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| February 3, 2000 |
| February 3, 2000 |
EDITOR'S NOTE: Details and Analysis of the Defense Department's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2001 will be available on the CDI website at 8:00am Eastern on Monday, February 7, 2000 at: http://www.cdi.org/issues/usmi/highlightsFY01.html
White House Loss of Influence in Congress Apparent in House Vote on the
Taiwan Security Enhancement Act.
Dr Nicholas Berry
The House of Representatives has gone freelancing on legislation that, if passed by the Senate, would raise tensions across the Taiwan Strait. The bill would reverse the current warming of Beijing-Taipei relations and could affect Taiwan's upcoming presidential election.
In a 341 to 70 bipartisan vote, the House gave Taiwan a ringing endorsement of its autonomous status. The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act would require the Department of Defense to establish direct and formal communication links with Taiwan's military officials. Such links would violate the 1979 U.S.-China agreement on diplomatic recognition which stipulated that Washington would end its formal defense arrangement with Taiwan. Only slightly less controversial, the legislation would allow increased U.S. training of Taiwan's military personnel and give Congress a greater role in arms sales to the island. Backers of the legislation, introduced last summer by Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-TX) and Rep. Christopher Cox (R-CA), want the U.S. to provide Taiwan with diesel-powered submarines, AIM-20 air-to-air missiles, and four Aegis destroyers capable of missile defense. China's growing missile deployments and offensive air and naval forces were cited as justification for increased arms sales.
White House and Chinese officials expressed opposition to the bill in similar terms.
"This bill would mandate a number of new security and military arrangements with Taiwan that could create dangerous, false and inaccurate expectations on both sides of the Taiwan Strait," said a statement released by the White House. Specifically, Beijing may come to believe that the U.S. is abandoning its one-China policy by restoring a de facto military alliance with Taiwan, thereby pushing Taipei towards a formal declaration of independence. Taiwan might interpret the bill falsely as encouraging independence. National Security Advisor Samuel "Sandy" Berger likened the bill to a "nuclear weapon" that would "upset 25 years of stability and peace on Taiwan." Speaking at Washington's Woodrow Wilson Center, Berger said that "more formal relations [with Taiwan] will increase the danger ...and is not necessary."
In Beijing, Deputy Foreign Minister Yang Jie-chi warned that U.S.-China relations would be "seriously damaged" if the bill became law because it would be a "serious encroachment on China's sovereignty [and] a gross interference in China's internal affairs."
The White House hopes to convince enough senators to oppose the bill in order to sustain a promised veto. Nevertheless, the House vote indicates that any bill favored by the White House dealing with China, such as the pending bill granting China normal trade relations and WTO membership, is in for rough sledding. Congressional animosity towards Clinton and his foreign policy can only be ameliorated by more advanced preparation and closer White House ties with Capitol Hill. Effective U.S. foreign policy cannot have two masters.
(See next week's featured article in CDI's Asia Forum on the Administration's efforts to calm Beijing-Taipei relations before Taiwan's presidential election.)
What's Next for Chechnya
Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org
With the apparent withdrawal of most Chechen forces from Grozny (or Djohar, as it is know locally), Moscow will no doubt declare victory in its five months-old war against the independence-minded Chechen fighters. Yet such claims may be premature, as the Russians learned in the first Chechen war, when they conquered Grozny in 1995 only to lose the city - and the country - in a counterattack in 1996. In fact, the next stage of the Russian military campaign promises to be more challenging than the previous one.
The unexpected withdrawal from Grozny has apparently strengthened the hand of Shamil Basayev at the expense of President Aslan Maskhadov. The retreat violates Maskhadov's order to the defenders to hold the capital until February 23. Basayev, a hero of the 1994-96 war and one of the participants in the August invasion of Dagestan which triggered the current war, has emerged as the spokesman for Chechen operations on rebels' web site, kavkaz.org. The change in leadership would all but bury the already slim chances for a negotiated settlement. Although Russian officials refused to speak to Maskhadov directly, they are known to have established a lower-level contact with the Chechen president. Because of Basayev's role in the Dagestan invasion, the Chechen commander is certain to be rejected as a negotiating partner.
