The Center for Defense Information
Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW * Washington, DC 20036
(202)332-0600 * Fax (202)462-4559 * www.cdi.org
| December 2, 1999 |
| December 2, 1999 |
The Military's Plans to Dominate Space
Jeffrey Mason, Research Analyst/Librarian, jmason@cdi.org
Just as military establishments in previous centuries sought to dominate and control access to sea lanes, so today's militaries seek to dominate outer space. The role of space in recent conflicts was noted by Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan at a 1998 Air Force Association symposium: "Our space-based capabilities were instrumental in the execution of the campaign that dismantled Iraq's military capability... [and in] our operations in Bosnia [where] I can tell you that space systems were vital. They afforded us precision targeting, the capability to revisit those targets, to avoid collateral damage and contribute to the peace."
In the recent war in Kosovo, given the poor weather conditions in the first few weeks of the NATO bombing campaign, Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites were especially critical in guiding bombs and missiles to their targets.
U.S. and Russian dominance of outer space is declining as other nations acquire space-based capabilities. Thirty or more nations now possess significant space industries and eight countries have direct access to space through their own launch vehicles. The U.S. alone has over 200 commercial, civil, and military satellites in active operation with a combined value of over $100 billion.
Growing economic competition in space as well as traditional concerns about the military control of the exoatmospheric domain have prompted more -- and more definitive -- official U.S. statements on the uses of space. President Clinton's latest "National Security Strategy For A New Century" (October 1998) states, "Our policy is to promote development of the full range of space-based capabilities in a manner that protects our vital interests. We will deter threats to our interests in space and if deterrence fails, defeat hostile efforts against U.S. access to and use of space. We will also maintain the ability to counter space systems and services that could be used for hostile purposes against our ground, air, and naval forces, our command and control system, or other capabilities critical to our national security."
The Joint Chiefs of Staff's 1997 "National Military Strategy" similarly outlines U.S. space policy but with a more assertive tone: "It is becoming increasingly important to guarantee access to and use of space as part of joint operations and to protect U.S. interests. Space control capabilities will ensure freedom of action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries."
Where the U.S. is headed is well summarized in the U.S. Air Force's publication, "Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century." This document (and other recent Air Force doctrinal manuals) points to a forthcoming "transition of enormous importance" whose goal, in the words of Air Force Chief of Staff Ryan, "is to eventually evolve from an air and space force, which we call ourselves today, into a space and air force."
Another spokesman for this "transition," Air Force Historian Richard P. Hallion, recently wrote that "We must dominate the military space dimension and integrate space forces into our overall warfighting capabilities across the spectrum."
While this sounds benign enough, many observers such as Dr. Karl Grossman, Professor of Journalism at the State University of New York, insist that "space control" really means an increasingly dangerous, destabilizing militarization of outer space by U.S. armed forces. Dr. Grossman, in the 1996 Air Force Board Report "New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century," says: "A first option for force projection from space would capitalize on advances in large lightweight antenna technologies...which will enable space-based electro-magnetic weapons...to project very narrow beams with extremely high power density on airborne, surface, or space targets." The report elaborates on this point by discussing space-based high energy laser weapons and hypersonic precision-guided projectile weapons.
Most recently, in Spring 1999, the Defense Science Board's "Joint Operations Superiority in the 21st Century" identified advanced technologies needed for U.S. military operations in 2010 and beyond. Military capabilities in space were especially noteworthy. These include: two-stage ballistic-missile launched precision weapons for attacking high-value ground targets; GPS satellites used in conjunction with kinetic energy or conventional penetrator projectiles; a constellation of space-based lasers to provide global coverage and defense against hostile missile launches; and a fleet of space orbiting vehicles carrying rods of heavy material in highly elliptical orbits to re-enter and transit the atmosphere striking targets at hypersonic speeds (Mach 10 or 10,000 feet per second).
Perhaps, in part, to dampen increasing unease about planned military uses of space by the Pentagon, General Richard Myers, Commander-in-Chief of NORAD and U.S. Space Command, stated "There is no national policy to weaponize space. So our focus now is looking at the concept [of operations] and some of the basic technologies that would someday, if we're tasked by the national command authority, to go do that." Whatever his intent, Myers' statement provides little comfort, particularly since he added that the United States is only "a decade or two away from having a significant space force application capability." There can be little doubt, if the Pentagon has its way and the capabilities evolve, that the militarization of space will move from concept to reality.
Bulgaria's Arms Trafficking: An Issue Yet to Be Resolved
Annemarie van Berkel, Research Assistant, avberkel@cdi.org
On November 22, President Clinton visited Bulgaria, the first U.S. president ever to do so. During the visit, he praised Bulgaria's progress towards democracy and thanked the government for its support of NATO's air war against Yugoslavia. However, the President carefully stepped around a troubling issue: Bulgaria's trade in weapons.
