The Center for Defense Information
Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW * Washington, DC 20036
(202)332-0600 * Fax (202)462-4559 * www.cdi.org
| March 30, 2000 |
| March 30, 2000 |
New Opportunities in US-Russia Relations
David Johnson, Senior Fellow, djohnson@cdi.org
Russia has a new leader in Vladimir Putin who replaced Boris Yeltsin, Russia's dominant figure since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Putin is young and energetic, a former KGB agent who rose from obscurity to be the elected president of Russia in less than a year. He is still a mystery both at home and abroad. Can Putin restore public confidence and stop Russia's slide into chaos? While there are many uncertainties some observations can be offered about what lies in store for Russia and for U.S.-Russia relations. Most importantWhat lessons should be learned from the past and what opportunities can be seized?
Putin comes to power in a country that has experienced catastrophic economic and social decline. A third of the population lives in crushing poverty and most others face a daily struggle to make ends meet. There has been a massive deterioration of the social infrastructure. While elections have become an accepted feature of political life, power has been centralized in a corrupt elite who control the country's major economic assets and much of its media. A sense of powerlessness and despair has become widespread as Boris Yeltsin's repeated failures of leadership dashed early hopes that life would get better in the new Russia. Putin is a repository of the rekindled aspirations of Russians for positive change.
At the beginning of the nineties, Russians were very pro-American. But the United States' role as an enthusiastic supporter of Yeltsin has damaged America's reputation. Russians associate the U.S. with the failures of economic reform and the corrupt privatization program that was implemented with American advice and financing. Compounding the disillusionment has been the expansion of the NATO military alliance and occasions, such as the war in Yugoslavia in 1999, when Russians felt their vital national interests were ignored. As relations soured and Yeltsin's health declined, progress became stalled as Russians rejected paternalistic American directions about to order their economic and political life.
The dominant and enduring U.S. interest in Russia has been to help secure and remove the huge arsenal of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union. Even in its decline, Russia remains a nuclear superpower. Nuclear safety has been an important area of constructive cooperation between the two countries. But Russia's continuing economic catastrophe threatens to undermine attempts to address the nuclear issue.
Vladimir Putin has been sending mixed messages about what he stands for and what he will do. The brutal war in Chechnya has been his main focus since Yeltsin appointed him prime minister in August 1999. His close connection with security and intelligence agencies and his call for a "dictatorship of law" create anxieties, even among Russians. On the other hand, Putin says that "Russia is a part of European culture" and clearly wants Russia to be integrated with the world economy and to secure foreign investment to help achieve economic growth. He has even suggested that Russia might join NATO some day.
The Putin government has adopted a new national security doctrine calling for a more assertive foreign policy and maintaining the central role of nuclear weapons. Along with China it insists on a multipolar world not dominated by the U.S. There is more emphasis on promoting the country's economic interests. But the focus remains on the dangers from economic weakness and threats at home. It is unlikely that Russia will try to restore the Soviet Union or pose a military threat to its neighbors. Economic progress at home is the number one priority.
On the immediate agenda of U.S.-Russia relations is progress on arms control. The START II treaty has been languishing unratified in the Russian parliament but will likely be approved as a prelude to the further, more drastic cuts in nuclear arsenals sought by the Russians. Russia cannot afford to maintain even its diminished nuclear forces. The U.S. also seeks to amend the U.S.-Russia ABM treaty that limits missile defenses, but Russia has strongly opposed any such step. Putin has given some indications of flexibility on the matter, but the issue could potentially derail further arms control measures if the U.S. pushes too hard or too quickly.
Another danger lies in NATO expansion. Yeltsin's Russia acquiesced in the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe, but Putin's Russia is adamantly against any further expansion, particularly into the Baltic states that were once part of the Soviet Union. The U.S. needs to take great care in its next steps in European security so as to insure that legitimate Russian interests are respected. Russian military forces have been taking part in peacekeeping in Kosovo, but relations could be aggravated again if conflict reignites in the former Yugoslavia.
Russia is burdened with a huge foreign debt, some inherited from the Soviet Union but most generated in the Yeltsin era as Western governments and international financial institutions expressed their support for Yeltsin with money. Easing this debt burden will be very helpful to Russia as it tries to achieve economic progress.
