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| June 6, 2002 |
The Department of Homeland Security: Issues and Initial Observations
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
On June 6 President George W. Bush announced his plans to create a new federal agency - The Department of Homeland Security (DoHS). Below is a brief analysis of the President’s proposal, as well as issues that remain unresolved and potential problem areas.
Organization of DoHS:
Both the White House Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council will remain and will not be part of the new Department. Will the DoHS Secretary serve as head of the White House Office? Will there be a separate position of "Homeland Security Advisor?"
The organizational chart of the new department looks straight-forward, but will become more complicated when small entities are broken out (e.g., Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, Office of Domestic Preparedness, National Domestic Preparedness Office, and those entities that DoHS will "direct": Nuclear Emergency Search Teams, Radiological Emergency Response Team, Radiological Assistance Program, Domestic Emergency Support Team, National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, National Disaster Medical System).
The Secret Service and Coast Guard are transferred intact and FEMA is completely absorbed. For all three, they take with them their non-homeland security missions. In fact, the Secret Service's "primary mission will remain the protection of the President and other government leaders."
"Revenue Neutral":
Although DoHS will employ 170,000 personnel and have a budget of $37.5 billion, the Administration says that it will not increase the size of the federal government or budget.
The DoHS will have to hire general intelligence analysts (see below) and must staff a new "National BW Defense Analysis Center" in particular.
The administration believes "the cost of the new elements...as well as department-wide management and administration units, can be funded from savings achieved by eliminating redundancies inherent in the current structure."
The administration also assumes a "more productive workforce at the agent level."
The administration wants the Secretary "to have great latitude in redeploying resources, both human and financial." Congress will be wary of this, as it was with the $10 billion special fund requested for the Secretary of Defense in the FY2003 budget.
Shared Responsibilities Between Cabinet Departments:
DoHS will "assume the legal authority to issue visas to foreign nationals" while the State Department. "working through the United States embassies and consulates abroad [will] continue to administer the visa application and issuance process."
DoHS will also "lead efforts to create a border of the future that provides greater security through...unprecedented international cooperation against terrorists, the instruments of terrorism, and other international threats." These visa responsibilities suggest that the new department may well begin posting representatives abroad in embassies and consulates.
DoHS will perform "drug interdiction operations" but will not absorb the Justice Department’s Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). What is the division of labor?
DoHS will "lead efforts to develop, deploy, manage, and maintain...a national public health data surveillance system." How will this mesh with what the Center for Disease Control does?
Intel and Threat Analysis:
DoHS will "contain a unit whose sole mission is to assemble, fuse and analyze relevant intelligence data from government sources...and data gleaned from other organizations and public sources." This implies access to raw data rather than just other agencies' products. Such access has strengths and drawbacks:
However, in a background briefing, a "senior administration official" said that "they [FBI, CIA, Customs, DEA 'and everybody else'] will do their work, and their analysis, and make that available to the Dept" -- which implies that raw data may not be provided. That means the information provided will be derivative, not original, and potentially something vital to homeland security could be omitted or be buried in the analysis.
Duties of DoHS go beyond traditional analysis in that it is to "map [current and future] threats against our current vulnerabilities, inform the President, issue timely warnings, and immediately take or effect appropriate preventive and protective action." In the military, the latter function is performed in the operations/operational plans sections, not the intelligence section. Yet DoHS has no operational arm; it must convince law enforcement agencies to take action.
Other Issues:
The President wants legislation that will allow DoHS to be established by January 1, 2003. Congress has only some 50 legislative working days remaining. It is highly unlikely that the committees with jurisdictions over agencies that would lose a substantial part of their authority will embrace the proposal without a thorough, and perhaps lengthy, review.
Further, from the charts drawn up by the White House, the President implies that the number of congressional committees with oversight of homeland security should be reduced, just as his plan calls for consolidating the 100 government organizations that currently have homeland security responsibilities.
Transformational Stars: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or Unmanned Ground Vehicles?
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) garnered tremendous positive coverage during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The media used them as a poster-child for the new high-tech U.S. way of war and the administration cited them as key tools of military "transformation." Until the technology is much more advanced, however, UAVs will not be very "transformational" -- as transformation is defined below. The attention devoted to UAVs, however, has overshadowed a similar area of technology development that may well be far more transformational in the near term than UAVs: unmanned ground vehicles, or UGVs.