In the last decade, Bulgaria supplied weapons to armed forces in Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Angola, and Rwanda, all of which are embroiled in conflicts. While selling to countries at war is regulated under non-binding codes governing arms exports, selling to countries under UN embargoes or multilateral sanctions is illegal under international law. State-owned arms trading firms in Bulgaria -- particularly Kintex and Armimex -- dominate the field, but some arms transfers, both legal or illegal, occur outside the control of these firms.
These arms exports are Bulgaria's response to falling sales to traditional customers. During the Cold War, Bulgaria supplied weapons to communist governments and sub-national groups all over the world. The end of the Cold War hit this trade hard. As did many countries around the world (including the U.S.), Bulgaria turned to arms sale to maintain jobs, keep the arms production lines open, and bring in necessary hard currencies.
At the same time, Bulgaria has taken some important steps toward reforms designed to control its arms sales. In July 1996, it signed the Wassenaar Agreement which seeks to promote transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technology. Participating states agree, through national legislation and policies, not to transfer weapons and technologies that might contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities, or that might be diverted to support such capabilities. The new Bulgarian government elected in April 1997 said it intended to implement a "responsible" arms trade policy, and in August 1998, together with twelve other non-European Union (EU) members, Bulgaria agreed to abide by the European Union's (EU) Code of Arms Exports. The Code lists export criteria to guide decisions to grant or refuse an application for an arms export license. Bulgaria's agreement to abide by the Code may be driven by its aspiration to join NATO and the EU. Bulgaria hopes to improve its chances for gaining entry into NATO and the EU by demonstrating it is a "good citizen."
Nonetheless, Bulgaria's weapons trade continues. Its domestic legislation has yet to incorporate international regulations to which the country has committed itself. At the same time, regulatory enforcement is poor and incentives to export are strong. The surplus of weapons resulting from military modernization -- a requirement for NATO entry -- is being dumped on the open market. Although this drives down prices, earnings are still higher than what they would be if the weapons surplus were merely destroyed.
Another problem is widespread corruption. In February 1998, the British private military company Sandline International shipped weapons from Bulgaria through Nigeria to Sierra Leone, in violation of an existing regional embargo. The Bulgarian government issued a denial of complicity, saying that the arms were sold to Nigeria for use by that nation's armed forces. The truth may never be established, but arms dealers based in one country can often avoid national controls and export restrictions by buying weapons in a second country for delivery in a third country. Bulgaria, however, also sells directly to countries fighting wars. In late 1998, Uganda received Bulgarian tanks, which Uganda could use against rebels in its own civil war, send to support the fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo, or divert to Uganda-supported rebels in Sudan and Angola. The tank sales are legal, but contradict Bulgaria's pledges to exercise restraint in its arms exports. Ethiopia and Eritrea also have been frantically buying Bulgarian weapons since their conflict broke out last May.
The serious economic crisis that hit Bulgaria in 1996-1997 has added to the pressure for increased arms sales. As part of its response, the government announced plans to privatize the arms industry (among others), which will make export regulation even harder unless state agencies implement (and enforce) a reliable licensing system. The privatization is expected to be finished by mid 2000.
Bulgarian authorities are in the process of drafting new arms trade legislation. But whether the government will be able to control private weapons exporters any better than it controlled the state-owned defense firms is highly questionable.
We Can Rely on Allies
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, dsmith@cdi.org
The complaints from U.S. officials that our NATO allies did not pull their weight during the 78-day Kosovo air campaign made headlines. The lack of secure communications links in aircraft operated by Europeans and shortfalls in aerial refueling assets and precision guided weapons were highlighted on more than one occasion. It was almost enough to give credence to the Pentagon's original statement about its Major Theater War (MTW) scenario: that the U.S. must be able to fight and win two nearly simultaneous MTWs without support from allies.
Almost, but not quite.
Once again, the General Accounting Office (GAO) has produced a report [NATO: Progress Toward More Mobile and Deployable Forces, NSIAD-99-229] that validates a healthy skepticism about the Pentagon's formulation.
Key to the GAO study is the process -- largely ignored even by the military-oriented trade press -- by which NATO establishes force structure goals for each of the nations. National force contributions are based on mission scenarios to which NATO must be able to respond, the forces each nation was asked to provide in the past, and what each should be able to contribute in the future. Specifically, "force requirements are based on what a country could be expected to contribute and additional requirements that represent a fair and reasonable challenge to the country above and beyond the requirements in its national plan."
