The Center for Defense Information
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| August 24, 2000 |
| August 24, 2000 |
Reforming U.N. Peace Operations
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
In a little noted action on March 7, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked ten distinguished men and women from as many countries to take an in-depth look at U.N. peace and security activities. On August 17 the panel presented its findings to the Secretary-General. Six days later, Mr. J. Brian Atwood, the U.S. panel member and former head of the U.S. Agency for International Development, spoke to a gathering in Washington, DC about the report.
The report's message, emphasized by Mr. Atwood, is that the U.N. today cannot perform the principal mission for which it was created -- maintaining peace. In part, this is due to the change in the nature of conflicts from inter-state to intra-state. But most of the problems are systemic within the organization itself.
One of the more significant problems is that resources are inadequate for the missions that the Security Council hands the Secretary-General to execute. This is most clearly seen when "the baton is passed from the peacekeeper to the peacemaker" who is charged with rebuilding war-ravaged societies. This in turn produces long-term missions such as the ones of 30 and 40 years duration in the Middle East, South Asia, and Cyprus. Those who decry the absence of "exit strategies" overlook the point that adequate, sustained resources for rebuilding a society are the ticket for disengagement.
The report also discusses "entry" strategies -- the determination that the U.N. has to become involved. "There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them." In other words, any peacekeeping force must have the mandate, resources, and rules of engagement sufficient to do the task assigned.
Fundamentally, the U.N. is not designed and should not be expected to engage in warfighting. For that, coalitions of the willing must intervene. But where it does go, the U.N. will be a credible deterrent to the resumption of fighting only if it is well prepared. In some instances this means "bigger forces, better equipped and more costly." But being well prepared is less costly overall because potential troublemakers will find themselves confronted by a more professional force backed by a more unified United Nations.
Equally important in the panel's view is the necessity to change the psychology of peace maintenance. Should one party to a cease-fire or peace accord undermine the agreement (as in Angola or Sierra Leone), the U.N. must be willing to separate victim from aggressor, identify the latter in no uncertain terms, and if necessary abandon that neutrality which is the hallmark of traditional peace operations.
Mr. Atwood highlighted the report's recommendation that no Security Council mandate should be passed before the Secretary-General informs the Council that adequate numbers of trained forces, properly equipped for the type of mission envisioned, have been made available by U.N. Member States. To this end, the Secretary-General should have the authority, with the approval of the U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to commit up to $50 million in advance of the enactment of a Security Council mandate "once it becomes clear that an operation is likely to be established."
Another problem is the lack of a centralized early warning system and an assessment center to identify and monitor trouble spots around the globe. The needed information sources -- U.N. aid and relief personnel, special representatives of the Secretary-General, those who work in specialized U.N. agencies (such as UNESCO and UNICEF) -- already exist; what's missing is a central point into which all data would flow for analysis. The report recommends forming a new Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat by combining the existing Situation Center in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) with the numerous policy planning offices throughout the U.N. augmented by a few "military analysts, experts in international criminal networks and information systems specialists."
Mr. Atwood surprised some listeners when he told them that the U.N., despite being in the peacekeeping business for 50 years, has no permanent peacekeeping office. DPKO is almost entirely excluded from the regular assessment process that funds the U.N.'s core operations -- of which peacekeeping is one. The staff positions in DPKO, the U.N. Headquarter's nerve center for peace operations, are all "temporary" and must be re-authorized annually. (Annual costs for DPKO and related Headquarters support offices is approximately $50 million, some 2% of total peacekeeping costs. By comparison, the Pentagon's Fiscal Year 2001 budget request for overseas contingencies, humanitarian and disaster aid was $4.165 billion or 1.4 % of the Pentagon's entire $289 billion appropriation.)
