The Center for Defense Information
Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW * Washington, DC 20036
(202)332-0600 * Fax (202)462-4559 * www.cdi.org
| September 14, 2000 |
| September 14, 2000 |
The World is Changing Before Our Eyes -- But Do We See?
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
Once again events in different parts of the world open remarkable opportunities for the United States if we can but see how much they foreshadow continuities with and changes from the 20th and 21st centuries.
Russia -- the Soviet Union -- loomed large in U.S. calculations during most of the 20th century. But this past week revealed the condition into which Russia has fallen since the Soviet Union collapsed. In what seemed to be an off the cuff announcement, Russian Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev confirmed that his country's conventional armed forces and Interior troops would be reduced from their current 1.2 million to approximately 850,000.
This comes on top of the reported decision by Vladimir Putin, Russia's President, to let the number of nuclear warheads fall from the approximately 6,000 allowed each side under the START I treaty to 1,500. This decision was made because there is not enough money to ensure the reliability of warheads or their delivery platforms -- intercontinental missiles and submarines. (In fact, Russia's missile forces don't even have money to pay their electric bills.)
Putin's apparent aim in reducing the conventional forces is to produce a smaller, more disciplined and professional military force such as the United States possesses. The proposed reduction will drop the military from fourth to fifth place -- behind China, the U.S., India, and North Korea -- in terms of numbers under arms. Given the current indiscipline, the pecuniary straits into which many Russians in the armed forces have fallen, the widespread avoidance of the draft, and above all the continued drain on people and resources caused by the war in Chechnya, forging a professional force even at this personnel level will be a daunting task.
But it is one in which the United States should stand ready to help. A prostrate Russia is not in America's -- nor the world's -- interest.
Some actions are already underway, such as the establishment of a joint missile information and tracking center designed to facilitate data exchanges about missile launch activities by the U.S. and Russia and eventually by other nations as well. This is a step to offset the well known state of decay in Russia's early warning satellite system. Under another program, the U.S. is helping build facilities to increase the security of stockpiles of nuclear weapons-grade material that have been accumulating as Russia has been dismantling nuclear weapons.
Working with the Russians, the U.S. should maintain and even expand these programs. For example, since the loss of the Russian nuclear attack submarine Kursk in August, the Russians seem open to the idea that navies worldwide need a single, international crew rescue system for use when a submarine cannot surface.
Russia's economic condition has forced it to make these cuts simply to retain a military force for defense. Yet at the same time the United States seems bent on expanding its forces even as its old enemy contracts. The question that has yet to be answered -- and may not be answered even by next year's Quadrennial Defense Review -- is when the U.S. will revamp the forces and force structure it has now and is projecting it will have in 15 years to the threats it will face in the same time period.
Unlike Russia, the U.S. has the luxury of choice, but the choices are not being made -- witness the Cold War legacy weapons systems that are about to be purchased instead of working on systems that would transform the force to better address the threats to peace that are emerging.
Not all of these threats are new, which is why the 21st century will in some ways be like the 20th (and why even a revamped military must retain a range of capabilities). Massive force-on-force battles such as the World War II battle at Kursk between Soviet tank armies and Nazi panzers are the least likely threat, which leaves peacekeeping and small scale rebellions and civil wars as the main challenges of the early part of the new millennium.
These challenges, while they can involve serous fighting, suggest a shift in emphasis along what the Pentagon calls the "spectrum of conflict" from high intensity to medium and low-intensity warfare. The range of possibilities in this arena can be partially illustrated by looking at what the British did in their former colony of Sierra Leone over the last few months.
In May, when it seemed that the government could not even hold the capital of Freetown against rebel advances, the UK dispatched paratroops, aircraft, and a flotilla of warships whose main mission was to maintain control of the airport so that Westerners could be evacuated from the country. But this was not to be a cut-and-run exercise. Joined by Royal Marines, the UK troops stayed on to provide training to government forces and to maintain stability in the area around Freetown. In the rescue of 233 UN troops trapped by the rebels, UK transport helicopters were employed to move men and material. Some 400 trainers remain in the country.
Then, in late August, a small group of UK trainers was abducted by a gang of thugs called the West Side Boys. Five soldiers were released but six others and a Senegalese soldier were held. When negotiations failed to win the hostages' release, British paratroopers backed by helicopter gunships and probably assisted by British special forces struck the encampment where the hostages were being held, freeing all but losing one dead in the attacking force.
Equally important, the British contributed high performance aircraft during the air campaign over Yugoslavia last year, fly missions over Iraq enforcing the "no-fly zone," and led the NATO forces that went into Kosovo after the Serbs capitulated.
