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Volume 4, Issue #33August 17, 2000

TABLE OF CONTENTS


United Nations Peacekeeping Update
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org

Throughout the summer peacekeeping issues seem to have dominated the activity of the Security Council. Since mid-June, seven missions -- in Cyprus (UNFICYP), Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH), Croatia (UNMOP), Western Sahara (MINURSO), Lebanon (UNIFIL), Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and Georgia (UNOMIG) -- have been extended. These seven, which represent 50% of current peacekeeping missions (not including UNMOVIC, the proposed U.N. inspection team for Iraq), involve nearly 20,750 personnel with a projected annual cost of over $935 million.

(Putting these figures in perspective, total U.N. peacekeepers number approximately 35,000 and estimated total U.N. expenditures for peacekeeping operations is $2.3 billion. U.S. military personnel are included in the 102-strong observer mission in Georgia and U.S. citizens are among the civilian police personnel operating in Bosnia.)

In early August, for the first time since December 1999, the Security Council voted to establish a new peacekeeping mission -- UNMEE. This 100 strong observer mission along the Ethiopian-Eritrean border is a prelude to a larger peacekeeping force whose mandate may well include the use of force, if necessary, to prevent a renewal of hostilities.

Indeed, such a mandate would be in keeping with what some see as a more determined U.N. stance with regard to peacekeeping. This new resolve was most evident in July in Sierra Leone where earlier in the year rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) seized 500 lightly armed UN troops who were part of the 12,500 strong UNAMSIL mission. While all were eventually released or escaped, much equipment was lost to the rebels and the U.N. was humiliated. Thus, when RUF partisans besieged 233 Indian peacekeepers and international military observers for two months and their release could not be negotiated, a heavily armed U.N. force backed by helicopter gunships surprised the rebel forces and rescued all the troops and their equipment.

Meanwhile, off the battlefield, the Security Council has instructed U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to begin talks with the Sierra Leone government for establishing an independent criminal court to prosecute war criminals. The United States, which supports creation of the court, has committed $20 million for peacekeeping activities in Sierra Leone.

This new-found U.N. resolve may be tested in southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) where, in late May, the Israeli military precipitously abandoned positions it had occupied for 22 years. Initially it appeared that guerrilla organizations such as Amal and Hezbollah would seize control of the area, but the Lebanese government finally agreed to have UNIFIL patrol the re-established border area and subsequently moved government troops into the region. But the situation remains volatile.

The U.N. may be further tested in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire) where a $141 million, 5,500 strong mission (MONUC) has been approved by the Security Council. DRC President Laurent Kabila has blocked deployment of the force on the grounds that he does not want armed troops in certain parts of his country. As a result, only 258 military observers are in the Congo, and the U.N. will not send in more peacekeepers until the impasse with Mr. Kabila is resolved.

How long these and the other peacekeeping efforts will survive depends in great part on whether member nations pay their assessments. The sparse participation of the U.S. on the ground is mirrored by the absence of U.S. monetary support. For Fiscal Year (FY) 2000, Congress approved the Administration's $498 million request to cover U.N. peacekeeping assessments. But depending on when (or if) the authorized contingents are deployed to the DRC, Sierra Leone, and along the Ethiopian-Eritrean border, and whether UNIFIL incurs additional costs from its repositioning along the Israeli-Lebanese border, that amount will fall about $250 million shy of costs allocated to the United States.

Moreover, while the Administration projected a need for $739 million for international peacekeeping in FY2001, Senate and House committees have allocated only $500 million and $498 million, respectively. In July Congress also rejected a bid for $107 million in supplemental funds for peacekeeping in Kosovo and East Timor. And in a related move, the Senate Appropriations Committee proposed rescinding up to 43% ($212 million) of the $498 approved for FY2000 due to "changing circumstances."

