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| September 12, 2002 |
An Afghan Blitzkrieg?
Mark Burgess, Research Analyst, mburgess@cdi.org
American successes in the Afghan campaign to date have been brought about primarily through a combination of airpower, Special Operations Forces (SOFs), and the use of the Afghan resistance as a proxy ground force. Of this trinity, airpower was particularly potent. However, airpower alone could not deliver victory. Rather, the Northern Alliance acted as infantry while U.S. airpower was used as aerial artillery. America thus avoided a local backlash against an overlarge U.S. "footprint," and U.S. forces were spared heavy casualties.
SOFs have been the fulcrum on which the use of proxy forces and airpower hinge. This use of Special Forces alongside indigenous allies is not new. It was used in Vietnam, for instance, where local tribes were often trained and led by American Green Berets. By the time of the Afghan campaign, however, technology had evolved to allow such forces to call up American airpower in support of their proxies with an accuracy that was hitherto unachievable.
Even the "smart bomb" technology employed by America has its limitations however, and there have been several "friendly fire" incidents involving both allied forces and Afghan civilians. The problem of avoiding civilian casualties became especially salient after the Taliban’s ouster, when suitable targets -- never numerous in undeveloped countries such as Afghanistan -- became increasingly scarce. Ironically, airpower -- the very means by which U.S. forces had sought to avoid mobilizing anti-American sentiment among ordinary Afghans -- risked doing exactly that, as the public outcry over the inadvertent bombing of a wedding celebration on July 1 highlighted.
The use of proxy forces has had drawbacks also, with rival factions sometimes suspected of feeding American forces misinformation and using U.S. airpower to prosecute factional disputes. Moreover, arming, paying and legitimizing the country’s regional warlords in return for their support against Taliban and al Qaeda forces may yet prove short-sighted. Many of these same warlords, strengthened by their powerful U.S. sponsor, have subsequently featured in the factional power struggles that continue to threaten Afghanistan.
America’s newly-found allies often proved militarily unreliable also, their limitations being particularly apparent at Tora Bora in December and during the later Anaconda operation, where they were compounded by an American overreliance on their proxy fighters; a misapplication of conventional forces; and a failure to seal off enemy escape routes. The latter was impossible to do fully but arguably could and should have been undertaken more efficiently. Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden may well have escaped as a result -- leaving one of the biggest aims of the Afghan campaign unrealized. Almost certainly, many of the al Qaeda/Taliban rank and file did escape, and are unlikely to offer such a concentrated target again, raising the prospect of a prolonged anti-guerilla-type operation to rout them out.
In fact, the U.S. effort has turned into such an operation since the inconclusive end of Operation Anaconda on March 18. The relative absence of enemy forces since then may be a "tactical pause" in operations until the hunt for them abates. It may also arise from their need to regroup and re-supply after what was a significant, if not decisive, series of defeats. Certainly, since Anaconda, enemy forces have avoided regrouping in large numbers and are unlikely to do so, even if they still can, lest they incur U.S. and allied air strikes.
As such, American forces had no significant contacts between the end of Anaconda and July 27. Since then, small guerilla-type attacks on American forces have intensified. This type of fighting is less matched to the particular mix of proxy forces, SOFs, and, most especially, the extensive use of airpower that proved so successful in the beginning of the Afghan campaign. Indeed, the situation in Afghanistan has long resembled a complex emergency rather than a war, with the writ of the Afghan government largely confined to Kabul (and guaranteed there mainly by the International Security Assistance Force’s presence), an assassination attempt on its president (who has to be guarded by Americans), one government minister and vice president already assassinated, and warlords still vying for power in the provinces -- all against the backdrop of a continuing manhunt for al Qaeda/Taliban fugitives, and a terrorist bombing campaign of increasing intensity in the Afghan capital.
As the commander of U.S. Central Command acknowledged recently, American troops will be in Afghanistan for a long time yet. Moreover, as the campaign there continues, the methods which proved so effective in its opening days will prove less so. Recent remarks by Paul Wolfowitz, the U.S. deputy secretary of defense, indicate that the Pentagon’s stance towards the peace support operations and so-called "nation-building" that it has so disdained in the past is softening. It will have to soften more if the significant, if imperfect, victory achieved in Afghanistan in the last year is to be built upon in the next.
Turkey Seeks Attack Helicopters—As Soon As Possible
Victoria Garcia, Research Assistant, vgarcia@cdi.org
While Turkey has been very supportive in the U.S.-backed effort against terrorism, and withstood much criticism from fellow Muslim nations for siding with the West, Turkish officials are greatly opposed to the prospect of targeting Iraq. The Turkish government fears that attacking Iraq could cause the border between northern Iraq and southeast Turkey to loosen, allowing Turkish and Iraqi Kurds to unite and attempt to form an independent state. This is exactly the scenario Turkey has fought against domestically for 15 years. To ease these concerns, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Turkey shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks to reassure the Turkish government that Washington had no immediate plans to strike Iraq, and thus keeping Ankara engaged in the war on terrorism.
In recent days, however, talk of attacking Iraq has increased. In order to secure its military capabilities, the Turkish government is hoping to purchase a number of attack helicopters in the shortest possible time.
In 1997, Turkey began efforts to make one of the largest single arms deals in history: a $4 billion contract for 145 attack helicopters from an American high-tech arms producer. In July 2000, the Turkish government awarded a contract to Bell Textron for its AH-1Z King Cobra attack helicopters. However, Congress must still decide whether to grant an export license for the helicopters. To date, the sale has proven quite controversial. Human rights concerns have greatly slowed negotiations in the past. Because attack helicopters have reportedly been used against Turkish Kurds, U.S. export regulations state that Turkey’s human rights record must improve before the export license is approved. And while the State Department did note slight improvements in Turkey since the 1999 capture of the Kurdistan Working Party’s (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan, technical and financial disagreements have further impeded the deal.