Both Russians and Americans hope that President Putin will pursue policies at home that will lead to growth and stability. It remains to be seen whether this will be done while ensuring that the independence of Russian media is strengthened and new democratic political institutions involved and respected. Russians want order and stability, but they do not want dictatorship or the rule of oligarches.
The U.S. has a real opportunity to work with Russia to diminish and perhaps eliminate the role of nuclear weapons. We need Russian cooperation on proliferation issues and to help resolve conflicts in many parts of the world. If this is going to happen, however, we need to respect the capacity of Russians to generate solutions to their problems that may be different than our preferences. In our current preoccupation with our role as "the world's only superpower," such restraint may be difficult but it is necessary. And not only vis-a-vis Russia.
Overkill For the Likely Missions
Oscar Lurie, Research Associate, olurie@cdi.org
In November 1999 the Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College published a study predicting that "the future, typical war will be more like the Somalian, Bosnian, or Kosovar conflicts than the World Wars of this [20th] century. Religious, cultural, or ethnic animosities are more likely to bring on war than the search for Lebensraum or resources. Troops may be sent into such conflicts to separate the combatants. But once separated, are the combatants then at peace? No."
The U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century also predicted in its September 1999 report that "while conventional conflicts will still be possible, the most serious threat to our security may consist of unannounced attacks on American cities by sub-national groups using genetically engineered pathogens....While the likelihood of major conflicts between powerful states will decrease, conflict itself will likely increase."
(The Institute is the strategic level study agent for the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. The Commission -- with 14 outstanding military, political, and industry leaders -- was chartered by the Secretary of Defense in 1998 and endorsed by the White House and Congressional leadership.)
If we accept these views, we must raise the question: are the size and components of America's military organization appropriate for these threats and missions -- today or in the future? Presently, U.S. armed forces total 2,750,000 persons (1,381,000 active duty and 1,369,300 Reserves and Guard). For FY2000, Congress has authorized $288.8 billion to finance the organization.
The 1990-91 Persian Gulf War required 665,476 troops. The FY2000 troop strength is about four times larger than that. Since the Gulf War the U.S. military has been deployed in 39 overseas incidents involving an average of about 5,000 US military personnel. The largest of the deployments involved almost 32,000 -- only one eighty-eighth of our total forces. Given the predictions of the Commission and the Institute, as well as our recent actual experience, it appears that our military manpower is far greater than required.
When measured in dollars, personnel costs (including housing) make up only about 27 percent of the total military effort. The development and procurement of new equipment soaks up about a third of the total military budget. For the most likely kind of future deployments, the new equipment is simply not appropriate. For example, Congress is presently allowing the Defense Department to develop and procure three new fighter aircraft: the F-22 Raptor for the Air Force, the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet for the Navy, and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Each of these designs is pushing the state of the art.
Congress has capped the cost of the F-22 program at $62.7 billion. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the JSF will cost $219 billion. At $281 billion these two new planes are intended to replace the Air Force's F-15 Eagles and F-16 Falcons. These older planes are the most capable fighter planes in the world. Flown as a team with planes that feed them intelligence, jam enemy radars, refuel them in the air, and provide other assistance, they can beat the best planes that any other military power could pit against them. It is true that some F-15s need replacement; CBO says that the oldest planes could be replaced with upgraded new ones for only $2.7 billion over the next ten years. Since there are currently about 3,200 of the older models in service, it is likely that normal attrition would leave more than enough units to fight our probable adversaries without any replacements at all.
The Navy is replacing its F/A-18 C/D fighter-bombers with 548 F/A-18 E/F at an estimated cost of $47 billion. Yet these is no reason why the thousand C/D planes now flown by the Navy could not easily handle the type of interventions our Navy will probably be conducting.
This brief review shows that U.S. armed forces are numerically much larger and equipped with more technologically complex planes than what is required for the kind of missions the Institute and the Commission predict they will be asked to conduct.
Perhaps quietly realizing this, DoD's civilian officials, their opposite numbers in defense industry, and their congressional supporters have come up with a Madison Avenue copy writer's fear-ad to justify this high level of spending on the U.S. military. The headline on this ad says "Beware The Peer Competitor."
Must we?
Defense Secretary Cohen predicted in his 1998 Annual Report that until 2015 it is not likely that there will be a "global peer competitor" able to challenge the U.S. military around the world as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. But he foresaw that "in the period beyond 2015 there is the possibility that a regional great power or global peer competitor will emerge" and listed China and Russia as his prime concerns.
