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| January 27, 2000 |
| January 27, 2000 |
International Community Reaches Agreement on Child Soldiers
By Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
In a victory for children around the world, the international community has agreed on a Protocol that raises the age for conscription and participation in armed conflict to 18. Previous international law had established the age for participation, conscription, and recruitment into military forces at 15.
The reaching of the agreement was particularly noteworthy because it marked a substantive shift in United Sates policy. After six years of negotiations and numerous attempts to sabotage the process, the United States ceased its attempts to block consensus after certain conditions were met. The United States did not want the age raised to 18 because the Pentagon wanted to continue its practice of recruiting 17 year olds (who had parental consent) and assigning them to active duty forces.
After two weeks during which the U.S. came under mounting pressure from the international community, the Pentagon agreed to compromise language allowing the continued recruitment and training of 17-year olds, but requiring governments to take "all feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities." In the past the United States has routinely sent soldiers under 18 to combat areas such as Somalia, Bosnia, and the Gulf.
The agreement does allow government armies to recruit children as young as 16 with parental consent, a concession to demands by the United States and the United Kingdom, countries which recruit under 18's for the armed forces. Rebel and guerilla armies are banned from recruiting or using children under the age of 18 in their military forces.
United Nations officials estimate that there are approximately 300,000 children under 18 serving as soldiers around the world. Thus, the negotiations in Geneva are significant for the millions of children who are vulnerable to forced participation in armed conflict. Even so, the agreement is only the first step in protecting children and ensuring they are not subject to hazardous or dehumanizing treatment.
The United States is one of only two countries (the other is Somalia) that has not yet ratified the protocol's parent treaty, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, the Protocol can be signed and ratified by all governments, even if a country is not party to the UN Convention. The Protocol must also be accepted by the United Nations General Assembly and then ratified by the Senate before it comes into force in the United States. Senate ratification should be noncontroversial because the Pentagon has already agreed to make necessary changes to adhere to the Protocol. The Pentagon says that the U.S. has less than 3,000 soldiers under 18 among is 1.2 million active duty soldiers.
While enforcement of the Protocol will be difficult, as are current efforts to prevent the use of children under 15, the agreement does offer some monitoring provisions. Each state party must submit a report, within two years of the protocol's entry into force for that state, that provides information on the efforts the state has taken to implement the conditions of the Protocol. Future reports must be made every five years. The Committee on the Rights of the Child may also request information from states that is relevant to the Protocol's implementation.
The Protocol was a significant step in the movement to prevent children under 18 from participating in the armed forces. More importantly, the shift in U.S. policy marks the first time the U.S. has changed its position in order to be part of a human rights agreement. But there is still much work to be done.
The Protocol will mean nothing if states do not sign, ratify, and then implement the provisions outlined in the agreement. Advocates must encourage countries that have had a history of using child soldiers to ratify the Protocol and then help these countries implement policies that will accord with the Protocol's provisions. Universal adherence must be the standard for this Protocol or it will not be effective in stopping the use of child soldiers.
Beyond action on the Protocol itself, advocates must continue to press for change in existing national policies. Although countries received an exception for the voluntary recruitment of children for the armed forces, the United States must be encouraged to halt its recruitment of children under 18 for the armed forces. Additionally, increased funding is needed for rehabilitation and reintegration former child soldiers around the world -- money donor countries are often slow to provide. Finally, the United States and other governments should eliminate military aid (arms sales and training) to countries or groups that use of child soldiers.
The Protocol was an important move forward, but it was one step in a longer journey of protecting the world's children.
When Virtual Numbers Count
Colonel Dan Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
They are called "whisper" or "shadow" numbers.
They are not real, but they can have decidedly real world effects.
On Wall Street corporations report their profits every quarter. Depending on how well these figures meet the expectations of Wall Street brokers, stock prices move up or down. At least that's what an outsider might think. In actuality, there seems to be another, unspoken level of expectation -- the "whisper" number -- in play. So even if public expectations are met, stocks in a company might tumble because (among other factors) this "whisper" level was not achieved.
The same thing seems to be happening in politics. In caucuses and primaries candidates vying for the nominations of the major national parties garner a certain percentage of the votes. Yet if a candidate fails to meet the expectations of the pundits -- the political equivalent of Wall Street's whisper number -- the candidate's campaign is declared in trouble or even at an end.
