Democracy in Iraq?
Michael Donovan, Research Analyst, modonovan@cdi.org
The old adage, "be careful what you ask for, you just may get it," has rarely been more timely. The United States may get a chance to overthrow the odious Saddam Hussein. But attaining the larger goal, a stable, post-war Iraq, may well prove more challenging than eliminating the regime. Such an endeavor will require a long-term and large-scale U.S. commitment. Now is the time to be forthright about the many obstacles that stand in the way of building "institutions of freedom" in Iraq.
President George W. Bush and his advisors have consistently argued that a democratic Iraq would be a powerful example upon which to base political progress in the rest of the Middle East. This is a reasonable assumption and there are some reasons to be encouraged. Iraq’s population has all the makings of a modern middle class. They are relatively well educated, urbanized, and have a long secular tradition. By the standards of the region, there may be few better candidates for democracy, even if it is imposed from the outside. The possibilities are intriguing. A democratic Iraq could indeed provide an anchor for political reform in the Arab world. A successful transition to democracy could also demonstrate to the Arab world that the United States is capable of applying its values beyond the pale of its own narrowly defined national interest. Finally, an Iraq that took a more responsible attitude toward its own security interests would dramatically alter the strategic environment in the Middle East in a way that could not be imagined a short time ago.
The problem is that the administration has continually reified the idea of Iraqi democracy without providing any concrete ideas about the mechanisms by which this might be accomplished. Some analysts regard as fanciful the belief that Washington can simply install a government in Baghdad that is peaceful, pluralistic and pro-Western. There is no meaningful democratic tradition in Iraq and the country is rife with ethnic and religious cleavages. The simple and quick imposition of a democracy from the top down is likely to breed only factionalism and warlordism. Moreover, Washington will have to confront a central tension: A government that is sympathetic to American interests will not necessarily reflect the interests and desires of the Iraqi people. Conversely, a government that is representative of the Iraqi people may not pursue policies that are attractive to Washington.
The task of political reconstruction in the wake of Saddam’s downfall will be daunting. Internal feuding and competition mark the opposition-in-exile, and few of its constituent groups command any significant influence inside Iraq. Years of totalitarian abuse have decimated Iraqi civil society, and Saddam has long since destroyed any independent institutions or personalities that might have guided a peaceful transition to a more democratic form of government. This ensures that political reconstruction will have to be accomplished from the ground up. Violence has traditionally played a central role in Iraqi political culture, and competition among rival groups for influence in the new government could be fierce. The Kurds, the Shi’a, and the Sunni elite will all likely view the creation of a new system as a zero-sum game and be inclined to see the recognition of the interests of others as a diminution of their own. Additionally, the tribal rivalries encouraged by Saddam over the years are unlikely to disappear, and the settling of old scores and jealousies will probably accompany any opening of the political system.
None of this is to say that democracy in Iraq cannot be fostered. But it will be, by necessity, a long-term affair and a Herculean task. Simply asking our European allies and the United Nations to clean up the mess will not suffice. The United States will have to commit itself to the kind of complex peacekeeping and stability missions that the American military has traditionally been reluctant to undertake. Various estimates suggests that a force of between 75,000 and 100,000 troops would be required initially to stabilize the country, with many remaining in Iraq indefinably. In fact, these numbers could be low. U.S. troops will have to police cities, oil field and installations and guarantee the country’s territorial integrity, all while attempting to reinforce a weak sense of Iraqi nationhood. A prolonged American military occupation of an Arab state in the heart of the Middle East is fraught with risks. The indefinite presence of American troops on Arab soil will undoubtedly inflame the passions of Arab/Muslim populations already at odds with the United States. After all, the benign presence of 5,000 U.S. troops on Saudi soil was one of Osama bin Laden’s primary grievances. The connotations for the stability of regional allies could be serious. All of this will occur in an atmosphere of hardened anti-American attitudes. It will be a difficult laboratory in which to conduct an experiment in political transformation.
Thus far, the Bush administration has provided few details on this subject that extend beyond wishful thinking, and its record in Afghanistan gives ample reason for caution. Pragmatists in the administration will no doubt argue for a light touch and shirk the mantle of nation builders. But democracy in Iraq will still be an open question when the Bush administration has departed the White House. The choices the administration makes now will shape the legacy it leaves both the Iraqi and American people.
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