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| February 17, 2000 |
| February 17, 2000 |
National Missile Defense -- Just say No
Colonel Dan Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
Top Pentagon officials seem determined to elicit an unambiguous decision from President Clinton in June about deploying a national missile defense (NMD) system by 2005. The decision must be made this summer so that construction can be completed within the Administration's self-imposed deadline.
In all the arguing over NMD, the fact that 2005 is a self-imposed deadline seems to get lost. Yet it is perhaps the most important point, one that, if more widely known, might galvanize taxpayers into opposing what two blue-ribbon panels headed by former Air Forces Chief of Staff General Larry Welch termed a "rush to failure."
General Welch and his colleagues are not alone in their unease about this unseemly hurry to field NMD. On the political front, many Members of Congress are becoming concerned that political campaign considerations might spill-over into the decision process. They would prefer any decision be delayed until after the November election -- even after the next administration takes power.
Technologically, Philip Coyle, the Pentagon's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, has again warned Congress that "undue pressure has been placed on the program to meet an artificial decision point in the development process." Coyle's warning comes after the failure last month of a prototype interceptor to knock down a target ICBM over the Pacific Ocean. It is virtually the same language he used in February 1999 when he noted that the pre-decision test schedule was so compressed that there was not enough time to properly analyze data and make needed corrections to improve intercept performance.
In fact, since Coyle's February 1999 statement, delays have forced the Pentagon to scratch one of four planned tests. The October test, conducted with surrogate radars and booster rocket, scored a hit that the Pentagon later conceded involved a great deal of luck. A third test is scheduled for May, and it must score a hit for the Pentagon to meet its "minimum" standard of two kills in three tests against a single target and at most two simple decoys.
If a tangible threat really existed, there might be reason to run the program at high speed and accept the admittedly high technology risks. But as if with a single voice, the top professionals in the U.S. intelligence community -- Robert Walpole, the President's National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs; George Tenet, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and J. Stapleton Roy, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research -- say that an intercontinental ballistic missile is the least likely means by which a rogue state or a terrorist group would attack the U.S. homeland.
Moreover, what really worries these four individuals most (besides the long-standing missile threat from Russia and China) is the proliferation of short and medium range theater missiles that could strike deployed troops and overseas U.S. bases. According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, of the 38 nations known to have ballistic missiles (including the original five nuclear power states), 27 have only short range (under 625 miles) missiles and only four (India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran) are working to develop missiles with intermediate (1825 to 3500 miles) range. And considering that the number of ICBMs in the Russian arsenal has fallen by 52 percent since the Cold War ended while China's arsenal of ICBMs still stands at 20-25, the actual threat to the U.S. homeland from long-range missiles has diminished. Yet unlike our European allies, who are much closer to two of the three rogue states most often cited as threats (Iran and Iraq), U.S. policymakers in Congress and the Administration seem oblivious to the numbers that demonstrate a reduced threat.
So why the pressure to build a NMD system? The answer seems to rest on the point that without an anti-ballistic missile system the U.S. is defenseless against a missile attack, a situation that proponents say is unacceptable in the 21st century. We need, say NMD supporters, an "insurance policy" that only NMD will give. But as the State Department's Mr. Roy pointed out, Russia and China might regard a U.S. "insurance policy" as in "fundamental conflict" with their interests and decide to deploy more ICBMs, thus increasing "significantly...the quantitative threat to the United States." Such a possibility is not farfetched when one considers that some U.S. officials are already talking of a two site NMD deployment with 125 missiles at each location.
In the end, what should be most unacceptable is making a hurried decision to spend money on an inadequately tested, unreliable system that will be sold to the American people as a protective shield -- even if a limited one -- against a still remote threat. Because technology cannot be completely controlled by any one nation, at some point the U.S. might need to field a NMD system. Until that need becomes more imminent, we ought to just say "no" to deploying NMD and devote our diplomatic and military talent and resources to dealing with today's threats to our national security -- and perhaps precluding tomorrow's.
Middle East Remains Attractive Market for U.S. Arms
By Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
For decades the United States has been clear in its commitment to peace in the Middle East, often acting as a neutral mediator between conflicting parties. However, the United States continues to pour arms into the region, contributing to an arms race for the biggest and best weapons around. Since 1991, the United States has been the Middle East's number one source for weapons.