Corporations and candidates try to beat this game of shadow expectations by issuing conservative estimates of how well they will do. But in fact this "low-balling, where it occurs, fuels the whisper industry.
What might pass in these two arenas becomes much more of a liability when applied to the budget. For example, this week the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) revised its estimates of the non-Social Security surplus -- $1.9 trillion over the next ten years. Members of Congress immediately raised the cry that their favorite programs, including the military, should be given more money. What was lost in all the hoopla was the CBO's footnote: this surplus is the best possible projection and rests in large part on Congress and future administrations adhering to the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997.
The problem is there are two budgets: the official one and the shadow one. The official budget is all the spending that is subject to the limits imposed by the annual congressional budget resolution which must take into account the BBA. The shadow budget includes the official budget plus all the "emergency" spending passed by Congress which is not offset by cuts in the official budget. For example, for the current fiscal year, the official Pentagon budget was $288 billion. The shadow budget, however, was approximately $295 billion. This extra money can fund unanticipated activities such as the U.S. contribution to the Kosovo peacekeeping mission or it can be used to add funds to specific programs that Congress (or one Member of Congress) favors.
While some expenses such as natural disaster assistance cannot be forecast, Congress and the White House ought to be more honest with taxpayers up-front. Perhaps the BBA ceilings are not sustainable; perhaps certain programs need more funds. If so, these programs should be funded in the official budget to the extent possible. As Representative John Murtha, Ranking Democrat on the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee said, "If we had passed an adequate budget resolution...we would not have had to resort to the kind of gimmicks that have been so distasteful to those of us on the committee...."
This is the first presidential election year since the BBA was enacted. Congress and the Administration should debate the issues and take their respective views to the public. Voters will decide who is right by whom they send to Washington.
The Curious Case of Senator Jesse Helms at the United Nations -- An Opinion
Nicholas Berry, Senior Analyst, nberry@cdi.org
What follows is part fact and part, well, speculation. U.S. foreign policy events, such as Helms' UN visit, are usually more complex than they appear at first glance.
Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke presides this month as President of the UN Security Council. Using this authority, he invited Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) to address the Security Council on January 20. Undoubtedly, Holbrooke knew what Helms would say because the Senator has been a consistent critic of the UN. As expected, Helms blasted the UN for "a lack of gratitude" for all the financial support the U.S. has given over the years and for "routinely voting against America."
But even this seemed tame compared to what followed. "If the United Nations respects the sovereign rights of the American people and serves them as an effective instrument, it will earn and deserve their respect and support. But a United Nations that seeks to impose its presumed authority on the American people, without their consent, begs for confrontation and -- I want to be candid with you -- eventual U.S. withdrawal."
Why, in light of Senator Helms' well-known views, did Ambassador Holbrooke welcome the Senator's remarks on the organization within which he serves?
One explanation is known and eminently reasonable. Holbrooke wants to moderate Helms' hostility to the world body and increase his knowledge of UN functions. On the question of better U.S.-UN relations, Holbrooke told reporters "the fact that Sen. Helms felt it was safe to appear at the UN speaks for itself." New York Times reporter Barbara Crossette concluded in a January 24 article that "Holbrooke's carefully orchestrated meetings and his nonstop hospitality to influential members of Congress -- several a week -- may have made the United Nations safe again for American politicians."
Apparently, Holbrooke's strategy produced the intended result. In the same article, Crossette reported that Helms wants to open a new chapter in UN relations. "[Sen. Helms] told those around him that he had met extraordinarily interesting people, had learned a lot and hoped they had, too. He was wearing a blue and white United Nations cap."
Holbrooke may well have had additional reasons for bringing Helms and others to the UN. Obviously it raised the profile of the UN, putting it back in the news. But it also:
This may be reading too much into Holbrooke's handling of his Security Council presidency. But Holbrooke is known as a long-range thinker, a skillful and tough manager of highly complex disputes (such as the Dayton Accords ending the war in Bosnia), and a self-promoter (he is widely touted as a future secretary of state if Gore becomes president).
