
| May 18, 2000 |
Shaping, Responding, Preparing -- Selectively Please
Colonel Dan Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
In a May 15 speech at the Economic Strategy Institute Global Forum in Washington, DC, Secretary of Defense William Cohen described, as he so often has, the tripartite strategy to meet threats to U.S. security: shape, respond, prepare.
Just before he launched into the familiar rhetoric, Mr. Cohen observed two ominous realities that have descended on Africa. The first, just declared a national security issue for the U.S., is the explosive spread of AIDS in general and its concentration in Africa where, in 1998, 200,000 died in wars but 2.2 million died from AIDS. Citing South Africa and Nigeria (even though the infection rate is highest in Zimbabwe and Botswana), Mr. Cohen declared that the disease "if unchecked, certainly can destabilize those nations. The second reality is the prevalence of wars: "Sierra Leone is the most recent of 15 nations during the past five years in Africa that has been consumed by war."
One might think that Mr. Cohen's subsequent remarks would include some hint of the actions that the U.S. government might take to help alleviate these two catastrophes, particularly the second where military force might make a difference. But it was not to be.
Mr. Cohen did note that U.S. forces "shape the political environment" but they do so by "being forward deployed" in Asia, the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and Europe. In Africa, "shaping" seems to be limited to the classrooms of the African Center for Strategic Studies which opened in Dakar, Senegal in October 1999. Here, out of the flight path of the bullets and bombs of Africa's 15 wars in the last five years, the U.S. attempts "to indicate to the African nations the relationship between democracy and the military and how there must be civilian control over the instruments of the military."
With regard to responding, Mr. Cohen reaffirmed that U.S. forces must be able to operate across the full spectrum of conflict and rejected calls for troops specially skilled in peacekeeping. "Our forces must be trained if we go into a situation like Sierra Leone and evacuate our citizens ...They must be able to engage in peacekeeping and humanitarian type missions. They must be able to engage in something short of a major theater war. Our forces have to be fully prepared for that full panoply of responses."
Fair enough. But then the question arises as to why U.S. forces have not responded to the renewed attacks against the elected government of Sierra Leone or the seizing of some 500 lightly armed U.N. African peacekeepers. Over 1,100 British troops are in Sierra Leone, ostensibly to evacuate westerners but actually to stiffen the Sierra Leone army and its militia allies.
After responding to today's contingencies (if we so choose), Mr. Cohen would "shape the future and prepare for it...by adjusting our current force structure and shaping it in a way to anticipate the kind of forces that we'll have to confront in the future." This, he concedes, is an inherently risky proposition as it involves predicting which way nations and individuals will act. Nonetheless, it must be done.
But the connection between current contingencies and preparing for the future doesn't seem to register clearly. In physics, scientists acknowledge that the very act of merely observing subatomic particles influences the way the particles behave. In the human realm, the same is true. Simply observing what goes on sends a message to those who are acting -- usually the message that they can behave anyway they wish, including trashing any agreements signed and any promises made to the international community. And the longer and more often we simply observe, the greater the danger that others will take this as a sign that the U.S. is a "paper eagle" whose feathers they can pull with relative impunity.
U.S. shaping, responding, and preparing doesn't mean we have to go everywhere all the time with military forces. It means we ought to be more actively involved (shaping) with other states in dealing with the conditions that encourage violence (and renewed violence) before wars start. When such low-risk preventive actions are not taken, it might well require -- as it did in Kosovo -- concerted major power intervention (responding), including that of the world's "only remaining superpower," in one of Africa's conflicts to send a clear message to would-be warlords that the world will no longer just "observe" atrocities and the systematic violation of international norms.
Responding sooner rather than later, when more sophisticated weapons become available to warlords, would involve less overall risk for all concerned. That would seem another important way to "prepare" for the future.