Now there is nothing the British have done that U.S. forces can't do at least as well. Yet there is a great reluctance in this country to become involved in preventive actions that might stave off a crisis before it gets out of hand, requiring more costly interventions by the UN or by other regional or ad hoc organizations. As regards Sierra Leone, the U.S. is only sending Special Forces to train Nigerians and units from other nations for employment in Sierra Leone -- a minimal commitment compared to the British actions which includes funding the disarmament and reintegration of surrendered rebels.
The U.S. is not and should not be the world's policeman. But with forces that are properly apportioned to deal with the more likely threats that can be expected, America is less likely to be challenged and therefore less likely to have to use its forces. Military power does support peace, but only when it is usable.
CBO: Current U.S. Military Force Structure is Underfunded
Christopher Hellman, Senior Analyst, chellman@cdi.org
A report released this week by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found that the current U.S. military force structure is substantially underfunded. The report, entitled, "Budgeting for Defense: Maintaining Today's Forces," was requested by Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM), chairman of the Senate Budget Committee.
The report found that current levels of military spending were insufficient to support the force structure needed for the Pentagon's two Major Theater War (MTW) requirement. The two MTW requirement states that the United States needs to be prepared to fight two major wars virtually simultaneously. According to CBO it will cost an average of $340 billion annually -- roughly $50 billion above present levels -- to keep U.S. forces at their present size, modernize their equipment, and maintain current readiness levels.
Of the proposed increase, the lion's share, roughly $37 billion, would go into DoD's procurement accounts, bringing total procurement funding to $90 billion, fifty percent more than the Pentagon's current target of $60 billion annually. In his testimony before the Senate Budget Committee, CBO Director Dan Crippen stated that their procurement funding projection was based on DoD's current practice of keeping some equipment in service longer than in the past. According to Mr. Crippen, if CBO based its projections on DoD's past practice of retiring equipment earlier, the estimate would climb by as much as an additional $25 billion.
In introducing its findings, CBO emphasizes that when considering the size of the Pentagon budget three factors need to be considered: first, whether the U.S. national security strategy is appropriate to respond to likely threats to U.S. security; second, will DoD's military forces and modernization programs support this strategy; and third, will the proposed budget be sufficient to maintain those forces and carry out these programs?
The report focused only on the last of these three questions, as it relates to the current force structure. Yet it is really the first two issues -- whether the U.S. national security strategy is appropriate and the force structure the correct one to support it -- that are the critical ones. CBO recognizes this point, warning that without the comprehensive review necessitated by the first two issues "the appropriate level of budgetary support for national defense cannot be determined."
As is the case with all CBO analyses, the report makes no recommendations. Yet in pointing out the existing mismatch between funding sources and force structure, it does raise the salient issues which must be addressed by the next Administration -- Is the current force structure appropriate to the threats and challenges that will confront the United States in the 21st century, and does the generation of Cold War-era weapons currently under development -- the F-22, the Crusader artillery system, and the New Attack Submarine, to name just a few -- adequately support this strategy?
For additional information, see the complete text of CBO's report, "Budgeting for Defense: Maintaining Today's Forces."
U.S. Options in Montenegro
Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org
On September 24, the citizens of Yugoslavia will go to the polls and elect a new President and legislature. Hundreds of thousands will boycott the vote: Montenegro, the only remaining republic in Yugoslavia other than Serbia, has decided to sit out the elections to protest Serbia's usurpation of most federal powers. Although not voting, Montenegro will be watching closely: the outcome of the elections will decide whether the Yugoslav federation is destroyed once and for all. If Serbia re-elects the current president, Slobodan Milosevic -- or if he steals the election -- Montenegro threatened to secede. If and when it does so, the 14,000 Yugoslav troops in Montenegro may stage a coup to prevent the separation, possibly plunging the Balkans in their fifth war in less than a decade.
As the old adage goes, the job of the military is to prepare for the worst and hope for the best. In the case of Montenegro, a conflict with Serbia is clearly possible, although not preordained. What can the United States and the rest of the international community do to prevent the conflict? Should the United States and its allies act to shield Montenegro from violence?
Inaction would kill Montenegro's reform process and endanger its leaders. It would allow Serbia to punish Montenegro for pursuing every ideal the United States holds dear. Montenegro is not without faults -- most notably corruption -- but unlike Serbia, it has free press, its politicians can disagree with government without fear of persecution, and it has mended fences and pursued friendly relations with its neighbors. The republic's president, Milo Djukanovic, has opened his country to foreign investment and began pursuing European Union membership for Montenegro. For the past three years, Montenegro has been the Balkan success story, standing in contrast to Serbia, which is become increasingly dictatorial and repressive.
