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| May 30, 2002 |
Terrorism Unlikely to Drastically Change U.S.-European Relations
Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org
It has become popular to say that Sept. 11 changed the world as we know it. It would certainly seem so from a glance at the changes. Russia and the United States arguably made more progress on issues of nuclear arms reduction and relations with NATO in the eight months since Sept. 11 than in the preceding eight years. Russia today is cooperating with the United States in the fight against terrorism more closely than many of America’s established allies in Europe. The European countries, who in the months before Sept. 11 seemed to disagree with every single aspect of U.S. policy -- be it on issues of environment, the death penalty or the International Criminal Court -- are now actively engaged in Afghanistan, working under U.S. leadership and command. In fact, Europeans today have more troops on the ground in Afghanistan than the Americans. And finally, Washington itself changed. The United States was being accused of isolationism and unilateralism even before the election of George W. Bush; a trend which accelerated after his arrival in the White House. And yet within weeks of Sept. 11, the U.S. government built one of the largest political and military coalitions in recent history and held it together through eight months of fighting in Afghanistan.
These are truly remarkable events, indeed. However, on closer look, a more sobering view of these changes emerges, particularly regarding U.S.-European relations. The fact is that the effects of Sept. 11 vary in direct relation to one’s distance from Washington and New York. In the United States, the terrorist attacks have indeed changed, in a revolutionary way, the way the Americans think about their role in the world. But the farther one moves from Washington, the more politics remains the same.
To Europe, terrorism is not a new problem; it has been a fact of life in countries like Great Britain, Spain, or Germany for decades. However, until Sept. 11, it has been viewed exclusively as a domestic problem. The terrorist threat to Europe has historically come not from the Middle East but from domestic sources, be it the Irish Republican Army, the ETA in Spain, or the Red Army in Germany. That means that the fight against terrorism in the minds of most Europeans does not involve military expeditions but law enforcement actions, things like freezing bank accounts and cultivating sources of intelligence within the terrorist groups.
Sept. 11 changed that mindset only minimally. The attacks, after all, targeted the United States and not Europe. The Europeans view themselves -- as most countries do -- as vastly different from the United States. Because London or Paris do not have the sort of a global military presence that Washington does, the European capitals think they present a far less attractive target for international terrorists. Nor does Europe have the sort of a dominant and very pervasive cultural influence that the United States enjoys and Muslim radicals so despise and vilify.
This attitude in Europe may change if future attacks do indeed target Paris or London, which is not inconceivable. Already, a bomb explosion in Tunisia in April clearly targeted Germans rather than Tunisians -- the synagogue that came under attack was frequented by German nationals and most victims were indeed Germans. Law enforcement operations in Europe also uncovered plans to attack some of the best known landmarks such as the Eiffel Tower and the famous cathedral in Strassbourg, France. But in order for the European publics to be shaken out of their complacency, one of these attacks would probably have to take place on the European continent itself -- a possibility which President Bush pointedly raised during his recent visit to Europe. For the time being, Europe is an active but a somewhat distant participant in the coalition against terrorism.
What does this mean for Europe’s relations with the United States and its role in the world in general? It means that hopes for a tectonic shift in which global and regional rivalries will be replaced by a unifying desire to defeat the terrorist threat are probably too optimistic. (The unifying effect may be far stronger in case of U.S.-Russian relations than in case of U.S.–European relations.) U.S.-European relations after Sept. 11 are still torn by the same basic dilemmas that dominated political debates in Berlin, Paris, London, Rome and elsewhere for the past five years or so: are the institutions of the European Union strong enough for Europe to also play a leading foreign policy and military role? And is in fact such a role even desirable, or should European defense and foreign policy be set in conjunction with the United States?
This rivalry, if not competition, used to be framed in terms of the European Union against NATO, with the EU representing the European solution while NATO obviously symbolizing the transatlantic link. So when France wanted to make known its displeasure with Europe’s military dependency on the United States, it did so by withdrawing from NATO’s military institutions. On the other end of the spectrum is Britain, a staunch ally of the United States, whose main participation in the European Union’s defense policies consists of making sure that the EU military stays closely tied to NATO and does not become independent.
