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Weekly Defense Monitor

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Volume 4, Issue #22June 1, 2000

TABLE OF CONTENTS


On the Israeli-Lebanon Border
Colonel Dan Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org

Over the last ten days the mainstream media has reported the hasty withdrawal of Israeli forces from the part of south Lebanon it has occupied since 1978 and the triumphant return of Lebanese civilians and Hezbollah fighters.

Given the prolonged occupation by Israeli forces and their allies, the Army of South Lebanon, the events of the last two weeks are significant. But whatever the causes, the justification, and past actions by the various factions and governments, there is now a fundamentally altered relationship among the parties that will have repercussions well beyond this narrow strip of land.

On the front line now as never before is the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon -- UNIFIL -- created in March, 1978 under Security Council Resolution 425. Lebanon's civil war, which had been raging for three years, had left the southern part of the country open to guerrillas to use as a base from which to launch attacks against Israel. One such attack in March 1978 left 35 Israeli civilians dead, provoking a military invasion by Israeli forces of south Lebanon. Resolution 425 required Israel return to its own territory, with UNIFIL confirming the withdrawal and assisting the Lebanese government in regaining control of the area. Instead, an independent Lebanese militia, the Army of Free Lebanon (later the Army of South Lebanon), allied itself with Israel and occupied the southern enclave. Another Israeli thrust in 1982 up to Beirut was followed by an eventual withdrawal back to a "security zone" in 1985. Raids and counter raids continued, with perhaps the most serious incident occurring in 1996 when Israeli artillery struck the U.N. base at Qana, killing over 100 civilians.

Now, twenty-two years after they first occupied southern Lebanon, the Israeli forces have returned home, and UNIFIL has confirmed that all Israeli forces have left southern Lebanon -- as have some 7,000 of their militia allies and their families. Lebanon has deployed police to the region, but has so far declined to send military forces. This failure places the burden of border security on the 4,550 troops (plus 50 military observers from the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in UNIFIL, at least in the short run. And already the U.N. force has had to intervene at the border crossing point known as Fatima Gate to prevent a serious confrontation between Lebanese civilians and supporters of Hezbollah and Amal (a rival Muslim guerrilla group) on one side and Israeli forces on the other.

Meanwhile, in New York, the U.N. is considering increasing the size of UNIFIL to 5,600 and eventually to 7,935 so it can better monitor the border and ward off violence. The Israeli withdrawal, although promised by Prime Minister Barak in response to the ever increasing numbers of Israeli casualties, occurred earlier than expected and before the U.N. was prepared to respond to the changed circumstances.

The Lebanon border situation is closely related to the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations, particularly with regard to the Golan Heights where another U.N. mission -- the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force or UNDOF -- is located. (As with UNIFIL, UNDOF, created in 1974, is charged with supervising the cease-fire between the two sides and ensuring disengagement of military forces.) However, these negotiations again are at a standstill. What Syria will do now remains unclear, but to date Hezbollah officials have said publicly they do not intend to become involved in the Syrian-Israeli dispute. They also say the only issue still remaining is continued Israeli control of 100 square miles of land called the Shebaa farm, but the U.N. says that the original border in the area puts this land in Syria, not Lebanon.

How do these changes on the ground affect the United States? Politically, the Israeli withdrawal strengthens the U.S. position as mediator because Israel has finally complied with U.N. resolutions calling for its withdrawal from Lebanon. With Israel out of Lebanon, more questions will be asked about Syria's continued presence (some 35,000 troops) in Lebanon.

Militarily, U.S. aid to Israel may be accelerated. For four years the U.S. has been working with Israel on developing a Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) weapon that would be effective against Katyusha rockets, a favorite weapon of the guerrilla forces. While a recent test against a stationary target was successful, technological problems so delayed developmental that the first test of the system against a moving target has yet to be held. Even if successful, the system could not be deployed before early in 2001. In terms of U.S. funding, the FY2001 DoD budget request contains $5.2 million for continued development of THEL. The Senate added almost $10 million to the program but the House did not, meaning the issue will have to be resolved in joint conference. In addition to THEL, in late May Israel asked to buy 241,000 more M107 high explosive 155mm artillery shells to "maintain projected sustainment rates and reserve levels."

