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| April 20, 2000 |
| April 20, 2000 |
Getting the Priorities Right
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
May 20 will be the 50th Armed Forces Day celebrated by the nation. First begun in 1950 after the unification of the services under the Department of Defense, Armed Forces Day commemorates the work and the sacrifices of the men and women in uniform, active and reserve components, and those who support them on the home front.
Over the years it has been a day for the American public to renew its acquaintance with the military, for displaying military hardware and for air shows, and for the honoring those who serve the nation. It is also a public relations and recruitment opportunity for the services; according to the Pentagon, as of January 7 almost 76,000 copies of this year's Armed Forces Day Poster (above) had been ordered by the five military branches (including the Coast Guard). Moreover, the House of Representatives has passed a concurrent resolution declaring the "American G.I." (understood to mean everyone in uniform plus the Merchant Marine) as "The Person of the 20th Century."
As well intended as these measures may be, they really don't get to the real concerns facing the military in the year 2000.
Congress seems to think that the solution lies in mushrooming the Pentagon's budget. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2001Budget Resolution just passed added $4 billion to the Administration's $306 billion request for military spending (including Department of Energy nuclear weapons programs). Because the same resolution cut non-military programs by $29 billion, defense again accounts for more than half -- 52% -- of the total non-mandatory spending for FY2001.
Staying with money for the moment, what is perhaps more critical than the total dollars allocated for defense is the priorities that Congress and the Services set among the major budget categories: personnel, procurement, operations and maintenance (readiness), procurement, research and development, military construction, and family housing. Billions are still being poured into weapons designed to fight a Cold War industrial-age enemy that no longer exists.
For example, the latest (December 1999) Pentagon quarterly report about spending on major weapons systems shows a cost increase of $21 billion to $737 billion -- and that doesn't include $5 billion for the procurement phase for National Missile Defense. In testimony before Congress over the last quarter (January-March), the Pentagon has had to admit to further increases in the costs and to delays which increase costs in a number of these programs.
At the same time the services are unable to inspire enough young Americans to join and are losing the key people which they must retain to create and maintain an effective fighting force.
The Pentagon says it must to enlist 202,000 new recruits in FY2001 and has programmed $2.1 billion to reach that goal -- that's $10,396 per recruit. But in the last few years, the services have fallen short of their recruitment goals and this year doesn't seem to be any better. For FY1999, the Army fell 6,300 short of its recruitment goal, maintaining its overall strength only because it had better than expected reenlistment rates. The Air Force missed both its recruitment and retention goals by a combined 3,500, while the Navy was on target for recruitment but 460 below its retention goal. The Marine Corps beat both of its targets.
While the numbers work out, there are other costs -- the force gets a little older and as it does so inevitably it's not quite as fit. The ranks become a bit more top-heavy as the number of junior grade enlisted men and women fall (remember that the attrition rate in basic training can be as high as one-third of those recruited) and the services make extra efforts to retain the higher ranks to maintain end-strength numbers.
To deal with the fall off in new enlistments the services have increased the number of recruiters. They have expanded the high school Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) program through which they hope to entice high school graduates and even high school dropouts. Hollywood has been recruited. All this costs money and comes on top of the largest military pay increase since the early 1980s.
The Pentagon also is pushing for $3 billion over five years in new money for housing allowances for military members forced to live off-base. Congress is intent on reducing the costs to military families for health care when DoD medical facilities are unavailable. Enlistment and reenlistment bonuses are up sharply in what the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs termed "a pitched battle" to lure and retain men and women for military service.
But money doesn't seem to be the heart of the personnel problem, at least not according to a recent survey of officers attending the Army's prestigious Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The survey pinpoints the main reason so many mid-career Army officers are leaving as poor leadership across the board. There is a perceived lack of loyalty "down" the chain of command. Cynicism is fed by a lack of trust in the senior leadership as generals are perceived as unwilling to risk their careers by standing up for the troops. "Where's the [senior leader] loyalty? To the system? To political correctness? Or to the soldier?" Communications between leaders and the led is scarce, and the all important process of mentoring has been swallowed by a zero-defects mentality and risk aversion.
Other significant factors for leaving are family stresses, including separations and job conflicts as more spouses have their own careers. Some survey participants cite the change in mission from being ready to fight wars to peacekeeping. This dovetails with the perceived loss of the macho military image to "political correctness" a la gender relations and the "don't ask-don't tell-don't-harass" policy toward homosexuals, all as a reaction to occasional adverse publicity.
