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Weekly Defense Monitor

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Volume 4, Issue #46November 16, 2000

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EDITOR'S NOTE: Due to the Thanksgiving holiday the Weekly Defense Monitor will not be published next week. We will resume regular publication on November 30th.


Another Unwelcome Mat for Uncle Sam?
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org

Sila Maria Calderon has just been elected the next governor of Puerto Rico. Part of her campaign message was "peace for Vieques," in which she pledged to try to meet with the next U.S. president (whoever that is) to improve the terms of the deal inked earlier this year by the outgoing Puerto Rican administration and the Navy.

A key feature of the existing pact is a referendum which would ask Vieques residents to decide whether the Navy should leave its bombing and amphibious landing ranges on the island or if, for $50 million in economic aid, residents would allow the Navy to keep its ranges indefinitely. The referendum must be held by February 2002.

Ms. Calderon wants the referendum held much sooner and has said she will hold an independent one if the Navy refuses to advance the timetable. She has also pledged to provide the island $50 million if the vote goes against the Navy.

While this tango has some way to go before it is resolved, the unwelcome mat may soon appear in another island group -- this time the Chagos Archipelago in the middle of the Indian Ocean between Africa and Indonesia. Many may be unfamiliar with the Chagos until hearing the name of the largest island in the group: Diego Garcia.

First a little history from the British Broadcasting Corporation.

Britain took control of Mauritius and its territories, of which the Chagos group was one, at the end of the Napoleonic War. They were inhabited by descendents of African slaves and Indian plantation workers called the Ilois. In November 1965, as part of the agreement to grant Mauritius its independence, London separated the Chagos Islands and renamed them the British Indian Ocean Territory. Just over a year later, in December 1966, the U.K. and the U.S. signed an agreement giving the U.S. the right to build a military base on Diego Garcia. To accommodate U.S. demands for operational security, the U.K. agreed to move the Ilois off the island, which they did between 1967-1973, sending over 1,000 to Mauritius, some 1,200 miles distance. In return, Mauritius was paid 3 million pounds sterling and the U.K. was given an 11 million pound sterling credit by the U.S. off the purchase of the U.S. Polaris nuclear system.

A suit brought by the descendents of the Ilois forced off the island and banned by a 1971 order from returning to their homeland finally reached the British High Court this year. In a ruling earlier this month the High Court determined that the British government had "acted unlawfully" and that there had been "an abject legal failure" in the forced removal of the inhabitants. In short, the ruling opens the way for the islanders and their descendents to return to the Chagos, including Diego Garcia.

(What is ironic in all this is that during the last 30 years that the islanders have been banned from returning to their homeland, U.S. forces, which first arrived in January 1971, have employed citizens from Singapore and the Philippines on the island.)

Although given approval to appeal the High Court's decision, initial reports are that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Britain's equivalent of the State Department) will not do so. If the ruling stands, the U.K. cannot stop the islanders' return. Britain still owns the Chagos and British laws govern; the U.S. is only a tenant.

According to military sources, U.S. Navy units and activities at Diego Garcia include:

U.S. Air Force units and activities include detachments from the:

The U.S. Army has a "Care of Supplies in Storage Unit" that is responsible for maintaining Army watercraft and support equipment that is part of the Navy's Squadron Two.

Diego Garcia is an important U.S. staging base for the Persian Gulf area. It supported operations during the 1979 crisis in Yemen and the Iranian crisis of 1979-81 involving the fall of the Shah of Iran and the seizure of the U.S. embassy and staff. It was also prominent during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm (1990-91), Desert Strike (1996), Desert Thunder (1997), and Desert Fox (1998).

The unwelcome mat is closer than ever in one more part of the world.


U.S. Dominance in Arms Sales Unchallenged
Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org

Although the U.S. presidency remains up in the air, it's business as usual in Washington, DC. As the Clinton Administration winds down its tenure in office, last minute deal-making continues as policy makers hope to complete unfinished arms deals and implement defense reforms before the new President (whoever he may be) is sworn in.

In a real boost for the defense industry, the Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Air Force Lt. Gen. Tome Walters, announced last week that in FY 2000 U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) -- government to government sales -- were more than $12 billion, the second time in as many years the figure was that high. Lt. Gen. Walters also estimated that FY 2001 FMS figures could top $15 billion as "Congress has been notified of 77 pending arms and weapons systems sales totaling $25 billion that could become signed contracts over the next year or two." What's more, DSCA was confident of surging U.S. FMS sales even without major buys by Saudi Arabia, traditionally an important customer for U.S. weapons. Growing U.S. sales now rely on spare parts, upgrades, training, and support, as well as increased sales of secure communications and command and control equipment.