Fighting Erupts in Horn of Africa
By Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
While much of the international community's attention in Africa has recently focused on Sierra Leone and Congo, a conflict has been raging in the Horn of Africa for the last two years. Last week, this conflict was pushed to the forefront as peace negotiations failed and fighting resumed between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
At a time when resources of the United Nations and international community are being stretched -- with meager success -- in Africa, the resumption in fighting in the Horn has led to a shifting of priorities. In early May, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke led a Security Council delegation to Africa to visit the continent's trouble spots. "When the trip was planned, Congo was the number one crisis in Africa. By the time we got here, it had dropped to number three," said Holbrooke when he visited Asmara, Eritrea. Yet aside from Africa experts, few know or seem to care about the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Ethiopia and Eritrea have been at war since 1998 over "inland border territory and economic policy." Last week's fighting came as negotiators failed to reach agreement on a peace deal brokered by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). "World War I style trench warfare" has dominated the fighting, with over 600,000 troops facing off along approximately 600 miles of border. Since 1998, between 20,000 and 70,000 people have been killed, hundreds of thousands have been displaced, and millions face a major famine due to food shortages caused by drought and spending by both governments of scarce resources on weapons instead of food. In the latest round of fighting, Ethiopia has reclaimed most of the territory in lost last year.
The Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict is atypical of other African conflicts of the last decade. First, it is an interstate, not intra-state, conflict (Congo, initially intrastate, has become interstate -- involving eight outside countries). Second, Ethiopia and Eritrea are fighting with sophisticated conventional weapons, including tanks, helicopters, and jets, rather than just the small arms and light weapons that dominate the rest of Africa's conflicts. Third, unlike the wars in Congo, Sierra Leone, or Rwanda, the conflict's roots are not too complicated -- the two sides are fighting primarily over disputed borders and economic policies. In fact, many believe the war is the really the outcome of an intense rivalry between Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki. In the words of Ambassador Holbrooke, "The differences between the two sides are real but they are small and can be resolved by diplomatic means."
In response to the fighting, the United States, along with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, sponsored a resolution in the UN Security Council banning sales or deliveries of all types of military equipment to both belligerents, and prohibiting senior Ethiopian officials from traveling abroad until both countries sign a peace agreement. The U.S. resolution complements a previous Security Council resolution (introduced last Friday) that condemned the renewal of fighting and called for sanctions if a cease-fire did not occur within 72 hours on the premise that "The renewed hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea constituted a threat to peace and security and an even greater threat to the stability, security, and economic development of the subregion." U.S. Ambassador Nancy Soderberg, who introduced the American resolution, said an arms embargo should be implemented immediately, even if both sides agree to stop the fighting, "because we hope to degrade their ability to carry on this war. Obviously they have enough arms to fight for now but we hope over time it would have an impact."
The U.S. resolution, adopted on Wednesday, was a compromise between Security Council members. The resolution "bans the sale or supply of weapons, ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts to both countries. It also prohibits military-related training or technical assistance" (both of which Ethiopia and Eritrea were slated to receive from the United States in FY'00). According to the resolution, the "embargo will be terminated immediately if Secretary-General Kofi Annan reports that a peaceful definitive settlement of the conflict has been concluded. Otherwise, the council will review compliance with the embargo after 12 months and decide whether it should be extended." (This marks the first time a UN embargo was implemented with a time limit and wasn't open-ended).
Ethiopia and Eritrea have purchased millions of dollars of conventional weapons in the last few years. Russia, China, Israel, and Italy have sold millions worth of weapons to both sides. In fact, Ethiopia is reported to have purchased Russian-made ground-support combat jets for $20 million in the last year to continue its air campaign. Experts worry that future arms purchases could be transferred through Somalia and Sudan. Most significantly, both countries have relied on cheap weapons from surplus stocks in Eastern Europe to build their arsenals. Analysts believe Eritrea has funded many of its purchases with support from expatriate communities in Canada and the United States, and Ethiopia has taken money out of its social services budget to purchase weapons.
