other missile defense programs cannot be ignored, and they certainly should not skip any step in their developmental processes.

What the Pentagon is proposing is the deployment of an unfinished, untested system before it has proven itself to be reliable. The U.S. laws regulating weapons acquisition is supposed to prevent this exact thing from occurring. What is even more disheartening is that if this operational waiver is granted to missile defense programs, other weapons systems will likely attempt to follow suit. This could result in an arsenal of weapons that may or may not work. Confidence in our military technology is too important to be worked out on the battlefield during the fog of war.

CDI’s "Briefing Room"

Pentagon Seeks End to Ban on Development of Low Yield Nukes — Recently the Defense Department provided the House and Senate Armed Services Committees with its proposals for legislative changes in existing law. It includes rescinding the 1994 ban on the research and development of "low-yield" nuclear weapons – those with a yield below five kilotons. Past efforts in Congress to repeal the ban have failed, although the fiscal year 2001 Defense Authorization Act included language requesting a study on the possible use of nuclear weapons to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets. The Pentagon’s formal request that the ban be lifted means that some form of Congressional action on the issue is likely.

No Combat Role for U.S. Troops in Philippines — U.S. troops will not be permitted to conduct combat operations against Abu Sayyaf forces in the southern Philippines, according to Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (Mar. 5). While welcoming U.S. assistance and training in the government’s war against the insurgents, the President said, "I just draw the line at ground combat." The announcement came one day after the airport bombing which killed 21, including one American, and injured 148. When announcing the planned U.S. deployment to the region two weeks ago, the Pentagon stated that U.S. forces would take part in combat operations. Philippine officials refuted the statement, citing their constitution, which forbids such activities by foreign forces on Philippine soil. Officials believe that the bombing was the work of another revolutionary group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

China To Slow Growth in Military Spending — China's finance minister Xiang Huaicheng is proposing to slow growth in China’s defense spending in the coming year. According to the government, China plans to spend $22.4 billion on the military, an increase of slightly less than ten percent from the current budget of $20.4 billion. China’s official defense budget has grown dramatically over the last two years, increasing by fifteen to twenty percent annually. Some of this increase is certainly due to recent Chinese government efforts to curtail the commercial activities of the military, which used business ventures such as agriculture and hotel management, as well as arms sales, to supplement official spending. This situation made it difficult for the Chinese government to use the budget to control the military. Despite these efforts by the government, China’s actual military expenditures are likely considerably higher than official figures. For instance, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) put Chinese military spending at $27 billion in 2001, while the Institute for International and Strategic Studies in London estimated Chinese military spending at $47 billion for that year.

Singapore Joins JSF Program — Singapore signed a letter of intent on February 22 to participate in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, making it the ninth foreign government to join the United States in developing the aircraft. Singapore has pledged $50 million over six years to support JSF development. Like Israel, which joined the JSF program in early February, Singapore will not have official input in to the aircraft’s final requirements and capabilities. They will, however, receive program updates and access to proprietary information that will assist the Singapore government in determining whether the JSF will meet their military’s requirements for replacing their current fighter aircraft fleet.

Quotation of the Week — "Americans can hope that the arrest of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, and the hoped-for exploitation of it, will block terrorist plots now underway and break down parts of the al Qaeda network. It is certainly satisfying to have a prime author of the Sept. 11 crimes in U.S. custody; we hope that, once interrogation is complete, Mr. Mohammed can be brought before a tribunal to answer for his crimes. But it is too much to hope that we will not face such an enemy again," Washington Post editorial, March 4, 2003.
 

This Week on SUPERPOWER: Global Affairs TV —
"North Korea Ignored?"

SUPERPOWER: Global Affairs TV examines the timely issues that affect the United States together with foreign experts from around the world.

As the possibility of war in Iraq looms, another storm may be brewing over the Korean Peninsula. North Korean leader Kim Jung Il has said that more sanctions against North Korea could lead to war. Is this tough rhetoric by the North Koreans, or is there another conflict on the horizon even as we prepare for war in the Middle East?

Joining Superpower guest moderator Husain Haqqani, sitting in for Lisa Simeone, will be Mark Thompson, national security correspondent for Time magazine; Yoshihisa Komori, Editor-at-Large with Sankei Shimbun; and Hyung Lee, Director of the Korea Project at the International Center.

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