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Volume 4, Issue #47November 30, 2000

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Losing the Forest for the Trees
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org

Like "K" in Franz Kafka's "The Castle," we may wonder if there's someone real -- and really in charge of missile defense -- in the castle called the Pentagon.

One of the central themes of Franz Kafka's "The Castle" is the discovery that there is no reliable, solid communications link between the real world and the occupants of the Castle to which he believes he has been summoned to work as a land surveyor.

Surveying the landscape that is the U.S. missile defense program, the same aura of insubstantial whimsey seems to pervade. And even when a soul from the "real" world seems to get a line that connects to the Castle, what one finally gets is a busy signal, static, or a recording that simply recycles the caller through endless connections and reiterations of choices that lead to frustration.

A perfect example is the Pentagon's response to a letter from MIT physicist Theodore Postol. Dr. Postol presented evidence that called into question the interpretation of the results of an early national missile defense test designed to tell the difference between a real warhead and a decoy. The first response from the Pentagon was, "We wouldn't be spending a billion dollars -- billions of dollars on developing a National Missile Defense System unless we had some degree of confidence that we can make that discrimination and make it in time to be useful." The second response was to classify Dr. Postol's letter and the scientific/mathematical enclosures he submitted to buttress his position.

Even the third try was only partially successful. Philip Coyle, who as Director of the Pentagon's Office of Operational Test and Evaluation has been unafraid to criticize NMD, said in an interview with PBS' "Newshour With Jim Lehrer" that there is no evidence that tests were rigged. But he also acknowledged that while "testing has been as realistic as we know how at this point of the program...tests to date have not been operationally realistic."

The "who's in charge" question is more evident when one surveys the multiplicity of theater missile defense systems. The Army has the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and the Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system. The Navy has the Theater Wide (NTW) and Area Theater Missile Defense (NAD) programs. The Air Force contribution is the Airborne Laser (ABL) and, with BMDO, the Space-Based Laser (SBL). PAC-3 and NAD are being developed to knock out shorter range, lower flying ballistic missiles such as Scuds. THAAD and NTW are designed essentially to take on longer range, higher trajectory missiles in mid-flight or even in the descent phase. The ABL and SBL are oriented against rockets still in the ascent (boost) phase.

The Navy, however, believes that it will be able to get its NTW system closer to enemy missile launch points and thus will also be able to knock down missiles during boost phase before higher speeds are achieved. In this role, NTW becomes a rival for ABL and SBL. But the Navy programs suffered a double hit in July. In a test of the NTW's Standard Missile 3, a "complication" occurred when the third stage did not separate. Projected purchases of NAD missiles reportedly will be virtually halved -- to 134 instead of last year's programmed 240 missiles -- over the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP -- FY2001-2007). The longer range plan does provide for purchasing the planned 1,500 missiles, but this is still short of the 2,100 the Navy wants.

How much are these programs costing the taxpayer? Before answering that question, one should note that, in March of this year, General Ronald Kadish, the current head of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, said something his predecessors never did -- that more money (he advocated over half a billion dollars for Fiscal Year 2001) might speed the deployment of the Army and Navy systems.

In May the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives each passed a $310 billion authorization bill for military programs for Fiscal Year 2001. For the tactical missile defense programs mentioned above, the committees' actions pushed funding to over $2.1 billion. The Administration's request, General Kadish's recommendations, and the committees' work break out as follows (in millions):

  
Request		 BMDO
Add On		 Senate
Authorized		 House
Authorized
PAC-3 $446.5 $112.2 $446.5 $511.7
NAD $274.2 $103 $274.2 $274.2
THAAD $549.9 $150 $549.9 $549.9
NTW $382.7 $160 $442.7 $407.7
ABL $148.6 -- $241.0 $231.0
SBL $137.7 -- $167.7 $137.7
TOTALS $1,939.6 +$525.2 $2,122.0 $2,112.2

BMDO appropriations follow a similar pattern. The Administration request compared to the Senate-House conference committee report is (in millions):

  
Request		 Conference
Report
PAC-3 $446.5 $446.5
NAD $274.2 $274.2
THAAD $549.9 $549.9
NTW $382.7 $462.7
ABL $148.6 $233.6
SBL $137.7 $147.7
TOTALS $1,939.6 $2,114.6

In addition, the FY2000 supplemental provided $125 million for PAC-3 "unfunded requirements."