The rebels are now apparently retreating to the south and south-east of Chechnya to seek refuge in the mountains on the border with Georgia and Dagestan. Whether they manage to link up with the troops currently fighting there is still uncertain. The Russian forces are intent on blocking the Chechens' withdrawal. On Wednesday, Russian forces shelled the village of Alkhan-Kala where a large number of retreating fighters were regrouping. Igor Sergeev, the Russian Defense Minister, claims that 600 Chechens were killed fleeing Grozny. The Chechens claim that only 43 died while a further 2,970 escaped.
If the Chechens succeed at regrouping in the mountains, Russia will have several military options at its disposal. Moscow can decide to isolate the rebels in the mountains without engaging them. In the 1995-96 war, however, the Chechens answered Russian attempts to sideline them in the mountains with blitz raids against cities in neighboring Dagestan and Russia itself. The Chechens later managed to trickle back to the capital of Grozny with enough fighters to surround the 12,000 Russian troops in the city. Moscow, realizing the high political and economic cost of holding on to Chechnya, simply withdrew.
To avoid a repeat of the 1996 events, Moscow would have to guard against Chechen moves through the republic -- a feat impossible without repressive actions against the civilian population, who the fighters use as a disguise and a source of supplies. Already, Russian forces began detaining all men of fighting age in "filtration camps," which were notorious for miserable living conditions, torture, and executions during the 1994-96 war. Short of destroying the countryside, as Tzarist troops did in the 19th century, or repatriating the entire Chechen population, as Stalin did in 1947, controlling the movement of all Chechens throughout the province may turn out to be an impossible task. The Xinhua news agency quoted Russian officials as saying that Moscow plans to station 15,000 troops in Chechnya after the war ends. This number - roughly the amount of Russian troops in Grozny when it was retaken by the Chechens in 1996 - would clearly be insufficient to prevent Chechen counterattacks. Currently Russia has some 93,000 troops in the region, according to Kremlin spokesman Sergei Yastrzembsky.
Pursuing the Chechen fighters in the mountains could prove equally difficult. The terrain makes the use of artillery and tanks almost impossible, removing the main advantage Russia has enjoyed over the lightly armed Chechen fighters.
If the Russian military wants to engage the rebels on foot, it will have to commit a substantial number of personnel and be prepared to tolerate high casualties. In the 19th century Russian campaign against contemporary North Caucasus rebel Imam Shamil some 500,000 troops were needed to put down the revolt. The technological edge the Russian enjoy over the Chechens today will remove the need for so many troops, but some of that advantage will be lost in Chechnya's mountains. In an indication that Russia may be readying to fight the rebels in their mountain holdouts, Moscow is sending 3,500 paratroopers to Chechnya, The Times of London reported. These elite units trained in close combat and survival skills could be Moscow's most effective weapon in the mountains.
Moscow may also try to attack the rebels from the air. On January 27, acting President Vladimir Putin approved a new military procurement budget which calls for Russian air forces in Chechnya to be modernized. The older-generation Su-25 fighters and Mi-24 attack helicopters are to be upgraded with nigh-vision equipment and all-weather attack capabilities. Russian officials also say they plan to replenish their fleet of military satellites that would provide targeting data for troops fighting in Chechnya. However, as NATO learned in Kosovo, even the most sophisticated technology is relatively impotent against a skilled enemy.
Defending Vital Interests and Values
Oscar Lurie, Research Associate, olurie@cdi.org
Our vital interests are the survival of our nation and our way of life -- including the value we place on human life and human rights which are an integral part of what defines us as American.
The Pentagon is one agency whose mission is to defend our vital interests. But in doing so, it spends half of the federal government's total discretionary budget. Taxpayers thus have the right to ask if the money for "defense" is being used for programs and policies that protect our vital interests and our fundamental values from plausible threats posed by other nations.
As we enter the new millennium there simply is no foreseeable threat to America's vital interests. But America must take reasonable precautions to prevent certain situations from developing into future threats to our survival, way of life, and values. Some "threats" are highly unlikely, such as renewed large scale fighting in the Gulf or in Korea. Others may be more plausible but should not be exaggerated. Can our military forestall or defend us against such threats if they develop?