The report also states that there are too few positions in the DPKO for the workload. "It is clearly not enough to have 32 officers providing military planning and guidance to 27,000 troops [now some 35,000] in the field, nine civilian police staff to identify, vet and provide guidance for up to 8,600 police, and 15 political desk officers for 14 current operations and two new ones..." (That's a ratio of 1 person in DPKO headquarters for every 770 in the field. Again by comparison, the Pentagon's Joint Staff plus the headquarters staffs of the European, Pacific, and Central Commands, in whose geographic areas the U.N. has peacekeeping missions, total some 4,260 personnel. With 1.389 million men and women on active duty in the entire U.S. military, the ratio of operational headquarters staff to the entire U.S. active duty strength is 1:326 – and this does not include the staffs of the service components of the three commands listed above.)
Many other deficiencies were identified such as the need for more rapid deployments ( no more than 30 days for traditional peacekeeping and 90 days for more complex missions) by brigade-sized units; improved, verified stand-by force arrangements and identification of "on-call" police, judicial, and human rights volunteers; a global logistics support infrastructure; and adoption of a "modern, well utilized information technology" system.
Rectifying these deficiencies requires changing the U.N. structure -- the work culture in general as well as instituting a meritocracy that can attract and hold qualified people -- and the attitude of the Member States who are the source of the resources needed by the organization to carry out its mandate to serve the world.
Peace is a never-ending struggle, but the effort must be undertaken and renewed whenever and wherever needed. That is the simple if painful message left both by the "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" and by J. Brian Atwood.
See the full text of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.
U.S. Still Number One Arms Exporter
Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has released its annual report, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1992-1999," revealing that the United States again leads the world in arms exports. According to the report, worldwide arms transfer agreements, those that take into consideration both developed and developing countries, totaled approximately $30.3 billion in 1999.
The CRS report (also known as the Grimmett Report after its author, Richard Grimmett) defines developing nations as all countries except the United States, Russia, the European nations, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The report examines the export of fourteen categories of conventional weapons: tanks and self-propelled guns, artillery, armored personnel carriers and armored cars, major surface combatants, minor surface combatants, submarines, guided missile patrol boats, supersonic combat aircraft, subsonic combat aircraft, other aircraft, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, and anti-ship missiles.
The United States ranked first in all major categories. The U.S. led the way with $11.8 billion worth of arms transfer agreements worldwide (38.9%), up from the world leading $10.3 billion in 1998. For 1999 Russia was second with $4.8 billion and Germany was third at $4 billion. The United States also had the highest value of international arm deliveries in 1999 with $18.4 billion worth of weapons, more than 54% of the world total. The United Kingdom was second with $4.5 billion worth of deliveries and Russia was third with $2.7 billion.
In 1999 the developing world made 68% of all arms transfer agreements and received 66.8% of all arms deliveries with the United States concluding the most agreements with and deliveries to the developing world. At $8.1 billion worth of agreements, the U.S. was party to 39.2% of the total involving nations in the developing world. Russia was second with $4.1 billion (19.9% of the total) and Germany third with $2 billion (9.7% of the world total). In terms of deliveries, the United States delivered $11.4 billion worth of arms to developing countries for 50.1% of the world total. The United Kingdom was second with $3.9 billion (17.2% of the total), and France was third with $2.2 billion (9.7% of the total).
While the primary weapons exporters remain fairly constant, the major customers for weapons in 1999 were somewhat different that in previous years. In 1999 South Africa made the most agreements of all developing nations with $3.3 billion worth of agreements. Egypt was second with $2.6 billion and Israel third with $2.3 billion. However, between 1996-1999, the United Arab Emirates concluded $7.7 billion worth of agreements, India $7.3 billion, and Saudi Arabia $7.1 billion to lead the countries of the developing world. The developing world also received $22.7 billion in arms deliveries in 1999. Saudi Arabia came first with $6.9 billion in weapons deliveries (30.4% of the developing word's total arms deliveries) with Taiwan second at $6.2 billion and Israel a distant third at $2 billion in deliveries.
In addition to dissecting the arms trade numbers, the CRS report makes predictions about the trends in weapons sales in the coming years. It says that "As individual nations in the Near East, Asia, and Latin America attempt to replace older military equipment, it is possible that additional notable arms sales may result." However, the report also notes that the financial problems of many potential customers, some due to falling commodity prices, many prevent countries from undertaking expensive weapons procurements.