To become such a threat the enemy must first become an economic powerhouse. China has seen amazing economic growth in recent years, but even if it continues to grow by more than eight percent annually until 2015 its economic output would reach only $2.2 to $2.9 trillion. Keeping in mind that China must use its output to support a population of 1,240 million, contrast this with America's $13.3 probable output in 2015. Russia's economy is in tatters; no one knows how long it will take them just to pay their soldiers and workers -- let alone replace its decrepit conventional military with armed forces that could seriously challenge the United States.
There would also have to be the will to attack us. But China's increasing prosperity is largely based on its foreign trade, which has been growing by 15% annually. The U.S. has been taking over a third of these exports. For China to threaten America's critical interests would mean it is perfectly willing to lose this significant percentage of exports to the U.S. but probably most exports to America's close allies in the industrialized world. This would be a calamitous blow to China's economy and the welfare of its people. With regard to Russia, which is now less hostile toward the U.S. than it has been for almost a century, it urgently needs investment and other financial assistance from the west and is therefore also unlikely to risk the loss of these economic supports.
Facing no military competitor today, the U.S. could safely reduce its military forces to levels a few times larger than needed to perform its probable missions. Should either China or Russia begin rebuilding its military toward rough parity with the United States, our intelligence establishment would quickly discern the move and our policy makers could then determine if the build-up presaged the will to attack America. If so, a rapid build-up of the U.S. military could commence.
Such a course of action by the U.S. is not isolationist. Rather, it is the abandonment of militarism in favor of flexibility and realism.
South Korea Is Ready To Defend Itself
Corwin Vandermark, Research Assistant, cvanderm@cdi.org
Although hopes that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) would "collapse" after the Cold War have turned out to be unrealistic, recent events suggest that the North is on a path leading to integrating its economy with that of the Republic of Korea (ROK). High-level diplomatic contact between Pyongyang and Western capitals, along with ROK President Kim Dae-Jung's "sunshine policy," look promising in terms of luring the Stalinist regime in the North out of its isolation. If progress on the diplomatic front continues, the United States would have an opportunity to test Pyongyang's long term intentions by agreeing to a phased withdrawal of American forces from the Korean peninsula. The risk from a phased reduction in U.S. forces would be low in terms of its effect on the ROK's ability to defend itself. Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution argues in a Spring 1998 article that the DPRK's devastating blitzkrieg of June 1950 would not be repeated: "A traditional armored assault by North Korean forces would amount to putting metal into a metalgrinder." In terms of force structure, advanced weapons, explosives, and dug-in fortifications ROK forces are well prepared for any major conventional assault by the North. While the ROK is continuously modernizing its forces, the DPRK has been forced to rely on outdated Cold War-era equipment. In short, there is no steamroller to roll south to Pusan.
Nonetheless, O'Hanlon concludes that American ground forces should remain despite the advantages that South Korea possesses. Since his conclusion, the ROK has made further gains in building its forces. As South Korea recovers from the Asian economic crisis with a six-percent increase in GDP, the ROK's military continues to grow as well. South Korea's defense budget is expected to increase 5 percent in 2000 to $12 billion. Arms exporters other than the U.S. are providing Seoul with advanced weaponry, including Russia -- a long-time "ally" of the DPRK -- which hopes to settle its $1.7 billion debt to South Korea through arms transfers. The ROK Air Force has been acquiring or building under licence such weaponry as F-16C/D fighters and B-767 advanced warning and control planes to supplement the 500 combat aircraft already in service. On the seas around the peninsula, the ROK Navy is planning to deploy Aegis-class destroyers along with German Type 209 and possibly Russian Kilo-class submarines.
Even without the 36,530 U.S. personnel currently stationed in South Korea, North Korea's 1,082,000-strong, poorly equipped armed forces and 4.7 million underfed reserves would have to face a defending army of 560,000 better-equipped troops and 4.5 million well-fed reserves in the ROK. These forces will soon be supported by new ground attack fighters, helicopters, and a satellite reconnaissance program. Jane's Asia correspondent Robert Karnial points out that Korea has moved away from preparing strictly for an inter-peninsular war to building a force with new subs, destroyers, long-range aircraft and AWACS for promoting its regional interests as well -- perhaps in preparation for a unified Korea. This is a sign that the ROK is confident of its ability to deal with its recalcitrant brothers in Pyongyang.
