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| December 7, 2000 |
| December 7, 2000 |
Having It Our Way
Colonel Daniel Smith, U.S. Army (Ret.), Director of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941 witnessed the end of America's 20th century isolationism in a world already racked by 27 months of devastating war in Europe and 7 years in Asia.
Fifty-nine years later, December 7, 2000, the U.S. finds itself tending toward a new isolationism, one driven not by the desire to avoid being caught in the wrangling of others but by the perfidious notion, captured so well by Frank Sinatra, that we must have everything "our way."
This week's headlines in British and American papers talk of a "threat to NATO," referring to Secretary of Defense William Cohen's blunt warning to America's continental NATO allies that the European Union's proposed 60,000 strong Rapid Reaction Force must not be independent of NATO, thereby threatening the dominant role of the U.S. in European security decisions. (See companion article, "Gloves Come Off in U.S.-EU Defense Dialogue," in this issue.) At the same time, of course, the U.S. continues to push the Europeans to spend more on defense and assume a greater share of the "burden."
Meanwhile, half a continent away, the same schizophrenia is being displayed in Korea. The United States seems to have been caught off-guard by the success of South Korea's "sunshine policy" toward the North which, while "coordinated" with the United States, is being driven by South Korea's President Kim Dae Jung. The most visible results to date in the security sphere are the opening of rail and highway links across the four kilometer-wide Demilitarized Zones and establishing a hot line. The restoration of cross-border links requires the removal of thousands of landmines in and along the DMZ at a time when the United States continues to insist that landmines in Korea are indispensable for safeguarding the South. At the same time, the U.S. has advanced its own agenda with North Korea as reflected in the November's visit to Pyongyang by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.
Furthermore, the United States is currently locked in intense negotiations with the South over the Status of Forces Agreement governing many aspects of the U.S. presence in Korea. The December 6 edition of the Korea Times notes that "there is still a long way to go because of far-reaching differences on key issues" such as the environment, return of areas and facilities, criminal jurisdiction, quarantine of plants and animals, and working conditions for Korean employees on U.S. bases. The last time the SOFA was revised was in 1991, and talks have been deadlocked since the scheduled review that began in 1996.
Washington also risks a backlash in Korea from its handling of what the media calls the No Gun Ri massacre in July 1950. Last year the Associated Press carried a story about American GIs who, fearful of being overrun by invading North Korean forces, fired on and killed unarmed civilian refugees trying themselves to escape the invading forces. The U.S. position so far is that there is no "conclusive" proof that orders were given to open fire on the civilians.
But one would not expect "documents" to exist. In the chaos of retreat, with the fog of war and rumors of infiltrators swirling around them, those on the front lines would have no time to write, nor would soldiers wait for a piece of paper directing them what to do. This leaves only the memories of those who were there -- memories confirmed by the bodies (now estimated between 50-300) of those who died that day. In the face of oral evidence from those who were at No Gun Ri, both Americans and Koreans, suggesting that the lack of documentation translates into a lack of responsibility would be pure chutzpah -- the ultimate insistence on having it "our way."
Signing the Ottawa Treaty
Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
Three years ago this week, countries from around the world came together to end the scourge of landmines. On December 3-4, 1997 the Convention Prohibiting the Use, Sale, Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling of Anti-personnel Landmines (Mine Ban Treaty) was opened for signature in Ottawa, Canada. The United States was not among the signers.
Today, 139 countries have signed the Mine Ban Treaty and 109 governments have ratified it. Fifty-four countries, including the United States, have still not joined the majority of nations who've chosen to implement the provisions of the Mine-Ban Treaty. While the Treaty has had many significant effects since its entry into force in March 1999, -- reductions in landmine production, sales, and deaths for example -- landmines continue to take a dramatic toll on civilians around the world. Experts estimate that approximately 22,000 people are killed or injured each year due to landmines.
On the third anniversary of the Treaty signing, Jody Williams, Nobel Prize Winner and former coordinator of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), said: "It is time to put words into action. The civilian victims of landmines are tired of being told excuses. They are tired of being told that this nation has unique circumstances, that that nation has special security requirements. They are tired of being told that they must wait until this nation develops alternatives, or wait until that nation's neighbor has joined the ban. These are excuses, not justifications, and the excuses are costing lives and limbs every day."
The United States is one of those countries making excuses. Claiming it cannot accede to the Treaty because of the continuing military utility of mines in Korea, the United States has announced that it will sign the Treaty in 2006 if suitable alternatives are found. However, instead of searching for viable alternatives, the Pentagon continues to fund projects that would violate the Mine-Ban Treaty.
The United States actively uses landmines in Korea. But the United States is not alone in its reliance on landmines as part of its military posture. According to the ICBL, landmines have recently been used by Russia, Uzbekistan, Burma, Sri Lanka, Angola (a Mine-Ban signatory), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Armed opposition groups in Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Senegal, Sudan, Uganda, Colombia, Afghanistan, Burma, Kashmir, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Georgia (in Abkhazia), and Chechnya are also believed to have used landmines in their recent efforts.
