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| March 3, 2000 |
| March 3, 2000 |
Editor's Note: The Center for Defense Information is pleased to announce
that Bruce G. Blair became its President on
March 1. Mr. Blair comes to
CDI after 13 years at the Brookings Institution, where he was a Senior
Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program. He is an expert on the
security policies of the United States and Russia, specializing in nuclear
forces and command-control systems. Read about his
background
and his vision for CDI.
No Risks, No Reward: U.S. Troops in the Balkans
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
News media this week reported on a highly unusual letter from General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to General Wesley Clark, NATO's military commander and commander of all U.S. forces in Europe. General Shelton reportedly directed General Clark not to employ U.S. forces outside their designated zone in southeastern Kosovo. General Clark had sent some 350 U.S. troops, along with forces from other nations, into the northeastern Kosovo town of Mitrovica to reinforce French troops trying to collect arms and prevent pitched battles between ethnic Albanian and Serbs.
The problems in Mitrovica are reminiscent of those in the Brcko area of Bosnia which falls within the U.S. zone of control. During the war the predominately Croat and Muslim town was captured by the Bosnian Serbs, who drove out most of the population. Who would get control of the town, with its important rail and water links, became a highly contentious issue. Last March, after additional forces had been deployed to the city, an international arbitration panel decided that Brcko would be an autonomous region administered by a joint Bosnian Serb-Croat-Muslim government. It was a decision that pleased no one, leaving Brcko a likely flashpoint when NATO forces leave Bosnia.
General Shelton's letter highlights one of the difficulties of formal military-diplomatic coalitions that no longer face a major threat. NATO was conceived as a defensive alliance for western Europe against the former Soviet Union. The presumption underlying the alliance was that an attack on one member would prompt a military response by all. But this presumption of unified action concealed the fact that each member state retained the right to respond as it saw fit. In other words, while the NATO Treaty required a response, it was left to each sovereign state to determine what its response would be.
In the absence of a specific military threat or activity against an alliance member, the pull of sovereignty is more pronounced. This pull has become more apparent in all NATO nations who are wary of casualties among forces engaged in peacekeeping operations. This wariness may partially explain why only some 44,000 NATO troops out of an anticipated 49,000 have been deployed to Kosovo and NATO ministers rejected a call made last week for 2,000 more troops. Furthermore, nations seem more willing to place restrictions on the employment of their forces geographically and on the vigor with which their contingents will conduct operations. Such restrictions complicate the task of the commander responsible for accomplishing the mission, for he cannot be sure when and in what form new caveats might be imposed.
In sending reinforcements to Mitrovica, General Clark, as the NATO (and U.S. forces) commander on the ground, was reacting to the threat to NATO troops posed by the growing violence in the city. Yet perhaps haunted by the ill-fated raid by an earlier American peacekeeping force in Mogadishu, Somalia, congressional and American military leaders balked when it became clear that the violence in Mitrovica was no longer simply between Serb and Albanian factions but was being directed against the peacekeepers.
What is unclear about General Shelton's letter is whether he was expressing his own position or relaying instructions from Commander-in-Chief Bill Clinton or Secretary of Defense William Cohen. If either the President or the Secretary of Defense instructed General Shelton to write General Clark, the letter takes on the authority of an order (in which case it ought to have a phrase indicating "by order of..."). If neither the President nor the Secretary gave instructions to General Shelton, it would seem that General Clark's judgement about the situation and how to handle it ought to be respected.
If in Bosnia, as General Clark told the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 2, "civilian progress requires the continued presence of SFOR" some five years after the Dayton Peace Accords, it seems unrealistic to view Kosovo as any less of a challenge. "The hardest part of securing peace in Kosovo lies ahead," Clark said. "Progress in Kosovo is being made [but] the continued presence of KFOR is necessary to provide a secure environment...and is key to achieving a lasting peace in Kosovo."
If "a lasting peace" truly is the U.S. policy goal, Washington must be willing to participate fully in the effort. One part of full participation is to keep to a minimum the restrictions imposed on the commander on the ground.
Congressional Leaders Looking to Increase Pentagon Budget
Christopher Hellman, Senior Analyst, chellman@cdi.org
As members of the House and Senate Budget Committees begin their work on the annual budget resolution, congressional "hawks" are already putting pressure on their colleagues to boost funding for the Pentagon. The budget resolution sets the annual spending levels for the annual congressional funding bills, including the "topline" for the military. And if you read last week's "Weekly Defense Monitor," it will come as no surprise to learn that the "wish lists" provided by the chiefs of the four military services are being used as leverage by Pentagon supporters.
