The Center for Defense Information
Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW * Washington, DC 20036
(202)332-0600 * Fax (202)462-4559 * www.cdi.org
| January 11, 2001 |
| January 11, 2001 |
Getting Weapons or Getting It (Policy) Right
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
The knives, if not the guns, are already out in the competition for survival of pet weapons projects under the incoming Administration.
While an increase in defense spending can confidently be predicted, the amount of the increase will not come near to matching the costs that are looming. Mr. Bush, during the campaign, spoke of a $45 billion increase over nine years. But he also called for a pay raise of $1 billion, an increase of $20 billion for research and development between 2001-2006 (that's $3.3 billion a year on average). And there is the added cost of improved health care which is estimated to be about $1.5 billion per year. Added together, there goes the Bush increase, all of it on programs with no apparent look at policies driving the programs.
Of course, higher amounts are being touted by think tanks and pundits as the minimum increase needed for defense -- from $20-$100 billion annually. Apparently hoping that these increases will actually materialize, the services are busy spinning up their favorite weapons platforms in the mass media and the defense trade press.
The Air Force is starting to purchase long lead-time components in preparation for beginning low rate initial production of its F-22 Raptor stealth fighter. The program calls for 339 aircraft at $180 million each to replace the F-15 C air superiority fighter. Now, according to Defense News, the Air Force says the F-22 "was designed from the beginning to have a ground attack role" such as hitting enemy air defenses on the ground -- a mission now performed by F-117 and F-15E fighters. But this means the service will need 762 F-22s.
(The example given seems a bit ingenuous as striking enemy air defenses, even on the ground, is done to maintain air superiority. Ask a dumb infantryman what Air Force "ground attack" means and the answer inevitably will be "close air support.")
The Navy is nervously watching its futuristic DD-21 destroyer which is still on the drawing boards and at least 10 years away from putting to sea. The ship, with a radical new design intended to make it stealthy, would be propelled by an as yet to be devised electric propulsion system and have two 5 inch naval guns capable of firing shells 100 miles (extended range guided munitions). The service, which plans to acquire 32 of these vessels, estimates a procurement cost for the fifth ship at $750 million. But given that major weapons acquisition programs generally experience a 20-30% cost growth, this figure is sure to rise.
Even the Marines seem nervous. Their MV-22 tiltrotor Osprey transport aircraft has suffered 4 crashes in which 23 Marines and seven civilians died. When he was Secretary of Defense in the elder Bush Administration, Vice-President-elect Cheney attempted to kill the Osprey program but it survived. The Marines also are uneasy about the future of the Joint Strike Fighter which they want as a replacement for their AV-8B Harrier jump-jets. The Air Force bid to double the F-22 buy reveals its real verdict on the JSF while the Navy would rather have a longer production run on its F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. Facing this pressure, the Marines are now saying they might be able to get along with a conventional take off and landing JSF rather than a vertical one.
And the Army? Since it has already cut its projected buy of the Crusader heavy artillery system, the only major new technology weapons program under development is the RAH Comanche helicopter which has just emerged from yet another partial redesign. The Army's overarching priority now is transformation of up to eight brigades into "medium weight" forces for rapid deployment anywhere in the world. This effort seems safe, in part because much of the equipment necessary to transform these units incorporates proven technology that will support the changes being made in doctrine and tactics.
The contrast between this service parochialism on weapons and the just released recommendations for U.S. policy concerning the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) could not be more vivid. The report, written by retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili, is a step-by-step consideration of the benefits and liabilities for the U.S. that will flow from ratification of the CTBT. General Shalikashvili spent ten months talking to scientists, administrators, politicians favoring and opposing ratification, intelligence and security experts, and foreign officials. He traveled to key sites to gather first-hand information about U.S. capabilities to detect any cheating by others and his representatives visited the international verification center in Vienna. His findings can be summarized as follows:
General Shalikashvili proposed other measures, none requiring treaty renegotiation, that he believes need to be implemented regardless of Senate action on the CTBT. These include enhancing U.S. intelligence oriented toward detecting nuclear tests and test preparations, strengthening administrative oversight of the entire U.S. nuclear weapons complex, and establishing a timetable (e.g., every ten years) for an internal White House-congressional review of the effect of continued U.S. adherence to the Treaty.
