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| January 24, 2001 |
| January 24, 2001 |
Second Prepcom for 2001 Small Arms Conference Concludes
Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
The second UN Prepcom for the July 2001 conference on small arms wrapped up its two week session in New York last Friday. The 2001 United Nations Conference on Illicit Weapons Trafficking in All its Aspects will be held July 9-20 at the United Nations headquarters in New York. The 2001 Conference, established by UN Resolution 54/54V, will focus on coordinated international action to deal with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.
The first Prepcom was held February 28-March 3, 2000 (For more information on the first Prepcom see "UN Hosts First Prepcom for 2001 Small Arms Conference," Weekly Defense Monitor, March 9, 2000). Few decisions came out of the initial Prepcom, and between the two meetings, two informal intersessional work sessions were held to determine the conference venue and distribute conference documents.
The bulk of the second Prepcom focused on discussion of the Chairman's draft program of action, a document intended to guide the work of the conference. The discussion of substantive issues was a significant and important departure from earlier conference meetings which had been bogged down by procedural concerns. The draft was divided into four sections: a preamble; preventing, controlling and curbing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons; international cooperation and assistance; and implementation and follow-up. While most delegations were pleased with the format of the document, there were varied impressions on the substance of the sections.
Many delegates expressed concern that the document did not adequately reflect the regional initiatives undertaken on small arms and instead identified the United Nations as the primary body responsible for coordinating and implementing action on small arms. Other delegations felt the document was too broad and attempted to do too much. Throughout the deliberations, delegations made clear that the document will be a politically binding agreement among Member States for coordinated action on small arms, not a legally binding treaty on small arms. While the opinions of the Member States were at times quite disparate, in the end delegations agreed to incorporate the changes suggested throughout the two weeks into a new draft document to be made available to Member States before the next Prepcom session. Also noteworthy was that the conference process wasn't derailed and delegates quickly adopted the report of the meeting. There had been an expectation that some states not friendly to the idea of the conference would try to delay any progress or decision-making regarding the conference.
The United States' delegation at the second Prepcom, headed by Elizabeth Verville, included members from the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury. Ms. Verville most recently led the U.S. delegation at the negotiations in Vienna for a Firearms Protocol. The United States used its interventions during the Prepcom plenary sessions to reiterate the U.S. beliefs that the conference should support regional activities, strengthen cooperation and assistance, and build upon the consensus created by other regional and multi-lateral agreements. The United States also stressed that the conference was not a venue to create small arms marking and tracing regimes, negotiate an agreement on arms brokering, or address norms of civilian possession (a reflection of the influence of pro-gun lobbying efforts), because of an concern that such discussions would undermine ongoing efforts to undertake these issues in other fora.
While the issue of non-governmental organization (NGO) participation was not decided, NGOs were given the opportunity to address the delegates. Twenty-five five minute presentations were given by organizations representing constituencies affected by small arms, including public health, arms control, religious, development, and peace and security NGOs. The presentations covered five thematic clusters: reduction and control of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons; enhancing legal controls; collection, security, and destruction of small arms and light weapons; information exchange, transparency, and accountability; and demand issues. The representatives, from NGOs from around the world, discussed their personal experiences in addressing the worldwide scourge of small arms.
The final Prepcom will take place in New York March 19-30. The third Prepcom will be an important session as several significant decisions were deferred until the third Prepcom, including the draft objective of the conference, the modalities of attendance of non-governmental organizations, rules of procedure, and consideration of the final documents.
For general information on the conference and conference process, visit the UN's small arms website.
Let Montenegro Go
By Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org
In a region where a mere mention of border changes brings out the whiff of blood and gunpowder, the latest Balkan independence bid has crept in uncharacteristically quietly. The small mountainous republic of Montenegro is poised to hold a referendum on independence before this summer. Montenegro is Serbia's last remaining partner in the Yugoslav Federation. And if the country's opinion polls are to be trusted, that Federation may soon cease to exist.
Montenegro's independence has been in the making since the late 1990s. While Serbia -- then ran by Slobodan Milosevic -- turned increasingly dictatorial, Montenegro set out to build a modern democratic system. It was not a natural choice. Montenegro was known as somewhat of a haven for organized crime with some of the highest government figures implicated in smuggling. But the republic's President, Milo Djukanovic, saw his political future in presenting himself as an alternative to the increasingly erratic, violent, and isolated regime of Slobodan Milosevic. So when Milosevic had his security forces shooting indignant newspaper editors, Djukanovic sheltered them. Where Milosevic was throwing Westerners in jail for the pettiest of offenses, Djukanovic encouraged them to spend vacations on his republic's picturesque coast. And while Milosevic was passing draconian laws aimed at silencing all opposition, Montenegro enjoyed relative freedom of expression. The republic was rewarded with Western financial aid and President Djukanovic with friendly and privileged treatment by the world's leaders.
