What Can the Coming War Tell Us About the State of Military Transformation?
Marcus Corbin, Senior Analyst, mcorbin@cdi.org
Much discussion of military "transformation" focuses on how the introduction of new information and communication systems -- intended mainly to provide ever faster and more complete targeting data -- is proceeding. But a broader concept of transformation might be: "how is military preparation for the complex, political, multilateral, semi-combat scenarios that seem to be replacing the more straightforward ‘shooting wars’ of earlier times going"? The coming war against Iraq actually fits into the former category, given the widespread effects that U.S. actions will have on the war on terrorism, the clash with fundamentalist Islam, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, views of the United States among allied peoples and in the Muslim world, and the global economy, to name a few. So what might the course of the war tell us about progress in this broader concept of military transformation? Five issues follow.
Grand Strategy
How well will the nation’s political and uniformed leaders use the military tool of national security? Will they use it as a blunt club, and so hinder U.S. efforts in diplomatic, economic, and social arenas? Or will they use it in a restrained way, in cooperation with other tools?
Things to Watch: How sophisticated is the bombing plan? If the civilian infrastructure of Iraq -- roads, bridges, railroads, waterways, airfields, power plants, refineries, factories, and communications lines -- is targeted as it was during Operation Desert Storm, it will indicate that the U.S. leadership still gives relatively low importance to the political aspects of modern conflict. However, there are reports that the military is planning a relatively restrained bombing effort.
Also, how well will the neighboring states handled? Will Iran, Turkey, Jordan, or others be destabilized or drawn into the fighting?
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations
How well has the military, particularly the Army, prepared itself for complex semi-combat missions? It is one thing to defeat Saddam Hussein’s military forces, but how well will the occupation go?
Things to Watch: If the Army is able to restore order in occupied areas, and prevent ethnic groups attacking each other to settle old scores, it may indicate that some useful attention has been paid to preparing for stability operations. If U.S. forces handle potential problems with refugees, environmental crises (such as burning oil fields), incursions from neighboring states, chemical/biological attacks and the like effectively, it may indicate that U.S. headquarters are becoming more adept at the multiple elements of modern interventions. And if U.S. forces work well with nongovernmental, international, and civilian agencies, it will indicate that the military is beginning to accept and take advantage of the complementary skills that these other organizations can offer. Regardless of how well the Army does, it seems that the importance of ground forces will be reaffirmed and the hollowness of the currently in-vogue arguments that “air power can do it all” will be exposed.
Urban Warfare
How well have the political and military leadership, and the Army and the Marine Corps prepared for urban warfare? Will the leadership order an assault on Baghdad and other urban areas, or try more patient besieging strategies?
Things to Watch: If siege approaches are chosen, it will indicate that the leadership is able to pursue more complex strategies inherently involving political considerations, rather than solely relying on brute military force. If forces are able to capture cities or portions of cities by assault without suffering or inflicting the normal level of casualties and destruction, it will indicate that the attention given to urban combat training and doctrine, particularly in the Marine Corps over recent years, is paying off.
Weapons of Mass Destruction
How well will the U.S. leadership handle -- both tactically and strategically -- potential Iraqi use of chemical and biological weapons?
Things to Watch: Will the leadership be able to strategically turn potential Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruction into a drawback in the court of world opinion? Will U.S. forces operate effectively under chemical or biological attack, and in particular has sufficient attention been paid to developing relatively simple protective gear for troops in the foxholes while billions have been spent on high-tech, network-centric warfare equipment?
Will the United States itself be tempted to respond in kind with small nuclear weapons -- a move that no doubt would have serious repercussions for rebuilding Iraq as well as the international nonproliferation regime?
Network-centric Warfare
Will network-centric warfare -- using new information technology to link up sensors, "shooters," and commanders -- play a key role in the conflict, or will large numbers of troops on the ground be the crucial factor? Will the network provide too much information to commanders, overwhelming them with data and leading them to micromanage officers on the scene?
Things to Watch: If the U.S. network of sensors happens to spot Saddam Hussein and he is killed, network-centric warfare might get a lot of credit (assuming that the political situation improves or Iraqi military resistance ends then). Alternatively, targeting or bombing mistakes, particularly against sites of biological or chemical weapons that lead to widespread casualties, may give the new technology of warfare a bad name.
It is likely that Iraq will provide a strong test of U.S. military progress in transforming itself for complex military operations of the future. The answers may well be arriving soon.
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