As President Clinton reflects on his eight years in office, U.S. landmine policy is one area where U.S policy has failed. While the United States contributes millions of dollars a year to victim assistance and demining programs, the President himself acknowledges the United States has not done enough. According to an interview with the Ottawa Citizen, President Clinton claims that not signing the Mine-Ban Treaty in December 1997 was a mistake: "It is one of the bitterest regrets of the last eight years that we didn't sign it." The Citizen reported that the President blamed "the way the landmine treaty landed on Congress' doorstep for its failure to pass." "The way it came up to Congress, there was no way," the President said. Although he regrets not signing the Treaty, President Clinton does remain hopeful that the United States will sign the Treaty in the near future. "We may still be able to get it done," he said.
On the third anniversary of the Treaty signing, President Clinton has an opportunity to leave a lasting legacy on the landmines issue. The United States Campaign to Ban Landmines (USCBL) is urging President Clinton to take four steps before leaving office to move the United States towards joining the Treaty. First, the President should announce a permanent ban on production of antipersonnel landmines and their components. Second, the United States should immediately commit to a policy of no use of antipersonnel mines in joint operations (NATO and otherwise) with nations that are a party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Third, the United States should set a date for the Department of Defense to obtain alternatives to antipersonnel mines, and accelerate the Pentagon efforts to obtain these treaty-compliant alternatives. Further, the Pentagon should eliminate the BOS (battlefield over-ride system) from the current design of the Man-in-the-Loop antipersonnel landmine alternative. Fourth, the United States should cease production of the wasteful RADAM mixed mine system, which is not compliant with the Treaty.
As President Clinton leaves office, he has an opportunity to make a change in U.S. landmine policy. This opportunity should not be squandered. The time for the United States to reassert its leadership on the landmine issue is now. The positive steps the United States already participates in (survivor assistance, demining, etc.) should continue and be strengthened. President Clinton's "bitterest mistake" can turn into the sweetest accomplishment if the President and policy makers have the courage to stand up to the Pentagon and congressional opponents.
Gloves Come Off in U.S.-EU Defense Dialogue
Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org
It is not common for a U.S. official to publicly chastise European leaders, even less so to do it just as they assemble at a potentially historic summit of the European Union (EU). Yet Secretary of Defense William Cohen did just that this week, warning EU leaders that their plans for a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) could make NATO "a relic of the past." The United States, of course, knew of European plans all along. It has worked with Europe to make sure the transition to ESDP will not upset ties with Washington and sideline non-EU members of NATO in Europe. But as the EU moves from broad brush strokes to detailing its military plans, Brussels appears to be headed in a direction different from the one envisioned in Washington. With only days left before an EU summit in Nice, France, which is set to finalize many aspects of the EU's defense policy, Secretary Cohen sent out a distress call.
ESDP was conceived in 1998. At a series of meetings in Germany, Finland, and Portugal over the following two years, EU officials agreed to coordinate their security and defense policies and to build a 60,000-strong European Rapid Reaction Force. The United States, initially skeptical about European plans, gave its approval after seeing potential benefits of ESDP to NATO. But deep philosophical differences still divide the allies.
To Washington, ESDP represents the best chance in years to boost European NATO members' military capabilities. In the alliance's last two operations, in Bosnia and in Kosovo, U.S. forces carried out the vast majority of the combat missions. If the Europeans do build the forces envisioned by the ESDP agreements, Washington reasons, NATO itself will grow stronger.
But the U.S. view is simply unrealistic. To Europe, ESDP's significance goes far beyond NATO or force goals. Its value is primarily symbolic: ESDP represents a coming-of-age for the European Union, its assertion of autonomy over military affairs and an evolution of the EU into a world player in its own right. Because ESDP is mainly an identity symbol there will always be a temptation among European countries to keep it separate from NATO. Hence the French repeatedly use the word "autonomous" when referring to ESDP, and French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin omits of the NATO cooperation clauses from public speeches.
But the United States need not fear ESDP. Most European countries also recognize that too much separation between NATO and the EU could potentially be dangerous. When the need comes, NATO and the EU may not be able to fight together. If they grow too far apart, they may also end up fighting each other. For those reasons, many in Europe will always push for close EU-NATO institutional ties. The UK government, for one, dismissed any notion of a "European army" emerging on the continent. The challenge before Washington is to appeal to the latter group without appearing to oppose ESDP altogether, which would only hasten a EU-US rift.
Secretary Cohen identified defense planning as one area in which NATO and Europe should continue to work together. Joint defense planning -- the process of creating the forces needed to carry out assigned military tasks and dividing the responsibilities among allies -- is an absolute must from Washington's perspective. Should Europe choose a separate planning process, there is no guarantee that the forces it develops in the future will be compatible with NATO or meet the alliance's needs. The main benefit of ESDP to NATO will have been lost.