Throughout the Cold War the main operational concept driving the evolution of military forces of the Europeans was territorial defense -- resisting a major land invasion by the Warsaw Pact until reserves could be mustered and the full weight of the U.S. and Canadian forces brought to bear. Thus elemental geography dictated a different emphasis in military forces: North American forces needed a much greater degree of mobility to get to the war theater whereas the Europeans would be in the soup from the start. For them, strategic flexibility mobility was not a priority; operational and tactical mobility.
But in 1991, NATO revised its strategic concept, moving from an exclusive orientation against a massive ground assault by the Warsaw Pact to a more flexible posture that would enable it to respond to a more diverse set of contingencies. In April of this year NATO extended its range of "contingencies" to include transnational problems such as international crime, drugs, and other activities whose effects could undermine European stability. Together the 1991 and 1999 changes dictated that the European allies would now have to be more mobile and agile in the strategic sense if they were to pull their weight.
Weight, in the literal sense, was one element the military in all NATO countries, including the United States, had to face. Heavy tanks and artillery were essential in warding off the Warsaw Pact. But the recent deployments into Bosnia and Kosovo have shown they are less than useful in developing countries when peacekeeping or conflict prevention is the order of the day. (Indeed, the U.S. Army is only now beginning to seriously rethink the utility of a 70 ton tank and a 100 ton heavy artillery piece.) Consequently, the Europeans are embarking on a major effort to build a rapid reaction force that will be capable of getting 50,000 troops to any area on Europe's periphery within 60 days and be sustainable for as long as two years.
Directly related to the weight problem are "lift" -- air and sea -- and the capability to refuel aircraft, thereby extending ranges. Troops can be moved faster if they are lighter, requiring fewer transports and, for airplanes, reducing refueling requirements.
Taking these factors into account, the GAO's conclusion is that NATO allies (other than Poland, The Czech Republic, and Hungary, who just joined NATO), are generally able to meet the "reasonable challenges" that might confront the alliance in the future. On the basis of ten indicators, the GAO found that the allies have "become more mobile and deployable as envisioned by the strategic concept." Furthermore, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg agreed to blend their assets for peace support operations under the aegis of the United Nations, The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, NATO, or the Western European Union (or its possible successor under the new European Defense and Security structure).
In short, however one regards the wisdom of widening NATO's strategic concept, European nations are improving their ability to contribute assets that underpin and support the more probable missions that will confront the alliance in the future. The increased integration of various European defense industries, notably the four-nation Airbus consortium, will bolster the European contribution -- and perhaps allow Europe to act on its own if the U.S. is disinclined to participate in a mission.
"Putting more Europe into NATO" opens the way for the U.S. to reposition more forces at home ready to response to crises before they mushroom into heavy fighting. As with the Europeans, this will require the Pentagon to reevaluate sealift, airlift, and aerial refueling requirements to permit timely response. At the same time, trusting Europe to carry more of the load would reduce the operations tempo of U.S. forces, improve quality of life and esprit, and save billions in operations and maintenance and procurement costs. Not a bad bargain.
Changes Planned for School of the Americas
By Rachel Stohl, Research Analyst, rstohl@cdi.org
After years of controversy and protests by individuals, organizations, and Members of Congress, the Secretary of the Army, Louis Caldera, has announced the School of the Americas, headquartered at Fort Benning, GA, will "reopen" next spring with significant changes.
The school will henceforth be known as the Center for Inter-American Security Cooperation. Army officials said they plan on using the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany as a model for the Center's activities, which of late have focused on "combating drug traffickers and coping with natural disasters." (The Marshall Center was created in 1993 to help with the democratic transition of militaries from Eastern European nations.)
Changes to the Ft. Benning school will go far beyond adjustments in nomenclature. Caldera announced that pending approval by the Pentagon and Congress, the school will add more civilians to the teaching staff, providing a "different perspective to security issues." Central and South American political and civilian leaders will be invited to attend the Center. Further, some military courses such as commando training will be dropped and courses in military justice and international law will be substituted. The Army says these changes are in response to the changed security needs brought about by the end of the Cold War.
Although the school's annual budget is small, just $4 million a year, its effects have been significant in the Americas. Army officials claim that the school "gives the United States a chance to inculcate democratic values to rising stars in Latin American militaries." Over 60,000 soldiers and officers from 22 nations have been trained at the school, which first opened in Panama in 1946 and moved to Fort Benning in 1984.
Critics maintain that the school trains human rights abusers and thereby undermines the rights of citizens in many Central and South American countries. Some of the most notorious and egregious human rights abusers in Central and South America have graduated from or attended the School of the Americas. Infamous alumni include 19 of the 26 Salvador soldiers that murdered six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter in 1989, a Guatemalan colonel linked to the killing of an American innkeeper in 1990, and General Manuel Noriega, the former President of Panama. Further angering the School's opponents was the revelation by the Pentagon in 1991 that the school's training manuals referenced torture, blackmail, and "neutralizing" insurgents.