Ironically, this NATO vs. EU debate has changed since Sept. 11 -- NATO simply hasn’t been much of a factor. This is not because of any changes in Europe, but rather because the United States seems to have lost interest in the alliance. The EU, on the other hand, continues to grow larger and stronger (although not without problems). And there is every indication that Europe’s fight against terrorism will be centered on EU institutions, not NATO. This is precisely because Europe views terrorism primarily as a law-enforcement problem and not a military one. NATO is a military alliance; the European Union is how Europe coordinates its police and intelligence activities.
As a result, terrorism is unlikely to bring about a boom in Euro-Atlantic cooperation. Europe already has most of the mechanisms it needs to take steps against terrorism. Some cooperation with the United States, Russia, the Middle East and North Africa will clearly be required -- radical Islamic terrorism, after all, is a problem that transcends national borders. But such cooperation is a very different deal from a coalition or an alliance with the United States. If anything, European counterterrorist activities will end up strengthening purely European institutions at the expense of NATO.
Crucial Nonproliferation Assistance to Russia Hangs in The Balance, Again
Devon Chaffee, Herbert Scoville, Jr. Peace Fellow, dchaffee@cdi.org
The administration of U.S. President George W. Bush has recently informed Russia that it will be denied the certification necessary for Russia to receive new Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) funds. Funding for CTR and other cooperative nonproliferation programs with former Soviet republics has long been vulnerable to the political tremors of U.S.-Russian relations. This pattern of political maneuvering, however, is dangerous, and the administration might look to means other than threatening to withhold CTR funds to encourage Russian treaty compliance. Proposed legislation that would allow the president to waive the certification process may encourage such alternative strategies.
By securing and dismantling nuclear weapons and materials that could put both countries at risk, the CTR programs serve the security interests of both the United States and Russia. Yet the programs have been continually threatened by U.S.-Russian disputes since their establishment in 1991. These issues have included concerns over Russia providing nuclear energy technology to Iran, fear of Russia transferring missile technology to North Korea, China, and Iran, disagreements over Russian military action in Chechnya, and the arrest of a suspected Russian spy in 2001.
The Bush administration’s support for the CTR programs has wavered considerably over the past year and a half. In the beginning of 2001, the administration seemed determined to significantly cut funding for CTR. However, since December, the administration has promoted record increases for CTR funding for Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003.
Then, in early April, the Bush administration informed Russia that it would not provide the certification required by U.S. law to provide new funds to the CTR programs funds due to Russian noncompliance with the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions (CWC and BWC). The CTR certification requirements include the verification of Russian compliance with arms control agreements as well as with human rights treaties, and there are additional requirements for any aid for chemical weapons destruction (see: P.L. 107-107, SEC. 1308). The Department of Energy nonproliferation programs are not affected by the certification requirements.
Though the Bush administration claims that certification is being withheld due to BWC and CWC compliance questions, uncertainties about Russia’s compliance with these treaties in relation to CTR have been present since 1995 if not before, and have not previously resulted in the denial of certification.
It is possible that the Bush administration is holding out for a more intrusive inspection regime, and the closing of more Russian chemical and biological weapons development centers. The certification card also may have been played, in part, to increase the administration’s leverage in talks on strategic nuclear weapons reductions, which resulted in an agreement signed at the recently held summit between Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Given the importance of the CTR programs in preventing terrorists and states hostile to the United States from obtaining nuclear weapons capabilities, it is somewhat alarming how vulnerable these programs are to political manipulation. Russian noncompliance with the CWC and BWC may increase the risk of proliferation, but so does threatening the stability of CTR programs. Bush’s denial of certification could result in the halting of submarine dismantlement, and put into jeopardy programs which enhance nuclear weapons security and increase U.S. access to Russian facilities.
Treating the CTR program as an easily expendable bargaining chip may encourage Russia to follow suit, holding out on nonproliferation cooperation with the United States in hopes of obtaining other political gains. One must ask: is there not a less vital carrot that could be used?
Dr. Constantine Menges, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, suggested just that in a recent congressional hearing on CTR activities. Recognizing the importance of Russian compliance with all arms control treaties, he noted that the United States should look at monetary pressure points other than the CTR to encourage treaty compliance and limitations on technology transfers (April 23, 2002, Senate Foreign Relations Committee).
This would help develop what Menges described as a two-level strategy; on one level stabilizing programs such as CTR would help assure a normal civil relationship with Russia, and on another level other economic incentives, such as aid to production of consumer goods or support for Russian World Trade Organization membership, would be tied to nonproliferation conditions. He also suggests that financial assistance coming from U.S. allies might be used as a means of pressuring Russia towards treaty compliance.