But there is more to the story. The Army has or is involved in a total of six anti-ballistic missile programs:

To all the above must be added the Army's kinetic energy anti-satellite technology program, the Space-Based Laser, and the U.S.-Israeli Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) program to counter low flying rockets such as the Russian built 122mm Katyushas. In July, at White Sands Missile range, THEL hit a target rocket in flight for the first time. But the U.S. will not procure THEL, mainly because it is too difficult to transport -- it requires 6 vans. The United States, which has agreed to pay two-thirds of the cost, has already contributed $145 million while Israel has put in $70 million. Raytheon, the system manufacturer, is obligated to pick up 50% of any cost overruns. So far the system has cost $250 million, and Israel has added $7 million for the next test against multiple targets. The FY2000 supplemental provided $5.7 million for THEL, and the FY2001 Authorization bill provided an additional $30 million for U.S. Army High Energy Laser research.

So what does it all come to? Adding National Missile Defense (at $1.875 billion), associated sensors (Space Based InfraRed Systems -- Low and High at $810 million), and Air Force TMD and BMDO "technical operations" (at $311 million) to the theater missile defense programs detailed above, brings the total ballistic missile defense effort in the FY2001 Authorization Bill (PL 106-398) $5.112 billion.

Is anybody listening?

UN Releases Report on Small Arms Destruction
Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org

In accordance with a request of the Security Council, a UN report was issued last week highlighting "the advantages and disadvantages of various practical destruction methods [of small arms] currently available and their environmental impact."

The report is part of a larger effort within the United Nations to address the issue of small arms. As Member States, non-governmental organizations, and regional and international organizations develop initiatives to counter the proliferation and misuse of small arms, destruction of surplus weapons has become an integral part of such strategies. The UN report is an interim step in the creation of a manual intended to "assist Member States in disposing of weapons voluntarily surrendered by civilians or retrieved from former combatants" in an environmentally sound manner.

The report focuses on the destruction of surplus weapons after conflict situations and does not examine stockpile management or efforts to demilitarize state arsenals or large-scale destruction. The report details various principles that should be considered when planning a post-conflict destruction program including: equipment, cost, security, simplicity of operation, safety, environmental impact, accounting, and transparency. Further, the report stresses the importance of ceremonial destruction events and remembrance ceremonies in helping a society recover from war.

Several methods of weapons destruction are detailed in the report including various types of burning/melting, cutting, bending/crushing, shredding, dumping at sea, and burial on land. Specific methods for disposing of ammunition and explosives are also described. Other considerations such as recycling, safe handling, transport, and storage are considered and strategies for successful programs outlined.

The manual will be useful for states with internal conflicts, as well as states which are undertaking/funding destruction programs. "When the manual itself is completed, the world community will have at its disposal a practical tool to use in addressing one of the gravest threats to international peace and security in the new millennium. In a world awash with small arms, that will be no small achievement," said UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his presentation of the report to the current president of the Security Council.

The FY 2001 budget passed by Congress this year contains $2 million in the Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Accounts (NADR) budget to implement U.S. funded small arms destruction programs. "Recirculation of small arms and light weapons in the aftermath of conflict, literally from one war to the next, is a major part of the problem" according to State Department small arms expert Edward Peartree. "The UN report and manual will support U.S. government efforts in developing programs under this initiative by offering best practices and helping to raise global awareness of the importance of destroying surplus stocks."

The UN Report is S/2000/1092.

