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| February 28, 2002 |
NATO To Offer Russia Closest Cooperation Ever
Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org
NATO ambassadors are close to an agreement on creating a new architecture that would involve Russia closer in NATO’s decision-making than ever before. The "NATO at 20" [19 allies plus Russia] will allow Moscow to play the same role as any other ally in formulating NATO policies, albeit only on a limited range of issues such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. The arrangement will not be finalized until the May meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Reykjavik, Iceland. But if it materializes, it would represent the most substantive -- and most promising -- advance in NATO-Russia relations since the end of the Cold War.
NATO has long been an obstacle to Russia’s relations with the West. As many Russian observers point out, Moscow enjoys better relationships with each individual Western country than it does with the West’s military alliance. To many Russians, NATO represents a reminder of their country’s decline from its superpower status during the Cold War. The recent history of NATO-Russia relations is also burdened with grandiose political agreements proclaiming a united front but in fact masking the two parties’ differences on issues such as NATO enlargement and the alliance’s right to intervene militarily in other countries without a United Nations Security Council mandate. Every time NATO acted on these controversial issues, whether by enlarging in 1999 or launching a war against Serbia in the same year, Russia felt betrayed.
Although NATO is disliked in Russia, most Western countries have no inclination to abandon the alliance. Some doubt its importance after Sept. 11, particularly after the United States ignored NATO’s formal invocation of the mutual defense clause. The international campaign against terrorism is being directed from the U.S. Central Command in Florida instead of the alliance’s command structures, as was the case during the 1999 air war against Serbia. The allies have also fallen behind in military technology and are finding themselves increasingly unable to fight in alliance with U.S. forces. Nevertheless, the 19 allies are committed to expanding NATO at an upcoming summit in Prague in November 2002. Even U.S. defense officials, skeptical of NATO’s utility for their war aims, are pushing for reforms to NATO’s command structures, which may allow NATO to improve its warfighting capacity.
The challenge before NATO now is to find ways to keep the collective reliance on NATO from derailing rapprochement with Russia and, if possible, to actually use NATO to accelerate that process.
The new mechanism considered by NATO ambassadors is a step in the right direction. NATO’s strength is in the minutiae; daily consultations on defense issues force allies to openly discuss their military plans and intentions and leave little room for suspicion or misunderstanding. The allies’ need to compromise and find joint solutions helps develop trust in each other’s intentions. The process is not perfect -- witness the tensions between Greece and Turkey or, to a lesser degree, between the United States and its European allies -- but allied relations are arguably better with NATO than without it.
The previous NATO-Russia talks brought no such benefits. In 1997, the two parties created a special body, the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), ostensibly to allow NATO and Russia to consult on issues of joint importance. But PJC did not involve Russia in the process of formulating a joint alliance decision; instead Russia was presented with decisions already precooked by the 19 allies. In the end, it fostered Russia’s sense of isolation by pitting it repeatedly against all NATO allies.
Openness and transparency are even more important in Russia’s case than in talks among NATO allies themselves. Russia and NATO still distrust each other on fundamental issues. The alliance appears as a potential threat in Russia’s national security and military strategy documents. Some of the new allies and many candidate members view NATO primarily as a way to protect themselves against Russia’s resurgence. These suspicions only strengthen the need for Russia and NATO allies to be able to openly discuss their military plans and intentions.
Others suspect Russia of seeking NATO cooperation in order to weaken the alliance. Surely, there are some in Russia who’d be happy to see this happen, but the goal is to encourage those -- led by President Putin -- who seem genuinely interested in cooperation. The solution is to find mechanisms that engage Russia and, at the same time, build in safeguards that prevent Moscow from abusing the partnership. That’s why the alliance is limiting the range of issues to be discussed at the "Level of 20 " and not including the most essential and controversial decisions, such as enlargement and joint defensive operations. The proposed arrangement would also allow any party to withdraw an issue from the agenda if an agreement seems out of reach.
The new architecture is a positive step but must be put in the context. The speed and degree of NATO-Russia rapprochement will not be determined by new NATO bodies but by political will in Moscow and NATO capitals, primarily in Washington. Already there are signs that the U.S.-Russia relations are cooling. Most recently, Russia disagreed vehemently with the deployment of U.S. Special Forces in the Republic of Georgia, on Russia’s southern border. Neither does the new NATO-Russia architecture address the issue of NATO’s relevance in the post-Sept. 11 world. But it will keep NATO from potentially undermining the improving U.S.-Russia relations, and it may even add more depth to the process.
