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| February 1, 2001 |
| February 1, 2001 |
Making the World Safe for the United States
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
President George W. Bush last week declared that he wants "America...to lead the world toward a more safe world when it comes to nuclear weaponry." But do his proposed policies really take the world down the path towards "safety" or do they simply make the world safe for U.S. unilateralism -- and in so doing threaten to disconnect U.S. security from the security of our allies and thus actually render us less secure?
Consider the following.
Mr. Bush's "nuclear safety" plan has two parts. First, he would install a limited "allied" ballistic missile defense system to protect the United States and any allies that want to play by America's rules. So how does the Administration know who wants to come under this limited shield?
Acceptance could be signaled by allies agreeing to provide necessary sites for radars and possibly even interceptors since defensive missiles based in the U.S. would be unable to protect European countries from ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East. But many Europeans don't see a threat emerging from the Middle East -- unless the United States creates one by its insistent drumbeat about hostile regimes with nefarious plots against ourselves and our friends. The two countries whose cooperation is necessary for even an U.S.-only NMD system to be effective, Britain and Greenland (Denmark), have so far refused to allow in situ radars to be upgraded for the proposed NMD.
Or allies could put money into the development of a missile defense system, just as some (notably Britain, Germany, Italy, and Israel) put money into conventional weapons programs in the expectation they will get some of the production contracts as well as the weapons themselves.
So far there has been no money for NMD from allies.
At the very least, real allies would provide verbal and diplomatic support for the U.S. position. To date under this criteria the U.S. has yet to find an "ally" in Europe and has found interest among Asian allies only in theater missile defenses. Even Canada, which for decades has been an integral part of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, is opposed to NMD.
The other half of Mr. Bush's proposal is to reduce U.S. offensive nuclear weapons, even unilaterally, thereby abandoning the Cold War MAD (mutual assured destruction) paradigm of reciprocal terror. To do this, Mr. Bush will have to beat down the military's objections that it needs at least 2,500 warheads to carry out the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) which specifies for various attack options the timing, weapons, and delivery systems to be used by U.S. strategic forces. (Today, as during the Cold War, the vast majority of the SIOP targets lie in Russia.) While the Joint Chiefs may remain unconvinced, Mr. Bush's new Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, is fully on board. Last week he told reporters: "We're in a very different world. The Soviet Union is gone. The principal threats facing the United States are not the fear of a strategic nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union."
Yet simply cutting the number of warheads will not make either the U.S. or the world a safer place. To really accomplish that feat, the President will have to stand down that part of the U.S. missile force that is on hair-trigger alert, thereby eliminating the possibility of an accidental massive nuclear exchange with Russia. This is where the real danger resides, for no one would be safe should we trigger a nuclear holocaust.
Of course, there are other extant nuclear dangers "out there" that need to be controlled, not because they pose a particular risk to the U.S. but more generally because for some countries a miscalculation is all too possible. Great Britain, France, and Israel are all American allies, but Israel is very uneasy in a sea of Arab states. India and Pakistan (which have no missiles able to reach the U.S.) are bitter rivals, with China ever in the background of this South Asian flashpoint. With regard to the United States, China, which during the Cold War deployed about two dozen nuclear capable intercontinental ballistic missiles, is warning that the American NMD would be considered a threat to China's security by its potential to negate China's minimal nuclear deterrent.
The answer to these potentially destabilizing nuclear currents is already at hand if the Five Big Powers are willing to fulfill commitments already made to the rest of the world in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Right now, nuclear weapons can be cut deeply and unilaterally to the point of providing a minimal deterrence until comprehensive, verifiable measures to eliminate all nuclear weapons held by all nuclear weapons states can be concluded. Such a final state would, on the very face of it, provide more security for the United States because it would provide equal security for all.