Clearly, General Shalikashvili's conclusions rest on the premise that as long as others have nuclear weapons, the U.S. must also have a reliable arsenal for deterrence. But there is a second premise which the new Administration would do well to consider: in the long run, the fewer weapons held by the least number of states, the safer the U.S. will be. This is the policy that a ratified CTBT, in conjunction with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, will advance, and in so doing shape the weapons equation to support U.S. interests.
Getting it right on nuclear weapons would be a good way for the new Administration to start.
How Depleted Uranium Eroded U.S.-European Defense Cooperation
Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org
There is never a good time for a fight but the timing of the latest row between the United States and Europe over the use of depleted uranium ammunition (DU) in the Balkans could prove to be disastrous. Coming at the time when the European Union (EU) is building its own defense apparatus, the depleted uranium controversy could push European countries away from NATO and possible lead to competition between the new European defense identity and the North Atlantic alliance.
The European defense identity is a train that cannot be stopped. The EU is already an economic giant with a GDP comparable to that of the United States. It is also inching ever closer to becoming an actual state rather than a loose group of states. At the latest summit in Nice, EU leaders included 30 more policy areas under the rubric of "enhanced cooperation" which require a qualified majority, rather than unanimity. This means that on a whole range of issues, from EU budget to regulation of financial services, a collective decision by a majority of EU members can overrule an individual country's opposition, much as the U.S. federal government can, in many areas, overrule states' legislation and impose federal laws. Germany's Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, was only stating the inevitable when he called on the European nations to create within the next decade a functioning European government on a federalist model, presumably similar to the federal government in Washington, DC.
As an emerging actor on the international scene, the EU naturally demands a say in defense and security policies. Hence the recent effort to establish a 60,000-strong EU Rapid Reaction Force and the necessary political and military bodies to guide it. What is not clear yet, however, is the relation between the emerging European superstate and the United States. In the defense realm, this translates into uncertainty about the European defense identity's relation to NATO.
Some in Europe, most notably France, have sought to keep the EU completely separate from NATO. Although Europe and the United States see eye-to-eye on most defense issues, creation of a separate EU force carries the seeds of a conflict. The EU and NATO may find themselves unable to conduct joint operations as they used to for the past five decades. Moreover, should Brussels and Washington disagree on a security issue, there will be less incentive to seek common ground as Europe will have the ability to act independently. All decisions in NATO have to be made unanimously, thus forcing the allies to hear each other out and compromise.
Making a virtue out of necessity, the United States has publicly endorsed the European defense efforts. At the same time, Washington has sought to steer the EU's defense institution closer to NATO. The alliance's involvement in EU defense decisions would guarantee that Washington is at least consulted on, if not actually asked to approve, EU's military plans. To this end, U.S. officials have successfully worked with their close allies in Europe -- Great Britain and Germany -- to make sure that EU any defense agreements provided for close NATO involvement.
But proving once again that it is the little details that usually derail grand plans, the depleted uranium (DU) controversy is destroying much of the will in Europe to trust and work with the Americans. U.S. planes fired all of the controversial DU-coated rounds, which Italy, Spain, Portugal and other states now suspect of causing cancer in members of their peacekeeping forces. The European press has been merciless. "What kind of military alliance do we have where [we] must beg for information from the superpower?," wrote the Frankfurter Rundschau. "Confidence in the alliance has been shaken," wrote the respected French daily, Le Figaro. "It looks likely that a clash between the Americans and the Europeans cannot be avoided," wrote Italian daily La Repubblica.
