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| July 11, 2002 |
Spiral Development, Limited
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.) Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
Dissatisfied with the long timelines to move a material development program from concept to operational capability, the Rumsfeld team has been pushing "spiral development." Under this procedure, the Department of Defense would field a system - that is, put a pre-determined quantity of the equipment into some regular troop units -- that meets only 60 to 80 percent of its expected full operational capabilities. Over time, the remaining 20 to 40 percent of the required capabilities would be developed, incorporated into later production models of the system, and be retrofitted into earlier models in "blocks" of product improvements.
In its version of the Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Authorization Bill, the Senate gives Mr. Rumsfeld authority "to conduct a pilot program for the spiral development of major systems and to designate research and development programs of the military departments and Defense Agencies to participate in the pilot program (Section 803)."
The Senate bill lays down a number of conditions that must be met before the Secretary of Defense can approve a major system research and development program for spiral development. In addition to nominating a program for spiral development, the service secretary/defense agency head must provide a rationale for dividing the effort into separate spirals; a total program strategy (cost, schedule, performance goals); specific cost, schedule, performance levels, and measurable exit criteria for the initial spiral; a testing plan to ensure that all goals and criteria are reached; a ceiling on the number of prototypes that can be produced; and specific, measurable performance objectives that must be attained before additional production beyond the number of prototypes.
This last caveat about additional production beyond the initial prototypes is important. One early reservation about spiral development was that a military service, eager to get a system into the field, would simply churn out as many as it could under the guise of prototypes.
But the Senate bill is a mixed bag. It also designates, in effect, some of the candidate systems for spiral development. Section 132, entitled "Pathfinder Programs," lists 16 programs that the Secretary of the Air Force is directed to consider for spiral development. Many seem to be associated with "lessons learned" or shortfalls experienced in the fighting in Afghanistan: Space Based Radar for uninterrupted tracking of moving targets, Global Positioning System, Global Hawk (an unmanned aerial surveillance craft), Combat Search and Rescue, Predator B (a new version of armed unmanned aerial vehicle), Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle, and an improved AC-130 Gunship. Other programs seem to be long-standing: B-2 Radar, B-1 Defensive System Upgrade, Multi Mission Command and Control Constellation, Global Transportation Network, C-5 Avionics Modernization Program, Hunter/Killer, Tanker/Lease, Small Diameter Bomb, and KC-767 aircraft.
Moreover, the Senate bill contains what seems to be an unusual reporting twist. Not only must the Pentagon report on those pathfinder programs selected for spiral development, three officials -- the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) -- must also conduct an assessment of the programs not nominated by the Secretary of the Air Force or not approved by the Secretary of Defense for spiral development. The assessments are to cover "test contents of the acquisition plan…the extent to which the acquisition plan for each such pathfinder program addresses validated military requirements…[and] programmatic evaluation of the acquisition plan…including an analysis of the total cost, schedule, and technical risk associated with development of such program."
It seems a lot of work for programs not recommended or approved for spiral development, but apparently senators are not comfortable with the Pentagon’s plans to modify traditional acquisition requirements and oversight. Given the track record, one can hardly blame them.
Of course, the House will have to agree to these provisions before the bill goes to the White House. And since anything can happen in conference, the Senate’s unease may yet not be assuaged.
G-8 Pledges $20 million for WMD Threat Reduction
Devon Chaffee, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow, dchaffee@cdi.org
On the last day of their economic summit in Canada last month, the G-8 nations agreed to spend $20 million in a new "Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction." Though this agreement may signify an increase in international commitment to addressing the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), difficulties accompanying implementation should not be underestimated.
The Bush administration was able to convince Europe, Japan and Canada to commit significant funds to WMD threat reduction activities that the United States has supported for years, but whose benefits are wide spread. The partnership welcomes other non-G-8 countries to become contributing members, leaving the door open for enlarging the initiative.
Top priorities for the partnership include destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapons scientists, initially within Russia.
The G-8 leaders also announced that they "would be willing to enter into negotiations with any other recipient countries," opening the possibility for funds to be given to states not currently receiving such assistance through U.S. programs. Such activity would be in line with Senator Richard Lugar’s (R-Ind.) initiatives to expand so called "Nunn-Lugar" assistance to countries beyond the Former Soviet Union.
However, essential details of the partnership remain to be sorted out, including which countries will provide what percentage of the designated funds, and how the use of such funds will be coordinated.
Coordination of Nunn-Lugar initiatives between federal agencies in this country and between the United States and Russian authorities has been a struggle. There have been problem programs such as the U.S.-built Siberian factories that were to dispose of Russian rocket fuel. Unfortunately, by the time the factories were completed, this fuel had used for other purposes by the Russian government. One can only imagine that multilateral coordination will prove even more difficult, given the array of bureaucratic agencies in any one of the many participating countries.