Why hasn't this happened? The simple answer is because the United States doesn't see its security as a function of the security of other states. We seem to forget the principle that negotiations succeed only when all parties get something positive for whatever they are asked to forego -- even if what they forego is complete freedom of action. But in today's world, as never before, no nation has complete freedom of action in any sphere, and attempts by any country to act as if it is unfettered breeds resentment which transforms itself into growing and coordinated opposition.
Finally, there is the perception among allies that the U.S. is "going it alone" even in nonnuclear security affairs. This perception was reinforced during the recent presidential campaign by statements that the U.S. should leave the Balkans to Europe so that the U.S. could concentrate on preparing for real wars -- the "we don't do windows" approach. While this might insulate the United States from messy contingencies, it will do nothing for U.S. security should one of these untidy affairs get out of hand and lead to widespread upheaval. Then more than military security may be at risk; in the "wrong" part of the world our access to key resources could be disrupted and with it our entire way of life.
The Administration is right about one thing: there are regimes that are hostile to the United States. In a few instances this is because the regimes (e.g., North Korea and Iraq) violated international norms and were stopped by a U.S. led coalition. But if we truly want to make the world safe (as opposed to just the U.S.), we must also take the lead in trying to reconcile these regimes with the international community. This requires threading three needles simultaneously:
Space War Games and China as Vader's Empire
Dr. Nicholas Berry
In the first week of the Bush Administration, the Air Force's Space Warfare Center conducted the first major war game with space as the main theater of operations. "The scenario," according to a front-page article in The Washington Post, "was growing tension between the United States and China in 2017." The Empire was poised to strike. The Air Force invited the press in for a few hours to observe the 250 participants who played for five days at the Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado. Although Air Force spokesman Lt. Col. Donald Miles said, "We don't talk about countries," some did. China ("Red") was massing its military to attack a small neighbor, presumably Taiwan ("Brown"), which then asked the United States ("Blue") for help. Both Red and Blue relied on satellites, microsatellites to destroy enemy satellites, manned space vehicles (Blue had reusable space planes), cyberwar capabilities, lasers, ballistic missiles, and missile defense.
The question is not whether the Air Force should prepare for combat in space. The United States has key space assets that need to be protected, and command of that theater can deny an enemy vital command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) capabilities. Offensive space weaponry, such as "space rods" (solid, kinetic projectiles that dropped to earth have the explosive impact of small asteroids), can severely unbalance the military playing field. Nor is the issue of whether to use a "possible" military situation as the gaming scenario open to criticism. Russia, France, or India would not make a logical "Red." China, alone, has announced plans to develop manned space vehicles that could have military applications. These would be the prime weapon platforms fot space warfare.
What is highly questionable is the public designation of China as the enemy and Taiwan as the "Brown" meriting U.S. assistance.
Imagine how the "Washington Post" report is being read in Beijing and Taipei.
Beijing, at least the hardliners in the People's Liberation Army (PLA), now have ample evidence that the United States is preparing to fight in space and that China is the designated enemy. "We must prepare to deter and counter U.S. military capabilities with our own accelerated space capabilities" -- would be a predictable response from the PLA. Cooperation with the United States in space ventures would likely fade away. An arms race for control of space could emerge.
Beijing's political leadership would likely support the PLA position on the grounds that the United States is preparing to dismember China by protecting Taiwan, thereby supporting independence for its "renegade province." Superpowers use their military assets to protect small countries only if their independence is highly valued. Washington's policy, therefore, must be to contain and weaken China, thus strengthening and preserving Taiwan's autonomy for the foreseeable future. Perhaps the long-term U.S. goal is to replace the Communist regime with one led by Taipei democrats. "We must take no chances and expand our military ability to punish Taiwan so that Taipei never dares to declare independence" -- would not be a far-out Beijing policy conclusion. An accelerated arms race across the Taiwan Strait could be set in motion.
Taipei must read about the U.S. space warfare scenario with great comfort since the exercise was geared to deter Beijing and assist in assuring the island's autonomy. Pro-independence forces in President Chen Shui-bian's Democratic Progressive Party must be overjoyed. "We can safely proceed step-by-step towards formal independence now that we have the protection of an invincible ally" -- would be a reasonable conclusion made by these political forces. "Perhaps we can await the Communist collapse and then lead a unified China to democracy and a full-market economy."