More money targeted toward remedies for some problems such as poor housing and inadequate medical care is appropriate, but that shouldn't automatically translate into bigger defense budgets. And money surely doesn't address the problems of leadership, loyalty, and communications cited in the Fort Leavenworth survey. Good leaders don't just happen; they must be developed, nurtured, encouraged, and allowed to fail as well as succeed if they are to acquire the skills and attributes that will engender the trust and loyalty of future generations of young Americans.
It's a tall order, but it's one the present civilian and military leaders must face squarely by personal example.
Visit DoD's "Armed Forces Day" web site.
Cut Taxes AND Defense
Oscar Lurie, Research Associate, olurie@cdi.org
Republicans in Congress want to cut taxes and increase the Administration's proposed defense budget for Fiscal Year 2001.
Their tax cut plan would greatly reduce the dollar amount of the taxes paid by the wealthy and give little dollar relief to the middle classes. This hardly seems equitable. Their defense budget resolution, just passed, added some $5 billion to the Administration's $305 billion defense budget, already far larger than we need to protect us from the real dangers of the present world.
Let us, for the moment, turn the congressional proposal on its head. What might be achieved if defense spending were cut by 10 percent and this money applied entirely to reducing the tax bite on middle class Americans rather than reducing taxes for the wealthy?
Using the Clinton administration's 2001 defense budget request and Treasury tax distribution data for 1997 projected to 2001 produces the following results.
For the overall welfare of the American people, isn't this the way to go?
Defense Panel Calls for Re-vamp of U.S. Security Strategy
Christopher Hellman, Senior Analyst, chellman@cdi.org
This week the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century released the second of its three planned reports reviewing U.S. security issues. Entitled "Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom," the sixteen page report lays out a range of U.S. security interests and strategic objectives.
The Commission, created by Congress as part of the Defense Authorization Act, was charged by Defense Secretary Cohen with reviewing current U.S. security and recommending changes needed to better face the challenges of the future security environment. Also known as the Rudman-Hart Commission, after its Co-chairs former Senators Warren Rudman (R-NH) and Gary Hart (D-CO), it issued its first report in September, 1999. The final report is expected in March, 2001.
The Commission divides U.S. "National interests" into three types -- survival, critical, and significant -- and gives examples of each. "Survival" includes America's safety from direct attack, preservation of the nation's constitutional order, and promotion of its educational, industrial and technological strengths. U.S. "critical" interests include safeguarding those international systems -- energy, economic, health, communications and transportation -- which support our way of life. "Significant" interests include the spread of democracy and the rule of law, the principles of a market-based economy, and international order based on commonly accepted rules.
The report lists six key objects of any U.S. security strategy:
The commission recommends a greater emphasis on non-military responses to international situations, but acknowledges that preventive diplomacy will not always work. When preventive diplomacy fails, the commission details a set of criteria specifying when the United States should be prepared to act militarily "in conjunction with other nations":
When required to respond militarily, the commission recommends that the United States have the following capabilities:
Other significant recommendations and observations of the commission's report:
For the full text of the report, visit the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century's web site.
Protecting the Failing State (Part I)
By Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century issued a report this week outlining the six key national security objectives for the first quarter of the 21st Century. The sixth key national security objective is to "help the international community tame the disintegrative forces spawned by an era of change." Analyzing the impact of globalization and the emerging security paradigms that resulted from the end of the Cold War, the Commission identified failed and weak states as specific challenges the United States will face with increasing regularity in the next twenty-five years. Failing states represent the ultimate disintegrative force -- the inability of the state to provide for the needs of it citizens.
The concept of the failed state is not a new one, but in the last ten years the breakdown of states and the gross failures of state governments have received more attention. The term state failure has become a regular part of diplomatic and political lexicon. The U.S. government has even established the State Failure Task Force to analyze factors that can severely weaken or cause states to fail and to develop possible joint actions to address these factors.
States can fail for a myriad of reasons including economic inequality, political corruption, and the proliferation of weapons. But whatever the cause of state failure or state weakening, the results can be disastrous. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda is an all too graphic example of what can happen when a government fails its citizens.
The Commission's recommendation that the United States establish priorities for aiding weak and failing states translates into selective rankings of nations that should be assisted. The Commission pointed to four in particular -- Mexico, Colombia, Russia, and Saudi Arabia -- whose stability is of "major importance to U.S. interests." Presumably the United States would focus its preventive and reactive strategies first and foremost to these countries. For failing states of lesser U.S. interest, the Commission suggests the United States work with the international community to "develop innovative mechanisms to manage the problem of failed states."