The Bosnia Peacekeeping Mission Five Years Later
By Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org

On December 16, 1995, over 60,000 troops of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the alliance's first-ever peacekeeping mission entered Bosnia. Operating under the International Force (IFOR) banner, the troops moved quickly to disarm the combatants that in the previous 42 months had killed over 200,000 people and turned Bosnia's cities and villages into rubble. Five years and five commanders later, a scaled-down presence of 20,000 troops now known as the Stabilization Force (SFOR) remains in the country. But NATO's mission, which moved with speed and success in its first months, recently became mired in a web of corruption scandals and frustration that has almost paralyzed the international presence in Bosnia. Despite years of essentially direct rule by Western experts and five billion dollars of aid, Bosnia remains a poor country divided into three ethnic groups passionately resentful of each other.

Yet the military component of the mission is hardly a failure. The military's peacekeeping task, as defined in the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement was to enforce the former warring parties' accord to stop hostilities, withdraw from areas of conflict, and turn over their weapons. In the long run, IFOR was to assist civilian authorities in their efforts to rebuild Bosnia. IFOR and SFOR succeeded admirably on the first count but faltered on the second.

In parallel with the peacekeepers efforts, the international community began repairing Bosnia's economy and creating a stable political system. From the beginning, the civilian mission ran into trouble: much of the $5 billion allocated to Bosnia has been lost to mismanagement and corruption, mostly by local authorities. Even more importantly, international efforts failed to break the stronghold of extreme nationalist parties on local politics. Bosnia re-elected many of its extremist, wartime politicians in the November 2000 general elections. Five years into the rebuilding mission, virtually everyone in Bosnia agrees that should the international military and civilian forces withdraw, the country would quickly descend back to conflict.

The peacekeepers' work in Bosnia began with disarming and separating the warring factions. In this, IFOR was entirely successful. The war stopped, armies withdrew back to bases, and the highly visible IFOR presence discouraged skirmishes. IFOR and later SFOR were less successful at removing non-Bosnian armed forces from the republic demanded by the Dayton Agreement. In 1999, the independent International Crisis Group reported that mujahedeen forces, as well as units from Yugoslavia and Croatia, were still present in Bosnia. But the overall level of violence is very low -- by Bosnia's standards -- and except for isolated cases the foreign units have not been implicated in any armed incidents.

As their second -- and more controversial task -- U.S. forces (separate from IFOR/SFOR) also set out to arm and train the armed forces of the Croat and Bosniak (Muslim) entities, jointly known as the Federation forces. The program, knows as Train & Equip, was designed to bring the Federation forces to roughly equal strength with the Bosnian Serbs, thus deterring future hostilities. As a secondary goal, Train & Equip was to forge close cooperation between the Bosniaks and Croats in Bosnia. In practice, the cooperation sputtered. Bosnia's Croat forces continued to rely on aid, training, and weapons from Croatia itself. Train & Equip turned largely into an aid program for Bosniak troops. U.S. advisors trained the Bosniaks while Arab countries -- mostly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Brunei, and Malaysia -- supplied weapons. On one level, Train & Equip was a success: Bosniak troops have not been challenged by any of the other armed factions in the republic, although this is also due to the deterrent effect of IFOR/SFOR forces in the area. Train & Equip, however, cemented the division of Bosnia's armed forces into the three nationality-based components. Croatia's and Yugoslavia's financial support to Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs, respectively, have removed any incentive for those ethnic groups to cooperate with the Bosnian government in Sarajevo.

IFOR/SFOR units have been most often criticized for their timid approach to apprehending war criminals. Dozens of persons accused of heinous crimes during the 1992-95 war continue to live freely -- and in some cases very prominently -- in all three parts of Bosnia. The Dayton Agreement puts peacekeepers squarely in charge of enforcing order in Bosnia. Their reluctance to risk lives to apprehend known war criminals has cast a shadow over the mission. A 1997 report by the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) exonerates the military and puts the blame on political masters. "[There was] a clear abdication of decision-making responsibility on the part of NATO's political leadership," USIP wrote. "In order to limit the likelihood of political failure that often occurs when military lives are lost, politicians have seemingly left it to the generals to define the Bosnia mission. Based on the Somalia experience [where the relief mission ended after 18 American soldiers died in a botched assault] the NATO mission has adopted a minimalist approach in order to avoid conflict and casualties."