No central organizational body was established for the implementation of the Global Partnership initiative, and each country is to hold primary responsibility for fulfilling its obligation. The only coordination measure laid out thus far is an annual review, which is likely to prove insufficient for coordinating complex cooperation projects.
If coordination issues are not addressed the partnership could result in the wasting of valuable resources and time, leaving an urgent security risk -- the spread of weapons of mass destruction -- ineffectively addressed.
Even if the programs are successfully coordinated, the challenge of extracting the committed funds from the parliaments involved is considerable. There may be disagreement over how the financial burden will be distributed among participating states. Also, other countries may encounter the difficulties that have impeded U.S. efforts when congress attaches political conditions to Nunn-Lugar funds, restricting the flow of assistance (see: Crucial Nonproliferation Assistance to Russia Hangs in The Balance, Again," Weekly Defense Monitor, May 30, 2002).
Though obstacles facing the new G8 Global Partnership are significant, this political pledge holds the potential for sizable gains in WMD threat reduction in Russia and elsewhere. As is the case with most long-term assistance programs, the real test will be in successful implementation.
The statement by G-8 Leaders can be found at www.g8.gc.ca/kan_docs/globpart-e.asp
Space Command and Strategic Command: Merger Must be Carefully Handled
Colin Robinson, Research Analyst, crobinson@cdi.org
On June 26, the Pentagon announced that the U.S. Space Command and the U.S. Strategic Command, respectively located at Colorado Springs, Col., and Omaha, Neb., were to merge. Strategic Command controls the nation’s nuclear forces. Space Command directs military space operations, computer network operations and space campaign planning. Space Command and Strategic Command are two of the nine ‘unified combatant commands’ through which the Defense Department currently manages its military operations worldwide. Five are regionally focused and four deal with functional issues. This merger is not proceeding for purely efficiency reasons and must be managed carefully to ensure that military space functions receive the attention they deserve.
The origins of the merger lie in the creation of the new Northern Command to handle the homeland defense of the United States post Sept. 11 coupled with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s wishes not to expand the number of unified commands. There are also the perceptions that the two commands do not separately have enough work for each to justify an independent existence, and a certain amount of overlapping functions exist.
Following Sept. 11, it was deemed necessary to establish a full unified command, the Northern Command, for the defense of the continental United States, and Pentagon officials dusted off earlier studies that investigated the merger of the two other commands. Previously, Canadian participation in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which shared staff and facilities with Space Command, made it unlikely NORAD and Space Command would be folded into Strategic Command. Such a merger would likely have resulted in Canadian protests about being part of the offensive nuclear weapons command. Now however, NORAD and Northern Command will be paired, which leaves Space and Strategic Commands available to be merged.
However, this command realignment needs close consideration. This merger means that space assets, which are becoming more and more vital to the U.S. war effort since the Gulf War of 1991, will be consolidated under the direction of the U.S. strategic nuclear offensive command. Given the decreased importance of nuclear missions within the U.S. armed forces, this is a questionable move. U.S. Space Command is currently a supporting organization, running communications satellites, the Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation satellites, the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, and the Defense Support Program missile launch warning satellites. It also studies potential future use of putative space-based weapons.
This supporting role will not, however, last forever. Much of the U.S. military believes that conflict in space is inevitable. In any such conflict, the new command will play the leading role. Yet if the command is dominated by emphasis on former Strategic Command offensive nuclear missions and the associated culture, fostered by the strategic nuclear mission’s location at Omaha since 1948, the importance given to the military space function within the U.S. military will suffer a major setback. In implicitly down-grading the importance of the military space effort, the merger also runs counter to the principle objectives of the Space Commission, which was led by Donald Rumsfeld before he became Defense Secretary. Instead of consolidating and streamlining space functions, this reorganization will disperse them. Thus it will be important in the coming years that the new command focus on its space support mission, rather than the administration of a missile and bomber force whose use has become extremely unlikely.
A second possible worry is the announced inclusion of missile defense duties in the new command. This leads to the specter of the same command given both defensive duties and the responsibility for deciding whether to launch the nation’s strategic nuclear missiles. It appears that this decision was made because Canada did not want to become involved in missile defense functions, and thus resisted their inclusion in NORAD. Some analysts worry that if the same organization is given both defensive and offensive tasks the decision to retaliate to any apparent or real nuclear attack will be made without sufficient safeguards, potentially leading to nuclear catastrophe.
However, NORAD will make the assessment of whether an actual attack is under way, and thus will have a major say in whether missile defenses are alerted or used. This will impose some level of safeguards into the system. As firmer command arrangements for missile defense develop with their introduction into service, it will be important that NORAD retains its overall directing role in aerospace defense, notwithstanding international political concerns that complicate the overall effort.