The starting point for answering this question is to assess our recent military operations. When U.S. forces have been deployed since the Cold War ended, both the numbers involved and the objectives of the operations have been limited. In Bosnia and Kosovo we aided Muslims, Croats, and ethnic Albanians when they were subjected to atrocities that violated the basic principles on which our nation was founded. Out of our 2.7 million active and reserve forces, just 20,000 were deployed to Bosnia and 31,600 to Kosovo -- and these numbers have fallen to approximately 7,000 in SFOR (Bosnia) and in KFOR (Kosovo). While the territorial integrity of the U.S. was never an issue in these instances, our interventions were based on two principles relating to preserving our way of life: preventing the upheavals from spreading to surrounding countries, many of whom are allies; and halting rabid ethnic and religious-based atrocities that, in unchecked, might lead to similar abhorrent practices elsewhere.
Neither of these fundamental reasons to take military action seem to have been part of the Pentagon's thinking when it devised its strategy to be prepared to fight two major wars nearly simultaneously in the Persian Gulf and Korea. The rationale for fighting in these locations is less convincing in terms of protecting national interests than were our reasons for intervening in Bosnia and Kosovo. Interruption in the flow of Gulf oil would temporarily inflate world prices and Americans would be inconvenienced until the price fell as other sources came on stream. But our way of life would not be seriously impaired. The U.S. accords a higher priority to the free flow of oil from the Gulf than to human rights; we cultivate and sustain the oligarchic Saudi regime and we restored the undemocratic government of Kuwait after the Gulf War.
In Korea in 1950-1953 the U.S. fought Soviet expansion. This reason no longer exists. If the 37,000 American troops now in Korea were back home, any hostilities between the two Koreas would not even inconvenience the American public, let alone threaten our vital interests. Moreover, the South Korean military is now capable of standing on its own, and the South's elected leaders can protect their people's human rights without America's help.
If these unlikely scenarios are the ones for which the Pentagon is preparing, are we perhaps overlooking more plausible challenges to our vital national interests? For example, the decay of Russian society in the 1990s is reminiscent of Germany's decline in the 1920s. If Russia's deterioration is not reversed, desperation could become so acute that a Stalinesque internally repressive and externally aggressive government could take power. With its arsenal of nuclear weapons, such a regime might indeed threaten America's vital interests. The Pentagon is spending $4 billion a year to develop a limited anti-ballistic missile defense that at best could destroy a few missiles. No matter how successful this program is, it could not stop a Russian attack employing even tens of nuclear tipped missiles.
The best way to forestall this scenario and to help Russia develop a true democracy is to shift some of the billions being spent on defending non-vital interests to alleviating Russia's chaotic economy and improving its citizens' welfare.
China could potentially challenge our vital interests if we fail to treat it as a major world power. In time China's economy may rival the size of America's, not least because China's growth is supported by its exports to America, which have spurted six-fold in the past ten years to an annual total of more than $70 billion. While self-interest should dissuade China from jeopardizing this expansive market, one incessant Chinese irritation is the U.S. guarantee of Taiwan's independence. This has nothing to do with U.S. territory or the American way of life. If there were serious concern about China endangering America's vital interests, the straightforward solution would be to retract the Taiwan guarantee and press the two governments to implement the 'One China - Two Systems" arrangement that each trumpets.
In this regard, America's most vociferous criticism of China is over the latter's disregard of human rights. While Chinese practices often affront our fundamental values, our military forces cannot alter China's age-old totalitarian system.
Another danger point is the large Russian stockpile of inadequately protected nuclear weapons and materials. The possibility of theft by terrorists or "rogue states" presents a threat to the vital interests and values of many countries. Aware of this danger, Senators Nunn and Lugar drafted the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act which Congress passed in 1992. Through 1999 Congress has appropriated $2.7 billion for a variety of measures such as: withdrawal of weapons from risky sites in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, installing modern security devices on storehouses, implementing inventory control systems, and purchasing large quantities of fissile material. None of this requires deploying military personnel. The programs are an excellent use of money and talent, rather than armed forces, to reduce dangers to vital American interests and values.
