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| June 27, 2002 |
Needed Reform or Rearranging More Deck Chairs
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.) Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
The problems that allowed 9/11 to happen, everyone said, were macroscopic: failures of data analysis that might have provided intelligence pointing to the plot and its perpetrators, and failures in intra- and inter-agency communications that might have permitted someone to "connect the dots."
The "remedies" came quickly: more money, more people, and initially, more offices and agencies with a hand in homeland security.
The increases in federal funding and employees will undoubtedly stick and grow. The proposed Department of Homeland Security, which is to bring under one roof some 170,000 men and women from 22 existing agencies, will probably not be revenue or personnel neutral despite White House assurances to Congress. Moreover, simply pulling agencies and functions together under a new overlord doesn’t get to the crux of the problem: proper analysis of information and rapid dissemination of the resulting intelligence to a wide audience.
Now, it seems, the drive to reorganize is gathering steam within the intelligence community. Among the prominent early suggestions are two old ones: build a virtual wall between the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Directorates of Intelligence and Operations to reduce the chances that analysis will be driven by political considerations underlying covert action, and separating the position of Director, Central Intelligence Agency, an independent operational entity, from that of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), a policy coordinating and advisory position.
The argument for separating the positions is that the statutory dual workload of running one agency and trying to coordinate the efforts of the 13 entities that constitute the "intelligence community" is too much for one person. (And, of course, the current DCI, George Tenet, has been very prominent in trying to devise lasting security arrangements between Israelis and Palestinians.) The counter-argument is that the DCI, to carry clout, must head one of the premier intelligence organizations.
The wrinkle introduced into the latest debate would give the DCI control over "national" assets currently housed within the Defense Department, to include the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) (which is facing an internal restructuring and possible name change to something like National Geospatial Intelligence Agency). This suggestion, however, was rapidly dismissed as it ran afoul of major turf considerations.
Perhaps in a bid to stave off further attempts to poach on its sub-elements, the Defense Department is proposing its own post-9/11 reorganizations. The first involve changes to the Unified Command Plan that organizes the world into geographic warfighting fiefdoms and provides a combined approach to carrying out supporting functional missions (e.g., transportation). A new Northern Command, to coordinate Defense Department activities in support of homeland security, will come into existence on October 1, 2002. It has been proposed that Space Command and Strategic Command be merged into one entity, combining early warning (defense) assets with strategic nuclear capabilities (offense). Both proposals appear designed in part to help improve communications between the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security and within the military department (the sensor-to-shooter link) itself.
More relevant to correcting the 9/11 intelligence failures is the newest reported proposal affecting the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This calls for a new undersecretary of defense (the fourth at this level) for intelligence who would be charged with bringing together the efforts of the eight intelligence agencies housed in the department (NSA, NRO, NIMA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the four service intelligence organizations).
What is unclear is what will become of the current Assistant Secretary (one tier down from an undersecretary) of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) whose position was created in recognition of the interdependency of these functions. His office has policy oversight not only of the four high level defense intelligence organizations but also of defense security and information activities – the assistant secretary is dual-hatted as the Chief Information Officer in the Department of Defense. Abolishing this position would require finding a home for the non-intelligence functions, a problem similar to that confronting some of the agencies being transferred into the Department of Homeland Security.
And speaking of homeland security, in a further change the Defense Department wants to create a new Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security. The proposed trade-off downgrades the current Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict to a deputy assistant secretary and places the new position under homeland security. Given the highly touted success of special operations forces in Afghanistan and their continuing prominence as trainers in many countries allied with the U.S. in the anti-terror campaign, this change may not be well-received by Congress.
If there is a master plan at work, it remains unclear -- and cynics would say this is appropriate for those changes affecting the intelligence agencies. However, splitting intelligence from command, control, communications, and communications security functions at the policy level seems to contradict the whole movement toward seamless C3I (combined with surveillance and reconnaissance) at the operational level. Just as too much centralization can inhibit creativity and initiative, so too can too much decentralization inhibit vital "cross-pollination" that helps to connect the dots.
Time and events will judge whether these organizational changes, if approved by Congress, will do any good.
U.S. Senate Ratifies Child Soldiers Treaty
Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
On Tuesday June 19, the U.S. Senate ratified by voice vote the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, as well as the companion protocol on the sale of children.