A European diplomat told CDI that the Nice summit is most likely to produce a compromise: defense planning under EU auspices but with NATO present "at the table" and consulted at all times. The process would involve representatives from European NATO allies who are not members of the EU, as they and the United States have demanded. The U.S.-European dispute over planning will probably be put to rest. But as Europe proceeds to finalize its defense plans, expect more crises ahead.
National Guard to Take Over Bosnia Peacekeeping -- The Army has chosen six National Guard divisions to spearhead its peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. Only two active duty divisions will be deployed in Bosnia between 2000 and 2005; the rest of the six-month rotations will be commanded by National Guard units from Virginia, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Kansas, Indiana, and New York, and Guard infantry and armored units will be detailed for the deployments. For Kosovo peacekeeping, the Army has selected six active-duty units based in the United States as well as Germany. The Army's rotation schedule runs through 2005 even though no decision on the duration of the Bosnia and Kosovo missions have yet been made.
Pentagon Increases Gulf Port Security -- Defense Secretary William Cohen has ordered increased security at ports in the Middle East as a result of the October 12 terrorist bombing of the USS Cole. Secretary Cohen has authorized the deployment of extra Navy and Coast Guard security personnel to the region to strengthen port security, although the Pentagon is being intentionally vague about what specific measures are to be taken. The day the USS Cole was attacked all U.S. naval vessels in the Middle East were ordered out of port and have not returned since.
V-22 Production Decision On Hold -- The expected December 5 decision on whether to begin full rate production of the V-22 "Osprey" tiltrotor aircraft has been put on hold by the Navy's acquisition chief Lee Buchanan. According to the Pentagon, Mr. Buchanan met with V-22 program officials and requested more data on the aircraft. The announcement comes in the wake of the V-22's operational testing and evaluation (TO&E) report prepared by Philip Coyle, the Pentagon's head of testing, which raised concerns about the aircraft's reliability and maintainability. The Pentagon did not comment on the type of information Mr. Buchanan is seeking.
Sea-based NMD Requires Larger Navy -- If the United States decides that there should be a sea-based component of the proposed national missile defense (NMD) system, then the Navy will need additional ships, according to Rear Adm. Joseph A. Sestak, Jr., director of the Navy's Quadrennial Defense Review. According to Adm. Sestak, the Navy currently has 30% of its vessels forward deployed, compared to 20% in the early 1990's, and there are no plans to reduce the Navy's forward presence. Therefore, any decision to expand the Navy's core missions, including involvement in an NMD system, "must come with additional resources to conduct that mission -- in the form of additional force structure."
Quotation of the Week -- "I want to say thank you very much to the American soldier. I'd like them to stay for 100 years!" an unknown Albanian boy in Gnjilane, Kosovo, to a reporter interviewing a U.S. soldier, "Stars and Stripes Omnimedia," December 4, 2000.
This Week on America's Defense Monitor: "Colombia in Crisis"
Guerilla warfare, an expanding drug trade, and a history of government abuses have pushed Colombia to the brink of collapse. This program examines Colombia's deepening crisis, and America's controversial rescue plan.
Airs in Washington, DC on Sunday, December 10th at 10:30 a.m. on Channel 32.
Airs in NYC on Saturday, December 16th at 7:00 a.m. on Channel 13.
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NEW! CDI's "QDR 2001 Project" Listserve
CDI is pleased to announce the inauguration of our new Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001 Project.
Regardless of the outcome of the presidential race, the QDR, due out in September 2001, will have a profound effect on U.S. national security strategy as the nation moves into the 21st century. Questions about the current Two Major Theater War requirement, force structure, the Army's transformation initiative, tactical aircraft modernization, and the size of the Navy all will likely be addressed -- plus many other issues.
CDI's QDR 2001 Project will be a "must read" resource for up-to-the-minute information, in-depth analysis, and a wide range of viewpoints on the QDR process and product.
CDI will operate a secure listserv for automatic updates of QDR related developments from the Pentagon, official statements and reports dealing with or affecting the QDR (some of these may be links only), essays, and other material posted by CDI QDR administrators. Because the list is moderated, substantive observations/monographs on the QDR process and content will flow through CDI before being sent out to listserv addresses, thereby avoiding unwanted messages from clogging subscribers' email boxes.
Plans are also being discussed for an on-line newsgroup site where messages, comments, suggestions, objections, and random thoughts can be posted and replied to by participants. This will permit the free-flow of ideas among those involved or interested in the QDR process. Specific information on accessing this site will be provided later.
If you are undecided about registering for the listserv, please sample the items already posted on the QDR site, both those from QDR 2001 and those that we retained from QDR 1997 (in the Archives). We think you will find them balanced and interesting.
To join the listserv, visit the web-based portion of the project directly, OR, through CDI's main page which contains a QDR "button" for immediate access to the QDR site.