The sheer number of political currents and military possibilities will keep Israel's northern border area in a state of flux for weeks if not months. Rapid reinforcement of UNIFIL with a clear mandate could be a major factor in preventing a renewal of the tit-for-tat battles that have characterized the region for decades. Restoration of a secure border between Lebanon and Israel may prove to be the catalyst that will crack the last major unresolved impasse in the Middle East -- peace between Syria and Israel.


U.S. Changes Arms Export Policy
By Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org

President Clinton approved seventeen proposals concerning U.S. arms export policy on May 22. The shift is one step in the administration's new Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI), marking the first significant change in U.S. arms export policy since the end of the Cold War.

The proposals, hammered out in heated negotiations between the Department of Defense and State Department, are "intended to expedite the export licensing process to improve industrial competitiveness." The proposals apply to the United States' closest allies -- NATO countries, Australia, and Japan. Many experts believed that reform of the process was essential as the State Department reviews approximately 45,000 license applications a year and has been criticized for being too slow and cumbersome. Under the current system, industry must reapply for licenses with each request for spare and replacements parts with licensing requests taking an average of 89 days to process.

The proposals will streamline the export licensing process and reduce the time necessary for industry to obtain permission to export U.S. weaponry abroad. A license for entire weapons systems would be granted under the new system, removing the need to reapply for licenses for extra components. Further, licenses would be valid for eight years instead of the current four years. Licenses for NATO efforts including those under the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) will be given expedited reviews as well.

According to the Department of Defense, the proposals will allow U.S. industry to be more competitive abroad and allow companies to break into new markets previously closed to them because of export restrictions. Industries will be given a" single, comprehensive export authorization to permit qualified U.S. defense companies to exchange a broad set of technical data necessary for team arrangements, joint ventures, mergers, acquisitions, or similar arrangements with qualified foreign firms from NATO, Japan, or Australia."

The most significant and controversial change is the extension of International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) exemptions to qualified countries. (Another proposal would review, on a four-year basis, what weapons would be included on the ITAR munitions list.) In other words, after establishing specific security parameters including, export controls, industrial security, international agreements on end use and retransfer of defense items, countries would be granted license exemptions for unclassified weapons exports. Australia and the United Kingdom, which together account for of 25% of U.S. weapons export licenses, will be the first two beneficiaries of this new policy once they meet U.S. requirements. When qualified, the two countries would enjoy the same "license free zone" as Canada does now. Critics maintain that this will cause difficulties in tracking U.S. weapons abroad. The United States has experienced difficulty in monitoring this policy for Canada, and, in fact, suspended the program last year after it was revealed that Canada had re-exported U.S. weapons without U.S. approval.

Although the defense industry has spoken in favor to the changes, and the U.S. government maintains that it will uphold the strictest controls and restrictions to ensure national security needs are met, the new policies have potentially problematic repercussions. The streamlining of the export process removes the paper trail and lessens the time spent on reviewing licenses, which reduces oversight and transparency. The blanket export approval, which eliminates the need to obtain specific licenses, raises the probability of unauthorized retransfers and facilitates U.S. weapons ending up in the hands of unintended users. All of these changes could allow weapons build-ups in countries with human rights concerns and could put U.S. soldiers at risk of having the weapons used against them. Skeptics believe the loosening of the export restrictions promotes and unrestrained trade of U.S. weapons exports on the global market.

While reforming U.S. export policy was necessary, the administration did not have to throw out the entire system to fix a few outdated aspects. If these proposals are implemented to their full extent, the administration must make sure that the strictest oversight and controls are in place to protect U.S. national and military security, as well as the security of our allies abroad.

For a copy of the summaries of the seventeen agreed proposals to the Defense Trade Security Initiative, e-mail Rachel Stohl.


Clouds Over the Atlantic
By Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org

Officials in the U.S. Departments of State and Defense wait with apprehension for France to take over presidency of the European Union (EU) in July. The six-month term gives France the power to set the agenda at meetings of EU ministers and the summit of EU heads of state to be held in Nice in December 2000. Of all points on the French agenda, defense has arguably the greatest potential to derail transatlantic relations.