Recently proposed legislation being considered in Congress might help to insulate the CTR programs from the periodic vibrations of U.S.-Russian political disagreements. The FY 2003 National Defense Authorization, as was passed by the House, also includes a limited wavier provision with attached reporting requirements, and the version of this bill to come out of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the emergency supplemental request made by the administration for FY 2002 include an unrestricted waiver for CTR funds. (All proposed waivers also waive the eligibility requirement for aid through the State Department, as laid out in the Freedom Support Act, section 502, P. L. 102-511.)
The House version of the authorization act extensively addresses concerns about Russian proliferation to Iran while expressing the sense of Congress that there should be enhanced cooperation with Russia, and laying out specific steps towards this end. These steps include an agreement to reduce risks posed by tactical nuclear weapons, joint visits to test sites, laboratories, development and production facilities, and the establishment of a joint commission on nonproliferation (see: H.R. 4546 as passed by the House).
Hopefully the House’s reconciliation of Russian proliferation concerns with the concurrent need to increase U.S.-Russia security cooperation is a step in the direction of stabilizing the U.S. commitment to CTR programs. In addition to ensuring the continued positive results achieved by the CTR in countering nuclear proliferation, accomplishing the stabilization of the CTR program may eventually contribute to badly needed constancy in U.S.-Russian relations in general.
Crying Wolf: The Zero-Sum of All Fears?
Mark Burgess, CDI Research Analyst, mburgess@cdi.org
Abraham Lincoln had good grounds for confidence when, in 1838 he asked of his nation, "Shall we expect some transatlantic military giant to step the ocean and crush us at a blow?" Arguably, until the latter half of the twentieth century, Americans could indeed sleep relatively easily in their beds when it came to fear of attack from beyond their borders. The Atlantic and Pacific made formidable moats, and it was not until May 1915 that German U-boats demonstrated that America could no longer hope to isolate herself from the affairs of those in other countries. The events of Sept. 11, 2002 brought home that message anew to a nation that seemed to many to have forgotten it with the end of the Cold War.
Not that the Lusitania’s sinking brought a full realization of the invasive nature of international affairs to America’s shores. It was another 26 years before the United States truly awoke from its strategic slumber. Again the catalyst was technology, this time in the form of the aircraft carriers that enabled Japan to attack Peal Harbor. By 1945, the advent of nuclear weapons ensured that America could no longer ignore the threat of outside aggression. Soon the practice of being ill-prepared for war was reversed to the extent that some commentators began accusing the United States of strategic ‘overthink.’ To the degree that such preparations were geared mainly to conventional or quasi-conventional military threats, this charge has some truth to it. However, as was seen last September, the greatest threat to America is not necessarily a conventional one.
To that degree, current allegations that the Bush administration and their advisors did not do enough to prevent the al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are sustainable. It is impossible to prepare for something you cannot imagine and the indications are that those charged with protecting America against such outrages were at best unimaginative when it came to their counter-terrorist measures. This does not mean that their resultant failure to anticipate airliners being used as ballistic missiles is somehow excusable, however. If Tom Clancy can conceive the inconceivable surely the U.S. intelligence agencies can do likewise. Certainly these agencies do not seem to be suffering from any dearth of imagination at the moment if the variety of warnings currently emanating from them is any measure. Apartment buildings, landmarks, transit systems -- the list of potential targets is potentially endless. Al Qaeda is capable of developing a scuba diving capability, we are told. Tell us something we don’t already know -- after all, most people are capable of developing a scuba diving capability.
Those issuing such warnings would do well to reflect on the climate of fear and uncertainty that developed in the aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor, with the Joint Army-Navy Board reporting to President Roosevelt that Japan was capable of ‘devastating raids’ as far afield as Alaska, Hawaii, the West Coast, and the Panama Canal. In fact, what can only be described as panic developed in some sections of the U.S. military and civilian communities. This was typified by the warning delivered to the press on the war’s second day by Lieutenant General John L. Dewitt, commander of the Fourth Army and of America’s West Coast defenses that (non-existent) Japanese carrier planes had been spotted over San Francisco, and that "death and destruction are likely to come to this city at any moment." There were also warnings in New York, this time from the city’s mayor, that the East Coast too could be vulnerable to attack. In Hawaii the panic acquired more farcical proportions when a dog on a beach was reported to be barking in Morse code to a (non-existent) Japanese submarine lying off-shore.