The definition of transformation used here is: qualitative change in the way forces fight, rather than mere quantitative improvement. Under this definition, a new artillery piece that fires somewhat farther and faster than the old one, and drives faster, is unlikely to be transformational. But one that uses computers to integrate a network of sensors on separate platforms for targeting might well be transformational.
Currently, until UAVs become far more numerous, capable, and reliable, they add mainly quantitative improvements to operations. Their principal advantages over occupied aircraft are (1) they can have long "loiter" times -- ability to fly for long periods without in-flight refueling, over 24 hours for Predator, 36 hours for the Global Hawk; (2) they can be cheaper to buy and operate; and (3) if they are lost, no pilot is killed or falls into enemy hands.
The first two elements are quantitative improvements. The UAVs have a reconnaissance capability similar in concept to small or large manned aircraft, although not as well developed yet, but can do it for longer, particularly if manned aircraft are not refueled in flight. Their cost advantage exists in theory but must be carefully preserved or it could evaporate as the acquisition bureaucracy almost inevitably turns to more powerful, larger, more capable -- and more expensive -- models. Currently, cheaper UAVs like the $3 million Predator possess a key attribute: they can be used in higher-risk situations with less concern about losing a valuable asset. Once UAVs approach the cost of occupied aircraft -- Global Hawk costs have ballooned to $48 million each including the ground equipment, while F-16 fighters have averaged $19 million -- their expendability diminishes.
The third difference with occupied aircraft, however, is a qualitative change: the lack of a pilot to be killed or captured could, for example, enable a high level of reconnaissance to be undertaken in combat over well-defended enemy areas. But the advantage diminishes when, as in Afghanistan, there is a very low threat from air defenses and enemy air forces. UAVs will have limited self-defense capabilities for the near future and are vulnerable to hostile aircraft and ground-based air defenses, so they work best in conditions of U.S. air supremacy. The most likely scenarios for use of U.S. forces in the near future is smaller-scale contingencies without the threat of advanced integrated air defense networks like those possessed by the former Warsaw Pact. When the threat to pilots is very low -- or has been destroyed in the opening phases of an operation -- manned reconnaissance aircraft can be used with low risk, which limits the immediate transformational impact of UAVs.
Unmanned ground vehicles, in contrast, offer a huge qualitative change in the way smaller-scale contingencies, which are likely to occur in urban settings, are fought: they may make U.S. urban combat more acceptable and thus more feasible.
Intense urban combat has inevitably involved extremely high casualties for the attacker and defender -- if it is not "fought" in the recent Russian style of simply leveling built-up areas with artillery, as was done against Grozny in the second war with Chechnya. Annihilation of cities is unlikely to be an available option politically for the United States.
Even during the Cold War, the U.S. military approach was to avoid offensive ground combat in urban areas wherever possible. The perception that a U.S. military operation cannot absorb substantial casualties without losing public support has sustained this approach into the post-Cold War era. Although that perception may have eased somewhat in the post-9/11 context of strong public backing for U.S. military operations, the very high casualty rates of urban combat still support urban-averse doctrines. The Marine Corps, however, sensing a niche role, has taken an early lead in experimenting with urban combat. Among other initiatives, the Marine Corps conducted a series of high-level experiments on Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) called Urban Warrior starting in 1997.
The high casualty counts of urban warfare are caused by the concealment and protection that city blocks offer defenders -- every window, door, room, stairway, and building can contain enemy soldiers and must be painstakingly cleared at close range. Unmanned ground vehicles, such as remote controlled devices with video and other sensors, offer the possibility of checking rooms and corners without having to peer around each door or throw a grenade into each room. The addition of weaponry to the UGVs further reduces hazards for the infantry. UGVs could also be extremely useful in certain non-urban settings, such as the caves and tunnels that were prominent in Afghanistan.
