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| September 8, 2000 |
| September 8, 2000 |
Deferring NMD -- The President and the Chief Pentagon Tester Speak
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
Few Americans -- indeed few in the world who have access to CNN or the Internet -- can have missed the news about President Clinton's September 1 announcement deferring the start of construction work on the National Missile Defense (NMD) radar site in Alaska. News reports of the announcement, made in a speech at Georgetown University in Washington, DC, emphasized the technological unreliability of the proposed system -- one intercept in three tries.
Watching or hearing the President's address live could easily leave the impression that technology was the showstopper. While technology undoubtedly was a major factor, a careful reading of the transcript indicates that diplomatic considerations were at least of equal importance in Mr. Clinton's decision. The truly substantive beginning of his address focused on measures to control the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the means to deliver them. He then briefly discussed deterrence before turning to NMD and its technological problems, which he introduced with the significant caveat that "no one suggests that NMD would ever substitute for diplomacy or even deterrence."
Having declared that he could not conclude that the experts had "enough confidence in the technology and the operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system" and would therefore not "authorize deployment of a national missile defense at this time," the President transitioned back to the diplomatic realm: "An effective NMD could play an important part of our national security strategy. But it could not be the sum total of that strategy....We must work with our allies and with Russia to prevent potential adversaries from ever threatening us with...weapons of mass destruction in the first place...."
This line of thought then expanded into a discussion of arms control measures both during the Cold War when they enhanced strategic stability and in the post-Cold War era when the U.S. and Russia are reducing their nuclear arsenals. As could be expected in this context, the President singled out the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as a "key part of the international security structure...." He then spoke briefly about the position of the NATO allies on NMD and the need to consider the impact on Asian nations , particularly China, of going forward with NMD.
In one of his final paragraphs, after asserting that "no nation can ever have a veto over American security," Mr. Clinton summed up his view and his rationale for deferring deployment: "I am convinced that America and the world will be better off if we explore the frontiers of strategic defenses while continuing to pursue arms control -- to stand with our allies and to work with Russia and others to stop the spread of deadly weapons."
"Exploring the frontiers of strategic defenses" gets back to technology and the question of just how bad is the technology? That question was taken up in an August 9 segment of the "NewsHour with Jim Lehrer" on the Public Broadcasting System (PBS). Among the interviewees was Philip Coyle, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation for the Pentagon. What was aired by "The NewsHour" was the following:
Coyle: The testing program has been slipping. All of these things have turned out to be more difficult than we thought. Just manufacturing the kill vehicle, preparing for the tests, and achieving success in the tests has taken longer than we thought.
NewsHour: So, can you say yet whether the system is technologically feasible?
Coyle: Aspects of the program have already shown, been shown to be technologically feasible. We've shown that we can make those radars work. We've shown that we can hit a bullet with a bullet. There are other aspects that we simply haven't even tried yet, let alone demonstrated.
NewsHour: So, it's a question mark as to whether it's technologically feasible from your standpoint?
Coyle: Yes.
The transcript of the entire interview with Mr. Coyle expands significantly -- and revealingly -- on these brief observations in a manner that leaves little doubt that Mr. Coyle believes that NMD has a long way to go before it can be considered technologically viable. Even the "successful" intercept was not clear cut as "it did not have what you would call a realistic decoy...."
Early in the interview, after observing that the first intercept test proved that hitting a bullet with a bullet was possible, Mr. Coyle said: "What we haven't shown yet is that we can do that in realistic, operational situations without warning and in the presence of likely countermeasures."
A few minutes later, Mr. Coyle says: "The targets need to be more realistic. In the...flight intercept tests that we've done so far, the target complex has consisted of a reentry vehicle, the bus [rocket] that carries the reentry vehicle up into space, and a large balloon. The large balloon has been called a decoy but it really isn't a decoy because it is quite large and bright and doesn't really fool the interceptor." When asked if he thought the NMD system will be able eventually to discriminate a real warhead from decoys, Mr Coyle responded: "That will depend on how sophisticated the decoys are....[A]s the decoys become more realistic it makes the discrimination task more difficult. And when pressed by the interviewer: "But it's not an impossibility?" Mr. Coyle responded: "I think it's too soon to say."