Removing forward-deployed combat forces would not leave the ROK completely on its own. The United States could continue to support ROK security through air and naval support based in Japan as well as the large logistics infrastructure supporting our Japan-based units. Access to bases in South Korea would have to be agreed upon before the start of any withdrawal, and "ready-to-go" equipment would have to be prepositioned for U.S. units for both exercises -- and if needed -- for defense.
A gradual U.S. withdrawal from Korea would not be viewed as a manifestation of American neo-isolationism. Over the last few months, there has been a gradual thaw in relations between Pyongyang and the West, with high-level diplomatic contacts and even the establishment of formal relations with Italy. North Korea also appears to have ceased its development of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. At little cost or risk, gradually withdrawing forward-deployed forces could be considered a "peace offensive" that removes what North Korean leaders regard as an obstacle to permanent peace. At the very least, it would test the commitment of the North to peace, and if they are found wanting, we could freeze or even reverse the process in a short period of time.
Russia's Strategic Bomber Force Growing
Olga Kryazheva, Research Assistant, okryazhe@cdi.org
In order to maintain its nuclear deterrent, Russia recently expanded its strategic bomber fleet by purchasing eleven planes that had been stationed in Ukraine when it was part of the Soviet Union. Last month, Russia completed the redeployment of the eight TU-160 "Blackjack" and three TU-95MS "Bear" bombers, capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear loads. Along with the aircraft, Russia took delivery of 600 Kh-22 and Kh-55SM long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, the main weaponry for the TU-160 and TU-95MS.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine "inherited" a total of 19 TU-160 and 25 TU-95-MS bombers. Budgetary constraints prevented the Russian Air Force from buying new aircraft to replace those it lost -- the market price tag was $250 million. The Russian government then turned to the next obvious source, -- recovering the bombers left in the Ukraine. Initially, Ukraine demanded $75 million per TU-160. After several years of negotiations, the two countries agreed on a $285 million deal.
The TU-160 was designed by the Tupolev Design Bureau to deliver strikes on targets in remote geographic locations deep in the rear of the theater of operations. It has a maximum speed of 2,000 kilometer per hour and a service ceiling of 16 kilometers. With its range of 10,500 kilometers, it provides Russia with the capability to strike far beyond its borders. Experts believe that these strategic bombers could maintain the "aviation component of Russia's strategic nuclear forces...until 2015-2020." In an interview with ITAR-TASS, the commander of the 37th Air Army of the Russian Supreme High Command Lt. General Mikhail Oparin, stated that the Ukrainian aircraft, cruise missiles, and support equipment are in good condition, and after undergoing maintenance operations in April "will be distributed among units and a separate regiment formed on the basis of the fleet of TU-160 strategic bombers." With the addition of these aircraft, the Russian Air Force will have more than 60 TU-160 and TU-95MS bombers, including fourteen TU-160s. 85% of the fleet are considered to be in good condition and have adequate crews.
In spite of it's economic crisis, Russia's military aviation capability is growing. Although Russia does not currently produce military aircraft on a large scale, design bureaus continue to design fighters, bombers, and helicopters that are competitive with, and sometimes surpass, Western designs, although do to economic factors, few, if any models of these new aircraft are entering service. Currently Russia is designing a new strategic bomber scheduled to become operational in 2015. This aircraft will be smaller than either the TU-160 or TU-95. Russia is also constrcting the TU-60S which was designed at the end of 1980s.
For all the design work, however, combat readiness is low due to lack of funds. Fuel and spare parts are limited. In 1999, the Strategic Air Force received only 6% of the resources required for training and could execut no more than 40% of standard training operations. According to the Russian News agency Interfax, Russian pilots fly an average of 20 to 21 hours a year. This contrasts sharply with United States strategic bomber pilots who fly 25 training hours or more per month.
Despite the restricted training opportunities, the 37th Air Army, composed of two air divisions of TU-160 and TU-95 strategic bombers and four divisions of TU-22 medium bombers, continues to prepare for long-range missions. In a July 1999 exercise (Zapad 99), TU-160 and TU-95MS aircraft conducted training flights near Iceland, Canada, and Norway, testing the response times of Western air defense forces. This action marks a return to operational training that in the last decade has been almost non-existent. This year the 37th Air Army plans to continue its long-range training, focusing eastward with a mission to Vietnam.
