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| April 19, 2001 |
| April 19, 2001 |
Sorting Out Interests and Responsibilities -- An Opinion
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
"The hostilities last night (April16) in Gaza were precipitated by the provocative Palestinian mortar attacks on Israel. The Israeli response was excessive and disproportionate....There can be no military solution to this conflict."
This statement from Secretary of State Colin Powell was delivered at the State Department's April 17, 2001 Press Briefing. That night Israeli tanks occupied a section of the Gaza Strip that had been previously transferred to the Palestinian Authority under the Oslo Accords, withdrawing the next day. Since then two more attacks -- and two more incursions -- have taken place. It is becoming obvious that Israel's policy of raids/temporary occupations is having little effect on either deterring random Palestinian attacks on targets in Israel or in forcing the Palestinians to the bargaining table.
The Middle East, and the "question of Palestine," had long troubled the world before the United States became deeply engaged in trying to stem the seemingly never-ending cycle of violence in this small, volatile region. Throughout the first 30 years of the Cold War, the U.S. supported Israel diplomatically, economically, and militarily against neighboring Arab states, guerrilla organizations, and Palestinians who had been driven from or had fled their homes. Then came the first breakthrough when Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Menachem Begin forged a durable if uneasy peace cemented at Camp David. To this day, stemming from that agreement, the United States annually provides over $3 billion to Israel (which gets two-thirds) and Egypt in the form of direct aid.
Camp David began the process of an ever deepening U.S. involvement in the search for peace between Israel and all its neighbors, including the Palestinians. Although negotiated without direct U.S. participation, the September 1993 Oslo Accords (which led to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 with its implied evolution into a Palestinian state) quickly deepened U.S. involvement in Palestine. By 1997, a reluctant CIA had become an intermediary between Israeli and Palestinian security elements, passing information, encouraging trust and cooperation, and helping in the effort to control arms smuggling. A full-court press for peace came in the summer of 2000 when President Clinton reached for -- but failed to consummate -- a comprehensive settlement between Ehud Barak and Yassir Arafat.
Failure at the negotiating table was followed by failure of trust, failure of patience, and failure of peace itself. In late September 2000, the Barak government authorized a visit by Ariel Sharon, accompanied by a large police escort, to Muslim religious sites and another massive police and military presence on September 29, a Friday and therefore the Islamic holy day. Clashes were inevitable, and by mid-October the Al-Aqsa intifada was underway and spiraling out of control. To date it has claimed over 470 lives, the vast majority Palestinians. Meanwhile, the Bush Administration has attempted to draw back from the level of U.S. involvement that marked the Clinton Administration, declaring that it stands ready to "assist but not insist" in the search for a resolution to the current fighting and then to the larger issues at stake.
Without question, the United States has always favored Israel in its relationships with its neighbors. In its early days as a nation, Israel needed help economically and militarily to survive. It was, until 1967, a country under siege. But after the 1967 war, Israel became an occupying power -- a term used in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1322 (2000) of September 28, 2000. (which also speaks of Resolution 242 (1967),which calls on Israel to return the land conquered in that war, as the basis for a "just and lasting peace").
Over the subsequent years, Israel lost its memory of what it means to be besieged. It should look to its own history, both ancient and modern. Like others who wielded armed might, Israel's army can go at will into the areas returned to the Palestinians, but its gain is limited to destroying houses and clearing fields of fire by knocking down trees. Sharon's policy of strength and determination is being met by a determined spirit of resistance that this time will not be broken, only strengthened, as was Israel's in the first 20 years of its modern existence.
If the violence is to be brought under control, the United States must rethink its current one-dimensional view of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. This can be done without detriment to Israel and probably to its long term benefit. Consider the following:
First, Israel is by far the most powerful country militarily in the region. It possesses the only workable anti-ballistic missile system -- the Arrow (co-developed with the United States) -- and is the only state in the Middle East with nuclear weapons.
Second, it is economically far ahead of its neighbors, so much so that the United States has agreed to an Israeli request to phase out economic aid and increase military aid by $60 million annually until it reaches $2.4 billion. (The Clinton Administration had also favored a special supplemental that would have given Israel another $450 million for missile defenses and to help pay for Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon last spring.)
