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| March 8, 2001 |
| March 8, 2001 |
National Missile Defense Technology Found Wanting -- Again
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, smith@cdi.org
Last week, the multifaceted U.S. effort to develop and field a reliable if limited national missile defense (NMD) once again was panned by authoritative critics.
The General Accounting Office (GAO), one of Congress' watchdog agencies, struck first with another devastating analysis of the Space-Based Infrared System-Low (SBIRS-Low). The report, "Defense Acquisitions: Space-Based Infrared System-low at Risk of Missing Initial Deployment Date" (GAO-01-6, February 28, 2001), says that "the Air Force's current SBIRS-Low acquisition schedule is at a high risk of not delivering the system on time or at cost or with expected performance."
With its complementary six-satellite SBIRS-High system, the 30-satellite (24 active and six test) SBIRS-Low system performs several crucial functions. Operating from space, SBIRS is intended to detect hostile missile launches, perform mid-course tracking, identify decoys from real warheads, and cue land-based missile-control radars that would guide interceptor missiles and their "hit-to-kill" warheads to an intercept point in space.
But the SBIRS-Low program has flipped the logic of acquisition. Instead of designing and testing the system first, including its software, the Pentagon is pressing ahead with building the estimated $2.4 billion satellite array before it completes flight tests meant to help determine the final design. In fact, according to the GAO, five of six fundamental elements, including the infrared sensors themselves, may very well not be ready by the anticipated deployment window.
In response, the Air Force, which manages the program, says it has already restructured the SBIRS-Low schedule to reduce risk. It also pointed out that the SBIRS-Low schedule is being driven by Congress. In the FY2000 Defense Authorization bill, (PL 106-65), Congress dictated that the first launch of the SBIRS-Low system must occur in Fiscal Year 2006 so that the entire system will be in place by 2010. This is the date by which other nations could have intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with complex decoy systems. (In its December 2000 report, "Global Trends: 2015," the National Intelligence Council projects that in this decade Iran -- and possibly Iraq, if it receives foreign assistance -- could test an ICBM capable of reaching the United States.)
Lastly, GAO notes (without comment) that the Air Force pegs the life cycle costs (through 2022) for SBIRS-Low at $11.8 billion. This total has not changed since at least 1998. Given the propensity for programs to have 20-30% cost increase, this steadiness hardly seems credible. It should be noted, however, that the Air Force canceled contracts worth $700 million for satellite construction and demonstration flights because of cost increases of over 30%. (Costs for the companion system, SBIRS-High, originally put at $1.8 billion, in November 2000 were estimated to be as high as $4.2 billion with first launch delayed from 2002 to 2004.)
The other NMD related report actually goes back to January but only now has become public: "The FY2000 Annual Report for the Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation." Citing technological difficulties in trying to upgrade missiles, warheads, and radars, the report states that the U.S. will not be able to deploy a viable sea-based NMD option for at least five years. Even under an optimistic development program, such a delay means that a naval option could not be ready before the projected date for deploying the first 20 missiles in the land-based system currently under development.
But the January report also takes the land-based system to task, noting that it has yet to be realistically tested. Development of the interceptor boost rocket is 18 months behind schedule. The tracking and discrimination subsystems have yet to confront a realistic set of decoys and warheads. So far, the threat has been "narrowly defined" by "unsophisticated countermeasures such as simple balloons." Thus the land-based system faces further potential delays itself.
So much uncertainty suggests that it may be prudent for the new administration to have a complete review of NMD along with all the other reviews it is conducting.
For more information, see "Defense Acquisitions: Space-Based Infrared System-low at Risk of Missing Initial Deployment Date," GAO-01-6, February 28, 2001, or "The FY2000 Annual Report for the Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation."
Missile Dealers at the Gates of Europe
Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org
The Bush-Cheney victory strengthened domestic support for National Missile Defense (NMD) and moved the focus of the debate away from the United States and into Europe. The continent's largest countries, long skeptical about the need for and the effectiveness of an NMD umbrella, are being wooed by Moscow and Washington to gain support for their competing points of view on missile defense. In recent months both Russia and the United States have presented the Europeans with offers of collaboration on missile protection. But while there is strong interest in Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems in Europe, a static, NMD-like system may prove to be a much harder sell.