U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia: Opportunities and Pitfalls
Reyko Huang, Research Analyst, rhuang@cdi.org
With the swift defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Bush administration’s reiteration that Iraq is not an imminent military target, questions abound as to whether Southeast Asia is becoming one of the next theaters of war in the campaign against terrorism. The deployment of American troops to the southern Philippines for joint exercises against the Abu Sayyaf Group have only reinforced public concern that the momentum of U.S. military action might carry over into other parts of the region. Furthermore, in the past few months, Southeast Asian authorities have discovered evidence that members of al Qaeda had long ago infiltrated the region, establishing an expansive nexus with indigenous Islamic organizations.
Southeast Asia is not about to become the next Afghanistan, however. Counter-terrorism efforts in the region already demonstrate that there is no textbook formula to be followed—that the military campaign in Afghanistan will not be a prototypical tactic. Rather, success in the global campaign against terrorism will require careful analysis of each particular situation, and development of a strategy appropriate to each case and acceptable to the broad international coalition.
According to recent reports from Southeast Asia, al Qaeda’s involvement with regional terrorist groups varies, even though the main groups -- Jemaah Islamiah (JI), Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM), Indonesia’s Laskar Jihad, and the Philippines’ Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) -- have some ties to each other. The ultimate political motive of these largely homegrown and regionally focused groups seems to be the creation of an independent Islamic state sprawled across Southeast Asia. This contrasts to al Qaeda, which fosters an overtly anti-Western ideology and directly attacks Western interests. Nevertheless, the Southeast Asian groups’ histories of violence, acts of terrorism, and reported links to bin Laden’s organization make them a prime target in the ongoing anti-terrorism campaign.
For Southeast Asian governments to choose to support the United States in the "war" against terrorism was a formidable step with many political risks, but all of them have done so. With or without supporting the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan, Southeast Asian nations pledged to combat terrorism and summarily implemented a range of measures domestically and cooperatively in the region. And, despite initial large-scale demonstrations by Muslim communities against Operation Enduring Freedom, Southeast Asian heads of state have now regained relative stability in their countries.
At this point, the future course of the global anti-terrorism campaign depends to a significant extent on the ability of the various governments to continue to demonstrate commitment to the effort, and of the United States to recognize the risks involved in any U.S. action that may appear to disregard local views, demands, and sensitivities. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad has been especially vocal in pointing out that Washington should not impose on Kuala Lumpur, and has demonstrated through active policing, intelligence-sharing, and legal measures that Malaysia can handle its own terrorism problems. The recent arrest of dozens of KMM and JI members by Malaysian authorities seems to have convinced President Bush that Mahathir will be an ally as long as the hands-off approach is maintained. The same applies to Indonesia, where the 176 million Muslims still fear a global attack on Islam beneath the anti-terror rhetoric. President Megawati Sukarnoputri juggles democratization and maintenance of moderate Muslims’ support with the pressure to crack down on terrorist suspects and respect for the nascent rule of law. Partly in consideration of these internal difficulties, President Bush has not vociferously urged more action despite international criticism that Megawati has done little to combat terrorism.
What the United States has done is encourage and support domestic counter-terrorism efforts in Southeast Asia, and pledge U.S. military, monetary, logistical and other aid should the various governments ask for them. In the Philippines, U.S. troops began their advisory role only after endorsement by President Arroyo; in Indonesia, in addition to offering a range of non-military aid, the Bush administration is allowing Megawati to submit a wish-list of equipment needed to fight terrorism there. This strategy -- of restrained but solid backing of the region’s own efforts with U.S. military, intelligence and financial might -- has so far resulted in good progress in counter-terrorism, as well as the maintenance of good relations in a highly volatile diplomatic environment.
Since terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia have regional motivations and thrive on exploiting lax institutions and security systems, a successful anti-terrorism campaign in the region will be one led by the region’s own governments and one where the governments cooperate against the transnational terrorists. For the countries involved, the renewed focus on Southeast Asia is an opportunity to rebuild the credibility and functionality of ASEAN and develop regional cohesion on a common challenge. For the United States, its policy toward Southeast Asia will be a test on its ability to determine the appropriate American role in a situation wholly distinct from Afghanistan. Anti-terrorism in Southeast Asia is an opportunity to strengthen -- not undermine -- relations between the United States and the region by recognizing the players’ respective roles, and making the campaign a more global effort.