The School of the Americas is just one of the Department of Defense's regional training centers aimed at"establishing better military ties around the world." Besides the Marshall Center, DoD maintains the Asia-Pacific Center in Honolulu and has recently added the African Center for Strategic Studies, currently headquartered in Dakar, Senegal.
There is no way to know in advance if Caldera's plan will bring the much needed changes to the School of the Americas, or if these proposals will be implemented and accepted by the military. Further, it is not clear the real focus of the school has been altered. The school will still provide combat training to units that specialize in fighting drug traffickers, training that could equally be employed against innocent civilians.
If the Center continues to emphasize military training, then human rights and the rule of law must be stressed in the Center's curriculum. Concurrently, U.S. officials should continue to carefully screen individuals and units for any past abuses of human rights before they are accepted by the Center.
While encouraging democracy and stressing civilian control of the military are important concepts for this hemisphere, the quest to educate our Central and South American partners need not focus on counter-insurgency or other military training. Representative Joe Moakley (D-MA), a strong opponent of the School's program, said in a recent Washington Post interview that the United States should devote resources to Latin America for programs that strengthen judicial systems or other democratic institutions, rather than their militaries. "You can't teach democracy through the barrel of a gun."
The United States has significant security interests in helping Central and South America. Rather than encouraging Central and South American nations to waste precious resources on unnecessary defense and military items, we should encourage them to rebuild their civil societies and governmental institutions. This way both we and they will achieve stability and prosperity throughout the hemisphere.
Togo to Host UN Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament -- The United Nations has reached a formal agreement with the West African nation of Togo to host the UN Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. The Center was actually created 10 years ago, but the agreement had not been formalized. UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament, Jayantha Dhanapala, said the agreement, "reflects the renewed importance of regional disarmament." The Center is based in Lome.
UN Peacekeepers Arrive in Sierra Leone -- The first UN peacekeepers, 130 Kenyans, arrived in Sierra Leone this week, signaling the beginning of the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Sierra Leone. The total force, scheduled to arrive in the next few weeks will number 3,000.
Last U.S. Base in Panama Turned Over -- The last U.S. military base in the Panama Canal Zone was turned over to the Panamanian government earlier this week. The U.S. Army's departure from Fort Clayton, which is on the Pacific end of the canal, ends the 88 year U.S. military presence in the country. It is the last of 14 bases to be handed over to Panama since 1979 as part of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty. The final handover of the canal to Panama is set to take place on December 31.
C-17 Unable to Drop Paratroop Units Quickly Enough -- An ongoing problem with the C-17 transport aircraft makes it impossible for C-17 to drop paratroopers into combat fast enough to prevent them from being destroyed on the ground by enemy forces. The large transports create so much turbulence that the aircraft have to fly with large distances between them. This, coupled with an electronics system that limits the number of aircraft in a single formation makes it impossible for the C-17 to meet the Army's requirement to be able to airdrop a brigade within 30 minutes. According to the military the problem will take an addition two years to correct.
Russia Increasingly Reliant on Nukes -- In a sign of the continued poor condition of their conventional forces, Russia's commander of strategic missile forces says that the country will have to rely on its nuclear forces as a deterrent for at least another decade. Col. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev was quoted by the Interfax news agency as saying "Potentially dangerous states and alliances" now have greater conventional capabilities than Russia. He advocated spending at least one quarter of the country's military budget on strategic forces.
U.S. Asks Japan to Shut Waste Facility -- Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre has asked Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono to close a waste disposal facility near a U.S. naval base. The facility, located near the Atsugi Naval Air Station, is releasing high levels of dioxins, which are carcinogens. A joint U.S.-Japan study conducted this summer found the dioxin levels in the area near the base to be almost ten times the levels considered acceptable by the Japanese government.
This week on America's Defense Monitor: "Anti-personnel Land Mines: A
Double-edged Sword?"
The U.S. military insists that it needs land mines to protect tanks and "channelize" potential enemies in places like Korea. Many think there are other systems available that can perform these missions without the human costs of land mines. What are these systems and will they spur Congress to adopt the Treaty to ban land mines?
Airs in Washington, DC on Sunday, December 5 at 10:30 AM on Channel 32.
Airs in NYC on Friday, December 10 on Channel 25 at 8:30 PM, and on
Saturday, December 11 at 7:00 AM on Channel 13.
For air dates in other cities, check your local listings.
Visit our website for transcripts, CDI resources, and related links.
E-mail adminfo@cdi.org with "subscribe" in the subject line for updates
on new videos.
Regular Price: $39 each
INTERNET PRICE: $29
Order at 800-CDI-3334, or on the web.