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| September 19, 2002 |
Forced Regime Change: A Lesson from Lebanon
Dan Rothem, Research Analyst, drothem@cdi.org
Any U.S. military campaign to impose a regime change in Iraq will be the first such Western effort in the Arab world in two decades, and the second planned assault on an Arab capital by a non-Arab force since the crusades. The last time such a prospect arose was in 1982, when Israeli forces besieged Beirut, and later occupied its western part.
Unlike today’s Iraq, Lebanon of the early 1980s was torn by years of civil war, heavily influenced by outside forces (especially Israeli and Syrian), and played host to the PLO who settled there after being chased out of Jordan. The Palestinian fighters continuously attacked Israel, posing a security threat.
However, there are a few striking similarities between the Israeli campaign in Lebanon and any potential U.S. militarily-enforced regime in Iraq. The Israeli government and intelligence services, led by then defense secretary Ariel Sharon, attempted to install a new leadership in Lebanon. Moreover, Lebanon’s domestic makeup, like Iraq’s, was complex. The Arab population was divided between Shiite Muslims, Sunni Muslims, Druze, Maronite Christians and several other minority groups. Lebanon’s prominent Christian party -- the Phalange -- invited Israeli support for its effort to establish a pro-Israeli regime in Lebanon.
On June 6, 1982, Israeli forces entered Lebanon from the south, initiating Operation Peace of Galilee -- ostensibly intended to put Israel’s northern border out of Palestinian artillery range. On June 13, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and the Phalange first met inside Lebanon, and reached the outskirts of Beirut. The subsequent siege of the capital, where Palestinian militants entrenched, turned out to be a bloody, complicated episode, after which the PLO agreed to leave Lebanon. During the last days of August 1982, over 14,000 Palestinian fighters and hundreds of women and children left the city. Sharon then called the PLO evacuation "a crushing defeat." Ironically, history has taught us otherwise.
On Sept. 14, 1982, Bashir Gemayel, the Phalangist leader and the Lebanese president was assassinated in a bomb explosion, an hour before he was to meet with Israeli intelligence. The next day, IDF troops moved into the predominantly Muslim western part of Beirut, and on Thursday, Sept. 16, 1982, Phalangist militiamen were allowed to enter Sabra and Shatilla, two Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut. The Phalange took the responsibility for "cleansing" the refugee camps of any remaining Palestinian resistance in an attempt to save lives of Israeli soldiers. Early rumors of carnage were either doubted or ignored by Israeli officers and policymakers. After two days, first signs of the massacre emerged. Between 700 and 800 people, including women, children and elderly Palestinians, were slaughtered by Christian militiamen. IDF soldiers, only a short distance away, did not know what was taking place inside the camps.
Domestic Israeli outcry against the war and Sharon followed the massacre, and in 1985 Israel withdrew from most of Lebanon, leaving a "security belt" in its predominantly Shiite south. Fifteen years and hundreds of dead Israeli soldiers later, in May 2000, Israel withdrew overnight from Hezbollah-ruled southern Lebanon. "This 18-year tragedy is over," said then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud barak.
Several lessons from the Israeli adventure in Lebanon should be learned by any country seeking to force a regime change in the Arab world. The democratic decision-making process must be transparent, with goals and missions publicly defined from the start. Moreover, military hierarchy notwithstanding, no one person or group should lead the campaign without an evaluative system that continuously checks the campaign against its initial goals. Worrying in this regard is the deteriorating levels of journalistic freedom allowed by the U.S. military in recent years. For instance, while in Vietnam the press had unprecedented freedom of movement, Operation Desert Storm was marked by restrictive press pools, confining journalists to military press conferences, supervision and even censorship.
The temptation to exploit local minorities and ethnic rivalries should be avoided. For example, according to Human Rights Watch reports, the U.S.-backed Northern Alliance has been alleged to "settle accounts" with captured Taliban fighters via summary executions. Hence, policymakers should be aware of a country’s domestic makeup and be cautious, as ethnic rivalries can rapidly spin out of control.
