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| May 11, 2000 |
| May 11, 2000 |
National Missile Defense: Another Update
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
When it comes to technical parameters of the Pentagon's proposed missile defense system and the political fine points of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, most Americans tune out. But that may finally be changing, in part because the media is starting to talk about issues everyone can understand: logic, costs, benefits, alliances, and politics.
In just over a month, a crucial third attempt to "hit a bullet with a bullet" will occur over the Pacific Ocean. Based on a rapid and -- judging from the time taken to analyze the last two tests -- an inevitably incomplete analysis of the test, the Pentagon will recommend whether to deploy the system. To meet the self-imposed deadline of having the first 20 interceptors in place by 2005, the President must make a decision this autumn.
One of the most telling logical arguments against fielding NMD is that it reverses the entire course of U.S. nuclear weapons policy since World War II. (This was the same political flaw that afflicted Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" Strategic Defense Initiative of the 1980s.) Beginning with the missile race of the 1960s, the thrust of U.S. policy has been deterrence. The ABM Treaty of 1972 formalized this principle by limiting the ability of the two main nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, to deploy systems capable of countering offensive missiles, thereby precluding the "need" to build more and more offensive weapons.
Virtually at the same time that the ABM Treaty was being negotiated, the five nuclear weapons states were attempting to lock in their status. In the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Britain, France, China, the Soviet Union, and the U.S. pledged to work to reduce and then eliminate nuclear weapons in exchange for others pledging not to develop nuclear weapons. At the 1995 NPT Review Conference the five, led by the United States, made a major, ultimately successful effort to convince the rest of the world to extend the Treaty indefinitely by again promising to reduce and work for eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. And just this past week, the five powers formally reiterated their "unequivocal commitment" to such elimination -- albeit without a firm timetable.
These limitations and agreements have worked for the U.S. and the world for over a quarter of a century. It would seem, in this light, that we ought to follow that common sense phrase: "if it ain't broke, don't fix it."
Nor are conditions and threats likely to change radically over the next 15 years -- unless NMD is fielded. Robert Walpole, the CIA's point man on strategic and nuclear programs, recently reiterated earlier this month that the main threats will be Russia and China (old hat) and North Korea (nothing really new either). Since the 1998 failed attempt to put a small satellite in orbit with their Taepo Dong I missile, the North Koreans have not test fired another multi-staged missile. Range estimates for the Taepo Dong II, which is believed to be under development, credit it with the possibility of reaching the U.S. with a small nuclear warhead. Mr. Walpole's context for Iran and Iraq, the other two countries most often assumed to be striving for ICBM capability, are "probable" and "possible," respectively. But the CIA's assessment for North Korea, Iran, and Iraq is that all three regard nuclear-tipped ICBMs as means to other ends -- deterrence or coercive diplomacy -- and not as useful weapons in themselves.
If these assessments are even remotely correct, questions about the costs and benefits of fielding NMD come into sharper focus. Last month the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office estimated that the "Capability 3" system of 250 missiles at two sites would cost nearly $60 billion through 2015. Even this cost, which includes a constellation of 24 low-orbit satellites to track the flight path of hostile missiles, is sure to be low because of the numerous unanswered questions about NMD technology such as how well it will be able to distinguish decoys from real warheads.
Another unknown is whether the "X-Band" radar, designed to detect and track incoming missiles and provide up-to-the-minute data to defensive systems, can be built and protected on Shemya Island at the end of the Aleutian Islands in Alaska. The Pentagon says that Shemya is a vital link in NMD. Its position allows it to spot a North Korean launch early enough that defending missiles would have a second shot if the first defensive salvo missed. But even a second shot may not be enough if Russia or China believe that the U.S. is trying to gain a unilateral nuclear advantage. Robert Walpole observed that either country could transfer to a "rogue" the technology to counter missile defenses without violating any anti-proliferation agreement. Such countermeasures need not be "high-tech"; balloons disguised as warheads or warheads disguised as balloons or even chaff would be sufficient. The more complex the countermeasures, the more sophisticated the interceptors must be -- and so far they have been tested against only one simple decoy.
Getting the radar in will be a major feat. Winds are so high that construction is possible only two months of the year. The island is so remote that the Pentagon reportedly is still wrestling with the question of how long to leave individuals on-station, one or two weeks. And its very remoteness also raises the question of how well it can be defended against attacks by commandos, cruise or ballistic missiles, or by more exotic means such as electro-magnetic pulse.
On still another front, U.S. NATO allies are questioning the potential cost to the alliance of deploying a missile defense system that will protect the U.S. only. If Canada does not go along with deployment -- the price seems to be construction of an early warning radar in Canada -- the U.S. is suggesting it might "hold fire" if an incoming missile will strike Canada but not the United States. At a minimum, NMD would not be integrated into the U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) but would come under the U.S. Space Command.
European allies are as displeased as Canada by the implications of NMD for NATO. Javier Solana, former NATO Secretary General who is now the foreign and defense policy coordinator for the European Union, has raised the potential for defense "decoupling" if NMD goes ahead. An undefended Europe alongside a NMD-protected U.S. could very quickly translate into U.S. unilateralism. Mr. Solana's view has now been echoed by the prestigious London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies which states that the perceived threat has been "exaggerated."
The Pentagon remains undeterred. In fact, as events leading to the June 26 test unfold, the military is already charting its fall-back position in case the test fails. Since actual construction of the radar cannot begin until early next summer, the Pentagon believes the decision to deploy can be made this autumn and the contracts let with the proviso that one of the following two tests -- now scheduled for autumn 2000 and spring 2001 -- must succeed for actual construction to begin.