Representative Floyd Spence (R-SC), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, this week wrote to Budget Committee Chairman John Kasich (R-OH) urging him to boost the Defense Department's funding allocation. In his letter, Chairman Spence wrote, "I recommend that the...budget provide for increased defense spending...sufficient to address, at a minimum, the critical unfunded requirements that have been identified by the military service chiefs." According to congressional sources, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Warner (R-VA) sent a similar letter to Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM), who chairs the Senate Budget Committee. In all, the Chiefs are requesting $15 billion in additional funding in Fiscal Year 2001, and over $84 billion for the period FY 2001-2005.
Yet despite clear support in Congress for raising military spending, it appears that the ability of members to give the Pentagon a significant increase in FY'01 may be limited. The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 sets specific spending limits for defense and all other federal discretionary programs -- those on which Congress and the Administration must act to fund each year. The prospect of perceived significant budget surpluses have led some members of Congress to consider using these funds to pay for high priority federal programs, including defense. But do these surpluses really exist? And if so, just how large are they?
According to government accounting methods, when annual revenues exceed the amount spent, the difference is the budget surplus. The problem is that much of what the government takes in each year represents workers' contributions to the Social Security system. Currently the Social Security system is bringing in more than it is paying out in benefits, and the difference is being counted towards the overall federal balance of payments. This has the effect of making the surplus appear much larger than it actually is, and permits the government to spend funds that in future years will be needed to pay Social Security benefits when the system's income no longer is sufficient to cover benefit payments.
In recent weeks leading congressional Democrats and Republicans, along with the Clinton Administration, have decided, at least for the time being, that surplus Social Security revenues will not be counted towards the general budget surplus nor used to fund other federal programs. The portion of the surplus not related to Social Security revenues is known as the "on-budget" surplus. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the total budget surplus for FY'01 will be $166 billion, while the on-budget surplus will be roughly $21 billion.
In addition to those supporting increases in Pentagon spending, other members of Congress are trying to fund their priorities out of the on-budget surplus. Such items as a tax cut and Medicare coverage of prescription drugs are very popular, particularly in an election year. Supporters of critical domestic programs such as education and crime prevention are also interested in securing additional funding. The demands on this relatively small surplus are mounting quickly.
Thus, Congress' ability to raise military spending in FY'01 is restricted, but only if members continue to take a "hands-off" approach towards the Social Security surplus and if they are disciplined enough to avoid the budgetary gimmicks that have become commonplace in the last few years. For example, last year congressional appropriators declared $7.2 billion in Pentagon funding to be "emergency spending" and thus not subject to the spending caps set by the BBA. They also agreed to defer $1.2 billion in FY'00 spending until FY'01 by deferring payments to defense contractors, and by delaying the last payday for military personnel in FY'00 by one working day so that it would fall in FY'01.
While it is unlikely that Congress will raid the Social Security accounts in an election year, it is far less certain that members will be able to restrain themselves from finding other ways around the BBA's spending limits.
For an analysis of the increasing importance of the service's "wish lists" in the annual budget debate, see "Money, Money, Who Gets the Money?" the Weekly Defense Monitor, Volume 4, Issue #8, February 24, 2000.
Landmine Treaty Anniversary Passes Without U.S. Action
By Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
March 1, 2000 marked the first anniversary of the entry into force of the Ottawa Landmines Treaty, the Treaty banning the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. As of February 24, 2000, the Treaty had 137 signatories and 91 ratifications. Absent from the list of states parties is the United States, which, more than two years after the Treaty was negotiated, seems no closer to signing or acceding to the Treaty.
The U.S. continues to isolate itself from its allies as it persists in being among an ever decreasing number of states that have not signed or ratified the Treaty -- including China, Russia, Libya, Iran, and Iraq. All of the NATO countries except the United States and Turkey have signed, 41 of the 48 sub-Saharan African countries have signed, and every country in the Western Hemisphere except the United States and Cuba have signed.
President Clinton had been the first world leader to call for the total ban of anti-personnel landmines. But, in the years since, the Clinton Administration has tempered its position on an outright ban, arguing that the U.S. must be allowed to keep its anti-personnel landmines placed in the demilitarized zone in Korea and within its mixed anti-tank, anti-personnel landmine systems. The current Clinton administration policy is that the U.S. will sign the Treaty by 2006, if suitable alternatives to the mines used in Korea and in mixed-mine systems are developed.
However, progress on developing those alternatives has been slow. Instead of focusing on alternatives, the Pentagon has asked for funding for the RADM mine system, an artillery-fired anti-tank mine that includes anti-personnel landmines. The RADM system is illegal under the Ottawa Treaty. On the positive side, however, the United States has promised to destroy non-self-destructing landmines in its stockpiles, except those in Korea, and has continued to be the world's largest donor to demining and victim assistance programs.
