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| October 12, 2000 |
| October 12, 2000 |
Voting With Their Feet
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
In October 11 testimony before the House Government Reform Committee, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported on the results of a survey of the reasons Air Force National Guard and USAF Reserve pilots are transferring from flight status, moving to inactive status, or are leaving the service altogether. The GAO found that:
These findings come at a time when the Pentagon is relying more and more on reservists to ease the strain on the active units. It is most significant in that the Air National Guard and Air Reserve are the most closely integrated of all reservists in the daily activities of the active component with which they are affiliated. As the GAO said, "Without adequate numbers of pilots and aircrew, the Guard and Reserve could not support the active force in its worldwide operations." Moreover, considering that it costs some $6 million and takes 9 years to develop a fully qualified aviator, replacing these men and women will not be easy.
This report comes on top of statistics that show that the reserves, unlike the active forces, are having great difficulty in pulling in recruits. Since 1997 the Army, Navy, and Air Force Reserves have failed to meet their recruiting objectives. In FY1999 the Air Force came up almost 40% short, recruiting only 7,518 of the almost 11,800 needed. For FY2000, the shortage in enlisted accessions was 1,884 out of a requirement for 9,624. (The Naval Reserve also missed its target, enlisting only 14,911 against a goal of 18,410.)
Traditionally, many "recruits" for the reserves have been from those leaving active duty. But with the smaller active forces and the increased demands on the reserves, fewer departing active duty personnel are going into the reserves. This in turn means that those who do enter are more inexperienced, which translates in longer training time and higher costs per fully qualified soldier. Even increased bonuses are having only marginal effects on bringing in new blood.
Behind the resistance to the anthrax program is a reservoir of distrust of the Pentagon's truthfulness about medical matters, distrust fed by Agent Orange in Vietnam and Gulf War Syndrome. Opposition surfaced almost as soon as the anthrax vaccinations -- a series of six shots over 18 months -- began in March 1998 for troops destined for duty in the Persian Gulf. Within six months some 50 service personnel had refused to take the vaccine because of concern about the possible side effects and the safety of the vaccine itself.
Added to this growing movement were problems with the company that produced the vaccine. Data released by the House Government Reform National Security Subcommittee in September 1999 showed that over 32,600 reservists had received some of the vaccine series but half of these had not received subsequent shots within the time lines specified by the Food and Drug Administration for effective immunization. The Pentagon attributed this failure largely to unavailability of vaccine.
But safety concerns again were heightened in March 2000 when the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences declared that "there is inadequate/insufficient evidence to determine whether an association does or does not exist between anthrax vaccination and long-term health outcomes." Moreover, the Institute noted that the vaccine being used by the Pentagon was different from that evaluated in the only peer-review study done in 1962.
Despite the GAO testimony, the Pentagon denies that mandatory anthrax vaccination is having an impact on reserve recruitment numbers. At the regular press briefing on October 10, the Pentagon spokesman said: "I don't think it's been a major factor. I'm sure you can find some individuals who have left the Guard or Reserve rather than proceed with their anthrax vaccination...but I don't think, in numbers, I don't think we've considered [it] as a significant impact in that regard, no. People come and go for a variety of reasons. That is certainly one of them, but I don't think that would be a significant number, no."
Given that the vaccine shortage has forced the Pentagon to cut back on the inoculation program (emphasizing protection for personnel going to the Gulf region or to Korea), common sense suggests that now is an opportunity to step back and reassess the program. Matters of safety, the extent of the threat, whether other force protection measures can be introduced as substitutes for wholesale vaccination, the information provided to service personnel about the vaccination program, and the full impact on retention and recruitment of the mandatory nature of the vaccine program, all need further examination.
In the end, the threat may warrant such a program, but in the interim, regaining the trust of service personnel and their families is more important for the long-term health of the military.
Diamonds are Forever
Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
We all know the successful commercial slogan, "A diamond is forever." But do we really think about what that means? Diamonds are symbols of love, but in today's world, they've also become symbols of war.
The trade in diamonds has funded the decade's most brutal conflicts. Today, rebel groups fight not over political ideologies but over control of diamond mines and other economic resources. A Reuters report identifies the new role of diamonds in today's conflicts. "As the people of Sierra Leone, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have found to their cost, diamonds from rebel-controlled mines are the perfect currency to discreetly buy arms, bribe officials and keep soldiers fed and fighting. Stones smaller than a fingernail can be easily hidden and sold for thousands of dollars with no questions asked."