In the latest meeting of Turkish and U.S. officials in mid-July, representatives failed to reach a decision on the price and configuration of the King Cobra helicopters. This is partly due to Turkish fears of another domestic financial crisis along with their hopes of co-producing the attack helicopters on Turkish soil.
Turkey may instead accept an alternative bid in the attack helicopter deal. According to a July 26 article in Defense News, Turkish defense authorities launched negotiations with a group of Russian and Israeli companies to co-produce 50 attack helicopters. In the ongoing effort to revamp its military, Turkish authorities also held negotiations with Israel to purchase 108 unmanned combat air vehicles -- a contract that the American company General Atomics had been competing for and is said to be worth $76 million. In return, according to the Jerusalem Post, Israel promised to "buy 50m cubic meters of water annually from Turkey over the next 20 years."
In fear of losing military leverage in Turkey, the United States may act quickly to sell Turkey 30 attack helicopters worth about $600 million. Two U.S. companies are reportedly competing for the contract. Bell Textron is offering its AH-64D Apache Longbow and Sikorski has proposed its S-70 Black Hawk.
Since Sept.11, 2001, Ankara has provided crucial logistical support for military operations, and continues to allow American and British jets to use its Incirlik airbase in South Turkey to patrol the "no-fly" zone over northern Iraq. It helped freeze assets belonging to organizations that work in support of terrorist groups; offered about 90 Special Forces personnel to assist in the effort to defeat the terrorist network in Afghanistan; and has reached an agreement with the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan to help train one of the first battalions of the Afghan combat groups.
While widespread attacks against Turkish Kurds have been limited in the recent past, a U.S. strike against Iraq will more than likely destabilize the already volatile Kurdish situation and create a reason for the Turkish military to resume fighting against both Turkish and Iraqi Kurds. Attack helicopters, which proved valuable in the war against the PKK, may prove useful again in the near future while countering ongoing improvements in human rights that have taken so long to implement.
Al Qaeda: Fourth Jet Was Headed For Capitol -- Two Al Qaeda leaders interviewed on the Arabic news channel Al Jazeera said the fourth aircraft that crashed outside of Shanksville, Pa. on Sept. 11, 2001, was heading for the U.S. Capitol, according to a report by United Press International. The three targets were reportedly referred to as the "Faculty of Fine Arts," the "Faculty of Town Planning" and the "Faculty of Law" in communications between Al Qaeda and the hijackers. The interviews mark the first time that individuals believed to be members of Al Qaeda have openly claimed responsibility for the attacks and provided details of how the operation was planned.
Estonia Confident About NATO Membership -- Estonia’s Prime Minister Siim Kallas says that he is confident that his country will be granted NATO membership after his meeting last week with President George W. Bush, according to a report by Voice of America. Kallas said that Bush supports a second round of NATO expansion that would also include the other Baltic nations of Lithuania and Latvia. Kallas said that he believes Estonia’s joining the alliance will not harm his country’s relations with Russia, which has traditionally been strongly opposed to any of the Baltic nations entering NATO. A decision on further expansion of the alliance is expected at the NATO summit in Prague in November.
U.S. Deploys First Artillery Units to Afghanistan -- After 11 months of combat operations, the U.S. Army has deployed the first artillery units to Afghanistan. Six 105mm howitzers of the 82nd Airborne Division’s field artillery have been deployed at the main U.S. base at Kandahar. Equipped with counter-fire radar, the systems are able to identify the source of enemy mortar or rocket fire and return fire. The howitzers have been brought in to improve force protection for the 8,000 U.S. troops in the country, who have been increasingly targeted by al Qaeda and Taliban rocket and mortar attacks in recent weeks.
Egyptian Court Sentences Muslim Militants -- An Egyptian military tribunal has convicted 51 Muslim militants on charges of planning the assassination of President Hosni Mubarak and other public figures and attacks government institutions, and forming an illegal clandestine group. The convicted were arrested last year under a law that prohibits all Muslim political groups. 94 men were tried in all, in what is one of the biggest cases against Islamic militants in Egypt, and 43 were acquitted. Those convicted received sentences of from two to 15 years. The group, said by prosecutors to be a new militant organization, was dubbed al-Wa’ad, or "the Promise." Egyptian authorities have detained hundreds of suspected Muslim militants since Sept. 11.
Quotation of the Week -- "Attacking Iraq now will cause a lot of problems...The Middle East peace process, in my mind, has to be a higher priority. Winning the war on terrorism has to be a higher priority. More directly, the situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia needs to be resolved, making sure Al Qaeda can't rise again from the ashes, [that they are] destroyed, [that the] Taliban cannot come back, that the warlords can't gain power over Kabul and [Afghan President] Karzai, and destroy everything that has happened so far," Gen. Anthony Zinni USMC (Ret.), former commander-in-chief of U.S. forces in the Middle East and Central Asia, August 23, 2002.
This Week on SUPERPOWER: Global Affairs TV -- "9/11 and Anti-Americanism"
Immediately after the United States was attacked, several countries approached the U.S. offering America many forms of assistance. One year later, the allies that came to aid the U.S. immediately after the attacks are critical of U.S. policy on many fronts. This week's episode examines the increase in anti-Americanism around the world. Can anything explain the increase in anti-Americanism in Europe? Will this change in mood have an impact on forming any coalition if the U.S. invades Iraq?
Joining Superpower moderator Lisa Simeone as guests this week will be Jurek Martin, Columnist with the Financial Times; Joshua Muravchik, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute; and Evgeni Bai, Correspondent from the Russian newspaper, Izvestia.
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