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| December 9, 1999 |
| December 9, 1999 |
It Really Is Lonely at the Top -- When Paranoia Abounds
Colonel Dan Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
More and more in news articles and commentaries, writers are abandoning the term "superpower" for "hyperpower" when referring to American military and economic might. In so doing, they are suggesting that the U.S. has scaled the ladder of power to new, unprecedented heights, leaving the rest of the developed world -- not to mention the developing world -- in the dust of our rapid acceleration.
But nothing happens in isolation. In physics, we are told, for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. Similarly, in international affairs, every action produces reactions, some opposite, some tangential, all of them designed to sustain or advance the interests of other nations.
This is what seems to be occurring in Europe at the moment with the new drive to create a "separable but not separate" (from NATO) European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Ostensibly, the motivating force for ESDI is the recognition by continental allies that they must strengthen their capacity to respond to challenges to security and peace that occur on their doorstep. First Bosnia and then Kosovo revealed the extent of Europe's inability to handle security threats without U.S. intervention via NATO.
According to just released figures, European NATO nations combined spend approximately 64% of what the U.S. devotes to defense, yet observers say the return on this investment is only 10% of what the U.S. achieves. European NATO countries boast combined military manpower of over 3 million, more than twice the U.S. active armed forces, yet they are pressed to field the lions's share of the 28,000 troops in Bosnia and the 50,000 in Kosovo and Macedonia.
While no one is voicing any sentiment like "Europe for Europeans," many leaders on the other side of the Atlantic are concerned that the U.S. is assuming an attitude of "America for Americans." Validating this concern -- which is a silent but not unthought justification for forging ESDI -- is the headlong rush by the U.S. to develop and deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD). Despite much arm twisting and haranguing last week in Brussels by Secretary of Defense William Cohen, the Europeans are not buying the U.S. contention that they are in mortal danger of ballistic missile attack from "rogue states" (as characterized by the U.S.) In fact, Britain and France, the only other NATO nations who possess nuclear weapons, fear that the creation of NMD by the U.S. will only spur the Russians and Chinese to build more ICBMs, thereby increasing the danger of nuclear war while reducing the deterrent value of the British and French nuclear arsenals.
The Pentagon is fueling this concern as officials are speaking less and less about a 20-interceptor NMD (which truly would be limited) and more and more about a 100-interceptor force at one site in Alaska and possibly a second, equally strong force located in the lower 48 states. Such deployments would shred the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which both friends and adversaries hold as the foundation of all arms control agreements and whose demise would be rightly laid at the feet of the U.S. government.
The paradox in all this is that the greater the disparity in power -- especially when manifested by a disregard of the positions and vulnerabilities of others (reminiscent of the old taunt, "I've got mine, now you get yours") -- the more others will seek to forge arrangements in which they have full confidence. It may take unprecedented energy and commitment; it may be couched in acceptable language such as "strengthening the European Pillar of NATO"; and it may take much time. But if the U.S. persists in trying to impose the view that what's good for America's military security is good for the rest of the world, we will find others willing to assert their independence from the world's hyperpower.
Perhaps Edmund Burke said it best in talking about the now-vanished British Empire: "I dread our own power and our own ambition; I dread our being too much dreaded....We may say that we shall not abuse this astonishing and hitherto unheard-of-power. But every other nation will think we shall abuse it. It is impossible but that, sooner or later, this state of things must produce a combination against us which may end in our ruin."
The Use of Nuclear Power in Space
Jeffrey Mason, Research Analyst/Librarian, jmason@cdi.org
With the successful Earth flyby of the $3.4 billion unmanned Cassini spacecraft in August 1999 on its five year voyage to Saturn, NASA seems committed, as is the U.S. military, to using nuclear materials to power space platforms. Launched in October 1997, Cassini is powered by three radioisotope thermal electric generators (RTGs). Although not full-fledged "nuclear reactors," RTGs use the heat of radioactive decay to provide power for unmanned spacecraft journeying to the outer solar system. An accidental launch explosion or inadvertent re-entry of the probe into Earth's atmosphere during the flyby maneuver risked dispersing some 72.3 pounds of plutonium into the environment, posing a significant health threat to global populations. As Dr. Helen Caldicott, President Emeritus of Physicians for Social Responsibility and an expert on the health effects of plutonium, noted: "Named after Pluto, god of the underworld, it (plutonium) is so toxic that less than one-millionth of a gram, an invisible particle, is a carcinogenic dose. One pound, if uniformly distributed could hypothetically induce lung cancer in every person on Earth."