Holbrooke also understands the nature of post-Cold War diplomacy. National security always rests on power, and power in the contemporary world rests primarily on assembling and leading coalitions, not on the unilateral use of military force and economic sanctions. Where the U.S. operates virtually alone, such as its bombing Iraq, organizing the opposition to Saddam Hussein, sanctioning Cuba, and preaching the overthrow of Castro, failure and frustration mark its foreign policy. Where it leads friends and allies, as in Kosovo peacekeeping or working with South Korea and Japan to stop North Korea's nuclear weapon and missile programs, success is the common outcome.
Holbrooke knows that the UN is already "an effective instrument" of American diplomacy because it is the number one diplomatic arena for assembling coalitions. One need only look at the record: U.S. post-Cold War policies in Cambodia, Desert Storm, Haiti, Bosnia, and East Timor were all facilitated by coalitions created in or authorized by the UN.
New Zealand's Cancellation of F-16 Lease Confirmed -- As was first reported exclusively in the December 16 issue of CDI's "Briefing Room" the new Labor-Alliance government of Prime Minister Helen Clark has indicated that the previous government's contract to lease 28 F-16 fighters from the U.S. will likely be scrapped. CDI predicted that Wellington would seek to negotiate a switch with the U.S., offering to lease C-130s instead of the F-16s since the ability to transport peacekeeping troops and humanitarian assistance would be more in keeping with the defense policies proposed by Clark during the election campaign. Confirming this analysis, New Zealand's new defense minister, Mark Burton, recently announced that leasing five to seven C-130s and two new Boeing 737s was under consideration. The previous government's F-16 lease, said Burton, was "the wrong decision at the wrong time."
U.S. Needs 2,500 Nuclear Warhead for Adequate Deterrence -- According to State Department spokesman James P. Rubin, the United States needs to maintain a nuclear arsenal of between 2,000 and 2,500 deployed warheads to deter other nations from launching a nuclear attack. This statement, the result of a 1997 Pentagon analysis of U.S. nuclear policy, comes as Russia is pushing to reduce both nations' arsenals to 1,500 warheads. The Russian position is based on economic, rather than strategic considerations. As early as 1996 staffers from the Duma, Russia's lower house of Parliament, told CDI that the country could not afford to support an arsenal of more than 1,000 warheads.
Mining to Stop in Sierra Leone -- Former rebel leader Foday Sankoh has announced that all diamond mining in Sierra Leone has been halted and all mining licenses have been revoked as of January 24. The cessation of mining is an attempt to halt the illegal trade and mining of diamonds, profits from which have been used to wage Sierra Leone's decade long civil war. Sankoh, appointed the head of the Strategic Resources Commission under the July 1999 peace agreement, made the decision in consultation with Sierra Leone's President, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.
Pentagon Considering JSF Procurement Alternatives -- According to Janques Gansler, the Pentagon's leading acquisition official, the Defense Department is exploring alternatives to the "winner take all" plan for the Joint Strike Fighter when the program's prime contractor is selected next year. Under the current plan either Lockheed Martin or Boeing, the two firms competing for the JSF program, would be awarded a contract to construct all 3,000 planes which are expected to be built. According to Gansler, "we believe special efforts are required to insure that both competing firms remain competitive after the competition." Critics of plans to divide the contract between more than one firm are concerned about what the loss of economies of scale will do to the per unit cost of the aircraft, which is currently estimated at $73 million including research and development.
Sierra Leone Disarmament Continues -- Almost six hundred rebels arrived at a disarmament center this week to register for demobilization in Sierra Leone. The soldiers will be screened, given $150 immediately, and another $150 in three months after they return to their communities. Experts estimate that only one-quarter of the 45,000 combatants have been demobilized. The original deadline for demobilization was last month. Meanwhile, as of January 18, 4,5000 troops of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and 215 unarmed military observers have been deployed. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan wants to increase UNAMSIL's numbers to approximately 10,000 troops.
Rebels Release Child Soldiers -- The 200 child soldiers captured last week in Sierra Leone have been released to the Catholic aid group Children Associated with War (CAW). The rebels say that they took the children because they had no orders to let them pass. RUF leader Foday Sankoh later gave the group permission to continue on their journey. The children had not been hurt but were malnourished. The CAW officials and ECOMOG soldiers that had been taken with the children were also released. In Sudan, 48 Ugandan children that had been abducted by the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army were released to the care of UNICEF officials.