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| August 22, 2002 |
Declare Victory in Afghanistan -- and Stay Engaged
Marcus Corbin, Senior Analyst mcorbin@cdi.org
The now well-known aphorism from the Vietnam era, "Declare victory and go home," is increasingly relevant to U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. In another fascinating case of urban myths, it turns out that the author of the phrase never said the "go home" part. But the original concept that he actually did propose is all the more relevant today.
During the 1950s and 60s, the respected senator from Vermont, George Aiken, argued against an excessively militaristic U.S. approach to the Vietnam conflict. But he was no dove and he supported Johnson’s military escalations after they were made, even voting for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.
By October 1966, Aiken felt that the military situation had reached a crucial pivot point -- the introduction of large U.S. forces had stabilized the situation, but could not achieve more without a dangerous military escalation "into a new dimension." So he proposed "declaring victory" -- but by that he meant recognizing that the military escalation of 1965 had indeed achieved its limited missions of halting the fall of South Vietnam and preventing an ignominious withdrawal of the U.S. advisers and other forces then in Vietnam. What Aiken said was the United States "could well declare unilaterally that this stage of the Vietnam war is over -- that we have ‘won’ in the sense that our Armed Forces are in control of most of the field and no potential enemy is in a position to establish its authority over South Vietnam." This was not an Orwellian statement, that the military had "won" when in fact it had "lost," because in 1966 it had by no means lost.
Although Aiken did suggest declaring military victory, contrary to the myth that has grown up he did not espouse "going home" or withdrawing from Vietnam at all. In fact, he even specified that the victory declaration should not be accompanied by "announcement of a phased withdrawal." What he did propose was reducing offensive operations throughout the country and redeploying U.S. forces to defend the "strategic centers" of South Vietnam, hoping that since the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong would not be able to seize those urban strongholds, they might be willing to negotiate. The strategy may or may not have worked, but the point was to seize the opportunity and shift the terms of the conflict out of the military arena back into the political arena. He hoped that "this unilateral declaration of military victory would herald the resumption of political warfare as the dominant theme in Vietnam."
So what is of interest in this history for today? Both that the achievable U.S. military missions have been accomplished in Operation Enduring Freedom, and that the prolongation of war operations is getting in the way of "post-war" reconstruction.
There appear to have been two primary missions for the U.S. military in Afghanistan: end the use of Afghanistan as a base for terrorism by removing the Taliban rulers, and kill or capture members of al Qaeda. The first mission has been provisionally accomplished, but the gains need to be consolidated through stabilization and reconstruction of the country. The bulk of what can be achieved in the second mission has likely already been done. As in Vietnam, the military situation has reached a temporary impasse, with the United States dominant -- for the moment. Operations have now largely degenerated to fruitless searches for absent terrorists, and there is no endgame. U.S. forces have now become targets -- they have lost the initiative, and end up chasing a few fighters who shoot rockets or mortars at their static bases.
But worse, the U.S. strikes and raids on villages have led to numerous mistaken arrests and civilian deaths, most egregiously in a gunship strafing of a wedding party in July. U.S. forces apparently are still operating as if the "war" is still underway -- incoming commander Lt. Gen. Dan McNeill said: "This is still a war, any way you cut it," in June. But these faulty uses of wartime force have had a damaging political effect on the respect and welcome afforded to the United States and its forces. It is terribly distracting for any government to try to build an environment of stability and pursue post-conflict reconstruction while a foreign nation is conducting wartime operations on its soil.
As in Vietnam, what needs to happen at this key turning point is for the United States to declare the military battle won -- which is far easier to say than in Vietnam -- and turn its focus, energy and thrust to the political and economic spheres as much as is feasible. The United States should not withdraw its forces, but reorient them to support the difficult political regeneration process rather than getting in its way. It is time again to "declare victory -- and stay engaged."
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Deterring Saddam
Dr. Michael Donovan, Research Analyst, mdonovan@cdi.org
There is much evidence to suggest that Saddam Hussein can be deterred. The twin threats of American retaliation and the Israeli nuclear arsenal were apparently sufficient to deter Saddam from using chemical or biological weapons against coalition forces or Israeli cities during the first Gulf conflict. He backed down in the face of U.S. military pressure in 1994 when he again seemed prepared to threaten Kuwait. These are the actions of a rational actor -- one who undertakes a cost-benefit analysis, weighs the risks, and acts according to the values he associates with them.
Saddam is rational, but he is also willing to absorb inordinate casualties, economic losses, and international hostility in pursuit of his goals. He is also reckless, possessed of a crude world-view, and an unsophisticated decision maker. It is widely believed that Saddam places little value on the advice of others and is surrounded by sycophantic counselors that tell him what they believe he wishes to hear. Most importantly, Saddam is fundamentally at odds with the status quo in the Middle East and is governed by revisionist goals that encourage risk-taking.