Such instances become somewhat less funny when contrasted with the woefully inadequate reactions to the very real threat posed by German submarines. Within a month of the war’s start, U-boats began a nine-month long campaign of unprecedented slaughter against U.S. shipping, often carried out within sight of the American coast and so one-sided as to be christened the ‘happy time’ by German submariners.
Those currently tasked with protecting Americans from terrorist attack should be cautious of being caught up in a panic of their own making, and direct their energies toward combating the threat of such attacks rather than risk sowing alarm with what are on occasion vague and unsubstantiated warnings about what al Qaeda is capable of or may be planning next.
To be sure, making people aware of the threat is important. Terrorizing the American public, however, is the aim of the terrorists; it should not be the function of the American government and law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Rather than being greeted daily by reports of every possible terrorist threat they are facing, Americans need to be reassured that those they have entrusted with protecting them are on the job. Nothing should be ‘inevitable,’ despite warnings about suicide bombers and weapons of mass destruction from FBI Director Robert Mueller and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to the contrary. A balance must be struck between alerting people and alarming people. If this doesn’t happen, one thing that will be inevitable is desensitization to such warnings, something that will only aid those planning future attacks. Crying wolf is a beguiling, dangerous and counterproductive pastime, albeit one that appears to defuse any accusations of under-preparation. America’s intelligence agencies and their overseers should do more to avoid it than currently appears the case.
Bush’s Cuba Policy Under Fire
Devon Chaffee, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow, dchaffee@cdi.org
As part of a broad review of the administration’s policy toward Cuba, President George W. Bush recently delivered speeches in Washington and Miami revealing a list of unsurprising initiatives that changed little in U.S. Cuba policy. As Bush maintains his hard-line stance on Cuba, he has encountered increasing opposition from members of Congress, many of whom are looking for more effective and innovative ways to influence the regime of Fidel Castro. Cooperative security efforts may be one of the most feasible, practical steps the administration could take in appeasing Congress’ call for change.
Earlier this month the 20 Democratic and 20 Republican U.S. representatives that constitute a newly formed Cuba Working Group released a nine-point plan calling for specific changes in U.S. Cuba policy. In addition to lifting the travel ban and allowing unrestricted sales of food and medicine, the plan argues in favor of increased security cooperation with Cuba, including furthering efforts to work with Cuba to thwart international crime, drug smuggling, terrorism, and environmental disasters. The plan noted the need to include the Coast Guard in some of these security efforts.
In his recent speeches, Bush neither supported nor denounced the possibility of increased security cooperation with Cuba. Bush’s initiatives include limited scholarships, modernizing efforts to reach the Cuban populations directly through TV and radio, easing restrictions on humanitarian assistance, directly aiding humanitarian and entrepreneurial activities by ‘legitimate’ nongovernmental organizations, and negotiating the resumption of mail service. None of these initiatives are significant changes to current policy. The president also made clear that he plans to continue to enforce the economic embargo and the travel ban and will use his veto power towards this end if necessary.
Democratic Sens. Chris Dodd, Byron L. Dorgan and Barbara Boxer held a press conference following the president’s speech in which they joined House members in voicing their disappointment with Bush’s current Cuba policy. Dodd characterized Bush’s initiative as much ado about nothing, criticizing Bush for making unrealistic demands on the Castro regime and continuing to exercise ‘pressure points’ that have proved ineffective for 40 years.
While demonstrating his full support for current hard line U.S. Cuba policy, Bush’s announcements did not amount to the severe crackdown that some analysts were predicting, particularly given Undersecretary of State John Bolton’s allegations of a biological weapons capability in Cuba, and the State Department’s new terrorism report, which continues to list Cuba as one of seven states that sponsor terrorism. The simple fact that Bush’s policy did not increase the severity of his hard-line stance may indicate that the administration is feeling the pressure applied by Congress. If the Bush administration finds it necessary to react to congressional pleas, increased cooperative security may be the most expendable bargaining chip to be offered.
There has already been some cooperation between the U.S. and Cuba on counternarcotic and immigration issues, and Coast Guard representatives have met with Cuban officials to discuss how this cooperation might prove more effective. Small steps in security measures, such as improved communication and coordination in counter-narcotics, counterterrorism, and regional disaster relief efforts, could prove beneficial to both nations’ national security interests.