Third, as Secretary Powell said, it has resorted to disproportionate means in responding to the Palestinians. In part, this is a reflection of Israel's inability to deal with the actions of small irregular groups whose members are not constrained by "rational" calculations of what constitutes winning or losing. Controlled (predictable) violence such as traditional warfare is bad enough; "irrational" (in the sense of unfocused or indiscriminate) violence is far more destructive to civilization and future reconciliation. And reconciliation there must eventually be, for neither side is going to leave.
Fourth, the infrastructure of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is not highly developed and integrated. Thus there are fewer "targets" of great consequence for the Israelis to destroy. The people can still remember how to live the "hard" life; they will survive, rebuild, and unfortunately remember.
Fifth, in the end, again as Secretary Powell said, there is no military solution. And as the stronger side, the Israelis will have to make the first step back from the fighting. Unfortunately, the March 28 U.S. veto of a proposed Security Council Resolution establishing a United Nations Observer Force in the Middle East -- referring to the border between Gaza and Israel -- stripped away what could have been diplomatic cover for the Israelis to de-escalate the violence and provide a neutral forum for the two sides to meet.
As in any dispute, the contending parties must both want resolution if a solution is to be worked out. But it is harder to reach a solution unaided when the contending sides are close neighbors whose relationship has been deeply scarred by the perception (and the reality) of broken promises and a sense of betrayal.
The fundamental point being ignored by both sides, but particularly by Israel, is that the drive for complete security for one breaks down into insecurity for all, which in turn leads to popular disillusion with leaders. When this bond is severed, individuals can easily believe they must take matters into their own hands, leading even to the uncontrollable spiral of perpetual violence to which we are witness. But security ultimately rests on trust -- which bridges gaps -- and not on self-interest -- which creates them. And at this juncture in Israeli-Palestinian affairs, the pillars that could support that bridge are missing and perhaps can only be provided by outside, even-handed mediation.
Whether the United States can be the mediator any more remains to be seen. However, should the Bush Administration hold back, as it has with regard to rapprochement between South and North Korea, it may find America's leadership replaced by the European Union whose proximity to the area makes it sensitive to any suggestion that a policy vacuum is developing.
With this in mind, in a real sense, the critical choices that lie ahead will be made both in Israel and America. If Sharon has the courage to disengage militarily and Bush to engage diplomatically, a shred of hope may be salvaged. If other choices are made, a Middle East Rubicon looms.
Bush Policy on Failed States is Lacking
Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
The early Bush presidency has so far focused on domestic politics, issues surrounding nuclear weapons and missile shields, and relations with Russia and China. To date, the Bush team has not focused on the issue of failed states and the approach to the problems such states might pose. Rather, it has indicated that most of the potential failed states are not within the scope of the U.S. national interest.
The most complete statement of the Bush Administration's foreign policy was enunciated by National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice in "Foreign Affairs" last year. Rice said, "American foreign policy in a Republican administration should refocus the United States on the national interest and the pursuit of key priorities. These tasks are: to ensure that America's military can deter war, project power, and fight in defense of its interests if deterrence fails; to promote economic growth and political openness by extending free trade and a stable international monetary system to all committed to these principles, including in the western hemisphere, which has too often been neglected as a vital area of U.S. national interest; to renew strong and intimate relationships with allies who share American values and can thus share the burden of promoting peace, prosperity, and freedom; to focus U.S. energies on comprehensive relationships with the big powers, particularly Russia and China, that can and will mold the character of the international political system; and to deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes and hostile powers, which is increasingly taking the forms of the potential for terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)."
Rice's concerns mirror much of the agenda of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (April 19, 2000) which, added a sixth key national security concern -- recommending that the United States establish priorities for aiding weak and failing states that should be assisted. The Commission pointed to four in particular -- Mexico, Colombia, Russia, and Saudi Arabia -- whose stability is of "major importance to U.S. interests." (For more information on the Commission's recommendations on failed states see "Protecting the Failing State (Part I and Part II)," Weekly Defense Monitor, April 20 and 27, 2000.
Mr. Bush said very little about failed states during the campaign, indicating that he did not believe that events in Africa concerned the U.S. national interest and that "nation-building" was not a proper role for the United States military. In the debates with Al Gore, Bush indicated that he would not have engaged in "nation building" in Haiti, intervened in Rwanda to prevent genocide, or become involved in the Balkans. But Bush did approve of the Australians intervention in Timor, primarily because it involved only a small U.S. support element.