As a consequence, the list of Saddam’s miscalculations and strategic blunders is both extensive and profound. Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980, the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the subsequent decision to fight for Kuwait in 1991, the alleged plot to assassinate former president George Bush while visiting Kuwait in 1993, the move to again threaten Kuwait in 1994, and the obstruction of weapons inspectors all attest to a personality that is acceptant of risk and not easily deterred indefinitely.
The problem of deterrence is compounded greatly by the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iraq. Concerns that Iraq might provide such a weapon to a terrorist group have been needlessly exaggerated, but they cannot be dismissed entirely. More worrisome are the scenarios Saddam might envision if he believes he has achieved a balance of terror with the United States. Even without a nuclear capability, Saddam believed he could annex Kuwait with impunity in 1990. Had he possessed such a weapon at the time, the process of evicting Iraqi troops would have been far more complicated and dangerous. Given Saddam’s track record of miscalculation, both regarding the intentions of his adversaries and capabilities of his own forces, there are few reasons to expect caution once he is emboldened by the possession of a nuclear weapon.
In the final analysis, an approach to Saddam’s Iraq based on a strategy of deterrence is fraught with risks. Few of the factors that made for a stable deterrence relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union are present in the case of Iraq. Saddam always retreated from the brink when he believed his personal survival or that of his regime was at risk. But the absence of a formal communication link between Saddam and his adversaries, different value systems upon which decisions are based, a weak sense of nationhood, and an inclination towards escalatory rhetoric all magnify the risks of a strategy based on deterrence.
The value Saddam attaches to weapons of mass destruction makes it unlikely that the Iraqi leader will forgo their development of his own volition. Saddam has constantly sought these weapons in order to underwrite his claim for leadership of the Arab world, as a challenge to the Israeli nuclear monopoly in the region, as a hedge against his regional rivals, and to support his own revisionist aspirations. He almost certainly sees the continuation of his regime as inherently tied to the possession of such weapons. Unless a solution can be found that includes either reliably and permanently disarming Iraq or overthrowing the regime altogether, he may be proven right.
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Official Confirmation of Long Afghan Stay Has Consequences for Iraq and Wider U.S. Defense Policy
Colin Robinson, Research Analyst, crobinson@cdi.org
On Aug. 16, 2002, Gen. Tommy Franks, commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command that is currently fighting the war on terror in Afghanistan, said that the United States was likely to stay in Afghanistan for many years, without however giving a specific figure. This is no surprise to most analysts. Virtually all commentators who have expressed an opinion have said that destroying al Qaeda and the Taliban entirely and stabilizing the country under the shaky new Afghan central government would take a good length of time. What was possibly more surprising was that Franks specifically mentioned South Korea, a state where U.S. forces have been stationed since 1945, in his answer. While he did not allude to that length of stay, actually only mentioning South Korea while citing the many countries where the U.S. has military-to-military relationships, Afghanistan presents an example of the kind of country where U.S. military forces might stay a long while as the "post-Cold War" era is superceded by a period of terrorist confrontation.
Since Sept. 11, U.S. forces have found themselves deployed to regions where few would have anticipated long-term deployments prior to that date. Meanwhile, the justifications for continued U.S. deployments in support of long-term allies like South Korea and especially Germany are fraying at the edges. Several assessments through the 1990s have opined that the U.S. forces currently in South Korea are not actually necessary to protect that country from the North Korean threat -- most authoritatively, a 1998 article in the journal International Security written by Michael O’Hanlon. In Germany the situation is clearer. There is no current conventional force threat to NATO countries from Russia or anywhere else. U.S. troops in Germany are mostly being tasked toward peacekeeping missions in the Balkans or contingency operations in the Middle East -- namely Iraq. U.S. Army Europe is examining its current structures with a view toward consolidation and rationalization. What this position suggests is that while new missions and areas of operation are opening up, current overseas forces either have enough spare capability or can be redeployed in their entirety to cover the gaps.
Afghanistan at the present provides a good picture of what most analysts believe the majority of conflicts in the 21st century will look like -- one needing few pure battle forces, but many formations and units directed toward what is effectively keeping the peace between factions, assuring civil order, and conducting civil support and reconstruction tasks. Of the roughly 8,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, most are civil affairs, psychological operations, and other support troops. Task Force Panther, the combat brigade built around the 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, accounts for less than half the force -- at most 3,000 soldiers. If a combat brigade is to be maintained in Afghanistan over time, then the equivalent of a division -- three brigades -- will be absorbed, as brigades preparing for and recovering from tours will be unavailable for other duties. Given that the 82nd Airborne Division already has the task of maintaining combat forces for deployment anywhere in the world at a few hours notice, not only the 82nd Division but others, probably the 10th Mountain, will be drawn in for later rotations. (The 82nd’s sister division, the 101st Air Assault, is quite likely to be preparing for operations in Iraq, given its long-range helicopter assault capabilities.)