Despite some shortcomings, the peacekeepers in Bosnia largely have performed well. In hindsight, political leaders in the United States and elsewhere clearly underestimated the complexity of the nation-building effort in Bosnia. This mistake was further compounded by the choice of some policies such as the decision to build three separate armies in the republic. As a result, the mission has lasted much longer than envisioned (IFOR was originally given a one-year mandate) and will likely continue for a few more years. But as the peacekeepers would quickly point out, the war is over, the fighters have gone home or are confined to barracks, and life in Bosnia has moved on -- and that is no mean achievement. The rest is up to the civilian authorities and the Bosnians themselves.

U.S. Opposition to the International Criminal Court
Oscar Lurie, Research Associate, olurie@cdi.org

In July 1998 representatives of 120 nations voted to create an International Criminal Court (ICC) that would hold _individuals_ accountable for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The Statute establishing the ICC has been signed by 116 nations and ratified by 24 as of November 27, 2000.

At the end of WWII the United States led the allies in establishing the Nuremberg court to try Nazis who had committed genocide and war crimes. The U.S. created a parallel tribunal to try Japanese for similar crimes. Since the 1990s the U.S. has consistently encouraged formation of ad hoc international tribunals to try individuals accused of committing war crimes in Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

It is therefore surprising to America's allies that the United States, despite its record of support for international law and human rights, has departed from this policy by refusing to join the parties to the ICC. The basic US objection is that the impunity of American use of force could be challenged by the ICC, particularly with regard to proportionality, legitimacy of targets, and civilian casualties. American citizens, their government, and its foreign policy could be subjected to an international body which the U.S. does not control.

This fundamental objection gets so dressed up in legal and bureaucratic obfuscation that at times the U.S. objections sound almost reasonable.

In the meetings leading to the proposed treaty, many adjustments were negotiated to make the document acceptable to the British, Germans, and even the French (who would be required to amend their constitution to be in compliance). Not so the U.S. which, when it was still considering joining the treaty, tried to get a complete exemption for Americans. When it became apparent that the U.S. would not get an exemption, Washington proposed that citizens of all states that do not join the ICC be exempt. Since this would have allowed not just Americans but also tyrants like Saddam Hussein to escape penalties for their acts, the American ploy was summarily rejected.

The U.S. stance is short-sighted. Only if it becomes a party to the Treaty will the U.S. be able to help shape the application of the Treaty's rules and procedures. These provide strict guidelines for the selection of judges and prosecutors as well as a set of internal checks and balances that meet the highest existing international standards. The U.S. judicial system is admired and even envied in virtually the entire world. It is hard to imagine a scenario in which the parties to the Court would allow it to take jurisdiction over an American after he had been investigated and tried by U.S. attorneys in U.S. courts -- whether the verdict was guilty or innocent. Only in the highly unlikely event that a charge of infamous behavior against a U.S. citizen is deliberately ignored by the American judicial system would the ICC even be in a position to assert jurisdiction.

Just as U.S. courts must interpret the law (sometimes broadly and sometimes narrowly), the ICC will have to do the same. This is neither "legislation" nor a step toward world government. The ICC is no more of an invasion of American sovereignty than are a host of other treaties and international agreements -- not least the one committing the U.S. to the rulings of the World Trade Organization.