Proliferation is not confined to nuclear materials or to Russia. Iraq's ability to make chemical and biological weapons that could kill thousands of innocent people continues to be of great concern. However, policing "no-fly zones" and intermittent bombing have not curtailed Iraq's capacity. The small space needed to produce and store these weapons makes it easy to hide them. Outside military forces can do little to discover these facilities short of conquest and occupation of the offending country.
Finally, there is the challenge of terrorism in America. But here too, U.S. military might is of marginal value. The bombings in Oklahoma City and at the World Trade Building could not have been stopped by Army divisions or Air Force wings. It was the Customs Service, not the Army or Marines, that captured an alleged bomber as he attempted to cross the U.S.-Canadian border in December, 1999. A few days later, when National Security Advisor Berger declared that U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies were operating at "full tilt," he was referring to non-military departments of the government. In fact, the major responsibility for dealing with such a catastrophe within our borders rests with state and local governments and with federal civilian, not military, agencies.
The American public should realize that only a very small fraction of the military budget is being spent on protecting U.S. vital interests. If military forces are only of marginal use against the more likely current and prospective dangers to our territorial integrity, our way of life and our fundamental values, does the Pentagon need to spend over a quarter of a trillion dollars annually? Only if its primary goal is to maintain America's pride of place as the number one military power in the world, a power that -- as our leaders too frequently and too loudly proclaim -- permits us to dominate affairs in just about any place on the planet.
Given all our other pressing priorities, is the price of such hubris worth it?
The Taliban: Afghanistan's Problem Becomes A Regional One
Corwin Vandermark, Research Assistant, cvanderm@cdi.org
The Taliban movement that controls most of Afghanistan has added diplomacy to the list of tools it is using to export its version of Islamic fundamentalism to the rest of Muslim South and Central Asia. Last week the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" openly defied Russia and recognized the independence of the breakaway republic of Chechnya. The recognition of what would be an Islamic state under siege by infidels has been avoided by other Muslim governments. By its action, the Taliban has given radical factions within these moderate Islamic countries an excuse to foster dissent, including opposition by armed Islamic militias.
But the Taliban's recognition of Chechnya has deeper implications for the region's stability and for the United States' interests in the area. The Taliban has infected a motley crew of Muslim guerillas with a form of radically conservative Islam that even Iranian and Saudi Arabian officials refer to as "medieval." Camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan -- which were originally started by the CIA and Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence to train the mujahideen guerillas fighting the Soviet Union and its Afghani puppet regime in the 1980s -- have turned out more than 100,000 soldiers in the last twenty years. Many of these men have used their newfound guerilla warfare skills in their homelands or wherever a restive Muslim population exists. Although the Taliban has no official territorial ambitions outside of Afghanistan, many within the Taliban want the militants they train to expel non-Muslim influences from Muslim regions of Africa and Eurasia and replace it with sharia, the harsh, strict Islamic legal system. Afghanistan has also been a training ground and safe-haven for reputed terrorists such as Saudi Arabian millionaire Osama bin Laden, the alleged mastermind of the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
The areas adjacent to Afghanistan are most susceptible to Taliban-influenced fundamentalism. After the Soviet Union dissolved, the people of Central Asia hoped that companies from the West would help them exploit the large oil and natural gas reserves in their countries. However, the chance for such development has decreased because the resources in this region are now known to be less than once thought. In other words, Central Asia is strategically unimportant when compared with the Persian Gulf. This has left the five former Soviet Central Asian republics -- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan -- in dire straits. They are weak, economically downtrodden nations with arbitrarily drawn boundaries and little or no national identity. With the exception of Kyrgyzstan, they are ruled by dictators such as Turkmenistan's new president-for-life Saparmurat Niyazov. He and his counterparts are bureaucratic holdovers from the communist era, and their main priority is to stay in power. Increasingly disgruntled citizens in these countries are turning to armed resistance sustained by fundamentalist tenets. Tajikistan is especially vulnerable since the Taliban discovered that the Afghani opposition Northern Alliance was being supplied from Tajik bases. The Taliban has since threatened to incite a renewal of the Tajik civil war that was recently halted by the formation of a fragile coalition government.