The Middle East, referred to as the Near East in U.S. government reports, is a geographic area that includes Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. A number of these countries are important as the U.S. depends on their cooperation in case a quick U.S. response is needed to counter "threats" to U.S. national security in this area. Defense Secretary William Cohen's recent trip to Morocco highlights the U.S. desire to reinforce positive military relationships with countries that share similar security concerns. The 1991 Persian Gulf War reinforced the strategic importance of U.S. Middle East allies. Since the war, the United States has steadily increased its exports of sophisticated weaponry to its allies, with major deliveries and agreements made with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Kuwait and Egypt.
The upward trend in military support to the Middle East continues in the 2001 budget offered by President Clinton last month. The budget proposal provides $3.54 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants, funded by the State Department that recipients use"to buy defense-related goods and services primarily from U.S. contractors." As an exception, Israel is permitted to spend 26.3% of their financing on Israeli-produced weapons. In the 2001 budget, Israel is to receive $1.98 billion and Egypt $1.3 billion in FMF financing. Jordan and Tunisia were also identified as recipients of FMF funding.
The Middle East also set to receive Economic Support Fund (ESF) monies. Of the $2.3 billion allocated toward ESF in the 2001 budget proposal, Israel is expected to receive $840 million and Egypt $695 million. The 2001 budget also provides for increased funding for the Arrow program -- a cooperative U.S.-Israel program valued at $1.6 billion -- to develop a ground-based, theater ballistic missile defense system for Israel. If the 2001 budget is approved, the Arrow program will receive $73.6 million in 2001 and $42.7 million in 2002.
Beyond the FMF and ESF funds, Israel has requested $17 billion in new weapons, including surveillance systems, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and Black Hawk helicopters. Israel has also requested the construction of two infantry training bases and a storage and logistics base for a reserve armored division, with an estimated cost of $200 million, to aid in implementing a potential Syrian-Israeli peace pact.
Critics maintain that the influx in sophisticated weapons technology to Israel could further set back the resumption of the currently suspended peace talks with Syria. Some, pointing to allegations that Israel previously sold "sensitive" U.S. weapons technology to China and India, fear that providing Israel with newer weapons could renew those connections. There are also human rights concerns about increasing military aid to the Middle East, especially to countries that do not have democratic governments. Selling weapons to these countries can perpetuate autocratic rule and the oppression of citizens. United States programs should not contribute to the prolonging of these "un-American" practices.
The United States has a significant stake in promoting peace throughout the Middle East and in seeing its allies are stable and strong. But sustainable regional peace is more likely to blossom and be sustained if it rests, first and foremost, on trust, mutual respect, and confidence, not military weapons. Selling weapons of increasing sophistication to the region can only lead to the continued reliance on military means to solving the political problems that have plagued the area for centuries. The U.S. should encourage the Middle East to spend resources on good governance, strengthening the judiciary and civil society, and supporting existing and future peace processes.
Burdensharing: Round Number....Ah, Who's Counting...
By Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org
Earlier this month, Secretary of Defense William Cohen fired another salvo in the transatlantic squabble over "burdensharing," the code word for the division of costs and responsibilities in the NATO alliance. At a February 2 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary Cohen insisted that the Europeans buy new military equipment and reduce the size of their armies to give them more punch. "They have to put more money into procurement ....[and] reform the way they shape their forces," Secretary Cohen said. The charges brought an enthusiastic response from the chairman of the committee, Senator John Warner (R-Va): "That was a very powerful statement you made and it coincides with the views on this panel."
Although the burdensharing debate is as old as NATO itself, the recent tensions touch on a relatively new phenomenon -- the capability gap opening between the United States and its allies. In the air war against Yugoslavia, 61% of all flight sorties were conducted by U.S. aircraft, with the rest of the alliance mustering only enough airplanes to fly 39% of the missions. At the height of the conflict the United States had 731 aircraft in the theater, compared to only 84 from France, 58 from Italy, and 33 from Germany; the largest European contributors. These statistics were detailed in the Pentagon's recently released after-action report to Congress, "Kosovo/Operation Allied Force."
Despite the statistics, the charges leveled by the Pentagon against the European allies are not entirely fair. The capability gap is a legacy of the Cold War [see "We Can Rely on Allies," CDI Weekly Defense Monitor, December 2, 1999]. Because updating military arsenals is a slow process, NATO countries today fight with weapons devised and built during the Soviet era. The Europeans are best prepared for a massive mechanized army clash in Central Europe; the most likely war scenario in that period. Conversely, a sizable part of the U.S. military was built for mobility so that it can quickly reinforce the 350,000 U.S. troops already pre-positioned in Europe. While the United States was busy preparing airlifts and mobile units, Europeans never worried about getting to the battlefield; they expected the war to come to their doorstep.
