ÿþ<html> <head> <title> Weekly Defense Monitor - Volume 6, Issue #8 - April 4, 2002 </title> </head> <body bgcolor="#ffffff" marginheight="0" topmargin="0"> <!--------blue horizontal toolbar------> <table border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="630" bgcolor="254970" bordercolor="C1C1C2" align="center" valign="top"> <tr> <td align="center"> <a href="/"><img src="/toolbar/headlines.jpg" height="11" width="65" border="0" alt="CDI Headlines"></a> </td> <td align="center"> <a href="/hotspots/"><img src="/toolbar/hotspots.jpg" height="11" width="64" border="0" alt="Hot Spots"></a> </td> <td align="center"> <a href="/issues/"><img src="/toolbar/issues1.jpg" height="11" width="39" border="0" alt="Research Topics"></a> </td> <td align="center"> <a href="/pubs/"><img src="/toolbar/pubs.jpg" height="11" width="84" border="0" alt="CDI Publications"></a> </td> <td align="center"> <a href="/adm/"><img src="/toolbar/video.jpg" height="11" width="38" border="0" alt="Television"></a> </td> <td align="center"> <a href="/press/"><img src="/toolbar/press1.jpg" height="11" width="36" border="0" alt="Public Affairs"></a> </td> <td align="center"> <a href="/search/"><img src="/toolbar/search2.jpg" height="11" width="46" border="0" alt="Search"></a> </td> </tr> </table> <br> <!--------end blue horizontal toolbar----> <!----------code for new logo and header---------logo links to CDI Home----Header links to Weekly Home---------> <table border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="640" align="center"> <tr> <td width="175"> <a href="/"><img src="/toolbar/cdilogo150.jpg" height="92" width="150" border="0" alt="CDI Home"></a> </td> <td width="465"> <a href="/weekly/"><img src="/weekly/weekly-3.jpg" height="92" width="455" border="0" alt="Weekly Defense Monitor Home"></a> </td> </tr> </table> <!----------------code for new logo and header ends here--------------------------------------> <center> <hr width="75%"> Center for Defense Information<br> 1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW * Washington, DC 20036<br> (202)332-0600 * Fax (202)462-4559 * <a target="_blank" href="http://www.cdi.org">www.cdi.org</a> <hr width="75%"> <table width="75%"><tr><td width="50%" align=LEFT><nobr>Volume 6, Issue #8</nobr></td><td width="50%" align=Right>April 4, 2002</td></tr></table> <hr width="75%"> </center> <h2>TABLE OF CONTENTS</h2> <ul> <li><a href="#1">The Bush Administration's National Security Strategy: Late -- But Worth the Wait?</a><dl><dd> Well over a year into office, the Bush administration still does not have a National Security Strategy. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice says one is underway to be released in the spring. What might the final product reveal about the competing visions of national security policy competing within the administration? </dl> <li><a href="#2">Fighting Terrorism in Yemen</a><dl><dd> The United States plans to send up to 100 military advisors to Yemen to train its military and security forces. The Americans will find a country that has three guns for each of its 18 million citizens, little government control outside urban areas, and a tenuous mix of tribal and Islamist interests. </dl> <li><a href="#3">Israeli Situation Emphasizes "War on Terror" Merely Title for Unchanged U.S. Policies</a><dl><dd> The War on Terror is more of a hunt for <i>al Qaeda</i> than a quest for elimination of all terrorism worldwide, which would be very difficult both militarily and diplomatically </dl> <li><a href="#4">CDI's "Briefing Room"</a><dl><dd> News updates on security issues from around the world. </dl> <li><a href="#5">This Week on "SUPERPOWER: Global Affairs TV:" The Middle East Conflict</a><dl><dd> </dl> </ul> <p> <center><hr width="75%"></center> <p> <b><a name="1">The Bush Administration's National Security Strategy: Late -- But Worth the Wait?</a></b><br> Marcus Corbin, Senior Analyst, <a href="mailto:mcorbin@cdi.org">mcorbin@cdi.org</a> <p> Well over a year into office, the Bush administration still does not have a National Security Strategy -- the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), issued in September of last year, was not one. A useful distinction is made between a National Security Strategy and a National Military Strategy like the QDR. The former addresses the overall efforts of the government, using all of its available tools, to provide security to the nation; the latter focuses on the contribution of the military tool to that end. <p> Congress mandated the production of a National Security Strategy in Section 603 the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and most recently re-iterated the requirement in the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. President Ronald Reagan issued two documents, President George H.W. Bush three, and President Bill Clinton seven. The recent legislation required that the new administration issue its National Security Strategy no later than June 2001. <p> Apart from flouting a not-unreasonable congressional mandate, the Bush administration's failure to develop a National Security Strategy has had serious consequences, the most direct of which is that the military portion of the National Security Strategy  the QDR  was created without a National Security Strategy to guide it. Developing military strategy without knowing how it fits into broader goals and approaches suggests either that the chosen "strategy" is not very "strategic," or that the non-military components occupy a very distant second place in the administration's view of national security policy. <p> The lack of a National Security Strategy, which sets clear priorities among national security tools, has also encouraged a massive shift in