With so many weapons already available to both sides and the difficulty in enforcing embargoes, the UN action may be only symbolic in nature. But the United Nations cannot sit back and let war continue to engulf another region of Africa. Of all the current conflicts on that continent, this one has the best chance for a quick solution. War will only cost countless more lives and intensify the effects of the famine that plagues both countries. Swift and decisive action by the international community to resolve this conflict may well serve as a necessary confidence building measure to encourage continued action in the continent.
Kosovo Conflict Flares Up On Capitol Hill
By Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org
Two amendments in Congress, one recently passed by the House and and the other introduced in the Senate, threaten to force a unilateral withdrawal of U.S. peacekeeping troops from Kosovo. Although different in their scope and approach, both amendments raise important questions about the role of Congress in decisions to deploy U.S. armed forces, and the division of responsibilities between the United States and its NATO allies.
On Wednesday, by a vote of 264 to 153, the House of Representatives passed an amendment that may force U.S. troops to begin withdrawing from Kosovo after April 1, 2001. It requires the President to submit in writing information on commitments and pledges made by European countries to Kosovo's reconstruction, and to begin a "safe, orderly, and phased" withdrawal of U.S. troops unless a vast majority -- around 90% -- of the European commitments have been met.
In the Senate, Senators Robert Byrd (D-WV) and John Warner (R-Va) have proposed legislation that would suspend funding for peacekeeping in Kosovo unless the President certifies by July 15, 2000 that the European allies have provided at least three fourths of the promised humanitarian and reconstruction aid to Kosovo. Unlike the House version, the Senate language would also require the President to seek and obtain a specific authorization from Congress for a continued deployment of U.S. forces in Kosovo.
At the time of writing, the Byrd-Warner amendment's future in the Senate is uncertain. When Republican frontrunner for President, George W. Bush, declared opposition to the legislation, the Republicans in the Senate moved to kill the amendment outright. But after the House overwhelmingly passed its measure on Wednesday, the passage of the Senate version again seemed possible.
Both amendments grew out of frustration in Congress with the perceived European reluctance to pay a fair share of the peacekeeping expenses in Kosovo. Europe contributes around 85% of all peacekeepers in the province as well as the lion's share of expenses on governance and reconstruction. The aid, however, falls short of what is needed in Kosovo. The planned police force of 6,000 only reached a fraction of that size, and Bernard Kouchner, head of the UN Administration in Kosovo, at one point threatened to begin firing members of the UN mission because he ran out of money to pay them. The United States insists that reconstruction is Europe's job, while European countries grumble about cleaning up after a war that many did not embrace in the first place. These tensions are not unprecedented -- in an unwritten NATO arrangement the United States takes the lead in military conflicts while Europe bears the brunt of peacekeeping operations in Europe. This situation usually leads to Europe complaining about American military dominance and the United States faulting Europe for not contributing enough for reconstruction. This division of labor, however, may be coming to an end with 15 members of the European Union (EU) pushing for the establishment of their own Rapid Reaction force under EU auspices.
The Senate version of the Kosovo amendment takes on an even more controversial issue -- the role of Congress in decisions to use military force. The 1973 War Powers Act, which was intended to settle the dispute, was enacted on the wave of Congressional opposition to the Vietnam War. It requires the President to consult with Congress before introducing U.S. forces in areas of conflict, and to withdraw the forces after sixty days unless their deployment is specifically approved by Congress. But the law's provisions have been interpreted in many different ways and neither Congress nor any subsequent administrations have dared to submit the law to Supreme Court scrutiny lest they lose their case outright.
In May 1999, 25 members of the House of Representatives unsuccessfully sued President Clinton for violating the War Powers by ordering air strikes against Yugoslavia without Congressional approval. A House resolution in support of the war failed the preceding month on a 213-213 tie. The Clinton Administration argued that the air strikes did not constitute a war but rather a "limited military operation." A judge threw the case out arguing that courts should not intervene in political disputes on war.
In 1993, however, Senator Robert Byrd successfully used congressional powers to force a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia. He threatened to cut off funding for the troops and President Clinton instead opted to pull U.S. forces out in March 1994.