The reach of the fundamentalists is by no means confined to Central Asia. Last year, guerillas trained in Taliban-sponsored camps were involved in two major conflicts. In the spring, a number of mercenaries joined Pakistani soldiers in attacking Indian-controlled Kashmir. They were forced out by India after both sides suffered heavy casualties. Many of the troops who harassed the Russian army in Dagestan and are now fighting in Chechnya came from the same training facilities. Even China is facing Islamic opposition in its far western province of Xinjiang, where Uyghur Muslims have intensified their separatist movement. It is not inconceivable that pressures from these separatists could start China down the path of "balkanization," which would have enormous repercussions for the status quo in the Asia-Pacific region. In short, the tactics of employing radicalized guerillas and diplomatic blackmail could strengthen the hold of fundamentalists on the heart of Eurasia.
The worst thing for the United States to do now would be to actively interfere in Afghanistan's internal affairs by supplying the Northern Alliance. By arming opposing sides during and immediately after the ten-year Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the superpowers created the chaos in which militias like the Taliban thrive. To prolong the current war would be as grave an injustice to the Afghani people. Instead, the United States should mediate between the various opposing factions and governments in the region.
Economically, a small American investment could do a great deal for the Central Asian republics. Despite the fact that the energy resources in these countries have been dismissed by analysts as strategically unimportant when compared with those in the Persian Gulf, they are nonetheless crucial to Central Asia's economic development. If they were exploited and the infrastructure in the region improved, economic growth could well counter the misery that drives people to fight. But for real success, the United States would have to take another long-overdue step: lift sanctions against Iran, whose territory would be the most pragmatic route for a pipeline from the Central Asian republics to sea lanes. The prospect of Iranian-American relations, combined with the monetary cost of assisting Central Asia, will undoubtedly be unpopular with Congress and certain segments of the American public. However, if the Taliban and similar factions strengthen their influence in the region, Western interests in strategically important areas in the Middle East and East Asia could come under fire, with the long-term costs even greater.
Russia-China Arms Trade Growing
Olga Kryazheva, Research Assistant, okryazhe@cdi.org
The first of two Russian built Type 956E "Sovremenny"-class destroyers ordered by China have began their delivery voyage. After a long break caused by Cold War animosities, the countries resumed arms deals in 1990. Between 1991 and1997, China spent $6 billion on Russian armaments. Contracts signed in November of 1997 alone could net Russia $1 billion in sales, including delivery of the two destroyers, valued at $800 million. Sales to China now generate 40 percent of Russia's total arms export revenue.
The introduction of the powerful destroyers may well tip the naval balance in the Taiwan Strait in China's favor. Besides Sovremenny-class destroyers armed with the 3M-80E "Moskit" supersonic anti-ship missiles, China acquired in 1994 four Varshavyanka-class diesel-powered submarines and six S-300 anti-aircraft systems. Russia has already supplied China with six K-28 "Havoc" anti-submarine helicopters to be placed on Sovremenny destroyers.
China's air force has also been significantly strengthened. In 1992, Beijing bought twenty-six Su-27 "Flanker" fighter jets from Rosvooruzheniye, Russia's main state arms exporting company. In 1995-96 it added another batch of forty-eight Su-27s worth $1.7 billion. Moreover, China paid $150 million for a license to domestically produce two hundred Su-27SK planes within the next five years. Russian military officials also say that a modernized version of the Su-27 "Flanker," the Su-30 MKK, will be put into service with the Chinese Air Force this year. China tentatively plans to receive an additional forty of the aircraft, each with a price tag of $37 million, with an option to produce up to 250 of the aircraft domestically. In 1998 the two countries agreed that Russia would provide manufacturing assistance to China and would establish educational support in training military-technical personnel for the Chinese military.
Besides the obvious economic benefits to Russia, the arms sales between China and Russia are also based on an emerging strategic relationship between the two countries. Both share a desire to prevent U.S. hegemony in the security sphere and have criticized U.S. plans to deploy a missile defense system and the Western policy of intervening in conflicts taking place inside other countries' borders.