The analysis above may be an exaggeration. A senior PLA officer, responding to a question about his country being named the "Red" enemy in a space war game, expressed the equivalent of "so what else is new." Nevertheless, the fundamental foreign policy principle -- that it is highly unwise to provide evidence upon which a foreign power will draw the wrong conclusion -- has been badly abused by the Air Force's Space Warfare Center.
The aphorism "to speak loudly and carry a big stick" only works either in the face of an imminent threat to be deterred or in preparation for making an attack when cowing the enemy is good strategy. Neither situation prevails with China.
"Red" should have referred to the Marx Brother's imaginary country of Fredonia.
Does the "Powell Doctrine" Provide Any Clues to the Foreign Policy of
the New Administration?
Marcus Corbin, Senior Analyst, mcorbin@cdi.org
With the arrival of Colin Powell at the helm of the State Department, talk of the "Powell Doctrine" abounds. What exactly is the Doctrine? Is it really opposition to use of the military as a foreign policy tool as it has often been portrayed in the media?
Actually there is no Powell Doctrine that he has set to paper as such. The most-often cited Powell Doctrine is actually the Weinberger Doctrine, which was laid out by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in a November 28, 1984 speech at the National Press Club. At the time, Powell was the senior military adviser to Weinberger and he worked on the draft. Powell later concisely summarized Weinberger's recommendations regarding the use of U.S. troops:
"(1) Commit only if our or our allies' vital interests are at stake.
(2) If we commit, do so with all the resources necessary to win.
(3) Go in only with clear political and military objectives.
(4) Be ready to change the commitment if the objectives change, since wars
rarely stand still.
(5) Only take on commitments that can gain the support of the American
people and the Congress.
(6) Commit U.S. forces only as a last resort.
In short, is the national interest at stake? If the answer is yes, go in, and go in to win. Otherwise, stay out."
Does Powell endorse these principles? He seems to feel comfortable with them as broad principles but issues an important caveat that dilutes their importance for him in practice: for Powell, these points should be viewed as part of a broad philosophy or a general approach rather than as a rigid set of rules. Like most good diplomats, Powell craves flexibility and options. When Weinberger delivered his speech, Powell said he "was concerned that the Weinberger tests, publicly proclaimed, were too explicit and would lead potential enemies to look for loopholes. Later, in a key 1992 Foreign Affairs article, Powell argued: "There is, however, no fixed set of rules for the use of military force. To set one up is dangerous." The link between Powell and the Weinberger Doctrine may have been exaggerated by right wing attempts to paint him as a weakling unwilling to use force and so derail his potential presidential aspirations.
Powell prefers to pay more attention to the circumstances of each case as it arises rather than to have strong constraints beforehand. He has cited questions he might ask about a potential military intervention. They are similar to Weinberger's but are more variable and open-ended: "Is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined and understood? Have all other nonviolent policy means failed? Will military force achieve the objective? At what cost? Have the gains and risks been analyzed? How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences?"
It is revealing, though, how little the allegedly intervention-averse philosophies of both Weinberger and Powell seem to apply in the real world. In the very same speech that laid out his intervention principles, Weinberger cited Grenada as a place where "our vital interests are at stake." To view the almost farcical invasion of tiny Grenada as a key battleground in the clash of superpower titans is to make a mockery of the judicious sentiments in the principles. In 1999 Weinberger compounded this practical undermining of the principles by endorsing the bombing of Serbia -- an offensive war into which the U.S. and NATO stumbled without clear vital national interests at stake, without decisive force, and without substantial congressional support. Weinberger wandered into the trap of justifying the intervention by appealing to vague and debatable notions of "stability," "moral obligation," and defending "our values."