Such a course, considering the Pentagon's publicly stated criteria that it must have two successful intercepts to recommend proceeding with NMD, reminds one of another common sense phrase: buying a pig in a poke. It's not a smart basis on which to do business or plan for the nation's security.
Congress Mulls JSF Program
Christopher Hellman, Senior Analyst, chellman@cdi.org
With both the House of Representatives and the Senate Armed Services committees in the process of producing their annual legislation authorizing Pentagon spending, the fate of a number of high profile weapons programs are being carefully weighed. One such is the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which is under development for the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marines, as well as Britain's Royal Air Force and Navy.
Current plans call for the production of more than 3,000 aircraft, the first of which are to be delivered in 2008. At a total estimated cost of nearly $220 billion, the JSF is the single largest weapons program ever. A selection of which of the two competing defense contractors -- Boeing and Lockheed Martin -- will be prime contractor on the program is scheduled for April, 2001. At this time the program will go from the current concept demonstration phase, where aircraft designs are developed, to the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase, where the aircraft is fully developed, engineered, constructed and tested to determine whether production models of the aircraft will meet the military's performance requirements.
A report released this week by the General Accounting Office (GAO) recommends that the decision to begin the EMD phase be delayed so that technologies critical to the success of the JSF have sufficient time to mature and can be incorporated in to the aircraft as part of the EMD phase. This report is the final version of a draft study presented to Congress in March. According to the report, "Should any of these technologies be delayed, or worse still, not be available for incorporation into the final joint Strike Fighter design, the impact on the program would be dramatic ...DoD could expect an increase of several billions of dollars" in the JSF program.
Concerned about GAO's recommendations, as well as by the delays that have occurred in both Boeing's and Lockheed Martin's development programs over the last year, Deputy Secretary of Defense Rudy De Leon commissioned a study within the Pentagon to determine the impact of a delay of the JSF program. According to news sources, the study indicates that delays in JSF development would likely have a major impact on the tactical aircraft programs of the three U.S. services, all of which have incorporated into their long term planning the replacement of aging aircraft currently in their inventories by the JSF. As the older aircraft move closer to the end of their usable service lives, they become increasingly costly to operate and maintain. Delays in deploying the JSF would require the services to buy additional numbers of current aircraft to bridge the gap between the retirement of the existing fleet and the introduction of the JSF.
Both these reports have become public at a critical time in the annual budget process, as both the House and Senate are moving quickly on their respective Pentagon spending bills. Last week, the Senate Armed Services' Airland Subcommittee recommended that the JSF program be delayed six months to allow critical technologies additional time to develop. After meeting with Defense Secretary William Cohen, the full Senate committee decided not to delay the program, but cut $595 million from the EMD phase and adding $424 million to the current Demonstration and Validation phase in order, as the Committee's press release put it, to "strengthen" the program.
For additional information, see "GAO Recommends Delay in JSF Program," CDI's Weekly Defense Monitor, March 23, 2000.
China: U.S. Missile Defense Could Spark Renewed Arms Race -- Regardless of its stated intention to defend the United States against a ballistic missile attack by "rogue" states, China's chief arms control negotiator says it could well result in a renewed nuclear arms race. Sha Zukang said that the system under discussion would undermine China's ability to deter a nuclear attack, and could therefore force Beijing to significantly increase its nuclear forces.
Turkey Helicopter Decision Upcoming -- Turkey has moved the date forward for a final decision on acquiring 145 attack helicopters. The Turkish Land Forces Command will decide in late May or early June on the contract award. Bell Textron's King Cobra is the expected winner, but other finalists include Italy's Agusta A-129 International, and the joint effort of Russia's Kamov and Israel's Israel Aircraft Industries, the Ka-50-2.
Senate Cuts Colombian Aid Package -- The Senate Appropriations Committee approved less than $1 billion of the Clinton Administration's $1.6 billion request for counter-narcotics and military aid to Colombia this week. Worried about the effectiveness of the Clinton plan, the Senators decreased the levels of military funding and increased the human rights funding and conditions placed on the aid.
GAO Recommends Slowing F-22 Buy -- Delays in the F-22 fighter's development program should lead Congress to reduce the number of aircraft purchased until the program is fully tested says the General Accounting Office. A draft GAO report circling Capitol Hill recommends that only limited procurement of six to eight aircraft per year, and only 22 between now and FY'03 -- the current plan calls for 50 -- until the program can be sufficiently tested. The GAO estimates this could yield $828 million in savings in FY'01.
Canadian Military Halts Anthrax Court Martial Case -- Canada's chief military judge has halted the court martial of retired Air Force Sergeant Mike Kipling, who refused to receive an anthrax vaccine during his 1998 deployment to Kuwait. Judge Brais agreed with the defense that based on the evidence presented, the vaccine could have been unsafe, and that therefore Sergeant Kipling's rights had been jeopardized.
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "Isolating America"
Is America becoming increasingly isolationist? The Senate's rejection of the nuclear test ban treaty was but the latest episode in a trend toward "Fortress America" that includes rejection of treaties on landmines, a court for war crimes, and a perennial failure to pay U.S. dues to the United Nations. The public is right to ask whether major increases in military spending for programs like ballistic missile defense and hi-tech fighter planes are a better investment in the long run than fostering regional peace initiatives, helping our former enemies become democratic friends, and using diplomacy to help prevent conflicts.
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