European objections to NMD, in a nutshell, revolve around two key issues. NMD, European leaders fear, may isolate America from Europe and weaken the U.S. commitment to European defense. It also threatens to destroy existing arms control agreements and unleash a new arms race.
The Bush national security team set about attacking the second argument by pointing out, with limited success, that ballistic missiles in Iran, Iraq, and North Korea may pose just as much risk to Europe as to the United States. These risks, the new Administration argues, require a change in existing arms control treaties. The Europeans are skeptical. Some countries agree the threat may be there but virtually all think that there are better ways of dealing with it, such as diplomacy and export controls.
It is the first argument which garnered much attention lately. In response to worries about weakening the U.S. commitment to Europe, the Bush Administration proposed that NMD coverage be extended to European allies. Back in October 2000, Richard Armitage, then an advisor to Governor Bush and currently No. 2 at the State Department, proposed that the program be renamed from National Missile Defense to Allied Missile Defense to better reflect its new scope. President Bush has repeatedly stressed that NMD should also protect U.S. "friends and allies." Even Moscow, after initially questioning the need for an NMD-like umbrella, proposed to NATO in February to jointly build a missile defense system for Europe. The closely-held proposal is vague on technical issues but it appears to be based on future upgrades of Russia's successful S-300 surface-to-air missile.
At first glance Europe appears to be a solid sales prospect for aspiring missile salesmen. Although skeptical about NMD, European countries have long pursued a more limited TMD system to protect their troops deployed in areas of conflict. NATO is currently accepting bids for an alliance-wide TMD system with deployment planned for around 2010. Italy is working with the United States to build a Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), designed to guard against short-range ballistic and cruise missiles (Germany withdrew from the program in November 2000). The Netherlands, Germany, and Italy are in consultations with the United States about building a naval version of a TMD system to protect their fleets.
From a technical standpoint, an NMD system for Europe would basically be a TMD system. Europe is much closer to the countries the United States identified as possible sources of ballistic missile threats, meaning that any missile fired against Europe would follow a much shorter and shallower trajectory. The missile would be shot down not 100 miles above sea level (as NMD proposes to do), but at altitudes within the reach of TMD systems (the Patriot missiles used during the Gulf War had a maximum altitude of 15 miles).
Europe's future TMD systems could thus offer protection, albeit limited, to not only deployed forces but also static targets such as cities and ports, much as NMD proposes to do for the United States. Does that mean that, in pursuing a TMD system, the European nations have already embraced the missile defense concept embodied in NMD?
Not necessarily. European TMD projects are driven by a different rationale the need to protect troops deployed in areas of conflict. There is no disagreement that such protection is needed the Iraqi Scud missile attacks on U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War is just one example of the vulnerability of troops when deployed for war. TMD's technical capabilities would allow it to perform, in a limited form, essentially national missile defense duties, but here the similarities end.
NMD is designed to counter a missile attack against U.S. cities from a "rogue" country such as Iraq or North Korea. Many U.S. allies in Europe dismiss such scenario as far-fetched, pointing out that the conventional and nuclear might of the United States are sufficient to deter any such attack. Of the largest states in Europe, Britain comes the closest to agreeing with the United States on the dangers of missile proliferation. Prime Minister Tony Blair, meeting with President Bush in February, called the spread of missile technology "a real threat and a present threat." But even Blair, in discussing a proper response to missile risks, urged a broader strategy that encompasses not just a military response but nuclear arms reductions and strengthening of missile proliferation controls and counter-proliferation measures.
Elsewhere, the differences between the United States and Europe are even more pronounced. In a study entitled "European Views of National Missile Defense," the Atlantic Council of the United States pointed out that "German military officials seem reluctant to acknowledge the new [ballistic missile] threats." Almost as a rule, the Atlantic Council wrote, European countries "emphasize the importance of engagement rather than isolation of countries of concern."