Maintaining a nuclear deterrence capability is a top Russian priority. Increasing the number of strategic bombers, modernizing aircraft and weapon systems, and developing training programs to increase readiness and effectiveness are all part of the overall effort. Still, how much the addition of aircraft and the increase in operational training strengthens the aviation arm of the nuclear triad remains to be seen. If nothing else, these recent actions of the Russian Air Force reveal a definite resolve to reverse course and reassert itself as a viable strategic force.
NATO Enters Serbia -- NATO troops officially entered Serbia proper for the first time since the rescue of the F-117 pilot downed during the 1999 air war against Yugoslavia. This time, however, British troops with the KFOR peacekeeping contingent in Kosovo came in peace. A small group of them met with Yugoslav officials in the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) surrounding Kosovo and forbidden to both KFOR and Yugoslav troops by the June 1999 Military Technical Agreement Between KFOR and Yugoslavia. They came to investigate allegations that Yugoslav tanks entered the GSZ but found no conclusive evidence.
Attacks, Military Trial in Chechnya -- Chechen fighters struck back at Russian troops that conquered most of the republic and ambushed a column of paramilitary police on Monday. Of the 49 troops in the column three were killed, 16 rescued, and the remaining 30 are missing; Russian agencies report. Also in Chechnya, Russian military prosecutors arrested tank regiment commander Yuri Budanov and charged him with raping and murdering an 18-year old Chechen woman. It is the first known instance of Russian authorities prosecuting servicemen for their conduct during the war. The U.S. government and a number of human rights groups have been urging Moscow to fully investigate allegations that Russian troops have looted Chechen houses and abused and killed civilians in the course of the war against Chechen separatists.
Air Force Study Links Agent Orange and Diabetes -- A. U.S. Air Force study has found the "strongest evidence to date" that exposure to Agent Orange is linked to diabetes. The study found a 47 percent increase in diabetes in veterans with high levels of dioxin in their bloodstream. Dioxin is the substance in Agent Orange which has been shown to have negative health effects in rats. The National Academy of Sciences will review the study's findings and report to the Department of Veterans Affairs, which will then decide whether to add diabetes to the list of illnesses linked to Agent Orange, making Vietnam veterans suffering from the illness automatically eligible for benefits. The study is expected to be completed in May.
Navy Begins Live Fire Training in Florida -- As a result of the Pentagon's decision to suspend live fire exercises in Vieques, Puerto Rico, the Navy is currently conducting training at Eglin Air Force Base. Last Friday, the first day of the exercises, Navy aircraft from the USS George Washington dropped 62 tons of bombs on the base, which is located on the Florida panhandle. According to the Navy, noise and safety restrictions at the Eglin test range limit the realism of the exercises, which will run through this Sunday.
Boeing Strike Delays F-22 -- According to Air Force Secretary F. Whitten Peters, the recently ended strike at Boeing may seriously delay a major milestone in the F-22 fighter's development program. The F-22 is scheduled in December to fly with its "Block 3.0" software package, which integrates the aircraft's sensors, communications and defensive systems. The first flight of a Block 3.0 aircraft is one of ten criteria needed to allow the Pentagon to make a low-rate initial production decision to build the first 10 production F-22s.
This Week on America's Defense Monitor: "Star Wars: New Hope or
Phantom Menace?"
The "Star Wars" missile defense system is an extremely controversial public spending issue. $90 billion has already been spent on research and development. The recent successful test of a missile interceptor has breathed new life into Ronald Reagan's dream of a national shield against enemy missiles. But will building "Star Wars" make us any safer?
Airs in Washington, DC on Sunday, April 2 at 10:30 a.m. on Channel 32.
Airs in NYC on Friday, April 7 on Channel 25 at 7:30 p.m., and on
Saturday, April 8 at 7:00 a.m. on Channel 13.
Visit our web site for transcripts, CDI resources, RealVideo, and
related links.
E-mail adminfo@cdi.org with "subscribe" in the subject line for updates
on new videos.
Regular Price: $39 each
INTERNET PRICE: $29
Order at 800-CDI-3334, or on the web.