While NASA downplayed these contamination risks, claiming in a 1995 environmental impact statement that only 2,300 people over a 50-year period would suffer "health effects from such an accident," outside observers such as Dr. Ernest Sternglass, professor emeritus of radiological physics at the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, believe that "underestimated the cancer alone by about 2,000 to 4,000 times."
NASA said it had no alternative to the use of RTGs on deep space missions (those beyond Mars) because sunlight isn't powerful enough to power solar panels. But others such as physicist Dr. Michio Kaku of the City University of New York and Dr. Gerhard Strobl of the Deutsche Aerospace Company in Germany insist that recent advances in the development of silicon solar panels and long-lived fuel cells would allow unmanned space probes to explore the remote regions of our solar system.
Safety is the critical concern in this debate. The exploration of space has already seen its share of nuclear accidents, and the military-industrial complex has played a significant role in these disasters. Both the United States and Russia have launched spacecraft powered by nuclear energy. Three of 26 U.S. missions have resulted in accidents, while six of the 41 known Soviet/Russian space missions have failed -- a combined failure rate of about 13 percent. Three of the more serious U.S. and Russian nuclear space accidents that dispersed radioactive products in the atmosphere are:
Unlike the Cold War, nuclear space accidents did not enter the become an anachronism in 1991. Without question, reliance on potentially dangerous nuclear technology is set to continue for decades if not hundreds of years. Some of these nuclear "timebombs" remain in orbit around the Earth. At least four American and four Russian nuclear powered spacecraft, launched in the 1960s and 1970s, are orbiting from between 500 and 1,000 miles above our planet. The radioactive products in these spacecraft will one day shower our world with the deadly toxic byproducts of the nuclear race into space. Despite these risks, NASA claims it has addressed reentry dangers by developing "advanced radioisotope power systems" which reportedly will use greatly reduced amounts of plutonium to power deep space missions. These new generators will be used on at least three missions scheduled for the next decade: the Pluto-Kuiper Express, the Europa (a satellite of the planet Jupiter) Orbiter to be launched in 2003-2004, and the Solar Probe, to be launched in 2007, to study the sun's outer atmosphere.
But the situation could be worse. A few U.S. military nuclear programs never reached orbit:
Beyond safety concerns, past use of nuclear power systems in outer space raise questions of compliance with international law, particularly the 1967 Outer Space Treaty banning the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in space. While RTGs are not nuclear weapons, the inherent risk of dispersing radioactive materials into the Earth's atmosphere, even inadvertently, could be interpreted as a violation, at least in spirit, of this law.
The Flaws in Perry and Carter's "Preventive Defense" Strategy
Dr. Nicholas Berry
William J. Perry, former secretary of defense, and Ashton B. Carter, former assistant secretary of defense and now a professor at Harvard's Kennedy School, develop the concept of "preventive defense" in their book with the same title (The Brookings Institution Press, 1999). It criticizes US post-Cold War defense policies because they focus too much on intervention in relatively minor conflicts. They introduce a way to classify threats facing the US -- from the vital A-list, to the major B-list, to the minor C-list.
C-list threats, such as in Kosovo, Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Somalia, "are places and problems that do not threaten America's survival as World War II and the cold war did." While these threats are "not unimportant," dealing with them "cannot make up the core national security strategy of the United States." In addition, military operations in these areas divert resources "and they demand the time and attention of our national leaders."
Likewise, B-list threats should not determine core US military strategy. They may affect vital interests, such as countering renewed Iraqi and North Korean aggression, and, like C-list threats, require a strong military to meet these contingencies. But these threats should not detract attention from more important, long-term, potential A-list threats. Ignoring these A-list threats, say Carter and Perry, would imperil America's survival.
Carter and Perry argue that U.S. strategy currently focuses on B-list and C-list threats because they are real and in the media. By contrast, A-list threats are presently absent, and to keep them absent is the mission of preventive defense.
