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| April 27, 2000 |
| April 27, 2000 |
Somber Anniversaries in the Year 2000 -- A Reflection
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
This year the United States observes two significant anniversaries: the 50th anniversary of the start of the Korean War (June 25, 1950) and the 25th anniversary of the end of wartime U.S. involvement in Vietnam (April 30, 1975).
Although Korea and Vietnam are historically recorded as separate wars, they are in some ways linked. Geographically, the U.S. was involved in two sequential land wars on the Asian continent on either side of the People's Republic of China -- which might account in part for the belief occasionally expressed by Chinese officials that a continuing foreign policy goal of the United States is containing China.
Then there is the "continuity" of the wars. As early as 1950, the year the Korean War broke out, the U.S. had a 65 person Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam through which materiel aid was funneled to French forces. And although the first casualty registered on the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, DC is dated 1961, the Vietnam Veterans of America begin their count of American deaths in 1953, the same year that the Korean War Armistice was signed.
Eerily, the proportion killed in action to those who served during the conflicts is also strikingly similar. In Korea, 5,764,143 men and women served in the war and 36,914 or .64% who served were killed. In Vietnam, 8,752,000 served and 58,193 or .66% who served died.
Furthermore, when the wars "ended" they really didn't. On May 15, 1975, sixteen days after the evacuation of Saigon, 41 American servicemen died in an operation to rescue the crew of the Mayaguez who had been seized by the Khmer Rouge. In Korea, since the July 27, 1953 armistice, some 90 Americans have been killed, including two Americans who died in the infamous August 1976 "tree cutting" incident in the Demilitarized Zone.
Of course, there are significant differences as well. Korea officially lasted three years and one month. Depending on when one dates the start of the Vietnam War -- traditional options include the deployment of the first two helicopter units to support South Vietnamese forces in October 1961 or the introduction of the first regular ground combat units (Marines) on March 8, 1965 -- Vietnam lasted 13 years and six months or 10 years and one month.
More significantly, perhaps, is that 8,177 remain unaccounted for from the Korean conflict, including 5,500 servicemen whose unrecovered remains are believed to be in North Korea. In Southeast Asia 2,028 remain missing and unaccounted for (1,511 in North and South Vietnam). Of this total number, the Pentagon believes there are some 633 whose remains are unrecoverable.
As we are being constantly reminded by the news media, the anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War era is upon us. Out of the spotlight now but nonetheless growing in prominence are June events commemorating the start of the Korean War. In between Americans will observe Memorial Day, a day on which we remember all who served, all who died, all who remain unaccounted for from all our nation's wars -- including in this century 3,350 from World War I and 78,751 from World War II.
Some may think it a bit early to talk about Memorial Day, but in this first year of a new century and new millennium we should be conscious of the circumstances that in the past seemed to inexorably propel nations toward war and urge our elected leaders -- while maintaining a strong military defense -- to do everything possible to avoid repeating these patterns before the use of coercive power is deemed necessary.
Only through such a concerted effort will we be able to minimize violence and the pain of loss and uncertainty that all wars entails.
Protecting the Failing State (Part II)
Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
EDITOR'S NOTE: Part I of this article appears in the "Weekly Defense Monitor," April 20, 2000.
The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century recently issued a report outlining the six key national security objectives for the first quarter of the 21st Century. The Commission highlighted the challenges the United States will face in dealing with failing and weak states. To address these challenges, the Commission determined that under specific conditions, U.S. military intervention is necessary and prudent.
In light of these conditions, eight factors may help determine if a military intervention, conducted after a conflict has ended or the decision to send military forces as peacemakers or peacekeepers has been made, is likely to succeed. The eight factors do not represent a comprehensive list; rather they serve to demonstrate the myriad conditions for successful military interventions in today's changing international climate.
The first criteria is political will. The international community is often too cautious and slow in mustering political will, tending to intervene only when a situation has spun so out of control that inaction has become immoral. States turn to intervention when public awareness -- often dubbed the "CNN effect" -- is heightened to outrage. Politicians often play on public opinion polls, determining next moves by judging how it will play on the nightly news. Military planners are turning to public relations gurus to "spin" the intervention to make it more palatable and to manage the flow of information.
Second, military interveners must be prepared to deal with the reasons states fail initially. These include economic disparity, political corruption, and the proliferation of weapons, among others.