The Bush team has also stated the importance of economic interests in developing U.S. foreign policy decisions. Bush and Rice have indicated that they believe that the United States needs to encourage nations that are able to participate in the free market system. On its face, this implies that the global south has little to contribute and is thus of minimal importance. While the Bush Administration is not keen on U.S. military intervention, it seems quite content to continue promoting U.S. arms exports and training. Arms exports clearly have strong financial benefits to key actors in the American economy and strong political backing within Congress, but many of these arms exports also extract a toll by contributing to further instability and inhibiting economic sustainability, particularly in the most vulnerable states.
The Bush Administration will have to develop answers to policy questions about failed states such as:
In the near future, the United States may be tested by the rising tensions in Macedonia, Sudan and Colombia. The United States and its allies are already involved in some aspects of each of these crises. In each situation, the United States may be challenged to act in concert with allies and work collaboratively to reach a positive outcome.
Many nations look to the United States as the remaining superpower for leadership to the global challenges facing the world today. But, to date, under the Bush Administration, the United States continues to promote solutions that benefit the few -- especially in the economic area where the Administration's calculus and major justification for action comes down to what benefits the United States. Continuation of this mind set will perpetuate the absence of any meaningful defense by the United States of those too small and weak to defend themselves.
This article was based on the paper, "The Failed and Failing State and the Bush Administration: Paradoxes and Perils," by Rachel Stohl and Michael Stohl, prepared for the April 2001 Conference on Globalization and the Failed State. For more information on this conference and the ongoing scholarly and policy debate, see the Failed States Research Group web site at the Office of International Programs at Purdue University. For information on failed states or to read a fuller analysis of the Bush position on failed states see CDI's Failed States webpage.
Panel Recommends Delay in Osprey Program -- During a public meeting this week, members of the Pentagon's blue ribbon commission which is reviewing the troubled V-22 Osprey program recommended that the program be delayed, and additional testing done. The commission, while expressing support for the V-22, recommended lowering production to a bare minimum while fixes to the program are undertaken and additional testing done. The commission plans to make its official recommendations to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld next week. The Senate Armed Services Committee will hold hearings on May 1 to review the Commission's findings.
Navy Chief Critical of Environmentalists -- Dwindling open lands are having a negative impact on military bases and training facilities, according to acting Secretary of the Navy Robert B. Pirie, Jr., a situation aggravated by the environmental movement, "which creates further pressure on our activities." Further, environmental concerns are often raised by other interested parties and activists with totally different agendas. According to Mr. Pirie, "environmentalism was discovered by peace activists in the 1960s as a dandy pretext to restrict military operations."
Boeing JSF Successfully Tests Vertical Flight System -- Boeing's Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) version of its Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) successfully transited from conventional flight to STOVL during flight testing this week. To perform STOVL flight, the Boeing system closes the rear exhaust nozzle and redirects engine thrust downward through two lift nozzles. The STOVL version of Lockheed Martin's JSF, which is competing with Boeing, uses a turbofan mounted horizontally behind the cockpit to achieve vertical lift. The Boeing aircraft transited from conventional mode to STOVL flight while in mid-air, and not on take-off. Lockheed expects to flight test its STOVL version in June or July.
Quotation of the Week -- "Go out and test, test, test, test [the V-22 Osprey]. In the meantime, I think it would be appropriate to cut the production back to the bar minimum -- I mean bare. And the only reason I wouldn't stop production is it's so disruptive that in itself would probably introduce some more safety reliability problems than continuing on a low-rate [production] and also major cost issue," Norman Augustine, member of the Pentagon's blue ribbon commission on the V-22 Osprey, April 18, 2001.
This Week on America's Defense Monitor: "Are We Prepared for
Chemical/Biological Attacks?"
Ever since the poison gas attack on the Tokyo subway, our government has been preparing for a similar attack on U.S. soil. Forty federal agencies and billions of dollars are committed to counter things like sarin gas, anthrax, and small pox. Domestic and international terrorism are at the center of this fascinating and informative program.
Airs in Washington, DC on Sunday, April 22 at 10:30 a.m, on Channel 32.
Airs in NYC on Saturday, April 28 at 7:00 a.m. on Channel 13.
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