French President Jacques Chirac said earlier this week that he will push for "reinforced cooperation" on European defense. EU countries agreed last year to form a European Rapid Reaction force of 50 to 60 thousand troops with its own political and military bodies formed along the line of NATO's. This originally Franco-British initiative was adopted by the European Union at its December 1999 Helsinki summit. President Chirac said he plans to use the EU presidency to develop capability criteria that would allow the EU to deploy its Rapid Reaction troops, and to push all Union members to commit the necessary forces.

While outwardly supportive, U.S. defense and foreign policy officials have responded to EU's proposals with caution. French views on defense in particular are usually met in Washington with a mixture of suspicion and irritation. On May 30, President Chirac gave a speech on defense which criticized the U.S. national missile defense program; a view shared by many European countries. In uniquely French fashion, the President also took a swipe at a unipolar (i.e. U.S.-dominated) world, by calling for a "multipolar world...[that] will provide balance and harmony."

Predictably, French views drew howls of protest from across the Atlantic. A Senate Foreign Relations Committee member accused France of conducting "a foreign policy designed to knock America down."

But the French position on defense, long dismissed by U.S. officials as extreme and not representative of the Eu , has gradually won the backing of Great Britain and Germany and has ultimately become EU policy. With the new term of the EU presidency starting in July, France will also gain the tools to advance its agenda within the EU and to make the European defense organization a reality. Given the current state of French-American relations, however, French activism -- regardless of the merits of the EU defense initiative -- is almost guaranteed to create transatlantic tensions.

The danger is that in the squabble over whether the United States is a superpower or a "hyperpower," as the French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine once called it, a good idea will be lost. If Europe does manage to field a credible military force, it would allow the United States to cut back on its $4 billion-a-year peacekeeping mission in the Balkans and bring home some of the 100,000 troops still stationed in Europe a decade after the end of the Cold War.

U.S. officials are quick to point out that European plans are not backed up by adequate defense spending. But there are encouraging signs that Europe is on track. Just this past week Germany announced plans to drastically reshape its armed forces to make them smaller, more mobile, and more professional. Belgium cut its forces and allocated more money to procurement. Britain committed to buying Airbus' A400M aircraft, clearing way for the pan-European consortium to begin fulfilling Europe's need for heavy lift transports.


CDI's "Briefing Room"

No NATO Expansion Before 2002 -- NATO will make no decision on whether to admit new members before 2002, the alliance's Secretary General, Lord Robertson, said on Tuesday. Earlier this month foreign ministers of nine Central and Eastern European countries -- Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Albania and Macedonia -- signed a declaration calling for a joint entry for all nine applicants in 2002.

Pentagon Urges Funding for Kosovo -- The Defense Department is letting Congress know that without immediate passage of a supplemental spending package for Kosovo, the Army will be forced to pull funds out of other operations programs to pay for it. According to Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon, failure to pass a spending package will have a "deleterious effect" on Army training programs. The Kosovo spending package stalled in the Senate earlier this year after the House of Representatives included over $8 billion in unrequested military spending in its version of the legislation.

Generals Increasingly Concerned About Army Transformation -- Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki's plans for a lighter, more mobile force is drawing increasing criticism from top Army commanders, according to the "Washington Times." The concerns reflect a growing sentiment that efforts to fund the multi-billion dollar transformation plan will erode near-term combat capabilities, and that despite major cuts in current programs, the necessary funds may not ever materialize.

Air Force "Committed" to JSF Program -- According to Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan, the Air Force remains committed to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), provided it stays on cost and meets all the service's requirements. His statements come amid rumors of waning Air Force interest due to the cost and schedule of the program, and its potential impact on the service's F-22 fighter aircraft. Meanwhile, Deputy Defense Secretary Rudy de Leon continues to stress the importance of the JSF program in maintaining the U.S. industrial base. The Pentagon is looking at possible alternatives to its current "winner take all" plan for the program, which would select either Boeing or Lockheed Martin as the prime contractor on the $200 billion program.


This week on America's Defense Monitor: "The Cuban Military: An Economic Force"

Cuba's military, once known for "exporting revolution," has undergone a transformation since the end of the Cold War. Its new mission is the fight for Cuba's economic survival. The military is now deeply involved in national development, from hotels to agriculture to business ventures with foreign companies. How will this affect Cuba's future? Join America's Defense Monitor for a behind-the-scenes look at the evolution of one of the world's last communist militaries.

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