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Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW * Washington, DC 20036 (202)332-0600 * Fax (202)462-4559 * www.cdi.org
TABLE OF CONTENTS
AThirteen Days in October -- Plus Forty: A Personal View Forty years ago this month the world narrowly avoided a third world war. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 began when a U.S. U-2 spy plane photographed Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles on the island of Cuba. President John F. Kennedy, who had been assured by Premier Nikita Khrushchev and his foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, that the Soviets would not introduce offensive weapons on that island, was now faced with the worst crisis of the Cold War. There are interesting similarities and differences between these harrowing thirteen days in 1962 and the current crisis regarding Iraq. Both Cuba and Iraq are small nations with charismatic leaders who seized power and proclaimed a social and political revolution. Over the years, both Fidel Castro and Saddam Hussein have been accused of committing human rights violations, expanding the size of their nations’ military forces, and manufacturing weapons of mass destruction. While Castro’s island was allied with the Soviet Union, Iraq, it would appear, faces the current standoff with the United States without such a powerful superpower ally. However, if Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis is correct, a U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, like Afghanistan before it, may spark the embers of a Western-Islamic confrontation that could potentially eclipse the Cold War confrontation (1946-1991) and degenerate into a 21st century cataclysm. In 1962, Kennedy’s options for removing the nuclear tipped ballistic missiles from Cuba included diplomatic, political, and military measures, all of which are also available to President George W. Bush today. Kennedy set up an Executive Committee -- or Ex Comm -- made up of select members of his Cabinet, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of Central Intelligence, the attorney general (his brother, Robert Kennedy), and other key advisers. In the first few days of the crisis, as the Soviets were rushing to complete construction of the Cuban facilities, the predominant recommendation made to the President by the Ex Comm was to launch a military strike to surgically destroy the missiles. Kennedy was amazed at the answer the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave to him when the President asked how the Soviets would respond to an air attack that would probably kill Russian missile technicians. General Maxwell Taylor insisted that there would be no Soviet response. Eventually cooler heads prevailed and the President decided to proceed with a naval blockade of Cuba -- still technically an ‘act of war,’ but a more reasoned response than a direct military strike. Despite several near-misses when Soviet and American forces almost came to blows in the waters of the Caribbean, the crisis was resolved peacefully and the nuclear confrontation ended without a resort to force. Like Kennedy in 1962, today Bush enjoys seemingly overwhelming support of most of the military, the Congress, and the American electorate in his desire to eliminate another threat to our country from weapons of mass destruction. In 2002, as in 1962, however, miscalculations weigh heavy in the decisionmaking process. Forty years ago, Kennedy was assured that the Cuban missiles could be destroyed by a combined air-ground operation carried out by our military forces. He later discovered this calculation was in error. Declassified documents and recent testimony from Soviet participants in the crisis reveal that Russian military commanders on the island of Cuba, unbeknownst to American decisionmakers, had access to tactical nuclear weapons that they no doubt would have unleashed on an invading U.S. armada, especially if many of their comrade-in-arms had been killed in the first waves of American air strikes. It behooves President Bush today to avoid any similar miscalculations regarding the possible success of U.S. military forces in a combined air-ground operation in Iraq. It is particularly difficult to avoid these types of errors when there exists the historical precedent of a thoroughly successful military campaign waged against Saddam Hussein in 1991. But, in reality, our historical memory betrays us. Saddam’s attack on Israeli cities, his destruction of hundreds of oil wells, and the dumping of tons of oil into the Persian Gulf were not well foretold by the advisers of the elder President Bush. Further, few, if any, of those advisers in 1991 predicted that the Iraq Crisis would still be plaguing the world more than a decade after the Persian Gulf War. Extreme caution is always advised in any situation where U.S. military force may be wielded to achieve a resolution to a thorny international problem. And countless commentators have pored out reams of paper arguing that after twelve years of both unilateral and multilateral diplomatic and political measures, Saddam can now only be persuaded to disarm using military force. However, Bush would be wise to listen to the words of Kennedy’s National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy who once said that, "the most important part of crisis management is not to have a crisis, because there’s no telling what will happen once you’re in one."