Similarly, Powell is clearly not an automatic foe of intervention. He spoke warmly of interventions in Panama and the Philippines and of humanitarian operations in Somalia, Bangladesh, and Bosnia. Powell does not hesitate to give the United States a very strong role in the affairs of the world. He has skated dangerously close to the foreign policy arrogance criticized by presidential candidate Bush: Powell opened his Foreign Affairs article with an approving cite of President Lincoln's description of America as "the last best hope of earth." Powell argues, "If the free world is to harvest the hope and fulfill the promise that our great victory in the Cold War has offered us, America must shoulder the responsibility of its power. The last best hope of earth has no other choice. We must lead."
Clearly, although Powell is sympathetic to the Weinberger Doctrine, the real Powell Doctrine refuses to be doctrinaire. The Powell Doctrine does not indicate that use of force will be rare in the Bush Administration. Rather it indicates that the military will continue to be used in a broad range of deployments, though perhaps with greater attention to building domestic support, thinking through clear objectives, and being ready from the beginning to use decisive force.
For more information see:
- "The Uses of Military Power," Remarks prepared for delivery by the
Hon. Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, to the National Press
Club, November 28, 1984.
- "My American Journey," Colin Powell with Joseph Persico, Random House,
New York, 1995.
- "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Colin Powell, Foreign Affairs,
Winter 1992-/93.
- "Losing Track of the Main Objective of War," Caspar Weinberger, New York
Times, April 12, 1999.
National Security Commission Issues Final Report
Christopher Hellman, Senior Analyst, chellman@cdi.org
This week the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century released the last of its three planned reports reviewing U.S. security issues. Entitled "Road Map For National Security: Imperative for Change" the report is intended to be a blueprint for reforming the U.S. national security apparatus.
The Commission, created by Congress, was charged by Defense Secretary Cohen with reviewing current U.S. security (broadly defined) and recommending changes needed to better face the challenges of the future security environment. Also known as the Rudman-Hart Commission after its Co-chairs former Senators Warren Rudman (R-NH) and Gary Hart (D-CO) it issued its first report in September, 1999. That report attempted to define the domestic and international security environment from the present into the next century. The second report, which looked at existing national interest and objectives to determine their relevance in the future security environment, was issued in April, 2000.
The new report is broken down into five categories. Here are some of the major recommendations:
1) Securing the National Homeland -- The commission calls on the President to develop a comprehensive plan to improve U.S. capabilities to "prevent and protect against all forms of attacks on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and protection fail." Specifically, the Commission recommends the creation of a National Homeland Security Agency which would have authority over the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard. Homeland security would be made the primary mission of the National Guard.
2) Recapitalizing America's Strengths in Science and Education -- The report stated that, second only to the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against a U.S. city, "we can think of nothing more dangerous than a failure to manage properly science, technology and education for the common good over the next quarter century. The Commission recommends doubling federal funding in science and technology research over the next decade and the passage of a National Security Science and Technology Education Act to increase and improve the study and teaching of science, mathematics and engineering.
3) Institutional Redesign -- The Commission called for a reorganization of the Executive Branch to "permit the U.S. government to integrate more effectively the many diverse strands of policy that underpin U.S. national security in a new era." The report recommends redefining and narrowing the role of the National Security Council, restructuring the State Department along regional lines, reducing the size of the offices of the Secretary of Defense, the services, the Joint Chiefs of staff, and the regional commanders-in-chief (CINCs) and cutting Pentagon infrastructure by as much as 25 percent.
4) The Human Requirements of National Security -- The Report notes that as we enter the 21st century, "the United States finds itself on the brink of an unprecedented crisis of competence in government." The Commission recommends expanding the National Security Education Act to include support for social science, humanities and foreign languages in exchange for military or civilian public service, overhaul the Foreign Service system and streamline the presidential appointment process by reducing the number of positions requiring confirmation.