While the FY2001 bill (H. R. 4690, Appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies for FY2001) containing the request for peacekeeping funds has yet to complete its legislative journey, all signs point to another increase in U.S. arrears to the United Nations. Tiring of U.S. recalcitrance, the U.N. has rejected a bid to install a U.S. diplomat as the Deputy Undersecretary for Peacekeeping overseeing the New York operations of the 410 person U.N. department.

Like the new resolve demonstrated in Sierra Leone, this rejection may signal the beginning of a new resolve in the U.N. to tie participation in administering U.N. activities to the level of national support, particularly financial support. While it may be true that the U.N. cannot survive without the United States, it is equally true that the U.S. would be hard pressed to retain its claim to world leadership if it refuses to support the United Nations.


UN Security Council Takes Action on Child Soldiers
Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org

On August 11, 2000 the UN Security Council adopted by consensus a resolution, its second in as many years, that calls upon Member States to take concrete steps to prevent the use of child soldiers around the world. Resolution 1314 is significant because it advances the child soldiers issue on the Security Council agenda.

The resolution draws upon previous Security Council and international efforts to restrict the use of child soldiers. Citing Resolution 1261 (1999) condemning the targeting and use of children in armed conflict, the International Labor Organization Convention 182 banning the worst forms of child labor, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, among others, Resolution 1314 provides additional steps necessary to prohibit child soldiers.

The resolution highlights the link between the illicit trade in natural resources and armed conflict as well as the role of the illicit proliferation of small arms "which could prolong armed conflict and intensify its impact on children." The Council "underlined the importance of giving consideration to the special needs and vulnerabilities of girls affected by armed conflict," urging that "their human rights, protection, and welfare be incorporated in the development of policies and programs, including those for prevention, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration." The resolution further expressed the readiness of the Security Council to include child protection advisers in future peacekeeping operations.

Member States were called upon to sign and ratify the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child that raises the age for conscription and participation in armed conflict to 18. Emphasizing the importance of non-governmental organizations and civil society, the Council encouraged the strengthening of "the capacities of national institutions and local civil society for ensuring the sustainability of local initiatives for the protection of children," including the "full, safe, and unhindered access of humanitarian personnel and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all children." Member States were also asked to "consider assessing the potential unintended consequences of sanctions on children and to take appropriate steps to minimize such consequences."

The role of the Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, was also stressed. The resolution pressed "all parties to armed conflict to abide by the concrete commitments made to the Special Representative." Parties involved in conflict were also encouraged to include demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of child combatants in peace negations and peace agreements.

Adoption of the resolution comes a few weeks after the Security Council debated the child soldiers issue at the end of July following the release of the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of Resolution 1261 as mandated by last year's resolution (the report can be found at S/2000/712). The report recommended a number of actions on all aspects of the effects of armed conflict on children. It called upon states to take action ranging from assisting refugee children to marking small arms and ammunition. Resolution 1314 also calls upon the Secretary-General to submit a report on progress in implementing the current resolution and Resolution 1261 no later than July 31, 2001.

While the continued debate on children in armed conflict is important in keeping the priority and visibility of the child soldier issue high, it is not enough. Countries must begin to take concrete steps to eliminate the use of child soldiers in their armed forces and around the world. Signing and ratifying the Optional Protocol is key to this process. In the United States, President Clinton signed the Protocol on July 5th, and it now sits before the Senate for consideration. On another front, resources must be allocated to support children affected by conflict, including their disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Schooling and training must be provided to help these children become productive members of society. They cannot be helped by words alone.

For more information, see "Security Council Adopts Child Soldier Resolution," Weekly Defense Monitor, September 2, 1999, and CDI's Children and Armed Conflict website.


Classifying Documents Hinders National Missile Defense Debate: A Commentary
Nicholas Berry, Senior Analyst, nberry@cdi.org

Many defense analysts believe that the decision whether or not to deploy a U.S. national missile defense (NMD) will be the most important national security policy decision since the end of the Cold War. Certainly, it will have widespread consequences. It merits a thorough national debate. Unfortunately, the public has little idea what NMD is all about.