Never mind that Washington maintains that it informed its allies of the DU hazard back in 1999, that a link between DU and cancer has not been convincingly proven, and that the number of cases of cancer among peacekeepers may be well within the statistical average for the population at large. "The controversy about an alleged Balkan syndrome carries the traits of a panic," wrote the Suddeutsche Zeitung. Next time the European leaders discuss how closely to anchor the EU defense institution to NATO, the public will no doubt ask whether they want to be linked to an alliance which many Europeans are now convinced is killing its own soldiers.
But something positive may come out of the controversy. Washington has indeed at times treated its European allies with a cavalier attitude. Until recently, nobody has bothered to ask the allies what they think of the proposed U.S. national missile defense system, even though the program will not work without installations on the territory of European countries. U.S. pundits and officials routinely accuse Europe of not pulling its weight in the Balkans even though the EU pays 80% of non-military aid to Bosnia and Kosovo, and contributes two thirds of the peacekeeping troops (the U.S. share is 15%).
One way to ensure continued European defense cooperation with the United States is to make NATO a more palatable choice for the Europeans. This need not be complicated. Washington needs to be more forthright with its allies, more willing to hear their views on issues of common interest, and more careful to check the facts before accusing Europe of not pulling its weight.
Whence JSF?
Christopher Hellman, Senior Analyst, chellman@cdi.org
In a surprise move last week, Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones indicated that the service would be willing to forego, at least temporarily, a Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing (V/STOL) version of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). According to a statement released by Gen. Jones, the Corps would be willing to make do with a conventional aircraft if technological or cost hurdles for a V/STOL aircraft proved too difficult to overcome. In his statement, Gen. Jones said, "[The Marines won't] take a chance on something that isn't going to be very, very useful and recognized within the family of tactical aviation as being an additive ...We're not going to buy something that's technologically risky."
The Marine Corps is planning on buying 642 JSFs to replace its current fleet of AV-8B "Harrier II" and F/A-18A/C/D "Hornet" aircraft. All told, the Pentagon plans to purchase nearly 3,000 JSFs, with 2,036 going to the Air Force and 300 to the Navy although neither plans to acquire the V/STOL version. In addition, Britain is participating in the program and plans to purchase 60 V/STOL JSFs to replace its own Harrier force. Until last week the Marine Corps had been committed to the V/STOL concept which was being developed specifically to meet their requirement. The V/STOL capability represents the program's most complex -- and therefore most costly -- technological challenges.
Lockheed Martin and Boeing are competing for the lucrative JSF contract, which the Congressional Budget Office estimates will be worth over $200 billion. Both companies are currently flight testing the conventional versions of the JSF and plan first flights of their respective V/STOL variants in the coming months. Selection of the winning design is currently planned for late next spring.
The JSF, which is intended primarily to attack ground targets, is just one of three tactical aircraft currently either under development or in production for the Pentagon. The Navy's F/A-18E/F "Super Hornet" and the Air Force's F-22 "Raptor" are both further along, with the F-22 awaiting a decision to go to full-scale production and the Navy having this year signed a five year production contract for 222 Super Hornets. The estimated cost of these three programs is $350 billion, although it is likely to be much higher.
The new Bush Administration has indicated that it is likely to re-examine the Pentagon's tacair modernization plans. Thus, timing is a critical component in determining the future of the JSF program. While the Super Hornet represents the least margin of improvement of the three programs over the aircraft it is replacing, the multi-year production contract assures the program's continuation. The F-22 is the single highest priority for the Air Force, which has taken a number of major steps to ensure its continued funding, such as cutting the number of B-2 bombers it purchased from 132 to 21 and last year's restructuring of the C-17 transport program. With the JSF the program least advanced, it becomes the most likely target for significant reductions if not outright termination.
Ironically, in many ways the JSF is the most meritorious of the three aircraft. For example, according to several reports by the General Accounting Office, the Navy's Super Hornet represents only a marginal improvement over the existing fleet of F/A-18C/D's -- and in some areas actually fails to meet the performance of the current model -- yet costs a whopping $80 million per aircraft. The cost of the F-22 is even more staggering: over $180 million per aircraft. It becomes difficult to justify such an expense given U.S. air power dominance and the drain that the F-22 places on other areas of the Air Force budget where investment is essential -- electronic "jammers," tankers, transports and surveillance aircraft.