The report also discusses trends among arms exporters. Of particular note is that Russia doubled the value of its arms transfer agreements in 1999 after several years of falling export values. While Russia has had difficulty marketing and selling weapons in the post-Cold War world, the diversity of its weapons stocks availably and its willingness to make many smaller sales for hard currency are seen as strong points. Although Iran and Iraq have been lost as lucrative trading partners in the last decade, Russia has found expanding arms markets in China and India. Both have been beneficiaries of sophisticated weapons and technology transfers. The report claims that this trend is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
Even so, U.S. dominance of the international arms market is in no danger of falling, however. In fact, with additional export reforms (for more information see, "U.S. Changes Arms Export Policy," Rachel Stohl, Weekly Defense Monitor, June 1, 2000), the U.S. will be better positioned to export its wares with fewer restrictions. The report asserts, "At the turn of the new century, however, the United States seems best positioned to lead in new arms agreements with developing nations." But, the political and economic situation of developing countries will prevent many major arms purchases. The report says, "Furthermore, it seems likely that very expensive weapons orders from individual developing countries will be sporadic in the near term. Consequently, the overall level of the arms trade is likely to remain generally flat for the foreseeable future, with annual sales totals well below those of the Persian Gulf War period."
While arms exports have some benefits to the American economy and political standing, arms exports also come at a price. Arming our "allies" to the teeth does not encourage sustainability or peace; it only furthers arms races and boosts industry profits. The U.S. must reconsider its arms export strategies and limit the number of weapons it sends to already overly saturated and struggling economies. Offering assistance to rebuild infrastructures, assist with healthcare, fund development programs, and improve educational systems are better investments for U.S. industry and sound foreign policy for the United States.
For more information on the CRS report see, "Developing World Receives $28.6 Billion in Conventional Arms in 1997," by Rachel Stohl, Weekly Defense Monitor, August 28, 1998 and "Developing World Remains Attractive Arms Market," by Rachel Stohl, Weekly Defense Monitor, August 12, 1999.
The New Season of Discontent in Yugoslavia
By Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org
Wars in the Balkans usually come in the spring. Serbia's crackdown in Kosovo began in March 1998, NATO's air war against Yugoslavia in March 1999. The first shots in Croatia's war for independence were fired in May 1991. In April 1992, a rocket attack by Serbian jets launched Bosnia's fratricidal war. This autumn, the cycle may be broken. For not one, but two, conflicts threaten to flare from Belgrade to the Adriatic coast of Montenegro at this unusual time of the year. Both revolve around the Yugoslav elections set for September 24.
First may be Serbia, the larger of the only two remaining republics of the former Yugoslav Federation. In early polls, President Slobodan Milosevic lags behind the main opposition's candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, by as many as 26 points. In the past, Milosevic managed to diffuse challenges to his rule by splitting the opposition and waiting out months of street demonstrations. But the tactic may not work this time. The Trojan horse of the opposition movement, Vuk Draskovic -- whose propensity to let down fellow opposition parties in crucial moments made many Yugoslavs wonder is he is not on the government's side after all -- is finally being shoved to the margins. The presidential candidate put forth by Draskovic -- despite pleas from rest of the opposition not to split the anti-Milosevic vote -- is languishing on the margins of the polls with around 5%. There are even signs that some in the Draskovic camp are ready to cast their lot with the main anti-Milosevic coalition, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS).
Kostunica's overwhelming lead will make rigging the elections difficult. That's not to say it will be fair -- a crackdown on independent TV stations and newspapers left the government in control of most media in Serbia. The Milosevic government also controls access to Yugoslavia and is certain to refuse visas to foreign monitors -- if any are invited -- deemed unacceptable to Milosevic. The opposition plans to train nearly 30,000 observers but they will have no legal or physical way of forcing access to the ballots. Milosevic is in charge of the treasury and thus has an unlimited campaign chest. DOS is in financial trouble also because it wisely decided against accepting Western money. In a country still reeling from NATO's bombing campaign last year, taking Washington's and Brussels' dollars would be a political suicide. Despite overwhelming odds against him, Kostunica maintains a sizable lead in pre-election polls. If on September 24 votes for the opposition suddenly vanish from ballot boxes, trouble, possibly quite violent, will follow.