Unlike Kosovo, Montenegro is a republic and the United Nations has recognized the right of Yugoslav republics to secede from the federation. Four of them have already exercised that right with UN approval and assistance. A UN-sponsored intervention in Montenegro would stand on firm legal ground even though it would raise concerns about the deepening U.S. commitment to the Balkans. However, Montenegro is the last republic still in partnership with Serbia, and if it can be shielded from violence, it would leave Serbia isolated.
On the other hand, a forceful entry of U.S. and other Western forces into the Montenegro conflict would create a nationalist backlash in Serbia, thus solidifying Slobodan Milosevic's position and prolonging Yugoslavia's agony. Moreover, international intervention may be powerless to reverse Serbian advances in Montenegro.
Ideally, outside assistance would deter a Serbian attack altogether, possibly through a preventive troop deployment. From 1995 to 1999, a relatively modest UN peacekeeping force of about 1,000 helped Macedonia become the only former Yugoslav republic to secede without an armed conflict. CDI called for a preventive mission for Montenegro shortly after the end of the NATO air war against Yugoslavia in summer 1999. However, the chances for a successful preventive mission have dimmed considerably since then. Belgrade could -- and almost certainly would -- use the Yugoslav army to foil such a deployment. Since Yugoslav troops are already deployed in Montenegro, they could quickly gain control of ports and airports that are not already in their hands.
There is virtually no hope of catching the Yugoslav troops off guard. Unlike in 1999, neither the United States nor any other nations have sufficient strike forces in the area. It is doubtful that many of the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Kosovo could be relieved of their duties there without destabilizing their areas of operation. The deployment would take months to organize, giving Milosevic ample warning of upcoming military action and a chance to preempt it by stirring up trouble in Montenegro. If Serbian troops seize Montenegro's ports and airports and deploy on the border, U.S. and allied troops would be left to fight their way in from the Adriatic Sea and by land from Kosovo, Croatia, Albania, or Bosnia. A Serbian preemptive move would change the operation from a preventive deployment to a military intervention, rendering it unpalatable to political leaders in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere.
In another scenario, Yugoslav troops might move against Montenegro's authorities to prevent the republic's secession from the federation. They may have been trying to do just that in March 2000, when Yugoslav troops seized the Podgorica airport shortly before President Djukanovic was scheduled to land there. The pilot avoided the trap by diverting to another airport. Serbia may in the future attempt to take over key government buildings in Podgorica and arrest the republic's leadership. Since the United States and its allies do not have sufficient forces in the region for a ground operation, their only immediate option would be air strikes. It is doubtful that any strikes from the air could come in time to stop a Serbian advance on Montenegro government installations.
The final scenario -- arguably the least likely one in the near future -- is the outbreak of civil war in Montenegro. Its population, although divided on the issue of Montenegro's independence, is not nearly as polarized as in Kosovo or Bosnia. Nor are ethnic cleavages as clear and hostile as elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. However, if armed (which many in Montenegro have always been) and manipulated by Belgrade's propaganda, people of the border areas could try to thwart Montenegro's independence bid, especially if incited by the Serbian forces in the republic. Montenegro's government repeatedly alleged that the Yugoslavian Seventh Military Police Battalion, recently established in Montenegro, is merely a cover for pro-Belgrade paramilitary forces, who are ready to plunge the republic into violence on Milosevic's cue.
Again, NATO allies could do nothing, resort to air strikes and naval gunfire, or intervene on the ground. As Kosovo demonstrated, air strikes and cruise missiles alone cannot stop violence on the ground. They could be more effective in Montenegro if combined with ground operations by Montenegro's forces, which in Kosovo, for all practical purposes, never happened. A similar combination of Western air support and successful ground operations forced the Bosnian Serbs to lay down their weapons in 1995 (the Bosnian Serbs also began losing ground to combined Croat-Muslim forces). However, peace in Bosnia would not have come without Belgrade's pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to stop fighting and start negotiating. This time, Yugoslavia is more likely to unleash its full force against Montenegro. If so -- and if the troops obey orders -- Montenegro's population and security forces would find themselves outgunned and overwhelmed, with or without NATO air support. U.S. and allied ground forces could help stop Serbian advance but, as noted above, any plans to assemble forces are likely to be foiled by a Serbian preemptive move against Montenegro.
Western powers could try to force Serbia to withdraw its forces by bombing Serbia itself. At this point -- with Slobodan Milosevic's regime turning increasingly dictatorial and thus less responsive to public pressure -- the bombing would be unlikely to force Belgrade to change course. It would, however, serve as a pretext for a crackdown on the remaining opposition in Yugoslavia and solidify Milosevic's position. In essence, the West would condemn the Serbs to more years of economic misery and increased political repression in exchange for a most likely doomed effort to stop the Serbian aggression.