The Optional Protocol was adopted by the UN General Assembly in May 2000. Based on a provision in the Protocol, insisted upon by the United States, the United States does not have to ratify the parent treaty, the Convention on the Rights on the Child. The Protocol specifically:
President Clinton signed both protocols on July 5, 2000 and hearings were held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 7, 2002. Once the Senate formally grants "advice and consent," the last step in a treaty ratification process is for the administration to deposit the instrument of ratification with the United Nations. According to Jo Becker, Advocacy Director of the Children’s Rights Divisions at Human Rights Watch, since the Bush administration is already on record in support of the two protocols, the formal accession to the protocols should happen shortly. The United States will then join the other 33 countries that have ratified the Child Soldiers Protocol (to date, 109 governments have signed the Protocol). The Protocol entered into force on February 12, after ten ratifications.
Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Joe Biden (D-DE) had spoken in favor of the Protocol and is reported by the CQ Daily Monitor as having said that "signing the protocol will express U.S. support and moral authority on the issue, as well as help protect American children abroad." Further, Biden stated, "These two treaties on their own will not end those awful practices, but they will establish new international standards, that, over the long run, will provide greater protection for children around the world."
In ratifying the Protocol, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended specific understandings and conditions that were published in the Congressional Record on June 12. These understandings and conditions represent the U.S. interpretation of the Protocol and its adherence to the Protocol’s provisions and are listed below:
The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children In Armed Conflict, opened for signature at New York on May 25, 2000 (Treaty Doc. 106-37; in this resolution referred to as the "Protocol"), subject to the understandings in section 2 and the conditions in section 3.
The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is subject to the following understandings, which shall be included in the United States instrument of ratification of the Protocol:
(1) No Assumption of Obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child -- The United States understands that the United States assumes no obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child by becoming a party to the Protocol.
(2) Implementation of Obligation Not to Permit Children to Take Direct Part in Hostilities-- The United States understands that, with respect to Article 1 of the Protocol--
(A) the term "feasible measures" means those measures that are practical or practically possible, taking into account all the circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations;
(B) the phrase "direct part in hostilities"--
(i) means immediate and actual action on the battlefield likely to cause harm to the enemy because there is a direct causal relationship between the activity engaged in and the harm done to the enemy; and
(ii) does not mean indirect participation in hostilities, such as gathering and transmitting military information, transporting weapons, munitions, or other supplies, or forward deployment; and
(C) any decision by any military commander, military personnel, or other person responsible for planning, authorizing, or executing military action, including the assignment of military personnel, shall only be judged on the basis of all the relevant circumstances and on the basis of that person's assessment of the information reasonably available to the person at the time the person planned, authorized, or executed the action under review, and shall not be judged on the basis of information that comes to light after the action under review was taken.
(3) Minimum Age for Voluntary Recruitment -- The United States understands that Article 3 of the Protocol obligates States Parties to the Protocol to raise the minimum age for voluntary recruitment into their national armed forces from the current international standard of 15 years of age.
(4) Armed Groups -- The United States understands that the term "armed groups" in Article 4 of the Protocol means non-governmental armed groups such as rebel groups, dissident armed forces, and other insurgent groups.
(5) No Basis for Jurisdiction by Any International Tribunal -- The United States understands that nothing in the Protocol establishes a basis for jurisdiction by any international tribunal, including the International Criminal Court.
The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is subject to the following conditions:
(1) Requirement to Deposit Declaration -- The President shall, upon ratification of the Protocol, deposit a binding declaration under Article 3(2) of the Protocol that states in substance that--
(A) the minimum age at which the United States permits voluntary recruitment into the Armed Forces of the United States is 17 years of age;
(B) the United States has established safeguards to ensure that such recruitment is not forced or coerced, including a requirement in section 505(a) of title 10, United States Code, that no person under 18 years of age may be originally enlisted in the Armed Forces of the United States without the written consent of the person's parent or guardian, if the parent or guardian is entitled to the person's custody and control;
(C) each person recruited into the Armed Forces of the United States receives a comprehensive briefing and must sign an enlistment contract that, taken together, specify the duties involved in military service; and
(D) all persons recruited into the Armed Forces of the United States must provide reliable proof of age before their entry into military service.