The Services have already begun work on the new technologies. The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory has appropriately focused its unmanned vehicle work on the tactical level in urban combat. Rather than build a heavy 30-40 pound UGV able to climb stairs but too heavy for an individual Marine to handle well, it has developed a simple 12 pound UGV called Dragon Runner with video and infra-red sensors. It can be thrown up stairs. In the summer of 2002 the Army is scheduled to field a tracked robot called Matilda with sensors and a payload and weapon capability.
UGV technology is still in its infancy -- and UGVs can be more difficult to design than UAVs, given the variety of terrain they have to cross. Nonetheless, more than UAVs in the near term, they offer the possibility of bringing fundamental transformation to U.S. strategies and ways of fighting -- making crucial operations in urban areas possible that the nation would otherwise be loathe to conduct.
Surprise! What is Old is New Again
It is increasingly clear that an intelligence failure occurred prior to the attacks of September 11. Yet few of the charges currently leveled at the Central Intelligence Agency are new. At various stages in its history, the Agency has been accused of being ignorant of the relevant facts, unable to communicate the conclusions drawn from the facts it does posses, embroiled in bureaucratic politics with its sister agencies in the intelligence community, politically motivated, and or/just plain inept. But the CIA’s history is not one of unmitigated failure, despite what its critics might say. Though the Agency has, at times, been guilty of all these foibles, it is also true that predictive failures are inevitable. Identifying the shortcomings of the CIA prior to 9/11 is important. But the true challenge is to ensure that a capable and robust CIA emerges from the inquiry.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had a formative influence on the CIA. The major preoccupation of the young agency in the years after its creation in 1947 was simply to avoid a future Pearl Harbor, a task made more important with the advent of the nuclear age. But the obsession with crisis and surprise has attendant drawbacks. As the historian Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones notes, "this gave rise to the extravagant expectations that the CIA would be able to foresee every crisis, an expectation that gave an inappropriate skew to the Agency’s tasking and led to inevitable disappointment on account of the inevitable predictive failures (or sometimes, when the White House needed a scapegoat, alleged predictive failures)."
All of the CIA’s predictive failures, real and alleged, have cost it dearly in two important areas: efficacy and standing. In Washington, a bureaucracy that lacks either will have a hard time carrying the day among policy makers regardless of the accuracy of its position. The CIA’s perceived failure to predict crisis in Colombia in 1948 and Korea in 1950 set the pattern for this early. It was reinforced by later "nonpredictions," including the genuine failure to foresee the Yom Kippur war in 1973 despite a plethora of evidence suggesting that Syria and Egypt would attack Israel.
Other patterns were also set in the wake of intelligence controversies. The Agency has been made a scapegoat for presidential shortcomings, or rewarded for failure with more money, less oversight, and an expanded operational brief. President Richard Nixon "saved" the CIA from congressional investigations and allegations that the agency had been surprised by the Soviet drive to strategic parity, only so Henry Kissinger could manipulate accurate estimates later in pursuit of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. Kissinger further manipulated the intelligence process by burying CIA evidence of Soviet arms control violations. The casualties were the Agency’s standing, public faith in the value of CIA advice, and the opportunity for covert operational reform that would have saved the CIA much grief in later years.
Now the United States has suffered another surprise and the focus of the intelligence community, and those who oversee it, is drawn once more to the issue of crisis prediction. To be sure, in an age where nuclear terrorism is a distinct possibility, prediction is more important than ever. But it may also be true that knowing the details of those who carry out the attacks is a more realistic expectation for the intelligence community than knowing precisely when and where the next attack will come. Predicting and foiling the next crisis on the horizon, something the CIA has had some success at, will never be a substitute for a long-term campaign waged against the root causes of terrorism. It is revealing that, while elected officials speak of waging war on terrorism, intelligence officials talk of managing it.
There can be few quick fixes that will ensure that the U.S. intelligence community will foresee the next Pearl Harbor. The changes that will be produced by congress’ current inquiries may be helpful, especially if they invigorate the concepts of neutral analysis and intelligence coordination among agencies. But in assessing the quality of intelligence, the standard of accurate prediction must be used in the proper context. The historian Earnest May relates a story, certainly apocryphal, that illustrates this point well. An anonymous senior minister in the British government during the first half of the last century estimated, year in and year out for fifty years, that there would be no major war in Europe. In all that time, he boasted, he was wrong only twice.
