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| July 26, 2001 |
| July 26, 2001 |
UN Conference on Small Arms Concludes With Consensus
Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
After two weeks of harsh statements, compromise, and tough negotiations, the member states of the United Nations agreed to a Programme of Action for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects.
The Conference, held July 9-20, 2001, began on a rather sour tone with the statement of U.S. Under Secretary of State John Bolton, who expressed the U.S. position on the issue of small arms and the Conference in no uncertain terms. Bolton stressed that the Conference should address only the illicit transfer of military style weapons, excluding firearms and non-military rifles (the weapons responsible for terrible carnage and destruction around the world every year).
Bolton bluntly stated the position of the United States in front of the ministerial-level portion of the meeting, describing the U.S. "redlines," items unacceptable for inclusion in the Conference plan. Bolton stated that the United States could not support a final Conference document that included:
For two weeks, governments debated the 86 paragraph document. On the last day, after an all night session during which governments debated the most divisive of issues (non-state actors, civilian possession, self-determination, transparency, export criteria, and follow-up), the Conference concluded with consensus. The final debate centered on the U.S. refusal to allow any mention of restrictions on sales to non-state actors, with several African states taking the opposite position. In the end, the Africans relented and all paragraphs related to non-state actors and civilian possession were stricken from the action plan.
The United States repeatedly used its political capital to weaken the Programme of Action and block progress in the debate. While the United States had clearly defined the items that would receive no U.S. support, the United States did not publicly push U.S. best practices on export criteria or on export controls. In addition, the United States did not push for an international agreement on brokering (or the beginning of discussions of such an agreement).
The Small Arms Working Group (SAWG), an alliance of U.S.-based non-governmental organizations and individuals working together to promote change in U.S. policies on small arms and greater harmony in international controls on the small arms trade, had called for a Programme of Action mandating that states start early negotiations on the following three legally binding instruments: A Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers that sets out normative export criteria based on states' current obligations under international law; An International Agreement on Brokering that creates international norms controlling the activities of arms brokers and strengthens national laws to prosecute traffickers who violate these norms; and An International Agreement on Marking and Tracing that develops systems for adequate and reliable marking of arms at manufacture and import together with record-keeping on arms production, possession and transfer. The Conference failed to adopt any language that would have mandated such processes.
SAWG had also urged that the Programme of Action include: the establishment of regional and international transparency mechanisms; concrete steps to achieve improved implementation and enforcement of arms embargoes; norms for civilian possession of small arms and light weapons; and a strengthened relationship between NGOs and governments working on advocacy and awareness-raising on the small arms issue. Again, the document fell short of the majority of expectations that SAWG had put forward.
Although many compromises could not be reached, the Conference document did succeed in establishing a comprehensive approach, and included recognition of the grave humanitarian consequences caused by the proliferation of small arms. In addition, states now have a document on which they can base their future work on small arms. The Conference also agreed on a follow-up conference no later than 2006 with the precise date to be determined by the General Assembly at its 58th session, and biennial conferences to gauge progress on the implementation of the Programme of Action.
For the hundreds of non-governmental organizations present, the Conference served as a tool to galvanize international political, media, and public support on the issue of small arms. The Conference energized and mobilized NGOs to continue their work collaboratively on all aspects of the small arms issue, and the Programme of Action will provide the framework for continued action by like-minded states and NGOs in the future.
For more information on the Conference preparatory process, see "UN Hosts First Prepcom for 2001 Small Arms Conference," Weekly Defense Monitor, March 9, 2000, "Second Prepcom for 2001 Small Arms Conference Concludes," Weekly Defense Monitor, January 24, 2001, "Third UN Prepcom for Small Arms Conference Ends With Unresolved Issues," Weekly Defense Monitor, April 5, 2001, and "UN Will Hold Conference on Small Arms," Weekly Defense Monitor, July 5, 2001.
For general information on the conference and conference process, visit the UN's small arms website or the International Action Network on Small Arms website.
Genoa -- Tying Missile Defense in Knots
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
In an editorial published just before the Bush-Putin mini-summit in Genoa, Italy on July 22, former Senator Sam Nunn wrote: "President Bush's success should be judged not by whether he wins Russian acquiescence on missile defense but by whether he can begin to broaden and strengthen cooperation with Russia in defending against our common dangers."
So, how did the President do?
On a personal level, Mr. Bush, who in mid-June after his first meeting with Putin, said he had "looked the man in the eye [and] was able to get a sense of his soul," continued this remarkable theme by declaring "how easy it is to speak from my heart" to Putin. This goes far beyond Margaret Thatcher's famous assertion that Mikhail Gorbachev was a man with whom the West "could do business."
Yet this "personal style" at the presidential level, as significant as it may be, will not easily translate into broader issues on which the two sides will meet to talk about details. In fact, there is already a divide over whether subsequent talks will be discussions or negotiations.
Mr. Putin's style has been described as one step forward, two steps back: he seems to be open and accommodating to the positions of others, but when it comes to hard negotiations (or discussion) he is anything but easy. The day after the Genoa meeting he was quoted as saying that no principal breakthrough had been achieved.
Mr. Putin may well be a man of his word; the challenge is in the interpretation of what his "word" is. Mr. Bush thinks he can discern this. But when an American feels comfortable talking "from his heart" to a former KGB agent, it may be time to go over the transcript very carefully.
Thus, in "interrelating" national missile defense to reductions in offensive nuclear weapons, the United States believes that the Genoa meeting moved Russia closer to the U.S. position that there are "common threats." Given this assumption, Bush administration officials believe Russia is now open to a deal on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. But the "deal" is also being approached from different perspectives.