The U.S. Campaign to Ban Landmines, of which the Center for Defense Information is a member, is urging President Clinton to accede to the Treaty before he leaves office. In the likelihood that Clinton will leave office without taking action on the Treaty, the campaign believes the next President should make Treaty accession an immediate priority. But, of the current major presidential candidates, only Bill Bradley has indicated he would join the list of Treaty states parties. Vice-President Al Gore has touted the Clinton administration position of singing the Treaty if suitable alternatives are found while the positions of Texas Governor George W. Bush and Arizona Senator John McCain are unknown.
The second meeting of states parties will take place in Geneva in September 2000. Only those states that ratified or acceded to the treaty by March 1, 2000 are allowed to participate in the meeting as full states parties. That deadline has now passed without U.S. action, and the United States has missed yet another opportunity to "do the right thing" on the landmines issue.
The Myth of Multiethnicity
Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org
The semblance of peace in Kosovo was shattered on February 2 when a rocket-propelled grenade attack on a UN bus killed two Serbs and touched off a two week orgy of violence in the city of Mitrovica. The subsequent chain of events proved just how elusive peace is between the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. A multi-ethnic Kosovo is turning out to be a long-term goal at best, and perhaps an impossible one. The international KFOR mission deployed in Kosovo is unlikely to end soon -- peacekeepers and the UN police are currently the only barrier preventing more bloodshed.
What happened in Mitrovica? The attack on the UN bus was followed by two more grenade attacks on Serbian cafes in nearby Mitrovica. In response, an armed and enraged Serbian crowd forced over a thousand Albanians out of their homes in the northern part of the town and across the Ibar river, effectively splitting the city into a Serbian dominated north and an Albanian-controlled south. At least three people died and scores were injured during the night of violence. Over the next few days, protesters assembled on each side of the Ibar river as KFOR beefed up its presence in the city, eventually nearly quadrupling its original force of 700 to 2,500. Violence continued practically daily despite their presence; two French peacekeepers were wounded by snipers on February 13 and six Albanians were injured by a grenade attack on the same day. U.S. and other troops were stoned on February 20 while searching the city for weapons. On February 21, KFOR troops used tear gas and truncheons to stop a massive demonstration of several tens of thousands of Albanians from crossing into the Serbian part of the city. More trouble could be coming -- KFOR plans to begin moving the Albanians back to the northern part of town in the next few days.
The surprising aspect of the violence in Mitrovica is not that it took place but that it took so long to materialize. The reality in present-day Kosovo is that the Serbs and the Albanians show precious little willingness to live together. Mitrovica was the only town in Kosovo where a substantial Serb population of about 20,000 co-existed alongside an Albanian majority of about 90,000. Serbs have been expelled from most other cities and villages (many of those expelled found refuge in Mitrovica), and if small minorities remain behind, it is usually under heavy KFOR protection and in daily fear of their lives.
In the aftermath of the Mitrovica violence, U.S. and NATO representatives accused Yugoslav authorities in Belgrade of fomenting the unrest. "This is not a simple question of local Serbs who are all stirred up north of the bridge. This is being stirred up by...Yugoslav authorities," said U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Richard Holbrooke. Unnamed NATO officials leveled similar charges in an interview for the New York Times. The allegations are based on radio intercepts by NATO which, the alliance says, prove that Mitrovica Serbs were in contact with the police across the border in Yugoslavia. NATO did not specify the nature of those conversations or how they would have contributed to the outbreak of violence. The same officials completely ignored the significance of the presence in Mitrovica of General Agim Ceku, the former commander of the now officially dissolved Kosovo Liberation Army, during the February 21 Albanian demonstration. By eyewitness accounts, Ceku -- dressed in a uniform in violation of the agreement on dissolving the KLA -- addressed the crowd shortly before protesters began tussling with KFOR peacekeepers.
The fact of life in Kosovo is that the two communities do not want to live together. KFOR commander, General Klaus Reinhardt of Germany, admitted as much in a recent interview for Jane's Defence Weekly. He said that the horrors of the1999 war are "still too close, too vivid" for many Kosovars to accept the multi-ethnic society sought by the international community.
Thus a simpler explanation for Mitrovica violence is that the Serbs were providing for their own safety by expelling the Albanians from their midst after KFOR troops in the city proved incapable of protecting the Serb minority, as demonstrated by the rocket attack on the UN bus and subsequent grenade attacks on Serbian cafes in Mitrovica.
KFOR's attempts to repatriate the Albanians by force could lead to more violence. The peacekeepers vowed to restore the Albanians expelled on February 3 to their original homes. KFOR began registering Albanian families desiring to return to the north of Mitrovica and opened a foot bridge across Ibar to facilitate their return. The first Albanians trying to do so were stoned and forced to return back. Serbian families in Mitrovica say they will leave if KFOR resettles the Albanians in their part of the town by force. On March 2, KFOR dismantled the bridge, citing "a rise in the river's water level." One way or another, the dream of building a multi-ethnic Kosovo is on a respirator, if not clinically dead.