Milosevic is extremely unlikely to concede the elections and retire. If anything, his rule has only become more coercive. Since the end of the NATO war, Serbian security forces have jailed opposition journalists, beat up student activists, and raided and physically destroyed many independent media stations. Milosevic may yet succeed in fending off the opposition challenge through the usual means -- every day, new presidential candidates pop up in an apparent attempt to split the opposition vote. But if all non-violent means fail, Milosevic may fall back on two of his institutions: the police and the military, recently purged of all potentially non-loyal elements.
His victory would almost certainly launch the second conflict, this one with Montenegro, which remains a part of the federation only on paper. It has its own government, currency, security force, and for over a year it has all but ignored Yugoslav laws. It is also sitting out the September federal elections, arguing that recent constitutional changes passed by the Parliament have for all practical purposes destroyed the Yugoslav Federation.
For over a year, Montenegrin leaders have resisted the temptation to declare outright independence lest they provoke a war with unforeseeable consequences. Serbia has one soldier in Montenegro for every member of the Montenegrin security service. Thousands more troops at Milosevic's disposal wait in Serbia itself. A war would be nothing short of devastating and could leave Montenegro without much of the territory it now controls. For all these reasons, Montenegrin leaders have been admirably reserved in the face of provocations by the Serbian military in Montenegro.
But the prospect of another presidential term by Slobodan Milosevic is proving too much to bear. Montenegro has essentially given the Serbs an ultimatum: remove Milosevic in September or lose the last partner in the dying federation. Montenegro's president, Milo Djukanovic, warned that "the more uncertain the beginning of democratic change in Serbia, the more the people of Montenegro will favor independence." Lest the point be lost on Serbian voters, Montenegro's Prime Minister, Filip Vujanovic, elaborated. "It is certain that the citizens of Montenegro will opt for an independent Montenegro if Slobodan Milosevic wins the September elections."
Would Milosevic fight to keep Montenegro in the federation? Past experience from Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia would suggest "yes" but it may not be a clear choice. The Kosovo crackdown was precipitated by the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army and its attacks on Serbian forces in Kosovo. No organization with its zeal and tactics exists in Montenegro. The war in Croatia was carried out on behalf of Serbian minorities there. In Bosnia, the ethnic Serbs in the republic actually did most of the fighting themselves. But the ethnic distinctions in Montenegro are rather blurry. Serbia's differences with the republic are political, not ethnic. The populations of Serbia and Montenegro are quite reluctant to fight each other. Milosevic recently replaced old hands in the Yugoslav (now essentially Serbian) army with cadres hardened from the Kosovo war to assure the military's loyalty. That may guarantee the officers' allegiance but will the ordinary troops fight?
It is also possible that Milosevic will need a war -- any war -- to give himself a pretext for breaking up opposition protests after the vote, or to prevent voting altogether should he expect an unwanted outcome. The Kosovo war and especially NATO's air attacks silenced the regime's critics better than any police or censor ever could. But again, there are differences. Serbs genuinely felt under siege in Kosovo, where the culturally foreign Albanian majority displaced Serbs from some of Serbia's most treasured religious and historic locations. The sense of endangerment, in turn, fed a wave of nationalism in Serbia. NATO attacks fueled this nationalist sentiment.
But no such link exists in Montenegro -- no ethnic minority under siege, no orthodox churches being toppled. A war there will not garner as much popular support for the government as Kosovo did. Furthermore, if he mobilizes reservists already tired of a decade of wars and increasingly hostile to Serbia's ruling circles, Milosevic threatens to unleash forces that might eventually topple him.
Will there be one, two, or no wars in Yugoslavia? Only the ruling regime knows. But one thing is certain: this autumn promises to be a season of upheaval in Yugoslavia.
F-22 to Exceed Congressional Production Cost Cap
Christopher Hellman, Senior Analyst, chellman@cdi.org
A report released last week by the General Accounting Office (GAO) states that estimates by both the Air Force and the Defense Department put the costs of producing the F-22 "Raptor" above spending caps enacted by Congress.