The right of trial by jury and the other protections of the U.S. Constitution do not travel with American citizens who go to foreign countries. They are subject to the jurisdiction of foreign courts whose rules and procedures are in many cases remote from our Constitution and less favorable to the accused than those of the ICC will be. (An American accused of a crime overseas would be grateful that the ICC had priority in jurisdiction over a foreign court.) In the case of an American military person accused of a crime in a foreign country who is returned for trial in America, Article 57 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice allows for his returned to a foreign country after court-martial if a treaty or status of forces agreement so provides.

American objections that the ICC endangers U.S. military personnel are illogical. Is it possible that the ICC might initiate an investigation of a U.S. or U.S.-led intervention as was done by the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia with respect to NATO's 1999 air war to halt expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo? Yes, but as in the NATO case, if there were sufficient grounds for a full blown investigation of an individual, any such investigation would quickly be superceded by U.S. courts or the military justice system. One must not lose sight of two important facts about the ICC: it has no jurisdiction if a nation's legal system is investigating or prosecuting one of the three crimes the court is established to hear, and the ICC can only prosecute individuals, not nations or organizations.

Virtually all recent U.S. military deployments and engagements have been in reaction to violations of international standards of conduct that America values. The ICC cannot guarantee that similar violations will not occur again, but over time fear of the Court's jurisdiction may give pause to potential violators and induce them to abandon their intentions. Such an outcome would have the added benefit of reducing the need for overseas deployments of America's armed forces.

To the extent that the Court reduces massive abuses of human rights, the international order will be more stable and peaceful. To that extent refugee flows, drug trafficking and other organized crime (all of which have costs to the U.S.) will be ameliorated.

The ICC will strengthen the world's view of the importance of international law, including laws protecting foreigners abroad. Again, this will decrease the need for military operations to protect and rescue American citizens caught in foreign internal conflicts.

Perhaps most important is the simple fact that the Court exists to try and punish departure from the humane principles that Americans esteem.

America's principal allies hold the same values as the U.S. and deploy forces beyond their borders in peace operations and interventions. Why should the American attitude toward the ICC be so different? The answer becomes apparent when this issue is seen in the light of other recent American stubbornness: the rejection of the Law of the Sea Treaty, the Ottawa Anti-Personnel Land Mine Treaty, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Some American leaders are not content that America is the superpower. They want to be the "hyperpower" so that America is unconstrained by any rules. They laud America as being the world's leader, but ignore the fact that more and more of its friends resent U.S. unilateralism and its overbearing attitude. Washington's position on the ICC merely adds fuel to the fire.

CDI's "Briefing Room"

START III Talks Launched -- Russian and U.S. officials met in Washington on Thursday to begin drafting the proposed START III Treaty, which would limit strategic arsenals to 1,500 warheads on each side. Both countries have already ratified the START II Treaty which allows each nation to deploy 3,500 warheads, but differences in the treaty language have postponed its implementation. Currently, the United States deploys over 6,000 nuclear warheads. Vice-President Al Gore has vowed to "continue on a course of deeper [nuclear weapons] reductions," while Presidential candidate George W. Bush has called for the number of U.S. warheads to be cut "significantly further,"  to "the lowest possible number consistent with national security."

Air Force Tanker Fleet "Indispensable" -- The U.S. fleet of aerial refueling tankers was the "unsung hero" of last year's Kosovo air operations, according to retired Lt. Gen. Michael Short, who commanded the U.S. air forces during Operation Allied Force. Says Gen. Short, "There was only one platform without which we could nat have fought that war and that's the air refueling platform -- the KC-10s and the KC-135s." General Short believes the aging tanker fleet should be a central part of the Air Force's plans to recapitalize its equipment. Current plans call for some existing tankers to remain in the fleet until 2040, when they will be 80 years old.

Navy TMD Program Delayed -- According toe Pentagon, the Navy's theater missile defense (TMD) program is 13 months behind schedule and will be unable to meet its fiscal year 2003 deployment schedule. A draft program budget decision released this month by DoD's comptroller's office says that the delay is the result of the system's Standard missile's inability to attack ballistic missiles. The Navy plans to deploy 79 ships with TMD systems, with 21 scheduled to be available by the end of FY'05.