This has profound implications for international peacekeepers in the country, including roughly 5,000 Americans. It is unlikely they will be withdrawn before the situation is stabilized; a resumption of violence in Kosovo would call into question the wisdom of policies which led to the 1999 war and their deployment.
KFOR countries may decide to let time heal the wounds between the two communities. However, little healing is under way and more strife may follow -- the NATO-Yugoslavia agreement left open the question of Kosovo's future political status. An attempt to declare Kosovo independent is sure to enrage the Serbian population, which was guaranteed that Kosovo would remain a part of Yugoslavia in UN Security Council Resolution 1244. In the meantime, the continued uncertainty about Kosovo's status is conducive to more violence -- already ethnic Albanians living in areas of Serbia contiguous with Kosovo are launching attacks on Serbian police in the hopes of provoking a violent response. This, in turn, would justify a deployment of foreign peacekeepers and granting the areas the same de-facto independent status that Kosovo now enjoys.
NATO commanders are eyeing a possible change of government in Serbia in hope that a more democratic regime in Belgrade would open the door to a settlement of Kosovo's status and the beginning of real stabilization and eventual withdrawal of KFOR troops. General Wesley Clark, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, told the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives that KFOR troops are "not going to be able to complete that mission...until that regime in Belgrade is replaced by a democratic government." These hopes may be premature -- not only is the Serbian opposition notoriously weak and divided, it features several nationalist parties whose stance on Kosovo differs only slightly from that of the current government in Belgrade.
Cohen Urges Additional Base Closures, Military Chiefs Unenthusiastic -- Testifying before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Defense Secretary William Cohen renewed his pitch for additional rounds of base closures as a way to save money. Meanwhile, in separate testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Joint Chiefs were noticeably less supportive. Marine Corps head General James Jones stated that he had no facility he would recommend for closure, while Admiral Jay Johnson, the Chief of Naval Operations, said his opinion was basically the same. The Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, supported additional closures, but said the decision should depend on whether the Army needs to increase of decrease its personnel end strength. Only Air Force Chief of Staff, General Michael Ryan, expressed strong support for further closures.
Navy Needs 350 Ship Force -- Although the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review determined that a force of 300 ships would be adequate for the Navy to meet its warfighting needs, some top Navy officials are saying that a larger force of about 350 vessels is needed. According to Vice Admiral Charles Moore, commander of the 5th Fleet, this would include 15 carrier battle groups, up from the current 12. In order to reach this goal, the annual shipbuilding budget would have to be increased dramatically, to about $18 billion. Currently the average budget for shipbuilding and conversion is around $7 billion.
Arms Export Licensing Staff Increased -- The U.S. State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC) has increased the number of its licensing officers by seven. The ODTC has also filled four vacancies of officers who recently left. The ODTC plans to hire up to 23 new officers by 2001, 17 of them in 2000. The increase in staff size will double the number of licensing officers currently on staff.
Tomahawks for Tridents? -- After years of urging Congress to lift the legal restrictions on its ability to retire four of its 18 Trident ballistic missile submarines as a cost savings measure, the Navy is now considering plans to convert the submarines to Tomahawk cruise missile platforms. Each submarine would carry as many as 154 Tomahawks. Originally the Navy estimated it would save $500 million by retiring the four Tridents. Cost of the proposed conversion is estimated at $2 billion, but could run as high as $4 billion.
NMD Decision Needed by Fall -- According to General Ronald Kadish, Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, the Clinton Administration will have to decide this fall on whether to deploy a national missile defense if the Administration's proposed time line of having an operational system by 2005 is to be met. This means that the White House cannot wait until a new Administration takes over if it is to meet its own goal.
Services to Pay for Services? -- According to Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan, it's time for the military to consider cost sharing on certain functions which benefit more than one service but where only one pays for it. "We cannot continue to absorb those kinds of bills in systems that take care of all agencies and services," said General Ryan, because it drains funding from other Air Force priorities. He cited making the military's network of Global Positioning System satellites jam resistant as one such program.
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "Are We Prepared for
Chemical/Biological Attacks?"
Ever since the poison gas attack on a Tokyo subway, our government has been preparing for a similar attack on U.S. soil. Forty federal agencies and billions of dollars are committed to counter things like sarin gas, anthrax, and small pox. Domestic and international terrorism are at the center of this fascinating and informative program.
Airs in Washington, DC on Sunday, March 5 at 10:30 am on Channel 32.
Airs in NYC on Friday, March 10 on Channel 25 at 7:30 p.m., and on
Saturday, March 11 at 7:00 a.m. on Channel 13.
Visit our web site for transcripts, CDI resources, RealVideo, and related
links.
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