Okinawa: Increasing Strategic Flexibility for Korea, Iraq, and the War on Terror CDI staffers recently met with a delegation from Okinawa to discuss the future of U.S. forces based in the region. While this issue seems a relatively unimportant topic in the context of the war on terror or the possibly of war against Iraq, it has been a long-standing source of local concern. The Oct. 16 revelation of North Korea’s ongoing efforts to develop nuclear weapons sheds light on the volatility of Bush strategy towards East Asia and tests U.S. strategic flexibility out of Okinawa. As potential areas of conflict expand, the U.S. military in East Asia strives to reduce opportunity costs involved in increasingly globalized wars. The strategic significance of American forces in East Asia has been substantiated throughout the Cold War up to the current Bush administration. One of American allies in the Pacific, Japan has hosted a forward deployment of 45,000 troops in accordance with the Status of Force Agreement. Representative bases on the mainland include Yokosuka for the 7th Fleet, Marine Corps Air Station in Iwakuni, and Camp Fuji. Okinawa houses an approximate 27,000 American troops, composed of such units as the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and the 18th Air Wing, and serves many strategic purposes ranging from logistics and training to deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. In addition to symbolic and economic benefits they provide, the strategic value of the forces on Okinawa is viewed as considerable by the Pentagon, even after the Cold War. The Marine Corps constitutes the majority of American forces in Okinawa with about 18,000 troops whose primary mission is to establish a bridgehead for a ground campaign by making surprise amphibious landings in nearby theaters. But the present deployment comes with strategic constraints. For instance, the three amphibious ships currently based in Japan cannot transport more than 2,000 equipped troops of the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), requiring the purchase of diesel-powered, roll-on, roll-off high speed vessels (capable of carrying nearly 1,000 troops and 350 tons of cargo). From a broader perspective, in case of regional conflicts such as on the Korea Peninsula, their role is compromised by a shortage of airlift readily available from the American West coast. Growing U.S. military commitments including the ongoing war on terrorism, a possible war against Iraq, and instability in Korea require prioritization in distributing forces to minimize opportunity costs. Responses to the recent terror attacks against American assets in the Middle East and Southeast Asia -- the so-called second front in the war against terrorism -- may necessitate a widespread deployment rather than a concentration of forces. Unlike possible conflicts in Taiwan, counter-terrorism rarely requires emergency transport or major amphibious operations. A war on Iraq, on the other hand, would necessitate large-scale deployment, although lack of military agreements for permanent bases with other countries in the region means that redistribution of forces out of Okinawa, if any, would be temporary. U.S. military action against North Korea based on Bush’s policy of preemption would likely not require amphibious landing, largely because initial air superiority can be achieved with ease. As geographical priority fluctuates, the Marine Corps could seek temporary forward deployment elsewhere for greater efficiency. In this context, a short-term relocation of forces would help reduce the opportunity costs. The bilateral Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) has proposed a reduction scheme called the Koban system, which refers to the network of small forward police stations in Japan. The system would allow strategic flexibility by reducing troops to a few hundred troops (i.e. a 2,000-man MEU based out of Sasebo as proposed by former Prime Minister Hosokawa), while ensuring extended deterrence by a periodic presence in key areas in the region. There are at least five viable alternative sites to consider for relocation. First, the Philippines maintain some potential installations such as Subic Bay naval base which was used by the United States until 1992. President Arroyo has successfully garnered American support in the face of common threats from the Abu Sayyaf, Molo Islamic fundamentalists, and remnants of the belligerent communists, by using the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement to conduct joint exercises like the recent Balikatan 02-1. Second, Vietnam offers several possibilities, such as the historic Cam Ranh Bay, a centrally located naval base. Domestic political opposition to a permanent U.S. presence remains strong, but if converted for air use, the Bay could serve as a hub for Southeast Asian deployment after the Philippines. Third, Hawaii and Guam are already used extensively by the U.S. military, but they could provide additional space to host two or three thousand more Marines. It is rumored that a Marine Expeditionary Battalion may soon be established in Hawaii. Guam, which recently became the permanent base for two nuclear attack submarines for the first time, is located conveniently in Southeast Asia and 500 miles from Okinawa. Fourth, Singapore is another possibility, although space is limited. Its 1990 Memorandum of Understanding with Washington has allowed U.S. forces access to Paya Lebar and Sembawang bases for logistical purposes. Critically located at the center of the second front, the city-state would provide forces to operate against pirates as well as support for amphibious landings into the numerous Indonesian islands. Other possible re-basing locations for U.S. forces in Okinawa are either of limited strategic value, or are politically difficult to achieve. In South Korea, for example, the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed there serve important political and symbolic roles, but have little practical strategic value in case of a North Korean attack. Relocating U.S. forces from Okinawa would not be sufficient to change this, while the current force stationed in South Korea is more than large enough to demonstrate continued U.S. commitment to the region. Another candidate, Indonesia, would be desirable for humanitarian intervention and disaster prevention purposes, but with no existing military agreements, combined with a highly unstable domestic situation, even a temporary relocation of U.S. forces could incur a heavy political price. Such alternative basing strategies would still likely be temporary, as wars on terrorism and Iraq and instabilities in Korea would not necessarily require long-term commitments. But a study of options would be useful as a step towards increasing strategic flexibility in case rapid deployment of U.S. forces to the region is needed. Options that matter little today can open up as new threats, such as terrorism, appear.