The Washington Times describes this new phenomenon in an article discussing the significance of diamonds for rebel armies. "Diamonds have long conjured the most romantic notions...In parts of conflict-ridden Africa, however, diamonds inspire little sentimentality. African warlords have taken control of some of the most valuable diamond mines on the continent, using the proceeds to buy guns and machetes. Their involvement in the international diamond trade has given birth to a new gemstone: the blood diamond."
The impact of diamonds on the perpetuation of conflict is indisputable. A New York Times article on Angola reports that the war there has cost the lives of about 500,000 people while displacing about four million others. "The glittering stones have become agents of slave labor, murder, dismemberment, mass homelessness and wholesale economic collapse."
The country where conflict diamonds, or blood diamonds, have wreaked the most havoc is Sierra Leone. The Congressional Quarterly Daily Monitor reports that "in Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front, a rebel outfit seeking to conquer diamond fields in the eastern part of their country, routinely chops off the limbs of citizens to force evacuations of the countryside surrounding the mines. The rebels barter diamonds for weapons and fund their movement with the illicit diamond trade."
War-affected governments have no illusions about the impact of the diamond trade on the ability of rebel groups to wage war. During United Nations deliberations on a resolution to ban diamonds from Sierra Leone, its ambassador, Ibrahim Kamara, said: "We have always maintained that the conflict in Sierra Leone is not about ideology, tribal or regional difference. It has nothing to do with the so-called problem of marginalized youths or. . . an uprising by rural poor against the urban elite. The root of the conflict is and remains diamonds, diamonds and diamonds."
While the trade in diamonds represents a significant source of revenue, countries at war exploit a variety of natural resources to fund their war efforts. A June, 2000 World Bank report found that "diamonds and other commodities had overtaken politics as the biggest cause of civil war globally."
The use of diamonds to fuel wars has become intolerable for governments, industry, and consumers around the world. The World Diamond Congress has addressed the subject, industries have announced stricter examination of the source of their diamonds, and consumers have led protests against the sale of diamonds with unidentified origins. Non-governmental organizations have also begun a campaign to mobilize public opinion, influence governments, and push industry to further responsible efforts (see www.phrusa.org).
The U.S. Congress has made efforts to limit the use of diamonds to fund conflicts. In September Representative Tony Hall (D-OH), in conjunction with Representatives Frank Wolf (R-VA) and Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), introduced HR 5147, the Consumer Access to a Responsible Accounting for Trade, known as the CARAT Act. The Act will prohibit imports of diamonds mined in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Angola, Guinea, Togo, or Ukraine, with the exception of diamonds mined in accordance with specified UN Resolutions. The Act also calls for diamonds sold in the United States to be accompanied with certificates of origin, for the appointment of a Special Representative for Conflict Diamonds, and for the Executive Branch to work with other governments and organizations to develop a system for controlling the trade in conflict diamonds.
Such legislation may reduce the ease with which diamonds are used to fund wars. But in this country, the gap between the diamonds you buy in a store and the situation in a faraway country is not often understood or recognized by American consumers. In testimony before the House Trade Committee, Representative Hall said: "American consumers -- who buy two-thirds of all the world's diamonds -- have a very different understanding of diamonds than Sierra Leonean, Angolan, or Congolese people...Diamond gemstones' sole worth is for their value as symbols of love and commitment. Whether Congress likes it or not, American consumers simply will not be a party to this blood trade once ads like Benetton's, perhaps showing diamond bracelets on Sierra Leone amputees, start to run."
The CARAT Act attempts to make businesses accountable for their actions. Until now, diamond companies have acted with impunity, buying and selling diamonds wherever and from whomever possible. As Representative Hall put it: "As long as any criminal can capture diamond mines that generate that kind of money, we will be stuck in this vicious cycle of wars. A system that encourages responsible business people to prevent wars, and makes it harder for everyone to deal in smuggled diamonds, will go a long way to break this cycle...The diamond industry's belated response to this problem is promising, but incomplete. To encourage its progress, my bill gives an incentive to inventors who may be able to put diamonds on the same footing as other products -- so that consumers can know where they were mined and make their own decisions about what to buy. The CARAT Act includes ample waivers to ensure legitimate businesses aren't hurt, but it sends a strong message to the smugglers and thugs who count on governments and industry to look the other way. Those days are over, it says."