The U.S. is also eager to supply significant amounts of U.S. military aid to strategic allies before a new administration arrives in Washington. Israel, a major U.S. weapons customer, is now waiting for an additional $800 million in U.S. military aid beyond the $2.8 billion appropriated by Congress. The $800 million is based on a promise made by President Clinton to Israeli President Ehud Barak during the July Camp David peace summit. According to an Israeli Defense Ministry acting spokeswoman, "$250 million will cover costs associated with Israel's withdraw from Lebanon earlier this year. The remaining funds will be used for military modernization." Put another way, the Israelis will have $550 million to purchase new U.S. weapons and training.

In another case of the U.S. rushing to aid strategic partners in the waning days of the Clinton presidency, the U.S. has reached agreement on a "no-cost" transfer of surplus F-16s to Poland. According to press reports, "Poland would receive the 16 fighters at no cost per aircraft but would have to pay 'depreciation charges' to the United States over the span of the proposed five-year lease." The value of the deal is estimated at $250 million, including the transfer of the fighters, the upgrades, and a support package. The lease agreement allows the U.S. manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, to enter the Polish market and in turn encourages Poland to continue to "buy American" as it modernizes its military forces.

Even in military training, the Clinton Administration is implementing changes before it leaves office. For years, the Pentagon has been criticized for training some of the world's worst human rights abusers in its military-run programs. One of the most notorious institutions, the U.S. Army School of the Americas (SOA), is undergoing a name and curriculum change to improve its program and address critics' concerns. SOA is closing on December 15th and will reopen on January 17th as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. It remains unclear if the U.S. Army will continue to run the Institute, whose curriculum topics will included "peace support operations, along with disaster relief and preparedness programs, as well as courses on democratic sustainment, and advance counter-drug operations."

Addressing human rights concerns borne out of SOA graduates accused of leading or supporting death squads and assassins, a Pentagon press release said: "The new institute will provide professional education and training to eligible personnel of the nations of the Western hemisphere. It will focus its training on the democratic principles set forth in the charter of the Organization of American States. The Institute will foster mutual respect, confidence and cooperation among the participating nations and will promote democratic values, respect for human rights, and knowledge and understanding of U.S. customs and traditions among the students." Only time will tell if these changes are more than cosmetic.

The only major failing of current efforts is the Clinton Administration's inability to reach agreement on relaxing arms export requirements, primarily with the United Kingdom (U.K.). Negotiations with Australia are not yet complete, but are progressing in a much less contested way than those with the U.K. The defense export reforms are part of the Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI) announced this summer (for more information see, "U.S. Changes Arms Export Policy," Weekly Defense Monitor, June 21, 2000). The U.S. hopes to eliminate licensing requirements for U.S. exports to the U.K. and Australia, provided certain standards are met (including those outlined in this year's Security Assistance Act). According to reports in "Defense News," the U.S. has been unable to convince the U.K. to enhance its own export control procedures, a move that would run afoul of U.K. commitments to its European Union partners. While those critical of the DTSI process appreciate the lack of immediate agreement, DTSI and the export exemption regulations are in little danger of failing.

Even if the proposed changes in DTSI are not completed by January 20th, neither Presidential hopeful will significantly alter U.S. arms export policy. The major reforms under the DTSI will continue to be implemented by the bureaucracy. Privately, Defense and State Department officials have claimed that both candidates and their teams are committed to the DTSI process.

Even though the election remains muddled, one thing is brilliantly clear: the United States will continue to dominate the worlds arms market for the foreseeable future. The two candidates for U.S. president may have received a lukewarm reception from the American public, but the world appetite for U.S. weapons and military training remains high and unchallenged. No matter which candidate is inaugurated on January 20th, the worldwide presence of U.S. weaponry and military expertise will be sustained for a long time to come.


Time to Worry About Gas and Russia
Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org

Last month, President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine dismissed foreign minister Boris Tarasiuk, known for his pro-Western leanings. During his tenure, Tarasiuk steered Ukraine into close cooperation with NATO. His successor, Anatoly Zlenko, is an advocate of better relations with Russia, and immediately flew to Moscow on his first trip after assuming office. Is Ukraine heading back into Moscow's orbit as has its neighbor, Belarus? Is it time to start writing editorials about who lost Ukraine?