A recently-released national survey found that 63 percent of Americans incorrectly believe a NMD system already exists, and another 10 percent confessed they do not know whether one exists or not. That leaves only 26 percent who know NMD is currently under consideration. An earlier survey (in July 2000) found that only 11 percent said they monitored the issue very closely.

One reason for this huge knowledge gap can be attributed to government hyper-secrecy, which by its very nature inhibits debate. This is not a new problem but in the context of NMD it becomes acute.

On August 10, all of America's leading newspapers reported leaks from a highly-classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that U.S. national missile defense (NMD) would likely accelerate nuclear missile buildups by China, Russia, India, and Pakistan. Entitled "Foreign Responses to U.S. National Missile Defense Deployment," the NIE also reviewed the possible threats NMD is designed to counter, citing the ballistic missile programs of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea which could threaten the United States by 2015, perhaps earlier.

What was leaked was neither new nor detailed, and it did not include deployment recommendations to counter the threat. Undoubtedly, the classified version was more specific, which leads to the conclusion that government, once again, seems less interested in informed public debate and public participation than in carrying out a pre-determined policy.

There was no need to classify the report. Sensitive material on how the information was acquired -- data not relevant to the ultimate deployment decision -- could easily have been omitted.

Government classifies information for numerous reasons, some rational and some unreasonable.

  1. Protect sources, both human and technological, from disclosure. Revealing the names of American intelligence agents has resulted in their murder, including CIA station chiefs in Athens and Beirut. Keeping secret the methods the National Security Agency uses to listen in on communications within terrorist networks prevents terrorists from adopting more secure media. For NMD, the sources of information on foreign responses to the U.S. program could logically be omitted without diminishing the value of the NIE for public debate.
  2. Protect the process by which intelligence is evaluated. This prevents foreign adversaries from employing deception techniques that could bias the evaluations. For example, all intelligence agencies have procedures for double- or even triple-checking key facts. If the sources of these multiple checks were known, information could be planted by enemies to confirm incorrect data. The NIE would not normally include the evaluation process and so this reason for secrecy would not apply.
  3. Protect advanced weapons and their support technology. Revealing such information would give adversaries data that could save them time, money, and manpower they would be forced to expend if they had to develop weapons and support technology themselves. Governments, naturally, do not want a level playing field on the battlefield. Assuming NMD would work, the NIE could have focused on its deployment consequences. Another report could have dealt with NMD's technology.
  4. Protect a foreign policy initiative. Some foreign policy initiatives must be prepared in secret to prevent opponents of the initiatives from sabotaging them. Secrecy also allows an easy exit strategy if a proposed foreign policy is estimated to fail. Cases can be made, for example, that FDR's secret commitments to Britain before U.S. entry into World War II or Nixon's opening to China could have been halted by hostile Congresses. NMD itself is no secret and criteria have been publicly established for its deployment.
  5. Protect the bottom line in negotiations. If negotiators on the other side know the minimum you will settle for, then that is what will be offered and no more. The NIE was not about negotiating terms.
  6. Protect policy advocates by allowing them to give frank opinions, predictions, and advice. Media ridicule or praise of an advisor's policy positions that become public can inhibit advice. "Thinking out loud," the source of both great innovations as well as stupidity, would vanish. Formulating policy positions tests ideas that could look silly if done publicly. But the NIE presented information on a NMD policy proposal already formulated.
  7. Protect foreign governments and leaders from embarrassment. Announcing that a foreign policy is designed to compensate for the incompetence of a certain foreign prime minister is not good diplomatic form. A public NIE could report foreign responses to NMD while avoiding judgments on their rationality.
  8. Protect individuals by covering up their illegal activities. One could presume this was not a factor in the NIE.
  9. Protect individuals in their efforts to keep control of policy. The phrase "keep the pond small so that we can remain big fish," is apt. This is an all-too-common stance among policy elites when the only thing that they want to protect is their position and power. Opening information to others would stimulate wider participation and the likelihood of elites being marginalized. Since NIE's are routinely classified and not always leaked, one might wonder if sensitive data is sometimes added to them to keep information from being disseminated.
  10. Protect a policy position by limiting debate. This is another aspect of #9 above. NMD has enough flaws to induce its proponents to put a lid on public involvement that well might produce negative attitudes toward NMD. Comparison with the ill-fated Maginot Line could be anticipated. Its dubious technology would be more widely publicized. Highly critical views from abroad would also be highlighted.