Moreover, the TMD systems sought by Europe would complement the existing arms control agreements. NMD, on the other hand, cannot be deployed without violating the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. On this particular point, U.S. views could hardly be any more different from those in Europe. President Bush stated that NMD will be deployed whether or not the United States can reach an agreement with Russia on revising the ABM Treaty. The Europeans are far more reluctant to trade the safety of arms control agreements for a (currently non-existent) missile defense umbrella. "It is important that NMD does not proceed in a way which undermines the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty," said UK Foreign Affairs Secretary Robin Cook.
Russia and the United States may find selling a missile system to Europe a daunting proposal. To make their task even more difficult, both the NMD and TMD plans are little more than pie in the sky at this point. The Russian proposal is based on a currently non-existent upgrade to the S-300 missile, dubbed S-500. The U.S. NMD system may be further along in development but still far from proven. Of the three NMD tests conducted so far, two were complete failures and one missile found its target only with substantial coaching from the ground crew.
Dangers of Biological Weapons
Oscar Lurie, Research Associate, olurie@cdi.org
Biological weapons are not new. Throwing carrion into water wells was a not uncommon practice even before the Roman empire. In the 14th century, Tartars catapulted bodies of bubonic disease victims over the walls of Kaffa on the Black Sea. As residents escaped the city by ship, the fleas they carried jumped to the rats aboard the vessels, thus spreading the plague to wherever the ships made port.
In the 19th century, the biological scientists Koch, Pasteur, and Lister succeeded in isolating the common anthrax bacterium and developing a vaccine against it for animals. But anthrax is also fatal to humans if sufficient spores are inhaled. Given its natural occurrence worldwide, relatively easy preparation, long shelf life, and suitability for dispersal in aerosol form, anthrax became the biological weapon of choice. It is relatively safe for the attacker because its spores are killed by sunlight as they fall to the ground, and a well-established vaccine can protect the attacker in advance. (Of course, the effectiveness of an anthrax weapon would be reduced when its spores are exposed to sunlight, if the target population already is protected by the vaccine, or if treatment is administered quickly after an attack.)
In reaction to the horrors of World War I, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 outlawed the use of gas and bioweapons in war -- but not their development or production. The United States, Great Britain, Japan, and Germany secretly developed bioweapons before World War II. None were used in battle, probably because of imperfections in technology for dissemination. After 1945, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union spent years experimenting to develop effective means of stabilizing and distributing deadly agents. The principles of these delivery devices are highly classified.
In 1969 and 1970 President Nixon terminated deployment of biowepons and ordered destruction of all stockpiles. The 1972 Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC), which now has 160 signers and 143 ratifications, bans development, production, stockpiling, or use of bioweapons in armed conflict. But it has no provision allowing for investigation of suspicious activities.
Although the Soviets ratified the treaty, they continued a massive bioweapons program right up to the collapse of the USSR. Objective evidence of their activities came to light in 1979 near a microbiological facility run by the Soviet military. Approximately 100 people and uncounted livestock suddenly died from inhalation of anthrax spores. More recently, a Pentagon representative was able to visit a Kazakh institute where he found samples of anthrax, tularemia, and plague agents -- all alive and virtually unsecured.
The U.S. maintains an active bioweapons research program, but states that the program is entirely for "defensive" purposes.
The Russians have not been alone in disregarding the BWC. Despite Iraq's ratification of the BWC, Saddam Hussein's scientists have worked on at least eight bio-agents. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which was charged with finding and destroying Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs, found 500,000 liters of bio-agents before Saddam blocked their searches.
Recognizing the weakness of the BWC, an "Ad Hoc Group" of diplomats has been trying since 1995 to reach an agreement on verification measures to monitor BWC compliance. The United States, rather than using its leadership to achieve a strong agreement, has objected to a number of inspection provisions in the draft document even though they are analogous to inspection provisions in the Chemical Weapons Convention which the U.S. has ratified.