In Lebanon, the Phalange attempted to "ride" the IDF into power, and Israeli soldiers found themselves doubting their purpose and values many miles from home. The shelling of Beirut and nearby refugee camps, where militants hid among civilians, shook long-lasting perceptions and pride regarding the integrity of firearm use and observations of international humanitarian laws.
U.S. strategy may guide soldiers away from confronting civilian resistance in the Iraqi countryside, but all roads lead to Baghdad. Hopefully, the Iraqi people will overthrow Saddam Hussein, negating the need to besiege Baghdad. Such a siege would be a difficult, bloody mess for both sides. The Bush administration should take all the required steps to prevent a Lebanese-like showdown in Iraq.
Japan Meets North Korea, Revealing More Questions than Answers
Noriyuki Katagiri, Research Assistant, nkatagiri@cdi.org
On Sept. 17, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi met with North Korean leader Kim Jung Il in Pyongyang, at the first such bilateral summit. Following a sober meeting that took two and a half hours, the leaders came out with what will be known as the Pyongyang Declaration. Despite deep rooted pessimism based on historical mistrust, both countries now appear ready for a series of normalization talks starting in October.
In the past few years, North Korea has been active on the international arena, establishing diplomatic ties with several EU states and courting South Korea. From a strategic perspective, North Korea’s move, this time, seems designed to draw the Bush administration to the negotiating table and to calm the anti-North Korean sentiment in Washington. However, this diplomatic breakthrough, which Russia, China and South Korea have celebrated, may put Washington in an awkward position, since it views Pyongyang part of the "axis of evil."
By the end of the day, the two leaders had addressed several important subjects that, nonetheless, revealed more problems than answers. First was Kim’s unexpected apology for the abduction of 12 Japanese citizens, eight of which turned out to be dead. Once home, Koizumi and the Foreign Ministry received fierce criticism for what was seen to be decades of diplomatic neglect, and faced growing public calls for a return of the surviving abductees as a prerequisite to the normalization process.
Second, Kim promised to extend the moratorium on North Korean missile tests beyond 2003. North Korea launched two ballistic missiles, a short-range No-Dong in 1993 and a longer-range Taepo-Dong in 1998, toward Japan, prompting a U.S.-Japanese cooperation to build missile defense systems. He also acquiesced to abide by international agreements regarding its nuclear weapons but guaranteed no immediate inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Specific dates, duration and procedures for both promises have yet to be set.
Third, the issue of naval intrusions into Japan’s waters has yet to be resolved. Last December, for example, the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) sank a North Korean ship armed with SA-16 surface-to-air missiles, rocket-propelled grenades-7s, a U.S.-made engine, as well as a smaller boat -- probably intended for clandestine landings along Japan’s coastline. Most recently, on Sept. 4 Japan’s maritime patrol aircraft, supported by 15 JCG patrol boats and the 3,550-ton destroyer Amagiri, tracked another 100-ton North Korean ship approaching the Japanese exclusive economic zone.
Promising Koizumi to refrain from future aggression, Kim blamed his special naval forces for these reckless acts, as if the Navy is out of his control. His statement, however, contradicts a recent trend in the North Korean military: a shift of influence from the ground to naval forces, as reported in the September 2002 issue of Jane’s Intelligence Review.
In response to these threats, the JCG now plans to build 11 high-speed patrol vessels, while the Japanese government is considering amendments to the existing military emergency legislation. The amendments to the so-called Yuji Hosei, coupled with a possible constitutional revision, could send unwanted messages to the region, in particular heightening tensions between Japan and its traditional rivals like China and South Korea.
Other issues were not explored. Koizumi stopped short of proposing a six-nation security forum comprised of Japan, North and South Koreas, China, Russia and the United States, which might function as an East Asian version of the now-defunct ASEAN Regional Forum, the only existing security consulting body in Southeast Asia. Likewise, Tokyo’s protest to Pyongyang’s attempt to change the name of the Japan Sea to either the "Korean Sea" or the "Joseon East Sea" was ignored.