resources to the military component in the proposed Fiscal Year 2003 budget with little debate over the consequences for other tools. There may eventually be more discussion of strategic resource prioritization, but the budgets that will influence spending years into the future have already been developed. <p> National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice recently said that the administration's National Security Strategy is now being developed, possibly to be released this spring, and argued that it is better to take more time over it, given that this is the administration's first one. To be fair, neither the Clinton administration nor the first Bush administration produced a National Security Strategy in the first year. What is odd is that with the foreign and military policy brainpower mustered by the "Vulcans" -- advisers to candidate Bush, many of whom took office in the administration, including Rice, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, and Ambassador Robert Blackwill -- plus Secretary of State Colin Powell and Vice President Dick Cheney, they were unable or unwilling to produce a National Security Strategy in short order. The war on terrorism has, no doubt, recently slowed the process down, but on Sept. 11, 2001, the document was already three months overdue. <p> When the new National Security Strategy does come out, it should reveal how far President Bush's thinking has evolved from candidate Bush's, under pressure from U.S. allies and the realities of policy-making. The language in the document on three issues in particular will illuminate these questions. <p> <b>Nation-Building</b><br> Will the administration's strategy support nation-building as a necessary corollary to the war on terrorism and the promise to do something about the "axis of evil" and other countries linked to terrorism or proliferation of mass destruction? The Bush administration has long expressed a distaste for "nation-building." However, the administration's purported wish to conduct another "regime change" operation, this time in Iraq, actually indicates a hidden devotion to the concept of "nation building," to the extent that Iraq, unlike Afghanistan, already has a fully-functioning state apparatus. It may be an evil government, but it is a real one. A U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein would obligate U.S. leadership in rebuilding the nation's institutions. <p> <b>Prominence of the Military Component</b><br> To what extent will the National Security Strategy -- which is supposed to look at all the component of national security -- promote non-military tools as much as military ones to pre-empt and deter threats? The Cheney/Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz faction in the administration is seen as favoring more aggressive use of military force in contrast to the Powell/Armitage faction pushing for use of a broader range of tools. Given the actual budget and policy choices of the administration, it is hard to imagine the language in the strategy would give prominence to the non-military components, but it could be done by simply allowing a disconnect between the strategy and the resource priorities made. <p> <b>Unilateralism</b><br> Some within the administration have argued for sloughing off the encumbrances of working with coalitions in military operations and national security initiatives, others have argued the indispensability of allies and partners. Early in his term, Bush developed a reputation for unilateralism among allied leaders. Will the administration dare to enshrine its predilection to act unilaterally in its formal strategy? It seems unlikely to put such unpopular approaches in print, but if it does, it will be evidence of the unilateralist faction decisively winning that internal debate. <p> If the forthcoming Bush National Security Strategy document is diplomatic and bland it will not tell us much about the factional battles and victories of those who shape strategy. If, however, it is bold enough to take an unabashed regime-changing, military-based, unilateral approach to security strategy, it will indicate that the internal tensions in the Bush administration's strategic thinking have been resolved, rather than papered-over. <p> <center><hr width="75%"></center> <p> <b><a name="2">Fighting Terrorism in Yemen</a></b><br> Michael Donovan, Research Analyst, <a href="mailto:mdonovan@cdi.org">mdonovan@cdi.org</a> <p> The United States plans to send up to 100 military advisors to Yemen to train its military and security forces. The Americans will find a country that has three guns for each of its 18 million citizens, little government control outside urban areas, and a tenuous mix of tribal and Islamist interests. The poorest Arab nation, Yemen produced more recruits for the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan than any other country except Saudi Arabia. Terrorist groups throughout the Middle East maintain legal and illegal representatives in Yemen, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Yemen is also the sanctuary for elements of <i>al Qaeda</i>. <p> Following the events of Sept. 11, Washington spoke of Yemen as a key sanctuary for <i>al Qaeda</i> militants. Yemen is the ancestral home of Osama bin Laden and the site of the 2000 terrorist attack on the USS Cole that killed 17 Americans. U.S. officials openly speculated that Yemen would be the next target behind Afghanistan in the war on terrorism. <p> This speculation has since subsided and a subtler approach to terrorist cells in Yemen is now apparent. Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh quickly offered his government s cooperation to the United States. Yemen sided with Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf conflict and Saleh was determined not to repeat the mistake. But even with American training and equipment, the Yemeni government has a difficult task ahead. Yemen s hinterland is the perfect hiding place for terrorists: a no man s land of tribal fiefdoms and arms bazaars. Rounding up terrorists will mean extending government control in these areas. It also means confronting the balance of tribal confederations and religious allegiances that have kept Yemen stable. <p> It is impossible to verify how many Yemenis went to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight the Soviets. Some Western diplomats place the number in the tens of thousands. In contrast to most Arab countries, the government readily welcomed these Islamist militants back following the war. Veterans of the Afghan war played an important role in Saleh s 1994 civil war victory. Since the conclusion of the civil war, Yemen s Islamists have been integrated into society rather than excluded from it. This has in turn earned the government the support of the tribal constituencies upon which its legitimacy rests. <p> This delicate balance may now be jeopardized. It will be difficult for the government to pursue Islamists without treading on the toes of the tribes who identify with them. Moreover, the Islamist movement has put down roots in Yemen, and its influence is felt not only within the tribes, but also in the security services, universities, and the army. Islah, the Islamic political party, is the second largest party in the country. For the most part, the conservative Islamic movement in Yemen has evolved within the confines of government regulations. If the government chooses to move on the Islamist movement, pushing it underground, this could change. <p> Thus far the government has warned the Islamists to keep a low profile lest they be added to the target list. John Walker Lindh s alma mater, al Imam University, has, for the time being, quieted its militant Islamic curriculum. In deference to Washington, the government has begun rounding up foreign students and clerics who have overstayed their visas, forced some extremists to leave the country, and made it more difficult for Arab nationals to enter the country. <p> Any pursuit of <i>al Qaeda</i> will take place in rural rather than urban areas. There are some indications that Saleh may use the war on terrorism, and the U.S. training and equipment that comes with it, to extend government control throughout the tribal countryside. This may not be a bad thing if it brings law and order to the bandit country outside Yemen s cities and ends the spree of kidnappings Óý the favorite method of ringing concessions from the government. Thus far, hostages have been released unharmed in return for government promises to build hospitals, roads, etc. <p> But the extent to which the government can extend its control over the hinterland remains an open question. The majority of Yemen s population lives in rural areas under tribal control. Difficult terrain and centuries-old mountain fortresses have rendered some of these tribes immune to past attempts by the government to exert control. Efforts to apprehend <i>al Qaeda</i> suspects earlier this year were met with armed resistance by sympathetic tribal factions, and a number of government troops were killed. <p> The extent of the <i>al Qaeda</i> presence in Yemen remains unclear. There are no command facilities or training areas such as existed in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Yemen offers all the attributes required of a terrorist hideout: difficult terrain, a sympathetic population, a weak central government, and long and porous boarders. American military advisors will have their work cut out for them. Success against <i>al Qaeda</i> in Yemen may have more to do with tribal politics than military tactics. <p> <center><hr width="75%"></center> <p> <b><a name="3">Israeli Situation Emphasizes "War on Terror" Merely Title for Unchanged U.S. Policies</a></b><br> Colin Robinson, Research Assistant, <a href="mailto:crobinso@cdi.org">crobinso@cdi.org</a> <p> The current fighting in Israel, with charges of "terrorism" and "state terror" being exchanged by the protagonists, emphasizes a fact hitherto little noticed; that the Bush Administration s "War on Terror" is not new policy, but rather a new label for older policy. The United States has always been ready to strike back against opponents who would kill its citizens on its home soil. Since 1948, it has always been ready to support Israel. That is precisely the policy being implemented today, and the notion of a global war on all terrorism worldwide is merely window dressing. <p> At first glance, this proposition seems strange. After all, the first assault in the new conflict was against the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as <i>al Qaeda</i>, and the fighting has since moved on to the Philippines and Georgia. But given the level of atrocity inflicted upon the United States on Sept. 11, the traditional hawk-like traits of a Republican administration, and the fact that the Taliban was never a real state, rather a half-developed force that never controlled the whole country, the willingness to destroy the Taliban in order to eliminate <i>al Qaeda</i> is understandable. In the Philippines, traditional U.S. support for an ally combined with strong Abu Sayyaf links to <i>al Qaeda</i> led to a U.S. response. The Georgian deployment did not begin until it the U.S. was clear that <i>al Qaeda</i> fighters were in the Pankisi Gorge. <p> So what the United States is doing is not pursuing a world-wide war on terror, but rather acting as it