U.S. forces in Germany, at present, are earmarked for Iraqi scenarios. If a war occurs, however, when the fighting stops and the United States is faced with the requirement of winning the peace and assuring the stability of a second shaky government, they should not return to their current bases. Europe, for the foreseeable future, does not require them. The greater Middle East does. Thus, over the course of the first half of the 21st century, predominant concentrations of U.S. troops may well change from Germany and Korea to Afghanistan and Iraq. Their missions will have much the same end target as the Cold War forces -- to preserve and ensure stable, moderate governments, but this time from internal, rather than external, threats.
DoD Official: U.S. Nuclear Tests Likely Within the Decade -- Although no plans currently exist for a U.S. resumption of underground nuclear testing, it is likely that such tests will be conducted within the next decade, according to a Pentagon official quoted in the Las Vegas Sun (Aug. 14). Dr. Dale Klein, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological weapons, says that the nation’s nuclear stockpile is developing "aging characteristics" that might necessitate a resumption of testing. According to Dr. Klein, "looking at it from a scientific standpoint you need to have experimental data, to go along with the modeling and analytical study. Of course a return to testing would be a very difficult political issue. The science community looks at it from a standpoint of obtaining knowledge." The last U.S. nuclear test was conducted at the Nevada test site in 1992.
Okinawa Okays New Offshore Marine Base -- The prefectural government of Okinawa has approved the construction of a new offshore heliport to replace the Marine Corps base at Futema. The agreement calls for the construction of an 8,000 foot runway on a manmade island located about 2km off the coast of the city of Nago on Okinawa’s eastern coast. The $2.8 billion project is expected to take 12-13 years to complete. U.S. military presence on Okinawa, while supported by the Japanese government, has been a source of much local resentment, particularly in the wake of the 1996 rape of an Okinawan school girl by a Marine. Initially many Okinawans wanted the Marines to leave entirely, but later agreed to permit the new offshore facility.
Army Demonstrates High-Speed Catamaran for Sealift -- In a demonstration in Takoma, Wash., last week, the Army gave the public a glimpse of one possible option for its future fast sealift fleet. The high-speed HSV-X1 "Joint Venture" is a 313-foot catamaran capable of transporting 40 of the Army’s new "Stryker" light armored vehicles -- enough for two companies. Traveling at speeds of 40 knots (46mph), the vessel is four times faster than the Army’s current fleet of sealift ships, according to Gen. Robert Dail, commander of the Army Transport Center. As part of the demonstration the "Joint Venture" transported 14 Strykers, plus three trucks and five "Humvees," 1,500 miles in 36 hours, and unloaded them in under 30 minutes.
Australian Scramjet "a Success" -- Australian scientists are calling the late-July launch of the world’s first operational scramjet a success after a review of the data collected during the flight. According to scientists from the University of Queensland, the scramjet, which uses oxygen in the atmosphere to burn its fuel rather than carrying its own oxidant, successfully ignited after being boosted in to space by a conventional rocket, and achieved a speed of Mach 7.6 before crashing. In a scramjet oxygen drawn from the atmosphere is mixed with a small amount of hydrogen to create an explosive fuel. This process only begins to work efficiently at speeds of Mach 5 or above, necessitating the use of traditional rockets to get the scramjet up to its critical operating speed. It is believed that scramjet technology could one day propel aircraft at speeds in excess of 5,000mph (8,000kmh).
Quotation of the Week -- "Given Saddam's aggressive regional ambitions, as well as his ruthlessness and unpredictability, it may at some point be wise to remove him from power. Whether and when that point should come ought to depend on overall U.S. national security priorities. Our pre-eminent security priority -- underscored repeatedly by the president -- is the war on terrorism. An attack on Iraq at this time would seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the global counterterrorist campaign we have undertaken," Brent Scowcroft, former national security adviser under Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, "Don't Attack Saddam," an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2002.
This Week on SUPERPOWER: Global Affairs TV -- "Latin American Economies: Going South?"
SUPERPOWER, together with foreign experts from around the world, examines the timely issues that affect the United States. This week, Superpower examines U.S. economic policy towards Latin America. Why has the United States changed it's attitude towards economic aid for South America? What would be the repercussions for the United States if Latin America's economy collapsed? Is the Bush administration partly to blame for what's going on in Latin America?
This week's episode will feature a discussion on the Latin American debt crisis vis a vis the Brazil bailout. Joining Superpower as guests this week will be Aldo Caliari, from the Center of Concern; Rachel Menezes, from Inter-American Dialogue; and Prof. Jose Luis Guerrero Cusumano, Ph.D., Co-Director of the International Institute for Government, Management and Policy at Georgetown University.
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