The CARAT Act, while not a solution to the problem of conflict diamonds, is an important first step. If consumers, government, and business work together to screen diamond origins and scrutinize merchants, the profits from these diamonds will be curtailed. Rebel groups will still wage war, but their means to do so may be diminished.
How Many Major Theater Wars for the Next Quadrennial Defense
Review? -- Don't Ask, Don't Tell
Marcus Corbin, Senior Analyst, mcorbin@cdi.org
In recent defense strategy reviews much effort and attention focused on how many major theater wars (MTWs) the U.S. military should be prepared to fight at one time. The current "nearly simultaneous" two-war plan is used to justify a large portion of existing military forces. The defense bureaucracy is reportedly already resisting a move away from two MTWs in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
Using the number of MTWs as a central element in strategy-making, however, is to answer the wrong question. The MTW-based approach is deeply flawed because: (1) it is not a strategy, (2) its conclusions are arbitrary, and (3) it encourages outdated and rigid thinking. In the next QDR, rather than argue at length about how many MTWs the next strategy should fight, and then declare an "x-number-of-MTWs strategy," decision-makers should go back to the basics of strategy formulation.
A true strategy is a matching of "ends" and "means," by choosing priorities. The prominence of the Two MTWs focus is particularly detrimental because it distracts from a proper national security strategy -- which includes the political, economic, and social components of strategy. Two MTWs excessively emphasizes the last line of defense -- application of overwhelming military force. It overshadows "preventive defense" and efforts to forestall wars in the first place using less destructive and costly means.
Moreover, Two MTWs is decidedly not a national military strategy. It does a poor job of examining and prioritizing all the ends and means the military is likely to encounter in the near future. The Two MTW language focuses on certain ends -- winning the biggest plausible wars -- to the detriment of other national ends -- conducting peacekeeping and other smaller-scale operations -- that the U.S. military is increasingly being tasked to perform. Similarly, the Two MTW language is almost exclusively unilateral in its approach, failing to explore creatively the means that allies could potentially contribute.
If not a strategy, what is Two MTWs? Simply put, it is a force-sizing device, a very arbitrary one. The military uses the number of declared MTWs it prepares to fight as a yardstick in calculating how large its forces should be. The results of these force calculations are usually presented as the only possible answers but actually the force "requirements" depend on a wide variety of hidden and arbitrary assumptions about the shape of possible future interventions and combat. A few prominent assumptions and planning estimates include: acceptable friendly casualty levels; size and capabilities of enemy forces; the combat model used; duration of the fighting; ability to trade space for time; number and size of operations underway elsewhere in the world; desired level of strategic reserves; the level of destruction and civilian casualties that may be inflicted on the enemy; and acceptable overall "risk" in conducting the war.
Varying these and other assumptions can produce wide variations in calculating service "requirements." Focusing on MTW yardsticks in strategy-making encourages automatic acceptance of military planners' arbitrary assumptions and requirements as if they were fixed and immutable truths. In contrast, a more flexible strategy that puts greater emphasis on a wide spectrum of military operations and avoids hanging so much force justification on MTWs would encourage development of a variety of force options and solutions for different military challenges. A "yardstick" is not much use if you need to measure inches.
In addition to these problems, the MTW approach reinforces old ways of thinking and planning. It emphasizes intense "force on force" armored combat along the old Cold War or Iraq War model, downplaying the likely "asymmetrical" and political shape of future wars. The MTW phraseology is rigid because it really only has one answer -- two MTWs: three MTWs is politically impractical, and declaring we would only participate in one MTW is seen as strategic folly.
Although the MTW "strategy" and language have outlived their usefulness, they may serve in the next QDR as bulwarks against force structure reductions; or even against the status quo if forces are to be enlarged. The concept has become an impediment to proper strategy development and to open-minded discussion of future force structures. This approach takes attention, thought, and resources away from key concerns in the future military situation such as military transformation, weapons of mass destruction, peacekeeping operations, and homeland defense.
Because of these flaws, the number-of-MTWs strategy and language should be abandoned in favor of developing a true strategy that prioritizes better among all available means to achieve all desired ends. MTWs as a force-sizing device should be replaced with a "capabilities"approach. Such an approach would decide on a broad range of desired military capabilities -- for example, ability to deploy 5,000 peacekeeping troops within three days to forestall a Rwandan-style genocide -- and then size and equip the force to be able to perform those capabilities. These steps would add flexibility back into what has become excessively rigid thinking.