While observing that certain parts of the NMD complex have been shown to operate effectively and to be technologically feasible, Mr. Coyle repeated an analogy used by Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) to illustrate how much more needs to be done: "[I]n golf there is hitting a hole-in-one, which is hard to do. There is hitting a hole-in-one when the hole is moving but you know where it's going....We succeeded in doing that in the first flight intercept test....And then there is hitting a hole-in-one where the hole is moving and you don't know where it's going exactly, perhaps. And there may be other holes on the green with flags sticking out of them that are not the real hole and you have to discriminate between the real one and the fake ones, the countermeasures."
To which we would add, "and do it every time."
For additional information, see The text of the President's September 1, 2000 speech and the text of the PBS interview of Mr. Coyle.
End-Use Monitoring Program in Shambles
Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
A report issued by the General Accounting Office (GAO) last month has identified severe weaknesses in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) end-use monitoring program. The GAO report, "Foreign Military Sales: Changes Needed to Correct Weaknesses in End-Use Monitoring Program," details the inability of the current system to adequately track the destinations and uses of U.S. arms sold abroad.
The report defines end-use monitoring as "the procedures used to verify that foreign governments are using and controlling U.S. defense articles and services in accordance with U.S. terms and conditions of the transfer. Verification measures, referred to as end-use checks, range from contacting the appropriate foreign government representative for information to physical inspection by U.S. personnel." FMS is defined as "a security assistance program to transfer U.S. defense articles or services to foreign governments and international organizations from Department of Defense (DoD) stocks or through Defense-managed contracts."
The report examined three aspects of the current FMS end-use monitoring program: "1) the implementation of the Department of Defense's requirement to observe and report on defense articles and services transferred under the Foreign Military Sales program, 2) the Department's implementation of requirements to perform end-use checks, and 3) the extent to which the Department has satisfied the reporting requirements of the end-use monitoring amendment to the Arms Export Control Act."
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is responsible for carrying out DoD's end-use monitoring responsibilities. The Arms Export Control Act requires this monitoring to "provide reasonable assurance that the recipient is complying with U.S. government requirements on the use, transfers, and security of defense articles and services." To that end, DSCA has developed five criteria, called standards, when end-use checks are to be made: any indication that an Arms Export Control Act violation has occurred; discovery of substantial problems or weaknesses during DoD reviews of foreign government's adherence to U.S. requirements for protecting classified military information; impending or actual significant and unusual political or military upheaval in the host country; development of substantial defense interaction or other ties between the end user and another country whose interests are not compatible with those of the United States; or illicit attempts by countries unfriendly to the United States to obtain U.S. equipment of types held by the end user.
A limitation of the current system is that the United States must often rely on host country records to make sure that U.S. weapons are where they are supposed to be and are not being used for unintended purposes. For example, the U.S. relies on host countries to account for Stinger missiles, but the report notes that "the reliability of host country records varies." Further, other weapons such as the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles "have special monitoring provisions that are included in the terms of sale." But with regard to this particular weapon, the report found hat no monitoring has ever been performed by U.S. personnel.
The GAO found that there were several problems with the current FMS end-use monitoring program. In particular they noted that the Department of Defense "has not effectively implemented the requirements that its field personnel observe and report on foreign government's use of U.S. defense articles and services transferred through the Foreign Military Sales program,...has not issued guidance specifying what monitoring is required,....has not effectively implemented requirements for its field personnel to perform end-use checks in response to specific standards or for selected weapon systems,...did not establish procedures to ensure field personnel received the information needed to initiate end-use checks or provide guidance on how to apply the standards,...and has not complied with the reporting requirements of the end-use monitoring amendment to the Arms Export Control Act."
The report lists four recommendations to improve the current system: "issue specific guidance to field personnel on what activities need to be performed for the routine observation of U.S. defense equipment and issue guidance for the monitoring of specific weapons systems; develop procedures to provide field personnel with the information necessary to apply the five end-use check standards, including the information contained in Arms Export Control Act violation reports, and provide guidance on when to apply the standards; reconcile discrepancies in foreign governments' Stinger missile inventories where discrepancies exist; and comply with the 1996 end-use monitoring amendment by reporting required information to Congress."