However, Europe's procurement record since the end of the Cold War is spotty. Virtually all allies cut their budgets significantly. Because the size of the militaries (and the related personnel expenses) remained largely unchanged, the budget category that suffered the most was procurement [see CDI's spending graphs] Secretary Cohen is right in urging Europe to cut the size of their armies. The savings achieved can help Europe build a more mobile force, like the 50,000 to 60,000-strong rapid reaction force the European Union (EU) wants to field by 2003.
In addition to the planned European corps, the EU took steps last year to create its own political and military bodies. In 1999, the EU created the post of a High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy; a post which -- if member nations dare delegate the necessary responsibility -- could develop into a European version of the U.S. Secretary of State. If and when the EU has the tools to carry out military operation independent from NATO, the United States will be able to reduce its extensive military presence in Europe and the associated financial and personnel expenses.
It is ironic then that the U.S. Administration has responded cooly to the EU's defense efforts. Representatives of U.S. Departments of State and Defense insist that all European military operations be conducted within NATO. If not, NATO must at least have the "right of first refusal;" an obligation, in fact, for the Europeans to first turn to NATO if a problem arises. Only if NATO (in this case, essentially only the U.S.) decides not to take action, would the European Union be allowed to go ahead.
Needless to say, the Pentagon's and State Department's stance on European defense efforts undermine U.S. calls for Europe to carry a larger portion of the defense burden. The United States cannot have its cake and eat it too. If the Europeans are to build a force fully capable of military operations in Europe, they will surely expect to be in charge of it. As for the Pentagon's worries about "Fortress Europe," its patronizing statements about the EU's effort are more likely to bring about a transatlantic rift than to prevent it.
Russia Wins The Caspian Oil Race...For Now
Corwin Vandermark, Research Assistant, cvanderm@cdi.org
As the Clinton administration continues to endorse the economically questionable pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan to Ceyhan, Turkey, Russia may be on the verge of reestablishing its Soviet-era control over Caspian oil. Successes on the pipeline front and Russian President Vladimir Putin's domination of the recent CIS summit make it likely that the former Soviet states of Central Asia and the Caucasus will not escape Russia's sphere of influence anytime soon. Further complicating matters in Washington's eyes, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov recently stated that his country would "actively participate" in the $890 million expansion of the Iranian pipeline network. American oil companies had been hoping to invest in this project.
United States policy has advocated Russia's participation in the construction of pipeline routes, but at the same time it has called for alternate routes that avoid Russian territory. Washington believes that this will strengthen the former Soviet states' independence from Moscow. However, high-capacity alternatives to Russian pipelines have not been constructed. Talks between Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan collapsed in January. Interest in the proposed Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Afghanistan -Pakistan line died due to ongoing civil war and concerns over human rights violations in Afghanistan. In addition, a route which would channel oil from Aktyubinsk, Kazakhstan eastward to the Yellow Sea is in limbo because of disagreements between the Kazakh and Chinese governments. Two routes through Russia, the Tengiz, Kazakhstan-Novorossiysk, Russia line -- of which Mobil and Chevron own a combined 22.5 % share -- and the Baku-Novorossiysk line will be able to handle far more than the 1,100,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd) that Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan currently produce.
Even so, Russia does not have a lock on the energy resources of the former Soviet states. In December 1998, the U.S. Department of Energy estimated that the entire region will be producing approximately 3,000,000 bpd by 2010 and almost 5,000,000 bpd by 2020. Additional pipelines will be needed within just a few years, keeping a window of opportunity open for the United States and Iran to mend at least economic relations. Although the Iran-Lybia Sanctions Act (ILSA) continues to prohibit U.S. companies from making major investments in Iran, indirect preparations are already being made for an American return. Azerbaijan and Iran are moving closer to building the Baku-Neka line, which will tie Caspian Sea oil neatly into Iran's existing pipeline network. With foreign financial and technical assistance, this network's capacity could easily be upgraded in the $890 million expansion Ivanov mentioned.