All the while, wary of provoking an outright war with Serbia, Montenegro has been quietly and gradually cutting its links to Yugoslavia to the point where the republic today is a part of the federation only on paper. It has its own government, currency (the German Mark), and a security force of 20,000. The planned referendum could officially sever its last remaining ties to Yugoslavia. In recent polls, between 50 and 55 percent of those polled said they want to see Montenegro independent.
Last week, the new Yugoslav President, Vojislav Kostunica, although clearly displeased about the impeding breakup, said that no force would be used against Montenegro if it decided to split. His words were echoed by General Nebojsa Pavkovic, head of the Yugoslav General Staff, who said that the army would not interfere. As a token of good faith, the Yugoslav Supreme Defense Council recently decided to disband the Seventh Battalion of the military police, which -- the Montenegrins allege -- was created by Milosevic to stir up trouble and manufacture an excuse for attacking the republic.
Given the apparent smooth sailing for Montenegro's independence bid, it came as a bit of a shock this week when the European Union (EU) said it wants Montenegro to forgo independence and remain within the Yugoslav Federation. EU's foreign ministers said in a January 22 statement that Serbia and Montenegro must resolve their differences "within an overall federal framework." Montenegro's leaders shot back, calling the statement "unfounded" and unfair and reaffirming their plans to hold the referendum on independence.
Why would the EU insist on keeping Yugoslavia together? The stated reason was that independence for Montenegro could touch off a new round of ethnic secessions in the region. There are indeed ethnic minorities in Montenegro -- Albanians and Muslim Serbs among the largest -- who could be tempted to use the breakup to carve out their own enclave or expand Kosovo's borders. But this scenario is far-fetched at best. There is absolutely no indication that an independent Montenegro's policy toward ethnic minorities would be any worse than Yugoslavia's. In fact, during the 1999 violence in Kosovo, Albanians fled to Montenegro precisely because its ethnic policies were far more liberal that Serbia's. And although Belgrade now has another government, even the new leaders -- Vojislav Kostunica and Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic -- have a past full of dirty alliances with some of the cruelest of Serbian nationalist leaders such as the indicted war criminal and former Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic. To this day, Kostunica likes to drop hints about a future re-alignment whereby the Serbian part of Bosnia would become a part of Serbia itself.
UN Balkans envoy, Swedish diplomat Carl Bildt, added another dimension to EU's decision when he said that the ministers' statement "very clearly expresses that the international community has no interest in setting up new states in the region." Indeed, most European states would prefer that no borders on the continent change lest the domino effect reach their countries as well. That is a valid concern, but the EU has actually developed a sensible formula for the Balkans: it recognized the right of the Yugoslav republics to secede while drawing the line at smaller entities, such as provinces. The EU and the US spend billions of dollars a year keeping Kosovo in Serbia and holding Bosnia's disparate parts together because they had the misfortune of never achieving the status of a republic in the old Yugoslavia. On the other hand, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia have already exercised their right to secede. Montenegro is a constitutionally recognized part of the Yugoslav Federation. If Croatia had the right to secede -- with active German backing, no less -- Montenegro does too. By the same token, if any of Montenegro's ethnic groups tried to secede from the newly independent republic, the international community should step in, just as in Presevo, southern Serbia, where NATO works with Yugoslav police to stamp out a secessionist bid by local ethnic Albanians.
But the biggest single reason for opposing Montenegro's secession was never actually spelled out by the EU but rather by the recently elected Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic. The Serb leader said that he is not so much concerned about holding on to Montenegro as about the possible effects that Montenegrin independence would have on Kosovo. What about Kosovo? It turns out that UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which ended the 1999 NATO air war and formed the basis for post-war settlement, defines Kosovo's status as "substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." The problem is, if Montenegro secedes, it will also do away with the FRY, as the federation came to be known. Theoretically, nothing will stand between Kosovo and independence. Needless to say, the prospect of an independent Kosovo is anathema to most Serbs and to Yugoslav President Kostunica (who would appear to also lose his job if Montenegro secedes). And Kosovo is unlikely to secede peacefully -- the one thing that most Serbs agree on is that the province, an ancestral Serbian land, must remain a part of their republic.
But that is still no reason to bar Montenegro from separating. Kosovo's status is untenable as it is, with the entire international community in denial over the true state of affairs in the province. Although Kosovo is formally a part of FRY, Serbian or Yugoslav authorities have no practical jurisdiction over it. The province continues to be run by NATO as a protectorate. The ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo has let it be known it would never again accept Serbian rule.
