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| July 27, 2000 |
| July 27, 2000 |
GAO Releases Small Arms Report
Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
As requested by Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), the General Accounting Office (GAO) released a report last week entitled "U.S. Efforts to Control the Availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons." GAO was tasked by Senator Feinstein to provide information on three aspects of the small arms issue: 1) U.S. government monitoring and reporting policies regarding small arms and light weapons transfers; 2) the steps the U.S. government is taking at the international level to address the availability of small arms and light weapons; and 3) lessons identified regarding weapon collection programs.
The report begins with a background of the small arms issue and the impact of small arms on regions of conflict, focusing on Africa in particular. Noting the deleterious effect of small arms in Africa, the report notes that "since 1989, Africa has experienced more armed conflict than any other continent and is perhaps the region most affected by small arms and light weapons proliferation, according to the State Department." The efforts of the State Department to develop policies that would restrict arms transfers to regions of conflict are then described.
The report quantifies the significant amounts of small arms transferred by the U.S. government. For Fiscal Years 1996 through 1998, "the United States authorized or delivered $3.7 billion in small arms and light weapons to 154 nations through direct commercial sales; foreign military sales; or other transfers, including grants and 'drawdowns' from Department of Defense stocks." U.S. government policies on monitoring and reporting U.S. weapons transfers are outlined, highlighting the State Department's Blue Lantern monitoring program in particular. However, while detailing the criteria for the program's pre- and post-delivery checks, the report provides no data on the number of checks actually completed or their efficacy. The report also describes U.S. laws for reporting arms exports under the Arms Export Control Act, but again makes no mention of improvements to the system that are sorely needed, given the vast number of small arms that are exported to an already saturated global community.
According to the GAO report, the U.S. government's initiative on small arms has four overarching steps: 1) creating international standards to control illicit trafficking in small arms (primarily through the 1997 OAS Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms); 2) establishing mechanisms to govern small arms transfers (encouraging other governments to adopt the strict export controls the United States has implemented); 3) establishing diplomatic initiatives (pushing the small arms agenda through multilateral and international institutions such as the United Nations, Wassenaar Arrangement, and NATO); and 4) providing resources to help other countries destroy their excess weapons (highlighting programs in Liberia, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia).
The analysis noted that "the Secretary of State has said that although the United States is undertaking these measures to address the availability of small arms and light weapons in regions of conflict, the international community must develop an integrated and comprehensive response," but identified the following problems in trying to achieve international action. First, "definitional disagreements make consensus difficult concerning which types of arms to control." Second, "the unknown scope of both legal and illicit small arms transfers makes designing effective response difficult." Third, the United States and other major signatories have not yet ratified the 1997 OAS Convention, making implementation almost impossible. In addition, "progress in reaching future agreements also involves resolving differences among foreign governments and non-governmental organizations concerning the degree of regulation required for small arms transfers."
The report then describes the lessons learned from weapons collection programs around the world -- not necessarily U.S. specific programs. Fourteen key tasks are identified for organizing a successful weapons collection program. The U.S. DoD sponsored weapons collection programs in Panama and Haiti are then critiqued.
After all of the analysis of U.S. endeavors on small arms, the only recommendation in the report is in regard to weapons collection programs. The report recommends "that the Secretary of Defense direct that guidance, based on a comprehensive assessment and approach, be developed for implementing weapons collection programs." While this recommendation certainly makes sense given the lack of success of U.S. sponsored weapons collection programs, it's puzzling that the only recommendation in the 23 page report is on a subject so relatively insignificant in overall U.S. policy on small arms and light weapons. The report would have been much more useful had it identified key improvements to reporting requirements, end use monitoring and verification, restrictions on the legal trade, and efforts to control the illicit proliferation and trade of small arms beyond those currently undertaken by the U.S. government. As such, the utility of the report seems extremely limited.
A State Department Official (the State Department has the majority of responsibility for the small arms issue), was "quite pleased with the findings of the report," but emphasized that "in fact the U.S. Government is doing a lot more than what was recognized in the report, including technical and legal assistance in Africa." The Official also stated that "the State Department is very concerned about the small arms issue and is working diligently on all aspects of the problem, including law enforcement and disarmament," noting that "small arms are a major priority for this administration."
The GAO report was useful in that it was the first time there was an accounting of U.S. policies on small arms. However, because the report did not reveal anything new or provide recommendations that serve to further the U.S. agenda and action on small arms, the benefit of the study for legislative and advocacy purposes is restricted. Future GAO reports on small arms should address the myriad other issues surrounding small arms and provide real recommendations for responsible and effective U.S. policies.
Congress Completes Annual Pentagon Spending Bill
Christopher Hellman, Senior Analyst, chellman@cdi.org
This week the Senate joined their House colleagues in adopting the conference agreement on the Fiscal Year 2001 Defense Department Appropriations Act. The legislation provides $289.6 billion, $5.1 billion more than requested by the Clinton Administration. Added to this amount is the $8.8 billion Military Construction Act, and about $13 billion from the Energy and Water Appropriations Act, which funds the nuclear weapons programs of the Department of Energy. In all FY'01 Pentagon funding totals over $310 billion.