"Doomsday Clock" Moves Closer to Midnight -– Amid growing concerns about the security of the world’s nuclear stockpiles and the lack of U.S. support for several global disarmament agreements, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has moved the minute hand of the "Doomsday Clock" forward two minutes – to seven minutes to midnight. The "Doomsday Clock" is used by the Bulletin as an indicator of the nuclear peril worldwide. The move is the third advance since the end of the Cold War. The hand was last moved in June 1998, from 14 minutes to nine minutes to midnight. The new position is that same as when the clock made its debut in 1947.
U.S. Sends Forces, Equipment to Georgia -- The Pentagon has sent 10 Huey helicopters and is reportedly planning to deploy as many as 200 Special Forces in the Republic of Georgia. U.S. diplomats said in recent weeks that Chechen refugee camps in the country's north house terrorists who fled from Afghanistan. Moscow, which has long suspected the camps of aiding Chechen terrorists and on several occasions have bombed the border between Chechnya and Georgia, is opposing the U.S. force deployment. "We think it could further aggravate the situation in the region which is difficult as it is," Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told Russian television. Russia is pressing Georgia to agree to a joint counterterrorist operation in Georgia's north. The United States and Russia have cooperated on counter-terrorist operations after Sept. 11 but have historically disagreed about Russia's conduct of its military campaign in Chechnya. The Georgian government itself denies that counterterrorist operations are planned. "It is possible that a group of experts may arrive to train our rapid reaction force, which is guarding strategic sites in Georgia, particularly oil pipelines," the Georgian foreign ministry spokesman told Reuters.
Britain, Germany Disagree on Iraq Policy -- German foreign policy officials have indirectly criticized the British government for breaking the European Union's policy on possible military action against Iraq. The UK media is reporting that British Prime Minister Tony Blair is compiling evidence to justify a strike on Iraq. U.S. President George Bush has repeatedly suggested that military action may be necessary to remove Iraqi president Saddam Hussein from power. The spokesman for the ruling German Social Democratic Party's parliamentary delegation critisized UK support for possible U.S.-led attacks on Iraq as "very regrettable." The EU policy, agreed on last December, calls for all diplomatic means to be exhausted before such action. The German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer also urged his UK counterparts to hold the line. "Only when Europe has a common foreign and security policy...will we be taken seriously," the Daily Telegraph quoted him as saying. The German and British governments, both dominated by left-of-center parties, are under pressure by their conservative oppositions to ally themselves more closely with the United States.
Air Force: Weaponization of Space Inevitable -– Officials of the Air Force’s space command view the eventual weaponization of space as being essential to maintaining the current U.S. ability to dominate the battlefield. Accoridng to Lt. Gen. Charles Wald, Air Force deputy chief of staff for air and space operations, protecting space assets used for surveillance, communication, and targeting of precision munitions makes the use of weapons in space inevitable. Controlling space will involve denying access to future enemies. "We’re going to have to go down that path eventually – like it or not," said Gen. Wald.
DoD Kills Propaganda Office –- Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld this week announced the closure of the Pentagon’s new Office of Strategic Influence. While asserting that recent media reports about the role of the office were inaccurate, Mr. Rumsfeld said that, "the office has clearly been so damaged that it’s…pretty clear to me that it could not function effectively, so it’s being closed down." While the Pentagon described the intended mission of the office as being one of explaining U.S. military operations to an international office, many experts, including some within the military, thought that public perceptions about the office would undermine the credibility of official Defense Department statements.
Quotation of the Week –- "Here we are in the year 2002 fighting the first war of the 21st century, and the horse cavalry was back and being used, but being used in previously unimaginable ways. It showed that a revolution in military affairs is about more than building new high tech weapons, though that is certainly part of it. It’s also about new ways of thinking and new ways of fighting…In World War II the German blitzkrieg revolutionized warfare. But it was accomplished by a German military that was really only about 10 or 15 percent transformed…What was revolutionary and unprecedented about the blitzkrieg was not the new capabilities the Germans employed, but rather the unprecedented and revolutionary way that they mixed new and existing capabilities," Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, remarks to the National Defense University, January 31, 2002.
This Week on America’s Defense Monitor: "Lessons of Kosovo: The Limits of Air Power"
The United States and its NATO allies were determined to stop Serbian aggression against ethnic Albanians in the province of Kosovo, but decided to do so by relying exclusively on air power. Did NATO's bombs and missiles stop ethnic cleansing? How effective were NATO warplanes in attacking Serb forces? An eye-opening look at the air war in Kosovo.
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