always has done -- quite willing to follow enemies to the ends of the earth if necessary to destroy them, once harm has been inflicted upon it. The peripheral activity of the campaign, large Western naval forces scouring the Arabian Sea for <i>al Qaeda</i> who may be fleeing, confirms this. Further affield, state governments from Columbia to Russia have been quick to emphasize the "terrorist" nature of their own security threats, in order to gain US approval or support for their actions. Traditional US policies such as support to Israel and enmity to Iraq have been branded part of the war on terror as the concept gains attention among the policy community. <p> The "War on Terror," revealed as war against <i>al Qaeda</i> and its supporters and affiliates worldwide, means that at the end of the campaign, <i>al Qaeda</i> will quite possibly be thoroughly eradicated. It does not mean that the U.S. will hunt down and destroy "terrorist" groups worldwide whatever their ilk. If the United States tried to destroy groups ranging from Algeria s Armed Islamic Group to Japan s Aum Supreme Truth, it would overstretch its forces impossibly. This would tie down U.S. troops in the same way that "nation-building" is alleged to. It would also entangle the U.S. mightly with dozens of foreign governments and conflicts it has no intrinsic interest in. <p> The U.S. fight against <i>al Qaeda</i> is not unjustified. On the contrary, the destruction of a potent menace such as this group is a wise move. However, such an assault should be seem for what it is, not as a perpetual global hunt for a large number of ill-defined militant groups. Such an assault would be impractically large, and would meet with bitter disagreement from most governments over which groups to target and why. <p> <center><hr width="75%"></center> <p> <b><a name="4">CDI s "Briefing Room"</a></b><br> <p> <b>Defector Reveals Details of Iraqi Missile Program --</b> According to a report in the British newspaper <i>The Guardian,</i> the upcoming issue of <i>Vanity Fair</i> includes an interview with an unnamed Iraqi defector detailing Saddam Hussein s efforts to acquire components for missiles capable of delivering chemical, biological and eventually nuclear warheads. According to the defector, he worked on project "Tammooz," a program to develop a new generation of missiles with ranges of 600 to 700 miles. He claimed that he was also tasked to purchase materials for Iraq s nuclear weapons program, codenamed "al-Bashir." <p> <b>NATO to Streamline Balkan Peacekeeping --</b> NATO is studying plans to reduce and streamline its three peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, Jane's Defence Weekly reports. The alliance currently commands 43,000 troops in Kosovo, 18,000 in Bosnia, and about 700 in Macedonia. The reforms under consideration in NATO headquarters would cut a number of theater headquarters, reduce air surveillance and naval support, and remove heavy armored units. The European Union has offered to take over the command of the Macedonia operation from NATO once the two sides work out an agreement on sharing military resources. <p> <b>Navy Resumes Vieques Training --</b> Aircraft from the carrier <i>USS George Washington</i> begin dropping inert bombs on the Navy training range at Vieques, Puerto Rico earlier this week. A deal between the Navy and Puerto Rico calls for the Navy to end all training by 2003, and limits training until then to 90 days a year and only with inert bombs. Congress, however, included language in legislation passed after Sept. 11 requiring the Navy to use Vieques for training until it locates a suitable alternative location. <p> <b>Passenger Jet Enters Restricted Airspace Over D.C. --</b> A Frontier Airlines jet departing Washington, D.C. s Ronald Reagan National Airport bound for Denver accidentally strayed in to restricted airspace near the White House on April 1. Notified by air traffic controllers, the pilot acknowledged the error and changed course. Ironically, the plane s turn took it in to another area of restricted airspace over the U.S. Naval Observatory, which serves as the official home of the Vice President. Prior to Sept. 11, aircraft departing National Airport routinely flew near the White House, but since then pilots have been required to make a sharp turn immediately after takeoff to avoid the restricted area. The Secret Service argued unsuccessfully against reopening National Airport after Sept. 11, citing concerns about the possible threat posed to the White House. <p> <b>Quotation of the Week --</b> "Conflict is not inevitable. Distrust need not be permanent. Peace is possible when we break free of old patterns and habits of hatred. The violence and grief that troubled the Holy Land have been among the great tragedies of our time. The Middle East has often been left behind in the political and economic advancement of the world. That is the history of the region. But it need not and must not be its fate," President George W. Bush, April 4, 2002. <p> <center><hr width="75%"></center> <p> <b><a name="5">This Week on "SUPERPOWER: Global Affairs TV:" The Middle East Conflict</a></b><br> <p> Sunday at 12:30 pm on MHz2 (check local listings) "SUPERPOWER: Global Affairs TV" takes on the Middle East conflict. Host Lisa Simeone and co-host Mark Thompson, Time Magazine correspondent, are joined by Hisham Melham of As-Safir (Lebanon) and Janine Zacharia of the Jeruselam Post in a fascinating discussion about the regional reaction to U.S. action (inaction) in the escalating Israeli/Palestinian conflict. <p> Where to watch: <a href="http://www.mhznetworks.org/cable/listings.html">http://www.mhznetworks.org/cable/listings.html</a> <p> </body></html>