10 Tons of Russian Nuclear Materials Secured -- The Department of Energy has announced the completion of a program to consolidate 10 metric tons of Russian weapons-grade nuclear materials -- enough for 500 nuclear warheads -- at a new secure location. The materials were taken from three existing sites and relocated to the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant in Siberia, which is equipped with "comprehensive nuclear material security and accounting systems." The systems were installed as part of the U.S.-Russian Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program, a bilateral program funded in part through the U.S.'s "Nunn-Lugar" program. An estimated 960 metric tons of Russian weapons materials require security.

V-22 Worries Continue -- Despite the Navy's recent declaration that their V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft is "operationally effective and suitable," concerns remain about the program. The announcement came after an eight month operational evaluation that included a last minute correction to the tiltrotor's blade wing stow system and just in time for a December 5 decision to start full rate production of an expected $40 billion, 458 aircraft acquisition program. But according to Defense Week, Philip Coyle, the top Pentagon tester, told Congress on November 17 that the aircraft continues to be unreliable and could prove to be an "unacceptable burden." Among other problems, the vortex effect that caused the loss of one MV-22 with 19 Marines aboard has yet to be fully understood. The Marines want the MV-22 as a replacement for their CH-46E Sea Knight and CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters.

Quotation of the Week -- "The road maps for dealing with the world that were left behind for us were obsolete. We knew for 50 years what we had to be against -- in the context of the Cold War. Now we had to figure out what to build." National Security Advisor Sandy Burger on the challenges that faced the incoming Clinton Administration, Washington Post, November 26, 2000.

This week on America's Defense Monitor: "Small Arms and Failed States"

In Albania, thousands of guns taken in raids on state-owned arsenals created chaos. In Angola, the proliferation of light weaponry has triggered the collapse of a fragile peace accord. From Kosovo to Somalia, from Sierra Leone to Northern Ireland, the link between small arms and political collapse poses one of the true challenges to peace in the 21st Century. In many regions stopping the flow of small arms is a first step toward peace and stability.

Airs in Washington, DC on Sunday, December 3rd at 10:30 a.m. on Channel 32.
Airs in NYC on Saturday, December 9th at 7:00 a.m. on Channel 13.

Visit our website for transcripts, CDI resources, and related links.

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NEW! CDI's "QDR 2001 Project" Listserve

CDI is pleased to announce the inauguration of our new Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001 Project.

Regardless of the outcome of the presidential race, the QDR, due out in September 2001, will have a profound effect on U.S. national security strategy as the nation moves into the 21st century. Questions about the current Two Major Theater War requirement, force structure, the Army's transformation initiative, tactical aircraft modernization, and the size of the Navy all will likely be addressed -- plus many other issues.

CDI's QDR 2001 Project will be a "must read" resource for up-to-the-minute information, in-depth analysis, and a wide range of viewpoints on the QDR process and product.

CDI will operate a secure listserv for automatic updates of QDR related developments from the Pentagon, official statements and reports dealing with or affecting the QDR (some of these may be links only), essays, and other material posted by CDI QDR administrators. Because the list is moderated, substantive observations/monographs on the QDR process and content will flow through CDI before being sent out to listserv addresses, thereby avoiding unwanted messages from clogging subscribers' email boxes.

Plans are also being discussed for an on-line newsgroup site where messages, comments, suggestions, objections, and random thoughts can be posted and replied to by participants. This will permit the free-flow of ideas among those involved or interested in the QDR process. Specific information on accessing this site will be provided later.

If you are undecided about registering for the listserv, please sample the items already posted on the QDR site, both those from QDR 2001 and those that we retained from QDR 1997 (in the Archives). We think you will find them balanced and interesting.

To join the listserv, visit the web-based portion of the project directly, OR, through CDI's main page which contains a QDR "button" for immediate access to the QDR site.