The summit may produce further implications. Most significantly, Kim’s excessive concessions might weaken the core of juche -- North Korea’s ideology of self-reliance. While good diplomacy may reduce regional tensions and attract financial aid, it brings a danger of dissatisfying the domestic audience, especially the military. Notably, North Korea remains a dictatorial state whose stability and survival have long hinged on strong leadership.
Both leaders deserve credit for this diplomatic breakthrough, at least for the short run. But this implies an emerging internal instability in both countries, and Kim’s long-term commitment needs to be tested over time, as a Sept. 18 editorial in the Daily Yomiuri warned. The example of South Korean President Kim Dae Jung -- whose "sunshine policy" of engagement won him a Nobel Prize but now seems defunct -- should encourage a cautious approach. In conclusion, a substantive rapprochement between Pyongyang and Tokyo seems a far-away agenda.
Pentagon May Make Middle East Headquarters Shift Permanent -- The Defense Department is considering permanently moving U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters to the Middle East, according to Defense News (Sept. 16). According to Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the move has been under consideration since the beginning of Operation "Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan. Roughly 600 CENTCOM personnel are expected to deploy to Qatar in November, in what was initially described as a training exercise. According to Myers, the personnel now "may stay there permanently," adding, "That is a likely outcome."
Senate Wants PAC-3 Tests Against Scuds -- A classified annex to the Senate’s version of the annual defense authorization bill includes $30 million for testing of the Army’s Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile defense system against actual Scud missiles, according to a story in Defense Daily (Sept. 19). The Senate is specifically interested in seeing the PAC-3’s performance against a Scud prior to its possible use in the Persian Gulf. The Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency opposes the proposal, sighting environmental safety concerns about using the liquid-fueled Scuds at the available testing ranges.
Russia Lacks Cash to Decommission Nuclear Submarines -- Russia lacks the financial resources to decommission 45 nuclear submarines from its Pacific Fleet, despite the possibility of fuel and radiation leaks. Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Valery Lebedev says the government has pledged $70 million to scrap the submarines which were built in the 1950s and 1960s, but estimated it would take up to US$3.8 billion to decommission all of them. Other countries in the region have offered funding for the program, but Russian regulations prevent foreign governments from providing financial assistance.
Marines To Hold First Amazon Training Exercises -- 600 Marines will conduct their first ever exercises in Peru’s Amazon basin Starting this Sunday. The Peruvian legislature authorized the maneuvers at Nanay, on the Amazon River, about 120 miles south of the Colombian border, as part of joint efforts with the United States to halt drug trafficking in the region. Peruvian media reported that the Marines were looking to establish a permanent base in the area, an assertion that Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo denied "categorically."
Finland to Join NATO? -- Finland’s defense chief Adm. Juhani Kaskeala said the nonaligned country should consider NATO membership, reports the Helsinki daily Helsingin Sanomat (Sept. 18). Kaskeala said that joining NATO would improve Finland’s influence in international cooperation initiatives, and that the country would retain the right to participate in such activities outside of NATO. A July poll showed that the overwhelming majority of Finns opposed NATO membership.
Quotation of the Week -- "The President is authorized to use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force, in order to enforce the United Nations Security Council Resolutions referenced above, defend the national security interests of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and restore international peace and security in the region," excerpt from the draft joint congressional resolution on Iraq submitted to the congressional leadership by the White House on September 19, 2002. [Click here for the entire text of the resolution.]
This Week on SUPERPOWER: Global Affairs TV -- "Iraq and Beyond"
After President Bush spoke at the United Nations last week an international coalition against Iraq has been slowly forming. Iraq countered this week with an offer to readmit weapons inspectors, but U.S. policy makers remain unimpressed. This week Superpower looks at the increasing possibility of U.S. military action on Iraq and the international response. Will the United States end up making the situation in the region worse? What are the real motiviations for moving against Saddam Hussein? And what about the IsraeliPalestinian peace process?
Joining Superpower moderator Mark Thompson of Time Magazine, as guests this week will be Nile Gardiner, from the Heritage Foundation, Khaled Abdelkareem, of the Middle East News Agency, and Khaled Almaeena, from Arab News.
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