A word must be said about the leakers. Leaks often come from those who are in the minority on a policy but are convinced that their position is correct and the majority is wrong. They usually want a public debate in the hope their view will go from a minority to a majority by recruiting allies in government, the media, Congress, pressure groups, or the public. Some are whistle blowers who believe a public debate will bring vindication. Conversely, leaks can come from the majority who seek to pre-empt or cut-off debate before their position's flaws are revealed. In fact, leaking only supportive information might succeed in suggesting that there are few problems with a policy. Under this scenario, NMD proponents who now have the upper hand may want to limit debate and get on with the program.

Unless something changes that allows more open and informed public debate, the United States may end up implementing a program that in the long term denigrates our national security.


Peer Competitor -- Who and When?
Oscar Lurie, Research Associate, Olurie@cdi.org

Did you know that the federal government is devoting half of its discretionary spending for Fiscal Year 20001 to raise and maintain America's military forces? That much money -- $310 billion -- entitles citizens to know what threats confront the nation to require such expenditures.

Some of the threats cited by officials are real -- terrorism and nuclear weapons, for example. Other threats, or at least their immediacy -- seem to exist more in the doomsday imagination of those who want continued massive military spending. They are like Don Quixote, Cervantes' gallant but bemused "knight," who imagined a windmill to be his mortal foe.

But at least Don Quixote's windmill existed. The windmill against which some would have the U.S. military tilt is called the "peer competitor," a military staffed and trained to the same level and equipped with equivalent technology as American forces, backed by an economy close to par with the United States.

Will this hostile peer competitor ever materialize? It's always risky to assert that something will never happen, but it also is apparent that it will be a long time before any country will be able to challenge the U.S. in traditional military power. The only two candidates for this role today are Russia and China.

Russia is in a state of collapse -- industrially, economically, socially, and militarily. Its conventional military forces are so weak that they cannot win a low-level war in Chechnya. Official policy emphasizes Russia's dwindling nuclear weapons stockpile as the decisive weapon in its military arsenal. But recent reports from Moscow indicate that Russian President Putin is considering reducing nuclear forces significantly below treaty-agreed levels.

The ongoing struggle to rescue over 100 sailors from the submarine Kursk illustrates the deplorable state of the Russian Navy. The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that, even if extra money generated by higher oil revenue is devoted to the Navy, at least ten years will be needed "to make the entire fleet seaworthy again." In the end, no one can predict how many decades actually will be needed before Russia regains the economic and industrial capability to even begin to refashion itself into a first class military power.

It has been centuries since China has been a first class power even in its own world. It does not possess an economy strong enough to create and support a military capable of sustained foreign operations. With their "Four Modernizations," the Chinese are attempting to build such a base today. Whether they will succeed is doubtful. In fact, the Report of the Secretary of Defense to Congress on China's Military Power, released June 23, 2000, predicts the Chinese will fall short. "If present trends continue, Beijing believes it will achieve the status of a 'medium-sized' great power by 2050 at a minimum."

Since the two countries considered the most likely peers are decades behind, the U.S. has an opportunity to reshape and resize its armed forces so that the military will be prepared for the real threats we can expect in the coming years. Whether this will happen, or we continue to tilt at windmills, remains an open question.


Oil: the perpetual fuel of civil war in Sudan
Lucie Senftova, Research Assistant, lsenftov@cdi.org

More than one million people have died and millions have been forcibly displaced during the ongoing seventeen-year long civil war in Sudan. Suffering from extreme poverty, this largest African country began to export oil last year. Unfortunately, the trade in oil has allowed the Sudanese government to continue the war and disregard negotiations. And the oil will allow the war to continue for a long time to come unless something is done to limit the diversion of revenue from the oil trade.