Russian and Chinese officials stress the need for a multi-polar world, i.e. one not dominated by the United States and its allies. Referring to Russia's role in ending the air war against Yugoslavia, Igor Sergeyev, the Russian Defense Minister, stated that the recent war in the Balkans pushed the world towards multi-polarization. However, he added, the United States uses its economic and military superiority to prevent the emergence of competing blocs. At a recent meeting the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov and Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian also expressed mutual understanding and support for their countries' policies regarding internal conflicts. Klebanov confirmed Russia's complete "recognition of Taiwan as a part of the PRC and the armed non-recognition of [Taiwan's] sovereignty." Haotian stressed that China agrees that Chechnya is a part of Russia and supports Russia's military efforts to secure Russian territorial integrity. Haotian and Khebanov noted that the essence of the new NATO strategic concept is to turn the Western alliance into an interventionist and offensive political and military bloc.
The Russian and Chinese defense ministers also criticized the United States for building a national missile defense system, stressing that it will lead to a new arms race. Haotian denounced the United States in particular for planning to include Taiwan in the missile defense system. Both Russia and China see the U.S. decision as a gross interference in China's internal affairs and sovereignty.
Both China and Russia agree on the necessity to cooperate militarily in order to prevent the United States from carrying out NATO's new strategic concept and to end its military and political dominance. With China and Russia on the opposing side from the United States on a range of security issues, future arms deals between the two will likely continue to be an important element in their efforts to expand their international influence.
Pentagon Formalizes Gay Harassment Policy -- The Defense Department has issued fresh guidelines on how field commanders should respond to troop complaints about anti-gay threats or harassment. Instead of using complaints as a reason to investigate the complaining person, commanders are to focus only on the source of the threat or harassment. Said Defense Secretary William Cohen, "service members need to understand that harassment for any reason will not be tolerated, and commanders will take prompt, appropriate actions against individuals involved in such behavior."
Navy, Puerto Rico Reach Agreement on Vieques -- Under the terms of an agreement reached this week the Navy will resume training at the Vieques range, but will not use live ammunition and will cut its training schedule in half. Puerto Rico will hold a referendum on future training, likely on May 1, 2001, at which time it will decide whether the Navy may resume full-scale live fire exercises or cease all training by May 1, 2003. In exchange for permission to resume full-scale exercises, the island would receive $50 million in development funds. For background on the situation in Vieques, see "U.S. Navy an Unwelcome Neighbor in Puerto Rico," CDI's Weekly Defense Monitor, August 26, 1999.
Israelis Arrested for Iran Arms Sales -- Two Israeli businessmen have been arrested for allegedly selling weapons to Iran. The suspects are accused of selling military equipment that originated in the United States, including armored personnel carriers, which was transported through Germany and then transferred to Iran.
Congress Requires Additional Information for Arms Exports -- A new law, Public Law 106-113, section 1302, will require U.S. arms exporters to submit "a report containing all shipment information, including a description of the item and the quantity, value, port of exit, and end-user and country of destination of the item to the State Department" within 15 days of export. The law, introduced by Representative Chris Smith (R-N.J.), is intended to end criticism that the U.S. does not know the quantity or value of weapons that are exported.
Russian Military Personnel Arrested in Theft of Nuclear Fuel -- Four sailors and a retired nuclear safety officer have been arrested in the theft of radioactive fuel from a nuclear-powered submarine at the Vilyuchinsk-3 submarine base on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The sailors, who confessed and identified the officer who assisted them, said that they had planned to sell the fuel, along with precious metals taken from military electronic equipment. Such theft has become common among Russian military personnel, who often go months without pay due to the country's economic woes.
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "Survivors' Stories:
Americans & Landmines"
The threat posed by landmines is an issue far removed from the consciousness of most Americans. While images of landmines and landmine victims have been splashed across TV screens and magazine pages, many people still view landmines as something that affects people in distant lands. But a lesser- known fact is that over the years landmines have injured numerous American citizens - tourists on vacation, relief workers, and even exchange students. These are their stories.
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