"Preventive Defense is a defense strategy for the United States in the twenty-first century that concentrates national security strategy on thedangers that, if mismanaged, have the potential to grow into true A-list-scale threats to US survival in the next century, bringing the current era to an abrupt end. These dangers are not yet threats to be defeated or deterred; they are dangers that can be prevented."
The authors identify five dangers which preventive defense must address to keep them off the A-list:
To prevent a Weimar Russia and loose weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), Carter and Perry advocate reinforcing many current policies. They want a more active Partnership for Peace. They praise the 1997 "Founding Act" that established the framework for permanent Russia-NATO consultations. They convincingly describe the beneficial effects of the Nunn-Lugar program to help reduce Soviet-era WMDs, noting that as of mid-1998, "More than 4,800 nuclear weapons designed to destroy the United States have been eliminated." This is preventive defense at its best.
Arguing that: "If China is treated as an adversary, it will surely become one," they prefer to expand military-to-military ties, stabilize the Taiwan question, encourage greater counterproliferation, avoid sanctions, and include China in the WTO. These policies would serve preventive defense.
The authors believe that the 1994 "Agreed Framework" with North Korea, which shut down its Yongbyon nuclear facility in return for fuel oil and two light-water electrical generating reactors effectively suspended the danger of North Korean proliferation. (President Clinton tapped both authors in December 1998 to be special advisors and to negotiate with North Korea). Catastrophic terrorism receives less strategic analysis since the Pentagon "cannot and should not claim the lead role for the nation in combating [it]." However, the DOD has a host of assets -- technical, organizational, intelligence analysis, special forces assault forces -- to aid in preventive defense.
Sound analysis. Where are the flaws?
The flaws surface when the questions are asked: What if preventive defense fails? What if A-list dangers become A-list threats? In an attempt to address these questions, Carter produced a follow-up paper, "The Perils of Complacency: Adapting U.S. Defense to Future Needs, " made public in early November, l999. This paper introduces a second A-list strategy.
"If one focuses on the "A-list," two types of strategy are called for: one to attempt to prevent "A-list" dangers from developing into Cold War-scale threats to U.S. survival, way of life, and position in the world; and another to prepare to deal with them if they do develop despite our best efforts."
For all the emphasis on preventive defense, Carter foresees a substantial US military build-up. "The existence of the 'A-list' makes the chances of a sharp increase in the defense budget quite possible, perhaps probable." But a substantial defense build-up actually negates preventive defense. In fact, such a build-up will accelerate the transformation of A-list dangers into A-list threats!
A huge contradiction is thereby created.
According to Carter, a "new investment in defense, therefore, should properly be directed at [the A-list] asymmetric threats . . . provided by weapons of mass destruction (WMD): biological weapons in Iraq or nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles in North Korea, which would catapult these "B-list" items to the "A-list"; or chemical weapons in the hands of transnational terrorists; or cyber weapons used by an unseen foe." In one sentence, Carter indicates what new investments are needed. "A start in the direction of enhancing chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile defenses was made in the Counterproliferation Initiative in 1993."
A lingering question is why shifting to defensive capabilities inflames rather than prevents A-list threats?
The hottest defensive system advocated by the Pentagon, Congress, and the vast majority of the security community is national missile defense (NMD). NMD would require the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM).
Regardless of what the powerful pro-NMD coalition says, Russia and China believe that NMD is directed at them. It would inevitably worsen the strategic environment. Top Russian strategist Maj. Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin refers to the ABM Treaty as inviolable. "If that stone is removed, the whole system of treaties will collapse. The ruins will be as follows. START I will be dead, all mutual exchanges of information will be ended, hundreds of verification missions that both sides carry out on a reciprocal basis will be discontinued." This is hardly confirmation of preventive defense.
The Chinese are just as adamant. According to Beijing's arms control director, Sha Zukang, deploying NMD after scrapping the ABM Treaty "will lead to disastrous consequences. This will bring a halt to nuclear disarmament now between the Russians and Americans, and in the future will halt multilateral disarmament as well." This, too, contradicts preventive defense.
The likely Russian and Chinese response to NMD -- more offensive missiles with more warheads, the cancellation of key arms control treaties, and the preclusion of future arms control agreements -- has the effect of moving all five potential A-List potential threats far closer to real threats!