In addressing the weak and failing state, the Commission argues that preventive diplomacy should be the first reaction for the United States and its allies, including the use of political and economic initiatives. However, if preventive diplomacy fails, the Commission stresses that the United States "should be prepared to act militarily in conjunction with other nations in situations characterized by the following criteria: when U.S. allies or friends are imperiled; when the prospect of weapons of mass destruction portends significant harm to civilian populations; when access to resources critical to the global economic system is imperiled; when a regime has demonstrated intent to do serious harm to U.S. interests; and when genocide is occurring." The Commission contends that just one of these factors may be enough to justify military intervention.
While at times military intervention is a necessary step to protect weak and failing states, it does not have to be the only solution to addressing the above conditions. The United States must begin to "think outside the box" in terms of intervening in the affairs of another state. One such initiative may be alternative peacekeeping operations, such as non-military forces helping a country rebuild its political, social, economic, and judicial infrastructures. Strengthening the mechanisms whose failure precipitated the state's failure may allow the United States to avoid sending troops to more countries, stretching military resources farther than may be prudent. However, the United States must remain prepared to send its forces to intervene in weak and failing states if such initiatives are unsuccessful.
For a discussion on the general principles or pre-intervention conditions that must exist and be embraced by the international community if interventions are to have any chance of success, see "Protecting the Failing State (Part II)" in CDI's Weekly Defense Monitor, April 28, 2000.
For more information on failed states and the ongoing scholarly and policy debate, see the Failed States Research Group web site at the Office of International Programs at Purdue University. You can also view CDI's America's Defense Monitor Video "Small Arms, Failed States" on that site.
Changing of the Guard in Kosovo -- Spanish General Juan Ortuno assumed command of the international Kosovo Force (KFOR) on April 18, replacing German General Klaus Reinhardt. With Gen. Ortuno's arrival the command of the peacekeeping operations was also formally transferred from NATO to Eurocorps, an international force composed of troops from France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, and Luxembourg. Eurocorps officers will staff most of the KFOR command positions although NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, U.S. General Wesley Clark, will remain in formal control of KFOR.
An EU Crisis Management Force Proposed -- The 15-nation European Union (EU) has proposed creating a civilian crisis management group for quick interventions on the continent. The force, composed of judges, police, customs officers, and other non-military personnel, would be deployed in crises to preserve or reestablish basic civic structures. Lack of qualified personnel has plagued many past peacekeeping operations. In Kosovo the international police force never reached projected levels for lack of money and personnel.
Nuclear Weapons Cleanup Cost Estimates Grow -- According to the Department of Energy, the cost to clean up the toxic legacy of the nation's nuclear weapons program will cost $168 billion to $212 billion from Fiscal Year 1997 through FY 2070. This is 44 percent more than DoE estimated just two years ago. DoE officials say that the increased estimate is due to the fact that they now have a better understanding of the magnitude of the problem and what is actually required to clean up sites. This figure does not include $35 billion spent between FY'89 and FY'96.
Court Okays Chemical Weapons Incineration -- A federal court has cleared the way for the continued incineration of the nation's stockpile of chemical weapons at the Tooele chemical weapons disposal facility in Utah. Several groups, including the Chemical Weapons Working Group and the Sierra Club, had filed a lawsuit to block the Army's continued use of the Tooele incinerator, saying that the facility is unsafe and violates environmental laws.
Boeing: JSF Likely to Be Teamed Program -- Boeing vice president and general manager of its Joint Strike Fighter program Frank Statkus says the company is likely to have some sort of teaming arrangement with Lockheed Martin, which is competing with Boeing for the JSF program. "I believe that it is more than likely that [the currently planned] winner-take-all is not going to be the end scenario," said Statkus. Meanwhile, Rich Tuttle, editor of the trade publication "Aerospace Daily" says that the General Accounting Office's recommendation to delay the JSF program "has merit." GAO is recommending the delay so that technologies critical to the success of the program will have a chance to mature.
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "Star Wars: New Hope or
Phantom Menace?"
For 40 years American scientists have tried -- and failed -- to build a system to protect the U.S. from long-range missile attack. The recent successful test of a missile interceptor breathed new life into Ronald Reagan's dream of a national shield against enemy missiles. But will building "Star Wars" make us any safer?
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