The third factor is the need to begin planning an intervention well before a conflict has ended or a tenuous situation is resolved. Early planning is crucial in cultivating potential donor support -- both money and forces for a mission. Once the armed conflict has ended, or at least been reduced to random small-scale incidents, it is important to get peacekeepers on the ground as quickly as possible to facilitate the implementation of the post-conflict reconstruction process. Planning for military intervention has to include programs that can sufficiently stabilize conditions of daily existence that will permit non-military organizations to undertake the reconstruction of the civil society that has been destroyed. Police, the judiciary, other official government institutions, as well as political parties and specialized interest groups are essential to the creation of an environment of sustainable human security.
Fourth, the international community and the armed forces that will be present in the region must gain the trust of the citizens of the country to which they are deploying. Developing the mission early and publicizing the role that international agencies intend to play helps in cultivating and strengthening trust of the indigenous population in the upcoming mission.
Fifth, it is important that interventions have a viable and well-defined mission. Most significantly, it is crucial to set some form of end state -- as opposed to end date -- at which point the intended goals will be achieved. Without well defined goals, a mission can develop into an open-ended commitment. Similarly, without a clearly defined division of labor, the military side of interventions can get mired in other duties for which the troops may not have been trained beforehand.
Sixth, military interventions must have a component that focuses on the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants. If weapons are not collected, former combatants will hold onto them in preparation for a renewal of the conflict. If demobilized fighters are not taught necessary skills for reentering society as productive contributors, then they will have no stock in the reconstruction process. These kinds of programs must be developed in advance and implemented as rapidly as possible. If the intervention force waits too long to begin, the window of opportunity for progress will close. Combatants will be less willing to hand in their weapons if they have no incentives or see real prospects for peace.
Seventh, military interventions must be tailored initially to the situation's peculiarities and be flexible enough to respond as conditions on the ground fluctuate. Intervention forces must be trained and sensitized to the specific needs of the population in the target area or else they risk creating resistance from one or another group and, in extreme cases, be seen as favoring one side over all others. In the best of circumstances, this is all to easy to do for members of an intervention force, whether military or non-military. Perceived neutrality is essential for interveners to accomplish their goals. If one or both (or all) sides do not trust the military force, little or no progress will be made in reconstituting the elements of civil society.
Eighth, to be effective, military personnel must be seen. Intervening forces can serve to create a sense of physical security in which community building and reconstruction can proceed. Economic and social recovery rely on a secure, stable environment, whether perceived or real, and the appearance of peacekeepers on the ground can go far in easing overt tension by creating a shield behind which more or less normal life has a chance to resume.
Even with the best intentions, military interventions do not always have the desired results. It is essential, therefore, to evaluate missions during their deployment and after their completion in order to quantify lessons learned and apply those lessons to future endeavors. The international community must also begin to develop alternatives to assist and supplement military interventions in order to strengthen governments' ability to provide for the basic needs of their citizens. Without such measures, human security will deteriorate and countless numbers will suffer needlessly.
This article was based on the paper, "The Evolving Role of Military Forces in Human Security," written by Colonel Dan Smith, USA, (Ret) and Rachel Stohl, prepared for the April 2000 Conference on Globalization and the Failed State. For more information on this conference and the ongoing scholarly and policy debate, see the Failed States Research Group web site at the Office of International Programs at Purdue University. You can also view CDI's America's Defense Monitor Video "Small Arms, Failed States" on that site.
CBO: Missile Defense Will Cost $60 Billion
Christopher Hellman, Senior Analyst, chellman@cdi.org
A report released this week by the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) puts the cost of a limited National Missile Defense (NMD) system at nearly $60 billion. The report, entitled "Budgetary and Technical Implications of the Administration's Plan for National Missile Defense," looked at the costs of the various phases of NMD deployment, from an initial system of 100 ground-based interceptors at one location, to a more robust system with 250 ground-based interceptors at two locations. While the CBO did discuss the effects of technical problems in the NMD development program on the costs of the system, it did not explore whether such a system was technically feasible.
The Clinton Administration's plan calls for the sequential deployment of a limited NMD system in three phases starting in Fiscal Year 2007 and extending until 2011. The deployment could be halted after each of the phases. The CBO looks at the cost of development, deployment and operation of each phase through FY 2015.
Because the threat of ballistic missile attack is perceived to be developing more quickly than anticipated, the first phase of the program will be preceded two years earlier by a "threshold" system of twenty interceptors located in central Alaska. It is this system, currently scheduled for deployment by 2005 should the decision be made to do so, with which the American public is most familiar.