When Defense Secretary William S. Cohen touted NMD at a December 2, l999 meeting of NATO defense ministers, not a single ally signed on. German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping pointed out that going forward with missile defense would generate support for anti-Western nationalists in Russia during upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. French Defense Minister Alain Richard warned that it might provoke the Russians and Chinese to deploy multiple warheads on their missiles in order to overwhelm America's NMD. The proliferation of NMDs, both the French and British worry, would negate their minimum deterrent forces.
What is almost universally unrecognized by the US defense establishment is the simple fact that defensive systems linked to offensive systems are more threatening to other states than even strong offensive systems alone.
There are three reasons for this, as the Russian, Chinese, and even NATO allies have been trying to tell us.
First, a state cannot deter another state's defensive system. Its NMD is a threat that won't go away. It can only be taken out by a pre-emptive, non-ballistic missile attack, such as by aircraft or cruise missiles, or exhausted by a fake ballistic missile attack. It takes a war.
Second, the NMD's principal threat is the cancellation of the target's offensive, and therefore, deterrent capabilities. Seemingly invulnerable, a state with NMD and a robust offensive capability can use nuclear blackmail on states without NMD because they cannot strike back. They would be militarily naked. To overcome this enormous vulnerability, those states without NMD would be forced to increase their offensive capabilities in order to overcome the opposing state's defensive shield. Irresistible pressures would also arise to develop and deploy their own expensive NMD, inevitably spurring a new arms race.
Third, defensive shields, whether the Chinese Great Wall, the Maginot Line, or NMD, designate who the enemy is and who cannot be trusted to remain peaceful. Defensive systems, especially those linked to strong offensive systems as the America's would be, threaten and denigrate potential adversaries as no other military posture can. NMD would label its targets as hostile, rogues, crazies, or fanatics, thereby raising tensions, generating reciprocal threats, and poisoning diplomacy.
Counter-intuitively, offensive systems alone, while still threatening, are less so than defensive-plus-offensive ones. Offensive systems can be deterred, do not pre-designate an enemy (who is CVN USS Eisenhower's designated enemy?), encourage arms-control diplomacy, and do not cancel other states' offensive capabilities. A state with worthless offensive arms has no military status -- and great powers simply will not accept that humble condition.
This flaw in Carter's advocacy does not make preventive defense less urgent. The need for A-List threat reductions still exists via diplomacy, deterrence, intelligence, foreign aid, integration into international organizations, trade and direct investment, and cultural and educational exchanges. And the Pentagon can play a role, albeit not central, in forestalling A-List threats. However, this role can be made possible only by abandoning a NMD.
In addition, a persuasive case can be made that B-list and C-list threats, whether in the Persian Gulf or in Kosovo, must be met by US leadership in order to deal with existing threats that actually endanger progress towards a more peaceful and prosperous world.
We should always be wary of concepts advanced by national security advisors. While they may coincide with Pentagon aspirations, they may grossly neglect their effects on international relations. Preventive defense and its defensive corollary could not furnish a better example of strategic contradictions.
Russian Bases in Georgia: Two Out, Two Remain
By Tomas Valasek, Research Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org
Lost in the clatter over Chechnya at the recent OSCE summit in Istanbul was the Russian pledge to vacate two of its four military bases in Georgia and cut the number of Russian forces in this south Caucasus republic. In the midst of the summit, Moscow issued a pledge to "disband and remove" its bases in Vaziani and Gudauta by July 1, 2001. The fate of the remaining two bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki is to be decided through negotiations between Russia and Georgia due to start in 2000.
The agreement was nothing short of shocking. Although the Georgian parliament has repeatedly demanded that the bases be closed, Moscow, until the summit, gave no indication it intended to withdraw any forces from Georgia. Moreover, relations between Georgia and Russia have sunk to new lows since the outbreak of fighting in Dagestan and Chechnya this summer. Georgia has accused Russian forces of bombing its territory on at least three different occasions; Russia admitted to one such incident. Moscow, for its part, accused Georgia of supporting the Chechen fighters.