Given Cuba’s geographical proximity, the United States has an innate interest in securing the island’s stability. As drug traffickers often travel through Cuban territory, personnel involved in U.S. Caribbean counternarcotic missions would benefit from increased cooperation with their Cuban counterparts. Increasing security cooperation now could also serve as a useful confidence building measure that would help mitigate any future crisis, such as mass immigration, that might follow the end of Fidel Castro’s rule. Also, increasing dialogue with Cuban military officials may allow the United States to exert more influence over Castro’s successor.
The administration’s political interest in appeasing Florida’s Cuban-American population, large donors to the Republican Party, is clear. However, there may be a limit to how long the administration can hold out, given the growing sentiment in Congress that U.S. Cuba policy is antiquated and ineffectual, and should be reformed. As increasing security cooperation does not necessitate any major change in U.S. law or policy, particularly the notoriously controversial embargo and travel ban, it may prove to be the issue on which Bush can placate Congress while minimizing damage to Cuban-American support.
V-22 Returns to Flight -- The Marine Corps’ V-22 "Osprey" tilt-rotor aircraft made its first flight in almost eighteen months on May 29. The aircraft was grounded in December, 2000, after two fatal crashes in less than a year took the lives of 23 Marines. The aircraft has undergone extensive examination and a redesign of its hydraulic and other systems following the accidents and allegations of fraudulent record keeping during the flight testing program. The aircraft took off and landed three times, and included one flight during which it transited from helicopter to airplane mode.
One of Two Interceptors Fail to Fire in PAC-3 Test -- One of two interceptors failed to launch during a test of the Army’s Patriot PAC-3 anti-missile system on May 30. Both missiles were aimed at a single target, in what was intended to be a test of the system’s ability to ‘ripple-fire.’ The first missile fired successfully and intercepted the target. This is the third failure of the PAC-3 system in recent months. In a test on April 25 against two targets one interceptor failed to fire while a second intercepted but did not destroy its target. On March 21 one of two PAC-3 interceptors failed to fire during a test involving PAC-3 and PAC-2 interceptors and two targets.
U.S. Sets Reward For Capture of Philippine Terrorists -- The United States has offered a reward of up to $5 million for information contributing to the capture of any of five leaders of the Abu Sayyaf terrorist organization. The group is accused of conducting a raid against a beach resort in May, 2001, in which 17 Filippinos and three Americans were kidnapped. One of the Americans, Guillermo Sobero, was later beheaded. The other two Americans, a missionary couple, are still being held by the group.
F-22 "Unlikely" to Meet Testing Target Date -- The Air Force’s F-22 "Raptor" fighter aircraft is "unlikely" to meet its scheduled start date for Initial Operationa Testing and Evaluation (IOT&E), according to the program system director Brig. Gen. William Jabour. IOT&E involves testing of the aircraft by Air Combat Command to determine if it is suitable and effective for operations. According to Gen. Jabour, the Air Force won’t turn the aircraft over for the next stage of testing until it is sure it can reach the testing threshold. IOT&E was scheduled to begin April, 2003, and Gen. Jabour is hopeful that it can begin no later than the middle of the year.
Quotation of the Week -- "A light that scattered darkness from these shores and across France would spread to all of Europe -- in time, turning enemies into friends, and the pursuits of war into the pursuits of peace," President George W. Bush, Normandy, France, May 27, 2002.
This Week on SUPERPOWER: Global Affairs TV -- "Nuclear Crisis in Kashmir"
Sunday at 12:30 pm on MHz2 (check local listings) "SUPERPOWER: Global Affairs TV" showcases international television coverage of world events. Host Lisa Simeone along with Mark Thompson of Time Magazine and Jefferson Morley of the washingtonpost.com, discuss current events with a regular rotation of foreign journalists, as well as other guests from the foreign military and diplomatic communities in Washington.
This Week’s Episode: "Nuclear Crisis in Kashmir"
This week, Superpower examines the conflict between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region. What are the roots of the conflict? What has sparked this latest exchange of fire between the two sides? What is the likelihood that the conflict will go nuclear? Are the governments in the two regions really in control of the nuclear arsenals? What would result from a nuclear conflict between the two countries? What is America doing to broker peace in the region?
Joining Lisa Simeone will be Indian journalist Swaminathan Aiyar of The Economic Times and Husain Haqqani, syndicated columnist from Pakistan and currently a visiting expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Where to watch: http://www.mhznetworks.org/cable/listings.html
For more information, please send an e-mail to: info@superpowertv.org