Not quite, as it turns out. Ukraine's foreign policy since independence has been marked by periodic shifts between a pro-Moscow and a pro-Western course. In fact, President Kuchma himself campaigned on a platform of close Ukrainian-Russian cooperation in 1994. Once in the office, he oversaw Ukraine's rapprochement with the European Union and even signed an agreement on special cooperation with NATO. In fact, thanks to the very nature of the state, Ukraine will never be in a position to clearly chart either an eastern or western course.

Ukraine is a perfect example of a state lacking a clear majority cultural identity. Ukraine's borders were not formed along ethnic lines but dictated by political considerations of Soviet leaders. As a result, the country that emerged after the breakup of the USSR is fragmented ethnically, culturally, and linguistically lines. Ukraine is formed of as many as five distinct regions: the industrialized and Russified East, the ethnically conscious Ukrainian West, the majority ethnic Russian Crimea, the South and the diverse center of the country. The West has only been a part of Soviet Union since World War II. Its cultural identity has been shaped more by the Austrian and Czechoslovak governments than the one in Moscow. Its population strongly favors complete independence from Russia and integration into the Euroatlantic economic and military organizations. On the other end of the foreign policy spectrum lies Crimea, whose ethnically Russian population remains dependent on the presence of Russian troops. It strongly favors the integration of Crimea, if not all of Ukraine, with Russia. In fact, parts of the population of Crimea already consider it Russian territory. They regard the 1954 transfer of the territory from Russia to Ukraine as illegal.

Ukraine's internal divisions limit its foreign policy options. The Ukrainian government cannot chart a clearly pro-NATO and pro-Europe course lest it create unrest in the eastern part of the country. Moscow and ethnic Russians in Ukraine tend to view NATO membership for Ukraine as incompatible with a special relationship between Ukraine and Moscow. The Kiyv government can ill-afford to ignore their views. It is too weak to prevent a potential secessionist movement, especially should it be aided by Russian military personnel in Crimea and accompanied by other repressive measures from Moscow such as a cutoff of energy supplies. Similarly, the Ukrainian government would be unable to generate popular support for a policy of reintegration with Russia. It is certain to be opposed by the population in Ukraine's West. The Galicia region in the West has consistently voted for independence or for pro-Western candidates in the last three national polls in Ukraine (the 1991 referendum, the 1994 presidential election, and the 1998 parliamentary election). Ukraine's West will oppose any form of rapprochement with Russia that may jeopardize the country's independence and hamper its drive for EU and NATO membership.

The limits of Ukraine's foreign policy are defined by the above two rather contradictory views held by two very different segments of its population. The state can only generate popular support for the limited range of policies on which the different viewpoints overlap. The voters in the Eastern parts of Ukraine, although in favor of close links to Russia, also prefer Ukraine to retain its independence. Even more importantly, independence combined with a special relationship with Russia also appears to be the preference in the central regions of the country, which represents a majority of the voters. Ukraine's foreign policy has thus focused on defending independence (a majority view), preserving links to Russia (as dictated by economic circumstances and favored by the east), and building ties with the EU and NATO (in order to strengthen its independence from Russia and to appeal to Ukraine's west).

Foreign policy, of course, is not all identity-based. Ukraine is also pulled eastward by a combination of special interests that benefit from cozy business arrangements with Russia. Moreover, as a weak state, Ukraine is often merely responding to geopolitical events outside its borders and outside of its control.

Tarasiuk's firing belongs in the latter category and can be directly linked to recent moves by Moscow. Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia has tightened its policy toward the former Soviet republics. Moscow has abolished the visa-free regime which allowed tens of thousands of Ukrainians, Georgians and others to travel and work in Russia, thus sustaining their relatives back home. In case of Ukraine, Moscow also proposed to build a new gas pipeline via Belarus and Poland bypassing Ukraine. Ukraine has been unable to pay even the discounted prices Russia charges for gas, and its debt to Moscow has reached astronomical proportions. But Moscow couldn't turn off its pipeline to Ukraine without cutting off lucrative customers in Western Europe. The Belarus bypass would change that.

Ukraine's President Kuchma saw the writing on the wall. Ukraine could not afford to lose Russia as a gas supplier, especially with the winter approaching. It was time for one of Ukraine's periodic shifts toward Russia and renewed talk about how to "better tap the potential of Russian-Ukrainian cooperation" (words of the new foreign minister Zlenko).