(2) Interpretation of the Protocol -- The Senate reaffirms condition (8) of the resolution of ratification of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of November 19, 1990 (adopted at Vienna on May 31, 1996), approved by the Senate on May 14, 1997 (relating to condition (1) of the resolution of ratification of the INF Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988).
(3) Reports--
(A) Initial Report -- Not later than 90 days after the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report describing the measures taken by the military departments to comply with the obligation set forth in Article 1 of the Protocol. The report shall include the text of any applicable regulations, directives, or memoranda governing the policies of the departments in implementing that obligation.
(B) Subsequent Reports--
(i) Report by the Secretary of State -- The Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a copy of any report submitted to the Committee on the Rights of the Child pursuant to Article 8 of the Protocol.
(ii) Report by the Secretary of Defense -- Not later than 30 days after any significant change in the policies of the military departments in implementing the obligation set forth in Article 1 of the Protocol, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate describing the change and the rationale therefore.
Britain to Withdraw Combat Forces From Afghanistan -- Britain has announced plans to withdrawal its combat force of 1,600 Royal Marines from Afghanistan by July 4. The units will depart 90 days after their initial deployment, and will leave the United States and Afghani forces with responsibility for virtually all combat missions. About 11,000 coalition troops will be left in Afghanistan after the British forces depart, with a relatively small number of Canadian and Australian troops assisting in continued efforts to locate al Qaeda and Taliban troops, bases and supply depots.
Air Force to Reduce Response Time in Protecting D.C. Airspace -- As a result of last week’s accidental incursion of a civilian aircraft in to restricted airspace over Washington, D.C., fighter aircraft responsible for protecting the area will reduce their response time, according to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. While refusing for security reasons to specify what new measures would be taken, Secretary Rumsfeld said that improved communications between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Defense Department could cut response times by critical minutes in an emergency situation.
Committee Recommends Consideration of Comanche Alternative -- The House Appropriations Committee has recommended that the Army "begin reviewing potential low cost alternatives" to its Comanche helicopter program. In a report accompanying its annual defense spending legislation, the Committee, noting that Comanche has been under development for nearly twenty years at a cost of more than $6 billion, and has been restructured six times, stated that its "full support for this program is now in jeopardy unless the Army can show marked progress over the next fiscal year."
ABM Lawsuit Struggling -- The lawsuit being brought against the Bush administration by members of Congress in an attempt to clarify who has the right to withdraw the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was dealt a serious blow on June 20. The Senate Ethics Committee determined that Senator Russ Feingold (D-Wisc.) could not be a plaintiff in the lawsuit by denying him the waiver needed to accept the free legal assistance. While Feingold has vowed to continue supporting the legal action, the absence of any Senators among the plaintiffs will very likely weaken the case.
Quotation of the Week -- "It’s very difficult for someone like me to stand up and say I don’t know what it’s going to cost because we haven’t defined it well enough, but that is the case as we stand here today. And most of the cost estimates you’ve heard in the past have one characteristic in common. They’ve all been wrong, including the ones that we’ve come up with," Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, Director of the Missile Defense Agency, on what it will cost to deploy a missile defense system, Pentagon briefing, June 25, 2002.
This Week on SUPERPOWER: Global Affairs TV -- "The G-8: Is it Still Relevant?"
"SUPERPOWER: Global Affairs TV" showcases international television coverage of world events. Host Lisa Simeone along with Mark Thompson of Time Magazine and Jefferson Morley of the washingtonpost.com, discuss current events with a regular rotation of foreign journalists, as well as other guests from the foreign military and diplomatic communities in Washington.
This Week on SUPERPOWER: Global Affairs TV -- "The G-8: Is it Still Relevant?"
This week, Superpower examines the G-8 conference in Canada and poses the questions that Americans want to ask. What mandate does the G-8 have? Will there be any real progress made in assisting Africa? Whom do these meetings benefit? Who determines membership of the G-8? What does the G-8 do that the U.N. and the I.M.F. cannot?
Joining Lisa Simeone will be Nikolai Zlobin, Editor-in-Chief for Washington ProFile, Barrie McKenna, Washington D.C. Correspondent for the Globe and Mail of Canada and Benedict Sannoh, Visiting Fellow from Liberia at the National Endowment for Democracy.
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