In July 24th testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Bush administration officials said they are not interested in modifying the treaty but rather in a "mutual declaration" or walking-away from its provisions. But Sergei Ivanov, Russia's Minister of Defense, has conceded only that "if the experts come to the conclusion that some changes in the treaty won't harm the national security of Russia" then he will report that Mr. Putin. This does not sound like a mutual agreement to walk away from the treaty.
This leaves open the question of the extent to which Russia is willing to go -- and how quickly -- in changing the Cold War balance of nuclear terror and establishing a new east-west relationship based on "common dangers."
The administration also believes that, with talks under way with Russia, America's allies will lessen their opposition to plans for a limited missile shield. But so far no one seems to have changed sides publicly, and the probabilities are that the allies will hedge their bets until they see how the discussions/negotiations proceed.
Russia is willing to explore possibilities that link (or "interrelate," in U..S. terminology) U.S. missile defense to reductions in offensive nuclear weapons because they want some stability in the latter. Their preferred course seems predicated on verifiable, mutual reductions that will allow them to slash their increasingly unreliable, expensive nuclear arsenal. The Russians may also be calculating that a "deal" will quantify the extent of the U.S. missile defense force at a level that will leave Moscow with a viable retaliation capacity.
But even here Mr. Putin hedged. He noted that if agreement can be reached on both issues, then Russia might not have to consider putting multiple warheads on its new Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile. A possible deal breaker would be if the United States tried to push ahead too fast with missile defense activities without concomitant progress on reducing nuclear weapons. This could happen if the Pentagon balks at deep reductions -- down to 2,000 or 1,500 warheads. Resistance is a real possibility given the number of targets in the current nuclear warfighting plan. The military is uncomfortable with suggestions of a ceiling of 2,500 warheads mentioned in a proposed START III agreement. The Pentagon is in the middle of a nuclear posture review which will, among other issues, look at targeting and alert status. But this report is not due until December 2001, and the Ballistic Missile Defense Office is hoping to get two more intercept tests done before then.
These currents, taken together, potentially give Russia the whip hand with U.S. missile defense testing and, potentially, deployment schedules if they insist that tests/deployment that would violate the ABM treaty cannot go ahead until verifiable de-alerting and/or deactivation and/or destruction of set numbers or classes of offensive nuclear weapons has started or achieved certain milestones. The continued reticence of many U.S. allies, especially in Europe, will strengthen such a stand. Moreover, Mr. Putin can always resurrect the European card: regional missile defense for all of Europe (of which Russia is a part) as an alternative to the U.S. system.
Mr. Bush wants fast a timetable on the discussions to "get beyond" the ABM Treaty; the Russians reveal no such sense of urgency. Abrogation by the United States thus remains a real and unwelcome possibility. The stage is set for a clash.
Macedonia Pulls Back from Brink -- Last-minute intervention by EU and NATO officials on Thursday prevented an all-but certain war between Macedonian government forces and ethnic Albanian insurgents. The two sides traded fire earlier this week after peace talks fell apart over the question of the official status of the Albanian language. Over 30 people were killed in two days of fighting before EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and NATO Secretary-General George Robertson flew to Macedonia to get the talks back on track. The negotiations are aimed at granting the ethnic Albanian population of Macedonia -- about one-third of the total -- more rights in the Republic of Macedonia. Although some rebels were reported to be fighting for secession, the spokesman for the self-styled National Liberation Army representing the Albanian insurgents told Reuters that "we support the sovereignty and integrity of Macedonia and want to live in a joint state of Macedonians and Albanians."
House Votes to Lift Cuba Travel Ban -- The House of Representatives voted this week to lift the ban on travel to Cuba by U.S. citizens. Similar legislation was passed by the House last year, but it died in the Senate. The House also defeated an amendment to eliminate the U.S. trade embargo of Cuba, which was eased last year to allow the sale of food and medicine. Under current law, U.S. citizens can only travel to Cuba with a special permit issued by the Treasury Department, which traditionally limits travel to government officials, academics, journalists and humanitarian missions.
GAO: Pentagon Funding Shifts Illegal -- A new report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) has found that the Defense Department has been illegally shifting funds from old accounts to pay current contractor bills. Under existing law, funds that are unspent after five years are "canceled," meaning that funds in the account could not be spent without new authority. According to GAO, the Defense Department has been using loopholes in the law to reprogram the funds out of canceled accounts to pay current bills. GAO identified $615 million such improper accounting entries made by DoD last year.
House Maintains Cap on U.S. Personnel in Colombia -- The House of Representatives defeated efforts by the Bush Administration to remove the current cap on the number of U.S. military and civilian contractors involved in anti-drug operations in Colombia. Last year as part of "Plan Colombia," Congress capped at 500 the number of U.S. military personnel who could be deployed, and also placed a cap of 300 on the number of civilian contractors -- some of whom fly aircraft in to combat zones. As part of this year's foreign aid bill the House of Representatives included language capping the total number of U.S. personnel at 800, but removing the specific limit on the numbers of civilian contractors. The House language does, however, direct the Administration to inform Congress if it intends to increase the numbers of civilians deployed.
Quotation of the Week -- "[Future U.S.-Russian arms control agreements] are not going to be traditional arms control negotiations with small armies of negotiators inhabiting the best hotels in Geneva for months at a time," John R. Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 24, 2001.
This Week on America's Defense Monitor: "Light Weapons, Heavy Casualties"
The vast majority of today's wars are start and fought with small arms and light weaponry. Cheap, portable, easy to use, and widely available, small arms are responsible for 90 percent of conflict-related deaths since WWII. Now there is a growing international movement to limit the spread of these weapons, while the U.S. government gives assault rifles to nations with unstable governments.
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