5) The Role of Congress -- While the Commission notes that "it is one thing to appeal to Congress to reform the State Department or the Defense Department, [it is] quite another to call on Congress to reform itself." Nonetheless, future U.S. national security in the next century "mandates a serious reappraisal of both the individual and collective efforts of Congress and its members." The report recommends a comprehensive review of the legislative branch's relationship to national security and foreign policy and a streamlining of the current legislative process through the merging of the relevant authorizing and appropriating committees.
There are clear continuities between the recommendations of the Commission on National Security/21st Century and other recent reports such as that of the National Defense University QDR Working Group, the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, and the 2001 Annual Report of Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress. All conclude that the U.S. homeland will experience a significant terrorist incident in the next 25 years, that government and the civil sector (industry, law enforcement, health system) are ill-prepared and mis-organized, that intelligence capabilities (especially Human intelligence) need to expand and improve, the defense industry has to regain its fiscal footing (although DoD's 2001 Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress says that defense industries are no longer in a financial crisis), and that renewed emphasis on education and training in general and as an inducement for government service in particular is required. But while the 21st Century Commission parallels many recent non-government reports calling for revision of the "2 MTW" concept as the basis for force structuring, the Commission does not provide any suggestions about what specific criteria should be used to develop the force.
The 21st Century Commission's 50 recommendations are by far the most far-reaching. But because they concentrate on reforming processes and institutions in an effort to revitalize the national security structure, the probability that the majority of the changes will be implemented - particularly those pertaining to the organization and functioning of Congress - is slim.
For additional information and resources, see CDI's "U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century" webpage.
Russia Repeats "No" to NMD -- U.S. plans to build a National Missile Defense are "doomed to failure," said Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, at the Conference for Disarmament in Geneva on Friday. The Associated Press quotes Ivanov as saying that it was "illusory" for "even the most powerful'' country to think it could independently create "isolated islets of well-being and stability in today's world.'' Instead, the Russian Foreign Minister urged continued disarmament negotiations to reduce nuclear danger as such.
KFOR Under Fire in Kosovo -- Twenty peacekeepers were injured in clashes between ethnic Albanians and Serbs in the divided town of Mitrovica in northern Kosovo. NATO called on troops from seven countries to reinforce French members of the Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR), who normally patrol Mitrovica. The fighting started Monday, when a grenade attack killed a 15-year old Albanian. The event touched off a four-day long series of riots and demonstrations. The peacekeepers were injured while guarding a bridge that separates the Serb section of Mitrovica in the north from the southern, ethnic Albanian part.
Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation Opens -- The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHISC) has opened at Ft. Benning, GA. WHISC replaces the School of Americas, the controversial military training institution that trained some of the hemispheres worst human rights abusers which closed on December 15. WHISC will provide professional military and leadership training with an emphasis on hemispheric cooperation in education and training. (For more information see "U.S. Dominance in Arms Sales Unchallenged," Weekly Defense Monitor, November 16, 2000.)
International DU Debate Continues -- Supporters and opponents of the continued use of depleted uranium (DU) ammunition received help for their causes this week. Investigations by the World Health Organization and the Italian defense ministry found no link between exposure to DU and cancer or other illnesses in military troops or civilians in Kosovo or Bosnia. Meanwhile, Dr. Doug Rokke, who lead the U.S. army's DU assessment team in the 1991 Gulf War called the continued use of such weapons a "war crime" which should be stopped immediately. Dr. Rokke said it was an "absolute lie" that persons exposed to DU in the Balkans had not suffered health problems. "We do have birth defects, we do have tumors." he said.
Quotation of the Week -- "I think that if we don't invest in improvements in the levels of achievement in math and science education, then it is a greater threat to the national security...than any conventional war," former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, member of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, on release of the Commission's report, from the "Washington Times," February 1, 2001.
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "The Thinning Threat"
Over the past ten years, the enemies of the United States have become poorer, weaker, and more isolated. With America's growing military advantage, and its eagerness to demonstrate its destructive power anywhere and anytime, today it is America's potential enemies who feel threatened.
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Airs in NYC on Saturday, February 10 at 7:00 a.m. on Channel 13.
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