The latest shift, although not unprecedented, should not be dismissed lightly. Ukraine may be in real danger. Depending on whom you ask, Putin may simply be trying to put relations with former satellites on a more normal footing, or his actions may be an attempt to deal them a fatal blow and install new governments loyal to Moscow. Whatever his intentions, Putin has many more weapons at his disposal in the case of Ukraine, there are tens of thousands of Russian soldiers with the Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol, and the largely Russian population of surrounding Crimea, which would rather live in Russia than Ukraine. Last week, Putin also invited all ethnic Russians from former Soviet Union to return to Russia. One expert, Paul Goble of Radio Free Europe in Washington DC, pointed out that this will have the effect of making the ethnic Russians outside Russia look disloyal in the eyes of their compatriots. If attitudes towards the Russians in Estonia, Ukraine and elsewhere worsen, these Russians will never be able to assimilate and become genuine citizens of their new states. Countries with a disgruntled and disenfranchised ethnic group on their territory are inherently unstable and weak. Ukraine is not out of the deep water yet.


CDI's "Briefing Room"

Lockheed Martin JSF Completes Flight Test Objectives -- According to company officials, Lockheed Martin's conventional version of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) has met all of its preliminary flight test objectives. The X-35A completed its first in-flight refueling last week, the last of its planned objectives. The aircraft will continue flying through the end of the month, hopefully going supersonic. It will then go out of service, to be reconfigured as the short take-off (STOVL) version of the aircraft. Meanwhile, Boeing's JSF aircraft resumed flying after a two week delay due to a hydraulic problem.

CHEM-BIO Training Needs Improvements -- According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), U.S. military training exercises involving an enemy attack with chemical or biological weapons lack realism. The GAO examined the readiness of Army, Air Force and Marine units, and while they found the units better equipped, training exercises often did not include chemical and biological defense, although required to do so. One example cited by the GAO report: "Marines who were simulating operations during a chemical attack were required to wear protective masks but not protective gloves because it was too cumbersome."

NRO's Resources Strained -- The United States is in danger of losing its "eyes and ears" if the National Reconnaissance Office doesn't receive high-level attention, according to a report released this week by a congressionally chartered commission. The commission, co-chaired by Senator Robert Kerrey (D-NE) and Representative Porter Goss (R-FL) found that increased military and non-military demand, coupled with a "false sense of security" resulting from the fall of the Soviet Union, were straining the system. Among other recommendations, the commission suggested that the next administration rely more heavily on commercial satellite imagery.

Quotation of the Week -- "Every single [DoD] contract, especially construction ones, always exceed their costs." Joseph San Pietro, defense analyst at Wasserstein Perella Securities, on news that Newport News Shipbuilding's construction costs for the aircraft carrier "Ronald Reagan" are $89 million above projections. "The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot," November 14, 2000.


This week on America's Defense Monitor: "An Environmental-Industrial Complex"

Many Cold War era weapons programs were also jobs programs for high-tech industries in key congressional districts. Yet there is a growing consensus that public spending to find high-tech solutions to the world's mounting environmental problems would be equally beneficial to American workers, while addressing a very real threat to our security and well-being. Should America subsidize this industry too?

Airs in Washington, DC on Sunday, November 19 at 10:30 a.m. on Channel 32.
Airs in NYC on Saturday, November 25 at 7:00 a.m. on Channel 13.

Visit our website for transcripts, CDI resources, and related links.

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NEW! CDI's "QDR 2001 Project" Listserve

CDI is pleased to announce the inauguration of our new Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001 Project.

Regardless of the outcome of the presidential race, the QDR, due out in September 2001, will have a profound effect on U.S. national security strategy as the nation moves into the 21st century. Questions about the current Two Major Theater War requirement, force structure, the Army's transformation initiative, tactical aircraft modernization, and the size of the Navy all will likely be addressed -- plus many other issues.

CDI's QDR 2001 Project will be a "must read" resource for up-to-the-minute information, in-depth analysis, and a wide range of viewpoints on the QDR process and product.

CDI will operate a secure listserv for automatic updates of QDR related developments from the Pentagon, official statements and reports dealing with or affecting the QDR (some of these may be links only), essays, and other material posted by CDI QDR administrators. Because the list is moderated, substantive observations/monographs on the QDR process and content will flow through CDI before being sent out to listserv addresses, thereby avoiding unwanted messages from clogging subscribers' email boxes.

Plans are also being discussed for an on-line newsgroup site where messages, comments, suggestions, objections, and random thoughts can be posted and replied to by participants. This will permit the free-flow of ideas among those involved or interested in the QDR process. Specific information on accessing this site will be provided later.

If you are undecided about registering for the listserv, please sample the items already posted on the QDR site, both those from QDR 2001 and those that we retained from QDR 1997 (in the Archives). We think you will find them balanced and interesting.

To join the listserv, visit the web-based portion of the project directly, OR, through CDI's main page which contains a QDR "button" for immediate access to the QDR site.