Concerned about the spiraling costs of the F-22 program, Congress in 1997 capped both development and production costs of the aircraft as part of the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998. Development costs were capped at $18.688 billion, while production costs were limited to $43.4 billion. Flexibility was built in to the caps to permit changes resulting from such things as later congressional actions or revised inflation estimates. While capping the total cost of the program, the 1997 legislation did not specify the number of aircraft to be purchased.
At the time the GAO looked at the Air Force's and DoD's estimates, production costs for the F-22 were capped at $39.8 billion, due in large part to legislation which shifted two of the aircraft from production models to pre-production test airframes. The GAO found that both the Air Force's production cost estimate of $40.8 billion and DoD's estimate of $48.6 billion exceeded the adjusted congressional cap. The GAO also noted that while about half of the $21 billion in cost reduction initiatives identified by the F-22 contractors and the program office had not yet been implemented, the "possibility exists that these cost estimates could increase further if some cost reductions do not materialize."
The GAO looked at 10 cost reduction initiatives out of 1,240 plans identified by contractors and the program office. Alone these 10 plans accounted for $6.8 billion of the estimated $21 billion in potential cost savings. Of these ten, the GAO found that four of the plans, worth $5.6 billion "may not be achievable because they were made dependent on decisions or later determinations by the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Congress." Such cost reductions include congressional approval of multi-year production of the F-22, which contractors estimate will save $1.5 billion, and DoD and Congressional approval of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which could result in $1 billion in lower contractor overhead, since many of the JSF contractors are also working on the F-22.
In examining the reasons for the differences between the Air Force's and DoD's cost estimates, the GAO found that while "both estimates were based on the production of 339 aircraft, the two estimating groups did not use the same estimating methods, nor did they make the same estimating assumptions." The difference of $7.8 billion is due to DoD's higher estimates of the actual cost of production ($3.7 billion above the Air Force levels) and lower estimates of potential savings ($4.1 billion below). This difference represents 19 percent of total production costs, which could have a profound effect on the F-22 program if it is to stay within the congressional budget limit. The GAO estimated that "the Air Force would have to buy about 85 fewer F-22 aircraft than now planned."
The GAO report recommends that the Air Force report quarterly on the status of production cost reduction plans. It also recommends that DoD "reconcile the number of F-22s that need to be procured with the congressional cost limitation and report to the Congress on the implications of procuring fewer F-22s because of potentially higher costs." In his written response to the GAO's recommendation, George Schnieter, DoD's director of Strategic and Tactical Systems stated that the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review would determine the number of F-22s that could be produced within the congressional cap.
If DoD's estimates are correct and Congress stands firm, the GAO believes that 85 F-22s will have to be cut from the planned buy. (According to the GAO, DoD estimators put this number "between 75 and 90.") In 1991, the Air Force reduced the planned number of F-22s from 648 to 438, and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review cut it to 339. But can the Air Force really live with only 254 F-22s?
For more information, visit CDI's TacAir web site or see the text of the GAO's report, "Defense Acquisitions: Recent F-22 Production Cost Estimates Exceeded Congressional Limitation," NSAID-00-178, August 15, 2000.
NMD Testing Delays Increasing -- The National Missile Defense testing program has slipped behind schedule eight hours each day, according to Philip Coyle, the Pentagon's top testing official, and at this rate, won't be ready for deployment until 2007, two years after the current target date. "So the program has been slipping at the rate of a third or more of a day per day in the last year and a half,...(and) if it continues at that rate, we'll be a couple of years behind in 2005." The comments were part of an interview taped for "Newshour with Jim Lehrer," but which were never aired. Defense Week reported the story on August 21.
Kosovo Body Estimate Slashed -- Far fewer Kosovo Albanians have been killed by Serbian forces than NATO estimated during its air war against Yugoslavia in March 1999. The spokesman for the NATO alliance, which justified its military action as necessary to stop "ethnic cleansing" of the Albanian majority in Kosovo, estimated that 10,000 Kosovars were killed by Serbian forces. A year-long search by forensic experts, however, yielded only 2,788 bodies. "The final number of bodies uncovered will be less than 10,000 and probably more accurately determined as between two and three thousand," Paul Risley, the Hague tribunal's press spokesman, said yesterday.