John Parker of the State Department and the Woodrow Wilson Center has pointed out that while Russia and Iran will cooperate on some issues -- especially if Russia can sell Iran nuclear reactor cores and Kilo-class submarines, products of Putin's hometown of St. Petersburg -- it is unlikely that their relationship will become as strong as some Americans fear it might. Economically and technologically, Iran remains oriented toward the West for the long haul. The "pragmatists" in Tehran foresee the inevitable repeal of the ILSA and the return of American oil companies. As for the recent offer of Russian help with the pipeline, it is unlikely that a large amount of money will materialize. Past Russo-Iranian endeavors, such as the completion of the nuclear reactors at Bushehr, have moved slowly, and access to oil is more likely to be a source of competition than cooperation between the two.
While stressing Russian participation in Caspian oil development, the United States still wants the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline as the main oil and gas export alternative to Russian routes. But oil companies and other possible investors are skeptical. Besides the $3 billion price tag, the Baku-Ceyhan line could easily fall prey to any one of the numerous separatist factions that operate in areas where the pipeline would run. Georgia and Azerbaijan have been eyeing NATO membership in order to get the alliance to assist in protecting the pipelines. Even if the Energy Department's 2020 projections are correct, Caspian oil will comprise only three to four percent of the world's energy supplies -- hardly enough to justify NATO or American military involvement.
The economic and political realities of the Caspian region make it impossible for Washington to pursue a successful strategy that brings the former Soviet states closer to the West while it simultaneously isolates Iran and rewards Turkey for helping to contain Iraq. At least one of these goals must be sacrificed. The Clinton administration or its successor will have to reconsider current Iran policy or its interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia altogether if any of these goals are to be attained.
Chiefs Tell Congress More Funding is Needed for Military -- In what has become an annual event, the military service chiefs have delivered to Congress their "wish lists" of unfunded programs for which they would like additional funds. While last week it was reported that they had $16 billion in unfunded requirements for Fiscal Year 2001, this week Representative Floyd Spence (R-SC), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, sent a letter to committee members saying that the military would need an additional $84 billion for the period FY'01-05.
NATO Back in the Former USSR -- After visiting the Ukraine, NATO Secretary General George Robertson arrived in Moscow on February 15. It is the first high-level visit by NATO to Russia since Moscow broke off ties with the alliance over the air war in Yugoslavia. The two sides released a joint declaration in which NATO promises to "observe in good faith [its] obligations under international law." Russian has criticized NATO for breaking the UN Charter by attacking Yugoslavia without Security Council approval. Moscow, for its part, promised to remain in the Kosovo peacekeeping force and abide by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.
Kosovo Descends Into Violence -- Fighting in the Kosovo city of Mitrovica could degenerate in to all-out war between ethnic Albanians and Serbs, UN police officers warned on Tuesday. A rocket attack on a bus carrying Serbian residents touched off a week of violence in which Serbs and Albanians fought each other as well as UN peacekeepers. Mitrovica is the only remaining town with significant Serbian and Albanian populations living side by side.
Yemen Destroys Landmines -- Yemen has begun destroying 10,000 landmines in its stockpile in accordance with provisions of the International Landmine Treaty. An additional 5,000 mines will be destroyed at a later date. The United States is assisting Yemen with disposal of landmines planted across the country during a two month civil war in 1994. Yemeni government officials estimate that a half a million landmines have been planted in Yemen since 1962.
South Africa will Destroy 260,000 Small Arms -- The South African government announced that it will destroy 260,000 state-owned small arms by the end of 2000. The destruction project, named Operation Mouflon, will be funded by the government of Norway. The government announced that "all state-held redundant, obsolete, unserviceable, and confiscated semi-automatic and automatic weapons as well as purpose-built sniper rifles of a calibre smaller than 12.7 mm will be destroyed." The weapons included Uzi submachine guns, R1 rifles, and Bren light machine guns. The government plans to allow the public to view the destruction ceremonies.
Pentagon Releases List of Major Defense Contractors -- The Defense Department has released its annual list of the top 100 Defense Contractors. As they did last year, Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Raytheon topped the list in Fiscal Year 1999, which ended on September 30, 1999. Lockheed had contracts valued at $12.7 billion, Boeing did $11.6 billion worth of business, and Raytheon $6.4 billion. Click here to see the full list.
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "The Environmental Impact of War"
From the defoliation of the forests in Vietnam to the oil fires of Kuwait, all major wars of the 20th century, and recent conflicts like Kosovo, have had a hidden casualty: the environment. Unexploded weapons, polluted rivers, contaminated soil, and damaged landscapes have all harmed human health, local economies, and ecosystems. The long-term effects of such environmental damage have not yet been fully determined.
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