The JSF is, in many ways, a potential model for future weapons acquisition programs. It has an estimated per unit cost of $78 million, and with a "fly-away cost" (the cost to purchase the aircraft once production begins, not including previous research and development costs) of between $25 and $35 million, it is relatively affordable. This savings is achieved by incorporating technologies developed for earlier aircraft, including the F-22, and because of the high degree of "commonality" that exists between the different variants. The Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps versions are intended to all be produced on the same assembly line. Parts and components will be 70% to 80% common. This permits greater economies of scale during production, and makes the JSF simpler and cheaper to operate and maintain.
Is General Jones's statement an indication that the JSF program is in trouble? According to Defense News, Air Force briefing slides now circulating the Pentagon call for a total buy of 762 F-22s, up from the currently planned 339, and include using the F-22 in a "ground attack role." The JSF isn't mentioned.
NATO, Yugoslavia Breaking Ice -- In a move unthinkable a few months ago, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic said he would pay an unofficial visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium on January 10. Yugoslavia also renewed diplomatic relations with the United States and named its first post-Milosevic ambassador to Washington, Milan Protic, a U.S.-educated historian and the current mayor of Belgrade. Foreign Minister Svilanovic, during a visit to Washington in January, even suggested that the new Yugoslav government may cooperate to extradite former President Slobodan Milosevic to the Balkan war crimes tribunal in The Hague, Netherlands. Only a few months ago the new president Vojislav Kostunica refused to cooperate with the Hague Tribunal.
More B-2s? -- During meetings this week with Congressional defense leaders, President-elect George W. Bush heard pitches for dozens of pet military programs, including the B-2 bomber. Rep. Norm Dicks (D-WA) a member of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee who's Seattle-area district contains a major Boeing facility involved in B-2 production, urged Mr. Bush to consider purchasing more of the controversial bomber. Citing the bomber's performance during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, Rep. Dicks suggested that the Pentagon acquire 40 additional B-2s at an estimated cost of $27 billion.
ABL $98 Million Short -- The Air Force's Airborne Laser (ABL) program needs $98 million more this year than the $234 million appropriated by Congress. Of the additional funding, $64 million is for activities originally scheduled for later in the program, including efforts to reduce the weight of certain materials, while $34 million is needed to cover cost growth in the program. In an unusual move, the program's contractors -- Lockheed Martin, TRW and Boeing -- have agreed to spend $60 million of their own money to cover the shortfall, to be repaid by the Air Force next year. While technically a theater missile defense system and not part of the current NMD architecture, the ABL could conceivably be used as a boost-phase interceptor as part of an integrated NMD network. Current cost of the ABL program is $11.3 billion to equip seven Boeing 747s with on board lasers.
Quotation of the Week -- "My intensive review of the [nuclear] test ban treaty strengthened my earlier judgment that this treaty is compatible with keeping a safe and reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent and is an essential part of an effective nonproliferation strategy." General John M. Shalikashvili, USA (Ret.), former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington Post op-ed, January 6, 2001.
This Week on America's Defense Monitor: "The Environmental Impact
of War"
Recent news stories have focused attention on the health effects of depleted uranium shells left over from the war in Yugoslavia. From the defoliation of the forests in Vietnam to the oil fires of Kuwait to the battlegrounds of the Balkans, all modern wars have had a hidden casualty -- the environment. Unexploded weapons, polluted rivers, contaminated soil, and damaged landscapes have all harmed human health, local economies, and ecosystems. The long-term effects of such environmental damage have not yet been fully determined.
Airs in Washington, DC on Sunday, January 14th at 10:30 a.m. on Channel 32.
Airs in NYC on Saturday, January 20th at 7:00 a.m. on Channel 13.
Visit our web site for transcripts, CDI resources, and related links.
Regular Price: $39 each
INTERNET PRICE: $29
Order at 800-CDI-3334, or on the web.