In summary, the amalgamation of U.S. Space Command with U.S. Strategic Command is not the unmitigated efficiency gain that the Defense Department would have the public believe. Relatively concealed within the merger are potential hindrances to U.S. military space utilization and a chipping away of the checks and balances preventing an inadvertent nuclear launch. If these issues are not carefully managed through the development of the combined command, the effectiveness of and safeguards on the U.S. military may be threatened.
White House Releases DoD Funding Details -- As part of the $396 billion Defense Department funding request for fiscal year 2003 released in February, the Bush Administration included $10 billion in an unallocated "contingency fund" for undetermined expenses related to the war on terrorism. Despite their general support for the Administration’s efforts to combat terrorism, members of Congress have expressed their reluctance to approve funding for which no justification has been made, effectively creating a "slush fund" within the DoD budget. In response, the White House last week released general guidelines for how the funds would be allocated. Of the $10 billion, $2.6 billion would go in to personnel accounts, $5.6 billion would go for operations and maintenance, and $1.9 would go for procurement or research and development. For more details, see President Bush’s letter to Congress at http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2003/pdf/15dod_amend.pdf
Talks Off With North Korea -- The United States has withdrawn its offer to resume security talks with the DPRK after North Korean patrol ships fired on a South Korean navy vessel, sinking the vessel and killing four South Korea sailors. The incident has delayed much need discussion between the United States and North Korea on missile sales, nuclear inspections, and other contentious issues. For more information see: "United States and North Korea to Resume Talks," Weekly Defense Monitor, June 20, 2002.
Pentagon Mulling Troop Cuts? -- The Defense Department is considering significant cuts in the active force as a way to free funds for new weapons and technology development, according to an article in the Baltimore Sun. According to the article, the recommendations are part of a draft study done by David Chu, undersecretary for personnel and readiness. Under the draft recommendations, the Army and Air Force would take the biggest hit, with the Army losing one of its ten active divisions, or between 20,000 and 25,000 soldiers, and the Air Force losing 40,000 personnel. The Navy could lose 20,000 sailors, and the Marines from 2,000 to 5,000 troops. If the proposal is adopted, it would appear as part of the Defense Department’s fiscal year 2004 budget request, which will be released next February.
Health Care Pros to Discuss Post-Crisis Care Options -- National military, civilian and federal health care experts are to meet September 911 in Alexandria, Virginia, to discuss strategies for communicating medical risks to patients during and after crisis (war or terrorism) situations. The objective of the meeting is to develop effective methods of helping individuals make better health care decisions in a postcrisis environment. Some 300 health care providers, patients and practitioners, from military and civilian sectors, are expected to attend. The conference is being hosted by the Deployment Health Clinical Center (DHCC) of Walter Reed Army Medical Center. For more information on the conference, go to the Department of Defense PostDeployment website at www.PDHealth.mil
Quotation of the Week -- From the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the U.S.-Russian Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, July 9, 2002.
"Why does the treaty have no verification provisions? What is the meaning of Article 2, which appears only to acknowledge the obvious existence of the START treaty? How does the administration expect each party to verify the other party's reductions? What implications flow from the lack of any timetable in the treaty for reductions prior to December 31st, 2012? Since the treaty is scheduled to expire on the first day that its forcereduction requirement takes effect, how binding will it be in practice? Why does the treaty not limit tactical nuclear weapons, which are the most susceptible to theft? And finally, should the United States help Russia secure and eliminate its warheads downloaded from delivery vehicles pursuant to this treaty under the auspices of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program...Should we provide such assistance even if Russia, like the United States, chooses not to eliminate many of its warheads?" Committee Chairman Senator Joseph Biden, Jr. (D-Del.)
"To be sure, the treaty could have been more expansive, rigid and demanding, and we could have followed the Cold War template for arms control negotiations and entered into a multiyear discussion process. But that did not serve the interests of either side. Furthermore, the treaty cannot be the answer to all of the challenges we face. If we had sought to construct such an agreement, it would surely have been crushed under its weight," Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.)
This Week on SUPERPOWER: Global Affairs TV -- "Grading Bush's Foreign Policy"
SUPERPOWER, together with foreign experts from around the world, examines the timely issues that affect the United States. Superpower explains the foreign take on world events and their relationship to the world's only superpower.
This Week on SUPERPOWER: Global Affairs TV -- "Grading Bush's Foreign Policy"
This week, Superpower examines and evaluates President Bush's foreign policy. Is President Bush promoting or undermining democracy abroad? Has the Bush administration dropped the ball on free trade? Is the Bush administration being too unilateralist? Is George Bush's rhetoric too inflammatory?
This Week's Guests: Husain Haqqani, Columnist for The Nation (Pakistan), Minxin Pei, Senior Associate at the Jerusalem Post and Gary Schmitt, Executive Director at the Project for the New American Century.
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