The $289.6 billion includes $1.8 billion in emergency supplemental spending for FY'00. This was done in order to keep FY'01 funding levels below the caps set by the annual Congressional budget resolution. Given that the current fiscal year ends on September 30, however, little of the $1.8 billion will likely be spend in FY'00, and will actually go towards FY'01 programs. The FY'00 appropriation, not including any supplemental funds, is $266.1 billion.
Aircraft -- The legislation fully funds the Administration's $3.9 billion for the Air Force's F-22 program, including the purchase of 10 aircraft. The bill cuts the Joint Strike Fighter program's request by $170 million, providing $689 million. The cut is the result of concerns in the House and Senate about schedule delays in the program. The legislation also includes $1.2 billion for the Marine Corps' V-22 "Osprey" tilt-rotor aircraft, and $2.8 for the Navy's F/A-18E/F "Super Hornet."
Shipbuilding -- The package cut nearly $1 billion of the $1.5 billion requested by the Administration for construction of two LPD-17 amphibious assault ships, due to delays in the program and cost increases of 40%. Congress added $460 million not requested by the Administration for construction of LHD-1 amphibious ship. The Navy had not planned to request these funds until FY'05. The legislation also includes $4 billion for a new aircraft carrier, $1.7 billion for the "Virginia" class New Attack Submarine, and $3.1 billion for DDG-51 destroyers.
"Transforming" the Army -- The Conference agreement includes $1.6 billion to fund the Army's development of a lighter, more mobile force. This is nearly twice the amount requested by the Pentagon. The legislation also funds the $355 million request for the Crusader artillery system.
Congressional "Add-ons" -- As in recent years, Congress added substantial funding for programs not requested by the Pentagon. CDI has identified $3.3 billion in funds added by either the House or Senate for unrequested programs. In addition, CDI has identified nearly $350 million in funding that was added by members of the House-Senate Conference Committee (which wrote the final version of this legislation) that was not only not requested by the Pentagon but was not even included by either the House or the Senate.
See CDI's factsheet "Fiscal Year 2001 Add-Ons: Congress' unrequested spending for the Pentagon" for a complete list of Congressional add-ons.
The European Union: Silent On NMD
By Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org
Despite the recently inaugurated Common Security and Foreign Policy initiative of the European Union (EU), the organization has been conspicuously quiet on perhaps the most important national security issue today, the U.S.-proposed National Missile Defense (NMD) system.
Conceived as an economic organization, the EU has taken an increasingly active role in coordinating its members' foreign and security policies. In 1999 the EU created the office of High Representative on Common Foreign and Security Policy, who is empowered to act on behalf of the European Union in negotiations with other countries. To add military muscle to its nascent foreign policy arm, the EU also agreed in 1999 to build a 50,000-60,000 strong Rapid Reaction Force and a separate civilian crisis management group. The latter body, composed of judges, police and other officials, is designed to help administer crisis response plans.
While the EU strives to speak with a single voice in foreign and security affairs, it has so far been unable to arrive at a common position on NMD. The power to decide on issues affecting territorial defense, such as NMD, is being jealously guarded by national capitals. British Foreign Minister Robin Cook spoke for many EU governments when he told the British Parliament: "I am not sure I would regard it as wise for us to seek a specific European Union policy on NMD given our own very entrenched view that the European Union should not be a place for territorial collective defence." German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, while urging the EU countries to adopt a joint position, admitted that "interests are not homogeneous within Europe." Given that the EU can only adopt a position by consensus, European countries will likely forgo discussing NMD through the EU and seek resolution of their differences with the United States on a bilateral level or through NATO.
Similarly, the EU is unlikely to adopt a position on NMD installations on the European continent. Three countries are involved directly or indirectly in the actual NMD architecture. The current design calls for early warning radars in Fylingdales, UK, and Thule, Greenland, to provide the NMD command center with information on missile launches (Denmark, an EU member, is administering the foreign and security affairs of Greenland). Norway has also been linked to NMD. Even though it does not appear in U.S. plans, it built a powerful X-band radar near the Russian border. Because of its location and the fact that X-band radars play a crucial role in NMD architecture, Moscow has repeatedly alleged that the Norwegian station is in fact a part of NMD.
All three nations have already come under intense diplomatic pressure from Russia. President Putin warned them against "taking the risk of becoming dragged into a process which will result in an unpredictable loss of strategic stability."
But despite the potentially damaging conflict with Russia, there is little prospect for EU mediation. Of the three countries involved, Norway is not a EU member, Denmark does not participate in EU's defense policies (EU members have the right to opt out of cooperation on certain issues), and Britain, as noted above, has resisted discussing NMD in the EU for domestic reasons.
Russia In NATO -- Is it a Dream We Want to Come True?