NATO Won't Cut Forces in Kosovo -- Despite the end of Slobodan Milosevic's tenure as president of Yugoslavia, NATO forces in Kosovo and Bosnia will stay at current levels, according to NATO Secretary-General George Robertson. The international military missions in Kosovo and Bosnia, both of which consist predominantly of troops from NATO countries, currently number 45,000 and 20,000 respectively. According to Mr. Robertson, "it is too early to identity exactly how the changes in Yugoslavia will effect the region."
U.S. Shifts Position on European Security Structures -- Defense Secretary William Cohen, at the annual meeting of NATO defense ministers, signaled a shift in U.S. policy regarding alternative collective security arrangements in Europe under development by nations of the European Union (EU). "We must develop a clearer and -- to be blunt -- a more positive vision of the future NATO-EU relationship." said Mr. Cohen. "It is clear that in the future, NATO will no longer be the only major multilateral structure with a role in responding to crises, including miliary crises, which could effect European stability and security." U.S. support for an EU alternative to NATO, which some analysts believe would serve to "shut out" the United States, has been lukewarm.
Further Vieques Unrest Likely -- Protesters in Puerto Rico are preparing for the arrival of over 15,000 U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine troops this week after a federal judge refused to block the planned military exercises. This is the first joint military training exercise since the accidental death of a civilian military employee during training last April. Under an agreement reached between the Defense Department and the government of Puerto Rico the military can only train 90 days a year, and no live-fire exercises are permitted. Vieques voters will decide by referendum before the end of 2001 whether the Navy will be forced to halt all exercises or permitted to resume live-fire training.
Sea-based NMD No Quick Fix -- In a report released this week by the Council for a Livable World, defense analyst Rodney W. Jones said the next U.S. president should avoid a "headlong rush" to adopt a sea-based system as an alternative to the current ground-based national missile defense program. Proponents of a sea-based system, which would utilize Navy ships equipped with upgraded Aegis radar control systems to intercept ballistic missiles during their boost-phase, have touted it as a quick, cheap alternative to the proposed ground-based system. The report, entitled "Taking National missile Defense to Sea: A Critique of Sea-Based and Boost-Phase Proposals," puts the cost of such a system at as much as $43 billion, with full deployment not achieved until Fiscal Year 2020.
FMS Sale to Bahrain Announced -- The United States plans to sell $51 million worth of military equipment, including software upgrades to the Multiple Launch Rocket System under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program. The prime contractor is Lockheed Martin.
Quotation of the Week -- From the presidential debate, October 11, 2000:
Governor George Bush: "If we're an arrogant nation, they'll resent us. If we're a humble nation, but strong, they'll welcome us."
Vice President Al Gore: "The idea of humility is an important one. But I think that we also have to gave a sense of mission in the world."
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "Radioactive America"
Historically, nuclear weapons production has generated massive amounts of radioactive waste. Poor disposal and containment practices have allowed radioactive waste to contaminate the soil and ground water surrounding nuclear laboratories. A case in point: the nuclear facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. What effect has America's nuclear bomb-making legacy had on our communities nationwide?
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Saturday, October 21 at 7:00 a.m. on Channel 13.
Visit our web site for transcripts, CDI resources, and related links.
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NOW AVAILABLE! CDI's Issue Brief "National Missile Defense: What Does It
All Mean?"
As the debate in the United States on the planned deployment of the national missile defense (NMD) system heats up, the Center for Defense Information (CDI) has released a timely Issue Brief, "National Missile Defense: What Does It All Mean?" on this important national security issue.
The Issue Brief is designed to offer unbiased, in-depth, and up-to-date information on all aspects of the NMD debate to citizens, educators and decision-makers nationwide. Missile defense has gained additional prominence as one of the most divisive and defining issues in this year's presidential campaign. The 56 page document includes the following:
In addition to the print version, CDI is preparing a web site with further information on the National Missile Defense program. Each section in the print version will be updated on the web, on an as-needed basis, to keep the document current.
Readers of the Issue Brief will further benefit from access to the latest CDI documentary on missile defense, "Star Wars: New Hope or Phantom Menace?" This thirty-minute film contains interviews and testimonies by the nation's foremost experts on missile defense. A transcript of the film is available on the Web.
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