Marines in Philippines for Exercises -- 800 Marines from Okinawa arrived this week at the former U.S. Navy base at Subic Bay for joint exercises with Filippino forces on the island of Luzon. The exercises will last for two weeks and involve artillery live fire, aerial bombardment and jungle survival training. This is part of series of training operations that are scheduled to run through next June, and involve a total of 4,000 U.S. troops. An earlier and unrelated six-month deployment of 1,000 U.S. troops involved in training Filippino forces in counter-terrorism ended in August. Green Berets Deploy to Colombia -- 400 Army special operations troops have deployed to the Arauca province in northeastern Colombia. The Green Berets are training elements of the Colombian army in helicopter operations, night fighting, and intelligence gathering The region is the site of the Cano-Limon oil field and the 485 mile Cano-Limon-Covenas pipeline, which has been a repeated target of attacks by members of the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). According to the U.S. State Department, the ELN and FARC attacked the pipeline a combined 178 times during 2001 alone. Anti-Missile System Scores Successful Intercept -- The Missile Defense Agency (MDA)'s ground?based midcourse system (GMD) conducted a successful intercept in its latest flight test (Oct. 14.) The test involved the intercept of a single warhead by a single exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) which was launched aboard a prototype interceptor and then separated. According to a DoD press release, "Sensors aboard the EKV also successfully selected the mock warhead from among the five objects in the target array, including three decoys." This is the fifth successful intercept in nine such tests. While the test was essentially the same as earlier tests, it marked the first time that a ship-based AEGIS Spy-1 radar was used to track the missiles in?flight (the collected data was not part of the actual test). It is unknown, however, how much prior data about the intercept was pre-programmed in to the system, as MDA classified the release of such information in May, 2002. Special Forces Command Budget May Double -- Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is developing a plan that could double the U.S. Special Operations Command’s (SOCOM) budget, and increase its responsibilities, according to a Defense News story (Oct. 7) The new plan would also give SOCOM, which does not currently have a geographical region of responsibility, jurisdiction over large areas of the Middle East and Asia. It would also give SOCOM control over missions in Yemen and Pakistan, which now fall under authority of Central Command. The current Pentagon spending plan allocates roughly $23 billion to SOCOM over six years. Quotation of the Week -- "We are not asking the people of the United States or of any member state of the United Nations to trust in our word, but to send the weapons inspectors to our country to look wherever they wish unconditionally. This means unconditional access anywhere, including presidential sites in accordance with a 1998 signed agreement between Iraq and the United Nations," Mohammed Aldouri, Iraqi ambassador to the United Nations, op-ed in The New York Times, October 17, 2002.
This Week on SUPERPOWER: Global Affairs TV -- "EU Expansion" For nearly half a century, Europe was a divided continent. Now, more than ten years after the collapse of the Iron Curtain, the European Commission announced that it will once and for all wipe away the legacy of the Cold War and expand eastward by inviting ten countries to join the European Union by 2004. But whereas some see European expansion as ushering in a new era of peace and prosperity on a continent that spawned two world wars, others worry that the EU is biting off more than it can chew by accepting so many new members so soon. This may have recently been manifested with Ireland's rejection of the Treaty of Nice, which lays down rules for admitting new members to the 15-member union. Making things more complex, the United States is none too pleased that the EU did not extend an invitation to Turkey, which is a vital U.S. ally in the war against terrorism and in the Bush administration's confrontation with Saddam Hussein. Joining Superpower moderators Mark Thompson of Time magazine and Lisa Simeone to discuss the issue this week will be Desmond Dinan, Jean Monnet Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University; Umit Enginsoy, Washington Bureau Chief of the Turkish news agency NTV; and Tomasz Zalewski, Washington Bureau Chief of the Polish news agency Polska Agencja Prasowa. WHERE TO SEE SUPERPOWER: SUPERPOWER is aired in the Washington, DC area on Wednesday at 8:30pm on MHz, and again on Sunday at 12:30pm on MHz2 (check local listings at: http://www.mhznetworks.org/cable/listings.html). Superpower is broadcast nationwide: WorldLinkTV, Channel 9410 on Echostar Communications Corporation's DISH® Network direct broadcast satellite system. Superpower and WorldLinkTV are available on Channel 375 on DIRECTV® satellite TV service.
Broadcast times for Superpower: Global Affairs TV on WorldLinkTV To see when Superpower broadcasts on WorldlinkTV and your DISH® Network direct broadcast satellite system or your DIRECTV® satellite TV service, please visit: http://www.worldlinktv.com/cgi-bin/displayProgram.cgi?code=superpower For more information, please send an e-mail to: info@superpowertv.org. For free transcripts of past shows, go to www.superpowertv.org
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