Oscar Lurie, Research Associate, olurie@cdi.org
American and other NATO leaders have declared from time to time that Russia is not to be permanently excluded from consideration for membership in the alliance. They have dangled the possibility of Russia's joining at some undefined future time when some equally undefined conditions have been met.
Inviting Russia into NATO, some believe, would remedy some of the undesirable consequences flowing from the marked decline in the strength and reliability of Russia's conventional armed forces. These have so atrophied that Russian leaders have publicly stated that they will rely more heavily on nuclear weapons -- not just for deterrence but for protection against conventional assault.
This declaration has raised the nuclear stakes enormously, particularly the chance that a mistake will be made that sets nuclear tipped missiles flying. Moreover, given the continued Russian economic decay, their nuclear arsenal and its command and control system probably cannot be safely maintained. America's Nunn-Lugar Program has been helpful, but it is far from sufficient. Hence, the argument goes, a Russia in NATO is safer than a Russia growing militarily and economically weaker on the outside.
As theoretically attractive as this solution might appear, there would be major hurdles to overcome. For example, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, which recently joined NATO because they fear a resurgent Russia, could be expected to vigorously argue against Russia's admission. So too would many in the U.K. and the U.S. on the grounds that including Russia would either make NATO irrelevant or potentially embroil NATO in East Asia -- possibly against China. And then there is the biggest hurdle of all: the Russians themselves, virtually all of whom distrust the organization that for almost 45 years they believed was their mortal enemy.
Solid arms control and other confidence-building steps by the West -- especially by the U.S. -- may be a prerequisite to reassure Russians that NATO is not their mortal enemy. A key first step would be to postpone all work supporting deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) system. This would defuse the current tensions associated with trying to negotiate modifications to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to have initial NMD deployment in 2005. The U.S. should also embrace Russia's proposal limiting nuclear weapons to 1,500 on each side and should agree to de-alert all missiles on both sides. A third step -- adding more funds to Nunn-Lugar -- would enhance anti-proliferation efforts by improving control over fissile materials and providing alternative, non-weapons-related employment for highly talented Russian scientists.
With these as a foundation, one could dream of the day when cooperation between Russia and the U.S. (and NATO) will be so broad that the need for a military alliance like NATO will diminish as other bodies such as the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe grow stronger. Even the U.N. would benefit; the occasions for vetoes of Security Council resolutions would fall, permitting the U.N. to assume the role in world affairs originally envisioned for it.
Fantasies these may be, but if the U.S. and NATO fail to take the concrete steps needed to reassure Russia now, the world may someday have its hopes dashed and its dreams turned into nightmares.
Administration Will "Recommend" Future of NMD -- The Clinton Administration's decision on the future of the National Missile Defense (NMD) program will take the form of a recommendation, and leave the decision on whether to move ahead on deployment of the system to the next president. Defense Secretary Cohen told reporters this week that "the decision that the President will make...would be a recommendation as to whether to continue the process so that his successor would...have the option to go forward with the actual deployment of the system."
Peacekeepers in Bosnia Fired On -- Unknown attackers fired rocket-propelled grenades on Wednesday at an outpost of the international peacekeeping force in Bosnia, SFOR. No one was hurt in the incident.
Bell Wins Turkish Helicopter Contract -- Bell Helicopter's KingCobra has been chosen by Turkey to fill its attack helicopter requirements. The contract is for 145 helicopters and is worth $3.5 billion. The first stage of the contract will be for 50 aircraft at $1.5 billion. In a selection process that took over a year, the KingCobra was chosen over other helicopters from U.S., French, Italian, Israeli, and Russian companies. The aircraft will be largely built in Turkey, and Bell agreed to certain offsets to fulfill the contract.
U.S. Agrees to Give Military Aid to Armenia -- The United States will give Armenia $300,000 worth of nuclear and contraband detection kits to help stem the flow of weapons of mass destruction, said Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen at a meeting with Armenian Defense Minister Serzh Sarkisian on Tuesday. US grants are already financing demining efforts in the contested Nagorno Karabakh region.
Navy Unlikely to Reach Attack Submarine Goal -- According to Adm. Frank Bowman, the Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion, the Navy's goal of increasing its fleet of nuclear attack submarines by 20 boats is "cost prohibitive." The Navy currently has a fleet of 56 attack submarines, and has called for increasing the fleet to 68 by 2015, and to 76 by 2025. According to Adm. Bowman, to reach this goal would require the Navy to build as many as four submarines a year, which would take virtually all of the service's shipbuilding budget for much of the next twenty years.
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "Understanding Human Security"
At the close of the 20th Century, the globalization of commerce and communications has shrunk the world and made it vastly more interconnected. The struggles of distant lands to achieve liberal institutions and better standards of living are brought home immediately by satellite and the world wide web. The new century is marked by the emergence of a new doctrine that holds that the safety and prosperity of the world community starts with respect for individual human rights. The implications for international relations and the use of military force are staggering.
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