If the Senate also passes its Kosovo amendment, a conference between the two houses will be tasked with reconciling the differences. Unless the final wording of the provision is significantly weakened, President Clinton will likely veto the measure when it is submitted for his approval. A two-thirds majority vote is needed to override a presidential veto but the 111 vote margin on passage in the House -- 26 short of the two-thirds mark -- indicates that Congress may not be able muster the necessary votes.
The Senate version of the amendment also leaves open the question of how many U.S. troops would actually have to leave Kosovo. The provision exempts noncombatant troops, such as those providing intelligence support, air surveillance, and working in NATO headquarters. The U.S. Army actually distinguishes between three types of troops: combat, combat support, and combat service support units. The distinctions are further blurred in peacekeeping operations, where hostile situations are rare and virtually all troops serve in non-combat roles. The vagueness of the provision's wording leaves open the possibility that the President will opt for a limited withdrawal satisfying the letter, but not the spirit, of the law.
Under the Umbrella: Japan's Nuclear Potential
Corwin Vandermark, Research Assistant, cvanderm@cdi.org
Since the end of World War II, Japan has been a strong advocate of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Japanese officials have taken strong measures to maintain the image of a nation that can resist the temptation to "go nuclear." They have adhered to the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles," stressed Japan's status as the world's only "atomic victim," and forced the resignation of officials such as parliamentary defense vice minister Shingo Nishimura, who advocated Japan's acquiring the Bomb in an interview last October. However, real world circumstances have convinced Japanese policy makers to quietly lay the foundations for the future development in a relatively short period of time of a nuclear arsenal and the means to deliver it.
Japan is in an exposed position off the Asian mainland. The archipelago would be vulnerable to threats from a powerful and aggressive China. Tokyo also fears its neighbor on the Korean peninsula. Despite recent progress in improving relations between the West and North Korea, Tokyo remains deeply suspicious of Pyongyang's efforts to develop nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. The August 31, 1998 North Korean satellite launch of a Taepodong 1 missile alarmed Japan as it soared over the main island of Honshu. While Japan has begun to take defensive measures such as participating in joint development of the theater missile defense with the United States, Japan might pursue a nuclear deterrent if Pyongyang appeared poised to strike with nuclear weapons. Even a unified Korea, with a free-market economy and a democratic government, could cause Tokyo concerns. The historical animosity between Korea and both China and Japan could drive Seoul to develop its own nuclear arsenal.
Should Japan decide to build nuclear weapons, much of the infrastructure needed to develop and produce warheads and delivery systems is already in place. Wary of its heavy reliance on foreign energy sources, the island nation has vigorously pursued a domestic nuclear energy program. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Japan had fifty-three nuclear power plants in operation at the end of 1999, which supplied the country with 35% of its energy. As a result, the Japanese nuclear power cycle has produced a stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium adequate to build several thousand weapons. A report by the British Defense Ministry also stated that Japan is believed to have acquired all of the necessary components to build a bomb by the mid-1990s.
Japan's National Space Development Agency (NASDA) and its advanced space program are tackling the challenge of constructing a missile capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. Lessons NASDA learned by the recent failures of its scrapped H -2 space launch vehicle program are being used to help develop the cheaper and more efficiently designed H-2A. This rocket will have a 15,000-km range and be able to carry a 4,000-kg payload, making it an ideal intercontinental ballistic missile. The National Security News Service reported that Japanese engineers have been studying several warhead designs, including an old Soviet SS-20, which can be used to construct a multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) for the H-2A. While this missile might be several years away from its potential deployment, a fighter-based delivery system could be used if the need arose. Chinese analysts, however, point out a serious weakness in Japan's potential nuclear deterrence -- Japan has not actively pursued a ship or submarine launched delivery system.