Sudan is a former British colony that achieved independence in 1956. But even as it became independent, a civil war was underway, one that has continued with only short intervals of peace in 1972 and 1983. The war began in the south, an area populated by black Africans following mostly Christian or animist beliefs. The Southerner's People's Liberation Army (SPLA) has challenged the Sudanese government, dominated by Muslim Arabs living in northern Sudan, over self-governance in the southern region. Given the potential revenue from lucrative oil fields discovered in southern Sudan in 1978, the Sudanese government refuses to grant the rebels autonomy. The start of profitable oil export activity in August 1999 has simply reinforced the Sudanese government's position with respect to SPLA.

In addition to being an important source of foreign exchange for the Sudanese government, oil revenue enables the government to buy more and newer weapons for its military. The pipeline, the longest in Africa, brings oil from the south to a terminal on the Red Sea coast, from which it is exported by ship. But the pipeline is an easy target for SPLA attacks and has been blown up several times by the rebels.

In one sense, oil in Sudan is a multinational issue. Companies such as Petronas (Malaysia), Talisman (Canada), Agip (Italy), Total Fina (France), Elf-Aquitaine (France), OMW (Austria), Royal Dutch Schell (The Netherlands), Gulf Petroleum Company (Qatar), National Iranian Gas Company, and China National Petroleum Corporation operate in Sudan. Recently, Amnesty International accused these companies of "turning a blind eye" to war atrocities carried out by the Sudanese government. The Canadian government has also published a report warning the Canadian multinational company Talisman that it would impose sanctions against the company if it did not better monitor the Sudanese government's use of revenues from the oil trade.

It is very difficult to uncover public documents about the flow of arms between the Sudanese government and other states. In a report released two years ago, Human Rights Watch (HRW) detailed information on the arms trade obtained from ex-Sudanese military officers. HRW reported that Sudanese government forces receive weapons from China, Iran, Iraq, the Russian Federation, former Soviet Republics, and former Warsaw Pact states. Some of these countries sold arms to the Sudanese government in exchange for loans to be paid by future oil exports. Several Sudanese officers also claimed that they saw Iraqi pilots participate in combat against the SPLA. France is believed to have provided technical assistance, but there is no evidence that it sold arms to the Sudanese government.

Current U.S. policy toward Sudan is "to isolate the Government of Sudan; to counter the threat it poses to the United States, its neighbors, and its own people; and to press for fundamental change in its policies" [Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Hill Summit on Sudan, November 9, 1999]. Since 1993 Sudan has been on the U.S. State Department's list of countries that sponsor terrorism. In November 1997 President Clinton announced an extensive embargo against Sudan. One year later, in retaliation for attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the U.S. launched a cruise missile attack on a Sudanese pharmaceutical factory, believing it was producing materials for chemical weapons. A U.S. State Department official confirmed that the United States does not sell arms to Sudan and does not buy Sudanese oil. However, the U.S. does provide food assistance to the rebels in the south.

But as the international community has seen all too often, sanctions frequently have negative consequences for the general population while having no effect in changing a government's policy. In Sudan, poverty is widespread, and starvation and continued violence decimate the population. To help address Sudan's real problems, the United States and the international community should encourage a dialogue between the two sides and support measures to help get food and other aid to noncombatants on both sides.

With concerted multinational efforts, the civil war in Sudan may one day be resolved. But until then, governments and multinational companies have an obligation to promote efforts to prevent the diversion of oil revenues for war. This is an essential first step in moving both sides from the battlefield to the negotiating table.


CDI's "Briefing Room"

Russia to Slash Nuclear Arsenal? -- The Interfax news agency is reporting that President Vladimir Putin has decided that Russia will unilaterally reduce its nuclear arsenal to 1,500 deployed warheads in order to shift scarce financial resources into the military's conventional forces. The decision came after a meeting last Friday, and would seemingly put to an end the increasingly bitter dispute between Chief of the General Staff Gen. Anatoly Kvashnin, who has favored cutting the nuclear arsenal in favor of conventional forces, and Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, a former commander of nuclear missile troops, over military funding priorities.