Colombia Aid Plan to Move Forward -- President Clinton has signed a waiver allowing the $1.3 billion aid package to Colombia to go through, even though Colombia has not met the human rights conditions outlined by Congress. The plan, which calls for $1 million to train the Colombian military and police force and provides for 18 Blackhawk and 42 Huey helicopters, has been criticized for allowing systematic human rights abuses to continue.
S. Korean Range to be Partially Closed -- Bowing to protests by South Korean residents, the U.S. Air Force announced that it would close a portion of the Koon-Ni live fire range on South Korea's west coast. The range consists of a beach for strafing exercises, which is to be closed, and a small islet for bombing exercises, which will continue to operate. While a long-time source of anger by local residents, protests over the range flared up in May when a U.S. fighter with engine trouble dropped six bombs on the range.
U.S., Greenland in NMD Talks -- Officials from U.S. Departments of State and Defense visited Greenland in a bid to win the island's approval to build a radar station crucial to the national missile defense (NMD) system. NMD plans call for a U.S. early warning radar in Thule, Greenland to be upgraded and a new radar to be built in latter stages of the deployment. The governments of Greenland and Denmark -- the latter is still responsible for the island's foreign policy -- are said to be skeptical about U.S. justification for the system and worried that participation in NMD may upset their relations with Russia. Earlier this month, the Pentagon suggested it may put the NMD radars on ships if it cannot secure approvals to place them in European countries.
OICW Approved -- The U.S. Army has approved the formal acquisition program of a new infantry weapon. The Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW), is expected to be fielded beginning in Fiscal Year 2009. The OICW is intended as the primary weapon for close combat infantry units and will replace some M16 assault rifles, M4 carbines, and M203 grenade launchers. Reports indicate that the army is expected to buy 20,000-40,000 weapons for approximately $8,000-$10,000 per unit.
Quotation of the Week -- "The next president will inherit a military in decline," Governor George W. Bush, August 21, 2000, to the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.
"Our military is the strongest and the best in the entire world," Vice President Al Gore, August 22, 2000, to the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "The Next Space Race"
Pursuing a vision of U.S. "control and dominance" in outer space, the United States military is developing to technologies to make outer space the battlefield of the future. Meanwhile, the international community is working to ensure that outer space is used only for peaceful purposes, and prevent a war in the heavens. In a race to the ultimate high ground, who will get there first?
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Saturday, September 2 at 7:00 a.m. on Channel 13.
Visit our web site for transcripts, CDI resources, RealVideo, and related links.
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Coming Soon! CDI's Issue Brief "National Missile Defense: What Does It
All Mean?"
As the debate in the United States on the planned deployment of the national missile defense (NMD) system heats up, the Center for Defense Information (CDI) is releasing a timely Issue Brief, "National Missile Defense: What Does It All Mean?" on this important national security issue.
The Issue Brief is designed to offer unbiased, in-depth, and up-to-date information on all aspects of the NMD debate to citizens, educators and decision-makers nationwide. Missile defense has gained additional prominence as one of the most divisive and defining issues in this year's presidential campaign. The 40-48 page document scheduled for release in August 2000, will include the following:
In addition to the print version, CDI is preparing a web site with further information on the National Missile Defense program. Each section in the print version will be updated on the web, on an as-needed basis, to keep the document current.
Readers of the Issue Brief will further benefit from access to the latest CDI documentary on missile defense, "Star Wars: New Hope or Phantom Menace?" This thirty-minute film contains interviews and testimonies by the nation's foremost experts on missile defense. A transcript of the film is available on the Web. The Issue Brief will be available August 31, 2000.
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Please send a check for $5 to the Center for Defense Information, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Suite 615, Washington, DC 20036. Please write "Issue Brief" on the check. For more information, please e-mail Tomas Valasek.