Montenegro should not be kept hostage to the world powers' reluctance to discuss Kosovo's status. Perhaps Montenegro can be persuaded to wait, as Djindjic suggested, until things cool down in Kosovo and both issues can be resolved in a calmer environment. But if Montenegrins vote yes on independence, then Serbia -- and the EU -- must let it go.
NATO Troops Shot At in Kosovo -- British troops came under fire from ethnic Albanian militants in Kosovo on Thursday said the command of the NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo, known as KFOR. No one was hurt in the incident which happened near Serbia's boundary in the tense Presevo Valley. In recent months ethnic Albanian militants there have attacked numerous Serbian police posts in a bid to separate the territory and merge it with Kosovo. In response, KFOR troops have stepped up patrols of the Kosovo -Serbia boundary near Presevo in order to stop weapons smuggling into the disputed area. Earlier this month U.S. and Russian peacekeepers came under fire as they were destroying a path used by the smugglers.
Russia To Withdraw Majority of Troops from Chechnya -- Russia will reduce its troops in Chechnya from the current 80,000 to about 22,000 Interior Ministry and army troops, President Vladimir Putin said on Monday. The President also ordered the army to turn over the command of the Chechnya operation to the FSB security service, which is to conduct special operations against the remaining Chechen fighters. The decision is in line with recent Russian changes of tactics in Chechnya -- just last month, the military announced it would disperse troops from the current few large garrisons into a larger number of smaller encampments, presumably in order to take a more active role in seeking out the enemy. Since the recent war started in 1999, Russian troops claimed control over virtually all of the territory of Chechnya but Chechen fighters apparently continue to move freely through the occupied territory, attacking Russian military installations and government structures.
"Kursk" Sunk by its Own Torpedo -- The August 12 explosion which destroyed the Russian nuclear submarine "Kursk" was caused by one of its own torpedoes, according to a Russian source involved in the investigation of the incident. The unnamed source told the Russian news publication "Obshchaya gazeta" that the spontaneous combustion of fuel in a practice torpedo set off secondary explosions in live torpedoes which sunk the vessel. This report is supported by a new study of seismic records by researchers at the University of Arizona and the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The study's results, published in the journal "Eos" indicate that an initial explosion was followed about two minutes later by a second blast that was 250 times larger than the first.
Lockmart, Boeing, Raytheon Remain Top Three Contractors -- Lockheed Martin Corporation, the Boeing Company and the Raytheon Corporation continued to dominate the defense industry in Fiscal Year 2000, finishing in the top three slots as they did the previous year. Lockheed Martin's total DoD contracts were worth $15.1 billion in FY'00, up $2.4 billion from FY'99. Boeing's contracts increased by $400 million to $12.0 billion, while Raytheon's dropped slightly, down $100 million to $6.3 billion. Together the big three accounted for 25% of all defense contracts in FY'00, which totaled $133.2 billion.
Boeing's New NMD Deal Could Yield $13.7 Billion -- The $6 billion contract recently signed by the Boeing Company and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization could be worth as much as $13.7 billion by 2007, according to the Pentagon. The contract keeps Boeing as the National Missile Defense (NMD) program's lead system integrator or top contractor. The base contract contains "options" -- such as additional testing or development of an anti-countermeasures system -- which could drive its value as high as the $13.7 billion figure.
Quotation of the Week -- "The Department of Defense today announced that the commandant of the Marine Corps has directed the inspector general of the Marine Corps to investigate allegations that the commanding officer of Marine Tilt-Rotor Training Squadron-204 asked Marines to falsify maintenance records on the squadron's MV-22 Osprey aircraft...Marine Corps officials said that although the inspector general has yet to complete his investigation, at this point there appears to be no relation between these allegations and the causes of either the April mishap in Marana, Ariz., or the Dec. 11 mishap in North Carolina." Defense Department News Release No. 026-01, January 18, 2001.
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "Dark Cloud: Our Strange Love
Affair with the Bomb"
Nukes as portable infantry weapons. Nukes for digging tunnels. Nuclear decontamination with a whisk broom. Secret government films of the 1940's, '50s and '60s form the backdrop for this darkly entertaining exploration of America's fascination with the Bomb. At times humorous, strange and disturbing, these films reveal how the culture of nuclear weapons shaped American society during the Cold War, and how the advocates of nuclear culture sought to make atomic weapons a part of everyday life.
Airs in Washington, DC on Sunday, January 28 at 10:30 a.m, on Channel 32.
Airs in NYC on Saturday, February 03 at 7:00 a.m. on Channel 13.
Visit our website for transcripts, CDI resources, and related links.
Regular Price: $39 each
INTERNET PRICE: $29
Order at 800-CDI-3334, or on the web.