The first phase, know as Expanded Capability 1, would involve the deployment of 100 ground-based interceptors at a single Alaska location by the end of FY 2007. It would include 1 X-band radar, used for precision tracking, which are expected to be able to pick out a real warhead from among decoys or debris. It would also include 5 upgraded early-warning radars and currently deployed early-warning satellites that are part of the Defense Support program, 4 high orbit Space-Based Infrared System satellites (SBIRS-high) to provide the initial early warning of a missile launch and an estimate of the missile's trajectory, and 6 SBIRS-low satellites to track individual warheads. CBO estimates that Expanded Capability 1 will cost $29.5 billion through 2015. The Clinton Administration has estimated the cost at $25.6 billion. The Expanded Capability 1 system is designed to intercept "several tens" of incoming missiles employing simple countermeasures.
Expanded Capability 2, to be deployed by the end of FY 2010, is also a 100 interceptor system based at a single Alaska location. It includes 4 X-band radars, 5 upgraded early warning radars, 5 SBIRS-high and 24 SBIRS-low satellites. CBO estimates the system will cost $35.6 billion through 2015. The Administration, whose budget projections for the Defense Department only go through 2007, has not provided cost estimates of either Expanded Capability 2 or Expanded Capability 3. The Expanded Capability 2 system is designed to intercept missiles equipped with sophisticated countermeasures, but at the expense of only being able to handle a "few" incoming missiles.
The Expanded Capability 3 system will include 250 interceptors at two locations, one in Alaska and the other likely at Grand Forks, ND. It will have 9 X-band radars, 6 upgraded early-warning radars, 5 SBIRS-high and 24 SBIRS-low satellites. CBO estimates the system will cost $48.8 billion through 2015. The Expanded Capability 3 system will combine the capabilities of the two earlier systems, protecting the United States from "several tens" of incoming missiles equipped with complex countermeasures.
None of these cost estimates actually include the costs of the SBIRS-low satellites, because, according to the report "[the CBO] believes the satellite program will be deployed -- even without NMD -- to serve other important missions." However, the report notes that SBIRS-low satellites are critical to the NMD system. "Failure to deploy SBIRS-low would either increase the costs of NMD, reduce its effectiveness, or both." CBO estimates the costs of the SBIRS-low system at $10.6 billion, bringing the total cost of the Expanded Capability 3 system to $59.4 billion.
For more information, see the Congressional Budget Office's report, "Budgetary and Technical Implications of the Administration's Plan for National Missile Defense."
NATO Destroys Seized Weapons -- A NATO spokesperson has announced that NATO has begun destroying weapons seized and collected by KFOR troops. The weapons are being melted down for use as scrap metal. Since June NATO forces have seized 1,100 machine guns and mortars, more than 500 anti-tank rockets and 26 anti-aircraft weapons and collected 13,000 rifles, almost 2,500 pistols, around 30,000 explosive devices and more than 7.5 million rounds of ammunition at KFOR depots.
Landmines Kill 30 in Angola -- Thirty people were killed and an additional 17 were injured in Angola this week when the two vehicles they were traveling in hit two anti-tank mines. The mines were placed four miles apart and rigged with dynamite, according to local news reports. The incident was reminiscent of similar events in February that claimed the lives of 23 people and injured 19. Both the government of Angola and the UNITA rebel group have been accused of using mines in renewed fighting in the country's 25-year civil war. The government of Angola has signed the 1997 Ottawa Treaty banning landmines.
China-Taiwan War Unlikely -- Saying that China is engaged in yet another round of psychological warfare, a Taiwanese government official said he believes that war with China is unlikely. Lin Chong-pin, vice chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council that handles Taiwan's China policy, said that Beijing was trying to intimidate Taiwan into starting reunification talks.
Lockheed Martin Sees Teaming on JSF as Likely -- Echoing sentiments expressed recently by a Boeing official, Lockheed Martin Chairman Vance Coffman said this week that his company expects some sort of joint production with Boeing of the Joint Strike Fighter. Coffman told reporters at a symposium in New York that he felt that the odds the Pentagon would abandon its current winner-take-all approach to the JSF were "better than fifty-fifty."
Administration's Case for NMD Deployment "Weak" -- A report published this week by the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers and the Council for a Livable World Education Fund looks at the four criteria President Clinton will consider in his decision to deploy a national missile defense system, and finds the case comes up wanting. The report, entitled "Pushing the Limits: The Decision on National Missile Defense," is available on the internet.
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "U.S. Responses to Ballistic
Missile Proliferation"
Seven years after the end of the Cold War the threat of an attack against U.S. territory has greatly diminished. But some argue that America still needs a National Missile Defense capability to address new and emerging threats. It seems that the proponents of missile defense advocate a costly, risky technological solution to a political problem over the more promising defense of comprehensive non-proliferation measures through cooperative security arrangements. Reducing threats offers far more security at less cost than does the pursuit of dubious defenses against missile attack.
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