The United States must be realistic about its options should Serbia invade Montenegro. Serbian forces outnumber Montenegro's by as much as six to one, and only a significant commitment of U.S. or other allied ground forces, under a UN mandate, could even begin to reverse the situation.
House and Senate Conferees Spar Over Kosovo Language -- Members of the House and Senate who are meeting to iron out the differences between the two house's versions of the annual defense authorization bill appear deadlock over language in the House version which would force a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Kosovo. The House language would require the nearly 6,000 U.S. ground forces be removed from Kosovo by April 1 unless Congress authorizes an extension. The Senate defeated an amendment containing similar language in May.
NATO, US Busy In Former Soviet Republics -- Some 900 British, Polish and Ukrainian soldiers launched a military exercise dubbed "Cossack Steppe-2000" this week in the Crimea on Ukraine's Black Sea coast. The scenario calls for the troops to quell domestic ethnic unrest, irritating the numerous -- and often restive -- ethnic Russians living in Crimea. The same week, U.S. forces led another exercise, CentrasBat-2000, in Kazakhstan. The exercise, conducted under the auspices of NATO's Partnership for Peace program, also involves troops from Great Britain, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The last two are currently embroiled in fighting an Islamic insurgency on their territories. Also this week, U.S. Green Berets launched a training program in the South Caucasus republic of Georgia, instructing troops from the host country as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan in demining operations.
New Materials to Reduce B-2 Maintenance Time -- The Air Force has begun flight testing a B-2 bomber equipped with a new type of radar absorbing material that is intended to reduce the maintenance time of the aircraft. The new Alternate High-Frequency Material (AHFM) is a permanent coating that is sprayed on to certain sections of the airplane. It does not require the current lengthy process of taping joints and fasteners to ensure stealth, and permits easy and quick maintenance of systems inside the plane that are beneath the sprayed outer skin of the air craft. Not all areas of the plane are treated with AHFM. The current flight tests will check the material's durability and the radar-cross section of the aircraft.
Quotation of the Week -- "Deployment [of a national missile defense system] means the fielding of an operational system with some military utility, which is effective under realistic combat conditions against realistic threats and countermeasures, possibly without adequate prior knowledge of the target cluster composition, timing trajectory or direction, and one operated by military personnel at all times of the day or night and in all weather. Such a capability has yet to be shown practicable for NMD. These operational considerations will become an increasingly important part of test and simulation plans over the coming years." Phillip Coyle, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Department of Defense, in testimony before the House Government Reform Committee, September 8, 2000.
This Week On America's Defense Monitor: "Innovation in Arms
Control: De-Alerting"
As President Clinton pointed out during the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty debate, arms control measures not only provide security, they also save enormous amounts of money. In the aftermath of the debate's ultimate Congressional rejection of the treaty, there are several promising new approaches to arms control that are practical and provide real safety from nuclear disasters. They save billions of dollars by reducing nuclear arsenals and in turn, the likelihood of a new arms race with the world's nuclear nations can be reduced.
Airs in Washington, DC on Sunday, September 17 at 10:30 a.m. on Channel 32.
Airs in NYC on Friday, September 25 on Channel 25 at 7:30 p.m., and on
Saturday, September 26 at 7:00 a.m. on Channel 13.
Visit our web site for transcripts, CDI resources, RealVideo, and related links.
Regular Price: $39 each
INTERNET PRICE: $29
Order at 800-CDI-3334, or on the web.
NOW AVAILABLE! CDI's Issue Brief "National Missile Defense: What Does It
All Mean?"
As the debate in the United States on the planned deployment of the national missile defense (NMD) system heats up, the Center for Defense Information (CDI) has released a timely Issue Brief, "National Missile Defense: What Does It All Mean?" on this important national security issue.
The Issue Brief is designed to offer unbiased, in-depth, and up-to-date information on all aspects of the NMD debate to citizens, educators and decision-makers nationwide. Missile defense has gained additional prominence as one of the most divisive and defining issues in this year's presidential campaign. The 56 page document includes the following:
In addition to the print version, CDI is preparing a web site with further information on the National Missile Defense program. Each section in the print version will be updated on the web, on an as-needed basis, to keep the document current.
Readers of the Issue Brief will further benefit from access to the latest CDI documentary on missile defense, "Star Wars: New Hope or Phantom Menace?" This thirty-minute film contains interviews and testimonies by the nation's foremost experts on missile defense. A transcript of the film is available on the Web.
TO ORDER...
Please send a check for $5 to the Center for Defense Information, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Suite 615, Washington, DC 20036. Please write "Issue Brief" on the check. For more information, please e-mail Tomas Valasek.