U.N. Report: Sanctions Don't Work -- The use of economic sanctions to change a government's policy is usually ineffective and often illegal under international law, according to a U.N. commission report released this week. The report, written by a Belgian law professor, was done for the U.S. Subcommission on Human Rights. The report found that Iraq is the case where sanctions have had the worst effect. The report also declared the 40-year U.S. trade blockade of Cuba to be illegal under international humanitarian law.

Kosovo Bombing Accuracy In Spotlight -- British Royal Air Force bombs found their targets just 40% of the time during the spring 1999 campaign in Yugoslavia, according to a classified report by the UK Defense Evaluation and Research Agency leaked to the press this week. The hit ratio varied widely depending on the bomb guidance -- laser-guided bombs hit 60% of their targets, while unguided "dumb" bombs scored confirmed hits only 2.5% of the time. However, because the count is based only on hits observed by pilots or captured on video, many hits were likely unaccounted for. The hit ratio is in line with results reported elsewhere -- a classified U.S. Air Force report quoted in Defense Daily says only 35% of fixed installations attacked in Yugoslavia were actually destroyed.

Military Firing Ranges Pose Environmental, Readiness Problems -- A report by DoD's Inspector General shows that failures to clean up munitions and expended ordinance at military firing ranges pose serious environmental problems which could lead to facilities being closed and in turn, affect the readiness of U.S. forces. The IG estimates that 200,000 tons of munitions are expended each year, but in general none of it is removed from the ranges. "As a result," the IG report reads, "an unknown amount of range residue, potentially containing explosives, has built up on...training ranges managed by DoD."

Quotation of the Week -- From "Eternal Father, Strong to Save," The Navy Hymn by William Whiting.

Eternal Father, strong to save,
Whose arm hath bound the restless wave,
Who bidd'st the mighty ocean deep
Its own appointed limits keep;
Oh, hear us when we cry to Thee,
For those in peril on the sea!


This week on America's Defense Monitor: "The Next Space Race"

Pursuing a vision of U.S. "control and dominance" in outer space, the United States military is developing to technologies to make outer space the battlefield of the future. Meanwhile, the international community is working to ensure that outer space is used only for peaceful purposes, and prevent a war in the heavens. In a race to the ultimate high ground, who will get there first?

Airs in Washington, DC on Sunday, August 20 at 10:30 a.m. on Channel 32.
Airs in NYC on Friday, August 25 on Channel 25 at 7:30 p.m., and on Saturday, August 26 at 7:00 a.m. on Channel 13.

Visit our web site for transcripts, CDI resources, RealVideo, and related links.

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Coming Soon! CDI's Issue Brief "National Missile Defense: What Does It All Mean?"

As the debate in the United States on the planned deployment of the national missile defense (NMD) system heats up, the Center for Defense Information (CDI) is releasing a timely Issue Brief, "National Missile Defense: What Does It All Mean?" on this important national security issue.

The Issue Brief is designed to offer unbiased, in-depth, and up-to-date information on all aspects of the NMD debate to citizens, educators and decision-makers nationwide. Missile defense has gained additional prominence as one of the most divisive and defining issues in this year's presidential campaign. The 40-48 page document scheduled for release in August 2000, will include the following:

In addition to the print version, CDI is preparing a web site with further information on the National Missile Defense program. Each section in the print version will be updated on the web, on an as-needed basis, to keep the document current.

Readers of the Issue Brief will further benefit from access to the latest CDI documentary on missile defense, "Star Wars: New Hope or Phantom Menace?" This thirty-minute film contains interviews and testimonies by the nation's foremost experts on missile defense. A transcript of the film is available on the Web. The Issue Brief will be available August 31, 2000.

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