Anthrax is not the only disease that is causing concern. The last recorded case of smallpox occurred in 1977 after a long global eradication campaign by the World Health Organization. Consequently, routine vaccination has ceased and few Americans retain immunity today. Samples of the virus are still maintained by the U.S. and Russian governments. There is concern that terrorists might be able to penetrate Russian security and seize some of the virus. Present stocks of vaccine are meager, which means an outbreak from any source, intentional or accidental, could be devastating. To be better prepared, the U.S. government has contracted for a 40-million-dose stockpile with the first batches to be ready by 2004.
Others are looking ahead. In 1997 a group of academic scientists (named JASON) studied the range of "improved" pathogens that the rapid advances of biotechnology might make possible in the near future. Adapted for hostile purposes, these agents could result in bioweapons that are safer to handle, have increased virulence, are easier to target, are more difficult to detect, and are easier to distribute.
How do we try to mitigate the possibility that the U.S. might be attacked with bioweapons?
Counteracting such a possibility is a function for law enforcement more than it is for the U.S. military. Should bioweapons be concealed aboard ships that routinely visit our seaports or lake ports, there is little the Pentagon can do other than provide information it may glean from its many sources and assist in post-incident mitigation of effects. In particular, the proposed multi-billion dollar anti-ballistic shield would not be of any use.
But the United States, which has the resources (financial and scientific) to be able to attempt a missile shield, should be able to defend its citizens against bioweapons. What is required is the wisdom and the will to transfer the resources from planes, tanks, and warships to research and follow-through activities to develop and deploy vaccines against bioweapons.
To start with, use of bioweapons by terrorists is not as easy as some have argued. Before resorting to poisonous sarin gas in the Tokyo subway, the Aum Shinriko doomsday cult had attacked civilians at least nine times with a variety of bioweapons. None were successful, either because the wrong strain of agent was used or because the dispersion mechanism was not effective.
Solutions to part of the challenge are already at hand. The government's order for 40 million doses of smallpox vaccine can be increased to 280 million. The plan to protect military personnel from anthrax can be given much wider scope by extending it to the entire civilian population. The administration of these protections would be voluntary for each individual, conducted by civilian employees of federal, state, and local agencies, and paid for entirely out of the defense budget.
Presently, facilities for manufacturing these vaccines are extremely limited or non-existent. And in our litigious society, manufacturers would be reluctant to produce the vaccines for civilian use. Since this program would be for the defense of all our citizens, it is appropriate for the federal government to finance it and to remove the legal liability problem.
The fiscal 2000 budget provided $1.4 billion to combat biological and chemical terrorism -- a paltry allowance compared to the more than $4 billion cost of a single Seawolf submarine. Much more money can sensibly be devoted to research on improving our capability against bioweapons. Such research programs will also have spin-off effects of benefit to civilian society. Research to develop new types of sensitive detectors and monitors for biowarfare agents would likely result in improved diagnostics for disease. Creating innovative surveillance approaches for detecting biowarfare attacks should improve medical epidemiology. Money spent on stockpiling smallpox vaccine could add more to the security of the American people than does a whole fleet of F-22 fighter planes.
Briefly put, our military leaders must cool their love affair with offensive hardware and allow some of these resources to be used for softer defense of the American people.
China To Raise Defense Spending -- Citing "drastic" changes in the world military situation, China has announced plans to raise defense spending by 17.7 percent this year, in part to support efforts to catch up with Western militaries' high technology. According to Finance Minister Xiang Huaicheng, a large share of the $17 billion military budget would go to higher salaries and to improving weapons technology. Xiang told delegates to the national legislature in its annual session that the increase -- much higher than the 12.7 percent increase in 2000 -- was needed "to adapt to drastic changes in the military situation of the world and prepare for defense and combat given the conditions of modern technology, especially high technology." China's official budget represents only a portion of its total defense spending. According to the Institute for International and Strategic Studies, China's military budget in 1999 -- the most recent year for which figures are available -- was nearly $40 billion. Reacting to the announcement, Pentagon spokesperson Rear Admiral Craig Quigley (USN) said, "Is it something that we pay attention to? You bet. Is it all by itself going to have a profound impact on U.S. defense policy and defense spending? I don't think so. I think that is too strong a description."