According to weapon system analyst Carey Sublette, "Should Japan decide to do so, it is likely that emergency capability nuclear weapons could be deployed by Japan within a few months of a decision to produce them." Several factors have prevented Tokyo from going ahead with building and deploying the Bomb. First, Japanese public opinion remains bitterly against nuclear weapons, even as the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki fade from living memory. A 1998 Gallup poll revealed that 89% of Japanese said their country did not need nuclear weapons. Even after the North Korean missile launch, 79% of all respondents in an Asashi Shimbun poll stated that all countries should destroy their nuclear weapons without exception.
More importantly, Japan still has the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. As much as the Japanese public and some officials resent the American presence in Japan, it makes Tokyo's development of an independent nuclear capability unnecessary. American policy makers must take this into consideration while debating the future of America's military presence in Japan and East Asia. Tokyo is party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and several other agreements that promote disarmament and prevent the spread of weapons components and materials. If a champion of non-proliferation and peace such as Japan abrogated these agreements and joined the nuclear club it would deal a serious -- and perhaps fatal -- blow to years of work towards nuclear disarmament.
Civil War in Serbia? -- Serbian police has moved against opposition and independent media this week. On Wednesday, police occupied and shut down Studio B, an opposition-controlled TV station, the daily newspaper "Blic," and the most important opposition media source, the popular independent radio station B2-92. The government also arrested prominent members of the Otpor movement, which has emerged as the focal point of anti-Milosevic protests. Serbia's Interior Minister called Otpor "a fascist-terrorist organization which uses means and methods from the arsenal of the darkest past of world banditry." Responding to the government's crackdown, opposition leader Vladan Batic said "this indicates an introduction of a civil war."
Protesters Re-enter Vieques -- Last Saturday over fifty Puerto Rican protesters broke through the fence surrounding the Navy's Vieques training range. Navy guards detained the protesters shortly after they snuck on to the base. On May 4 U.S. Marshals removed over 200 people from the range, which has been occupied for more than a year by protesters who want the Navy to abandon the facility.
U.S. Suspends Training at South Korean Bombing Range -- The U.S. Air Force temporarily suspended live fires exercises at the Koon-Ni range after percussion from a bombing mission on May 4 broke windows and cracked walls of buildings in the nearby village of Mae Hyang. The training exercises, which the U.S. have conducted on the islet range since the end of the Korean War, have been a constant source of friction with the local population. The nearest village is only 500 yards from the range. The U.S. agreed to halt training temporarily after a request from the South Korean Defense Ministry so that an investigation of the damage can be conducted.
German Military Reform Proposals -- A leaked draft copy of a government-commissioned report on the future of the Bundeswehr shows dramatic changes in store for the German military. The independent commission chaired by former president Richard von Weizsacker is proposing that the active strength of the armed forces be cut from 320,000 to 240,000 and the size of the country's Rapid Reaction forces be increased from about 50,000 to 140,000. The most controversial portion of the report suggests that conscription be all but phased out with only 30,000 conscripts serving in the new force. The suggestions are in line with the European Union's plans to build an EU Rapid Reaction force around its members' militaries. However, the proposed near-elimination of conscription caused protests in Germany as it would end the tradition of the "citizen army" meant to prevent the creation of a separate military society outside the control of the citizenry.
U.S. Men Not Registering for Draft -- Nearly one in five American men are not registering for the military draft, according to the Selective Service Administration. Current law requires all men living in the United States and its territories, including immigrants and non-citizen residents, to register with the Selective Service within 30 days of their eighteenth birthday. According to the agency, for men born in 1980 who are now 19 or 20, the registration rate is 83%. This is down from 93% a decade ago. Agency officials believe that ignorance of the law, rather than wilful resistance, is the cause of the decline.
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "In the Shadow of Landmines"
For the first time, an American landmine survivor returns to Cambodia -- one of the world's most heavily mined countries -- to meet other landmine survivors, visit rehabilitation clinics, and investigate victim assistance programs. The survivor's odyssey is a gripping personal saga and a powerful look at the magnitude of the landmine crisis in Cambodia and around the world.
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