Georgia's President, Eduard Shevarnadze, and the former Russian Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, did sign a treaty concerning the bases in 1995 but the Georgian parliament never ratified it. As late as November, Russia asked for a permission to keep its bases in Georgia for 25 more years. In September, Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, bluntly told Georgia that Russian bases there "serve Georgia's as well as Russia's interest" and called on the Tbilisi government to grant the troops a legal status.
In the end, however, Russia compromised in order to comply with the ceilings imposed by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. The treaty limits the numbers of conventional arms on the European continent. Russia also agreed to withdraw all its troops from the former Soviet republic of Moldova.
Yet as surprising as the Russian annoucement was, it appears they actually gave up less than was initially thought. First, the Russian presence at Vaziani, an airbase 20 km east of Tbilisi, was already being reduced. In 1998, the Russian Air Force disbanded the Logistics Support center in Vaziani and ordered only a skeleton security staff to remain. Moreover, in exchange for vacating Vaziani and Gudauta, Georgia assented to Russian presence at the other two bases, Akhalkalaki and Batumi, which house the bulk of Russian troops in the country. While the talks on the future of these two bases are scheduled to take place next year, Georgian President Eduard Shevarnadze himself admits that "Russian military bases will partially remain in Georgia for some time."
(See CDI's study, "Armed Forces in Georgia," for more information on the country's military and security situation)
Russia Issues Ultimatum in Chechnya -- On December 6, Russian forces dropped leaflets on Grozny (Djohar) urging people to leave or they will be "viewed as terrorists...and will be destroyed by artillery and aviation." The statement, signed by "the head of military command of Russian forces" also tells the residents, "you have lost...there will be no more negotiations."
Clinton Signs Child Labor Treaty -- President Bill Clinton signed the International Labor Organizations Worst Forms of Child Labor Treaty last week in Seattle. The Treaty targets serious violations of child labor including slavery and bondage, child prostitution, child pornography, and illegal activities such as drug trafficking. The Treaty also addresses forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict. The Senate had ratified the Treaty in early November.
Pentagon: NMD Deployment Will Cost $10.5 Billion -- According to Gen. Willie B. Nance, Jr., director of the National Missile Defense Joint Program Office, development and procurement of a limited NMD system will cost $10.5 billion if it were deployed in 2005. However, program officials have already indicated that this cost may grow by as much as $4 billion. The system, including 20 interceptors, targeting radars and supporting equipment, would cost an additional $10 billion to operate over 20 years.
Russian Military Technology Lags Behind West -- Only 30% of Russia's military equipment is the technical equivalent of that of their Western counterparts, according to Anatoliy Sitnov, chief of armaments for the Russian armed forces. In a story in the Russian news service Itar-Tass, Sitnov is quoted as saying that the United States in particular is far ahead of Russia technologically. For example, "in terms of information science we are two generations or 10 years behind the United States."
IRA Begins Disarmament Talks -- The Irish Republican Army has announced that it has begun official disarmament talks with the independent international commission on disarmament led by retired Canadian General, John de Chastelain, as outlined by the Northern Ireland peace agreement. The negotiations come one week after the transfer of power from London to Belfast that took place under the Good Friday Peace Accord of 1998. Experts believe that the IRA has 2.7 tons of explosives, several missiles, 1.5 million rounds of ammunition, 600 handguns, and more than 1,000 other guns in its arsenals.
OSCE Establishes Working Group on Small Arms -- During its meetings in Istanbul in November, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) established a working group on small arms. The Forum on Security Cooperation also determined that a seminar must be convened in Vienna before the spring of 2000 to examine concrete measures concerning small arms and light weapons.
Russia, Belarus Strengthen Ties -- Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the President of Belarus Alyaksandr Lukashenka signed a treaty today forming a confederal Russian-Belarusan state. A Higher Council, comprising the presidents, prime ministers, and speakers of the legislatures of both countries, has been tasked with coordinate policies of the two countries.
This Week on America's Defense Monitor: "Human Rights: Universal and
Supreme?"
The Kosovo war marked the first time that a group of nations breached the borders of a sovereign country to stop human rights violations. As the rights of nations clash with the rights of individuals, who decides when and where to act? Human rights violations are not in short supply and TV is eager to cover them. Is Kosovo the first of a new kind of military operations or an isolated case?
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