F-22 Production Decision Delayed Again -- Despite the efforts of its congressional supporters, the Pentagon will again delay a decision on whether to begin low-rate initial production of the Air Force's F-22 fighter. The decision, originally planned for last December, was delayed until this month when the F-22 failed to meet congressionally mandated testing milestones. The program has subsequently met these milestones, prompting 56 congressional supporters to write to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld last week urging his approval of production of the aircraft. In a written response, Secretary Rumsfeld stated that any decision would have to await the completion of a comprehensive strategic review underway at the Pentagon. The review is expected to be completed this summer.
Bosnian Croat Proclaim Separation, President Fired -- The Croat member of Bosnia's joint presidency was fired Wednesday after the Bosnian Croat National Assembly voted on March 3 to establish a separate state in areas of Bosnia with an ethnic Croat majority. The Assembly is controlled by HDZ, an extreme nationalist party. HDZ won a majority of the Croat vote in the November 2000 Bosnian election by threatening ethnic Croats with "extermination" unless they created a separate entity within Bosnia. Ante Jelavic, the HDZ leader, also served as the Croat member of Bosnia's joint presidency until his removal on Wednesday. Wolfgang Petritsch, the international community's Bosnia administrator, fired Jelavic for violating the constitution and the Dayton Peace Agreement. Currently, ethnically Croat areas are merged with Bosniak (Muslim) territories in the Bosnian Federation. Together with the ethnically Serb Republika Srpska, these two entities form Bosnia.
First Defense Agency Submits "Clean" Financial Statement -- For the first time since the passage of the Government Management Reform Act, which required federal agencies to submit clean financial audit statements beginning in 1996, a DoD agency has successfully done so. The Pentagon's Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) submitted a clean audit sheet for Fiscal Year 2000, according to the independent accounting firm of Deloitte & Touche. To date, neither the Department of Defense nor any of the military services have done so successfully, nor do they expect to do so before 2003. For additional information, see "Pentagon Still Can't Pass an Audit," CDI's Weekly Defense Monitor, March 9, 2000.
More Trouble in Macedonia, U.S. Troops Involved -- U.S. peacekeepers in Kosovo fired at a group of suspected militants in Kosovo on Wednesday, injuring two. The attack is the first involving NATO troops in what has been a violent week on the Kosovo-Macedonia border. For the past two weeks, militants thought to be ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia have been attacking Macedonian police and military outposts near the Kosovo border. About a quarter of Macedonia's population are ethnic Albanians. The militants claiming to fight on their behalf demand independence from Macedonia and a union with Kosovo. Macedonian forces responded with heavy weapons fire, reportedly including Katyusha rockets. U.S. forces guarding the border also stepped up patrols to prevent fighters from the now disbanded Kosovo Liberation Army from assisting the Macedonia militants.
Uranium Not a Cause of Cancer, Says EU Panel -- A European Commission panel concluded that depleted uranium (DU) does not cause cancer. The findings appear to put to rest allegations in Italy, Spain, and elsewhere that exposure to DU shells have caused a rash of leukemia cases among European peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo. The DU allegations first broke in January and caused strains in the NATO alliance as European members accused the United States of a cavalier attitude about their soldiers' safety. The EU Commission even called for a moratorium on DU ammunition and commissioned a study on DU's link to cancer. Although the study found no relation between DU and cancer, it highlighted DU's toxic qualities and recommended a cleanup of DU contaminated sites.
Quotation of the Week -- "There has been no watershed event that has prompted me to ask for a search of options, or a study of alternatives to the Osprey, and I have not done so. Nor do I have any new information that would lead me to believe that this important program is 'in peril.' ...Until proven otherwise, the V-22 remains the program of choice." Statement by General James L. Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps, released March 7, 2001.
This Week on America's Defense Monitor: "Understanding Human Security"
At the close of the 20th Century, the globalization of commerce and communications has shrunk the world and made it vastly more interconnected. The struggles of distant lands to achieve liberal institutions and better standards of living are brought home immediately by satellite and the world wide web. The new century is marked by the emergence of a new doctrine that holds that the safety and prosperity of the world community starts with respect for individual human rights. The implications for international relations and the use of military force are staggering.
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