Rep. Kucinich Moves to Block ABM Treaty Withdrawal -- With the Bush administration planning to officially withdraw the United States from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty next week, Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) introduced a resolution requiring the President to seek congressional authority before withdrawing from any treaty. The Administration has asserted that it has the authority to withdraw from treaties without congressional approval. On June 6, Rep. Kucinich attempted to get his resolution considered as a privileged motion and thus eligible for expedited action, but his effort failed on a procedural vote, 254 to 169. Rep. Kucinich has already indicated that he is also considering filing a lawsuit to block the withdrawal on constitutional grounds.
Italy, Netherlands, Norway to Join JSF Program -- Italy, the Netherlands and Norway each announced this week that they would become partners in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. Representatives of the Dutch government signed a Memorandum of Understanding on June 5, becoming the fourth country -- along with Britain, Canada and Denmark -- to officially join. The Dutch joined as Level II partners, which requires an investment of $1 billion. Canada and Denmark are Level III partners, having each made a $150 million investment, while Britain has contributed $2 billion as a Level I partner.
First deliveries of the JSF will be made to the U.S. and Britain, after which they will become available to partner countries in descending order, beginning in 2012. In addition to preferred delivery schedules, partner countries have tiered representation in the JSF planning office based on their level of participation, and have thus have relatively more or less influence on the aircraft’s development.
NORAD Simulates Interception of Hijacked Jets -- Fighter aircraft of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) conducted training this week involving the interception of two hijacked aircraft flying over the United States. The exercise -- dubbed "Amalgam Virgo" -- was planned prior to Sept. 11, but adapted to reflect those events, according to a NORAD spokesperson. About 10 NORAD aircraft intercepted the airliners, but no specifics were given about their actions. According to NORAD the command has flown 22,000 sorties and responded to over 300 "aviation events" since Sept. 11.
Navy Suspends F-14 Flights -- The Navy has temporarily suspended carrier flights of its F-14 "Tomcat" fighter aircraft as a result of the investigation in to the cause of a March 2 crash that killed a pilot. Investigators have concluded that a strut in the aircraft’s nose wheel assembly had become corroded, causing the crash. Carrier aircraft are subject to the corrosive sea environment as well as the additional strain of catapult take-offs and arrested landings. Carrier operations of the Navy’s 156 have been suspended while the wheel assemblies of each aircraft are inspected, and if necessary, replaced. The Navy estimates it will take 45 days to inspect and repair the entire fleet, at a possible total cost of $30 million.
Quotation of the Week -- "...we want to have balance. We want to protect the civil liberties of the American people, protect our Constitution. If we need to change the way we collect intelligence in our country, we should do so thoughtfully. But it shouldn't be the easy out for people who miss (sic) a glaring mistake and then say, 'But if only we could collect -- if we could spy more on the American people, we might have been able to prevent this,'" U.S. Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), press briefing on first session of Joint House-Senate Intelligence Committee Inquiry into Sept. 11, June 4, 2002.
This Week on SUPERPOWER: Global Affairs TV -- "Peace in Asia: Russia's New Role"
"SUPERPOWER: Global Affairs TV" showcases international television coverage of world events. Host Lisa Simeone along with Mark Thompson of Time Magazine and Jefferson Morley of the washingtonpost.com, discuss current events with a regular rotation of foreign journalists, as well as other guests from the foreign military and diplomatic communities in Washington.
This Week’s Episode: "Peace in Asia: Russia's New Role"
This week, Superpower examines the role of the United States, Europe and Russia in brokering peace between India and Pakistan. How do the roles differ between Europe, Russia and The United States in preserving peace in Asia? Does the new arms control agreement between Russia and the US signal a new age of cooperation in non-proliferation? Will the current summit in Kazakhstan lead to a new framework for India and Pakistan in future peace talks? What does this mean for Americans?
Joining Lisa Simeone will be ITAR-TASS Washington Bureau Chief, Andrei Sitov and Gerard Baker, Chief U.S. Commentator for the Financial Times of London.
WHERE TO SEE SUPERPOWER:
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Marcus Corbin, Senior Analyst,
Michael Donovan, Research Analyst,