The lack of prudent oversight of U.S. weapons is particularly troubling in light of the arms export reforms announced by the Clinton Administration earlier this summer. (For more information on U.S. export reforms, see "U.S. Changes Arms Export Reforms," Weekly Defense Monitor, June 1, 2000.) The new export process will reduce oversight and transparency and raises the probability of unauthorized retransfers, which means more U.S. weapons may end up in the hands of human rights abusers and others who wage war. The U.S. must more stridently monitor its arms exports to prevent such unintended complicity in conflict and violence.
Sen. Cochran: NMD Technology Ready -- Accusing the Clinton Administration of "dragging its feet" on deployment of a national missile defense system (NMD), Senator Thad Cochran (R-MS), Chairman of the Government Affairs Committee's International Security Subcommittee, said that the technology necessary for deployment of an NMD system is ready. Senator Cochran released a report entitled "Stubborn Things: A decade of Facts About Ballistic Missile Defense" earlier this week, saying that "All the elements of the system have already been proven to work...further delays simply put us at risk unnecessarily."
Russia to Slash Active Forces -- The Russian AVN Military News Agency is reporting that according to a highly placed source inside the Ministry of Defense the Russian military will cut 400,000 people from the active military over the next three years, reducing the size of the total force by roughly one-third. The source also told AVN that Russia's independent Strategic Rocket Forces would be brought under the command of the General Staff, effectively downgrading its importance within the Russian military.
Laser Scores Multiple Target Success -- The U.S. Army's Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) successfully tracked and shot down two Katyusha rockets in a test at White Sands Missile Range last week. This is the first test against multiple targets for the THEL system, which is being developed by the Army and the Israeli government for deployment along Israel's northern border with Lebanon. The Katyusha rocket used as a target is similar to the short range rockets fired by Hezbollah guerillas at Israel from inside Lebanon. Previously the THEL performed successfully against a single Katyusha rocket during its first intercept test on June 6.
Quotation of the Week -- "The Clinton administration has spent too much money to assure that our forces can, by and large, meet this outdated [readiness] standard -- even troops who would not, in any circumstance, be used for months into a conflict. Certainly, the fact that all units don't meet every standard means far less than politicians may imply, and our current level of readiness is certainly not a significant threat to our national security." Adm. William Owens, USN (Ret.), former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "The Wrong Argument about Readiness," op-ed in the New York Times, September 1, 2000.
This Week on America's Defense Monitor: "Colombia in Crisis"
Guerrilla warfare, an expanding drug trade, and a history of government abuses have pushed Colombia to the brink of collapse. This program examines Colombia's deepening crisis, and America's controversial rescue plan.
Airs in Washington, DC on Sunday, September 10 at 10:30 a.m. on Channel 32.
Airs in NYC on Friday, September 18 on Channel 25 at 7:30 p.m., and on
Saturday, September 19 at 7:00 a.m. on Channel 13.
Visit our web site for transcripts, CDI resources, RealVideo, and related links.
Regular Price: $39 each
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Coming Soon! CDI's Issue Brief "National Missile Defense: What Does It
All Mean?"
As the debate in the United States on the planned deployment of the national missile defense (NMD) system heats up, the Center for Defense Information (CDI) is releasing a timely Issue Brief, "National Missile Defense: What Does It All Mean?" on this important national security issue.
The Issue Brief is designed to offer unbiased, in-depth, and up-to-date information on all aspects of the NMD debate to citizens, educators and decision-makers nationwide. Missile defense has gained additional prominence as one of the most divisive and defining issues in this year's presidential campaign. The 56 page document scheduled for release in September 2000, will include the following:
In addition to the print version, CDI is preparing a web site with further information on the National Missile Defense program. Each section in the print version will be updated on the web, on an as-needed basis, to keep the document current.
Readers of the Issue Brief will further benefit from access to the latest CDI documentary on missile defense, "Star Wars: New Hope or Phantom Menace?" This thirty-minute film contains interviews and testimonies by the nation's foremost experts on missile defense. A transcript of the film is available on the Web. The Issue Brief will be available mid-September, 2000.
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Please send a check for $5 to the Center for Defense Information, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Suite 615, Washington, DC 20036. Please write "Issue Brief" on the check. For more information, please e-mail Tomas Valasek.